R³ White Paper - Supporting Documentation

Note: This is intended to be documentation to support the R³ white paper. It needs to be re-ordered to align with the four subject areas defined by the paper:# The public interest# The growing complexity of governance# Why has it been so difficult to implement ICANN’s multi-stakeholder model (MSM)?# Institutional and practical cooperation:

This is a draft document and not for public distribution

DO NOT COPY OR REDISTRIBUTE THIS OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP AT THIS TIME.

Release 0.010

February 24, 2012

Authors:
Evan Leibovitch, Carlton Samuels, Jean-Jacques Subrenat, Yrjö Lansipuro, Hong Xue

1. Background

1.1 External threats (to ICANN governance)

• State authorities catching up on the Internet
  [ detail India proposal for Internet governance body at UN, India/SouthAfrica move at IGF ]
  From its inception, ICANN was meant to operate according to an innovative model of governance, based on equivalent duties and responsibilities for all stakeholders, including state authorities (“governments”) represented in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC).
  In the first decade of ICANN’s history, state authorities demonstrated an unequal degree of interest in the GAC, but most have become aware of what is at stake, and are now engaged in a debate about their role, with particular emphasis on public policy.
  In this debate, some countries have articulated specific proposals aimed at strengthening the role of states in ICANN. The most recent, proposed by India /provide references/, calls for the setting up of an international body under the aegis of the UN, which would be the ultimate locus of decision in matters of Internet governance.
  In ICANN’s historic and current structure, the role of states is “advisory”, whereas the proposal by India, and others, would aim at placing them above the other stakeholders, thus initiating a complete departure from the very principles on which the multi-stakeholder model is built.
  Some states, aware of having given insufficient attention to Internet matters in general, and to their own representation in the GAC, are now tempted to make up for lost time by proposing or supporting models which would allow them to demonstrate to their population how involved they are, even at the cost of jeopardizing the multi-stakeholder model.

• The dilemma of states, between laisser faire and interventionism  (JJS)
  [ refer to ITU activity, Russian complaints, Strickling scoldings ]
  [ Why did ICANN need to “affirm its committments”? Who else has ever needed to do that? ]
  In trying to compensate for past indifference or neglect towards Internet matters, a number of states are now reasserting the primacy of the inter-governmental model they are most comfortable with. For some states, the easy way out is to designate an existing inter-governmental body, such as the ITU in Geneva. In this regard, the position of the USA seems to have become ambiguous.
  Why did Washington engineer an “Affirmation of Commitments” (AoC) with ICANN? Was Washington afraid that other governments might want to hand over Internet governance to an inter-governmental agency which would jeopardize the multi-stakeholder system? Was it just a way of extending the previous “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) between the US and ICANN, in a way that softly re-asserted Washington’s oversight?
  Implementing the right model is of importance not only in Internet governance. Some of the major challenges of our time require exactly the multi-stakeholder approach on which ICANN was built, in order to spare our ecosystem and to ensure the sustainability of human activity. The recent international conference on Climate Change (COP-17 in Durban, 5-9 December 2011) was a case in point, and it is the failure of some states to acknowledge the scientific evidence that delivered a mediocre result. In this sense, the Internet has evolved into a structure analogous to our planet’s ecosystem: it is pervasive, and each of its components has an impact on all the others. It is striking to note to what extent some national positions are over-determined by financial and industrial interests, whereas the challenges we face are of greater magnitude than those interests, and deserve a longer-term view. On Climate Change, with Obama as President, the United States (and indeed Canada) are now defending positions on which even China has evolved. On freedom of speech and the protection of human rights on the Internet, the Patriot Act and other features of Homeland Security now place the USA in the same category as Russia, China, Iran...

• • The difficult relationship between ICANN and its own governmental advisory board has long been evident, but came to a (very piublic) head during an emergency meeting held in Brussels June 2011 between the GAC and the ICANN Board, a meeting characterized by some as “marred by name-calling and disagreement”#. A “scorecard” outlining governmental problems with the gTLD program was only partially addressed. Indeed, the very nature of the meetings -- having bilateral talks with the GAC as opposed to having governments as an integral part of cross-community policy design -- led to solutions that disappointed most.
    This relationship remains fragile. The Board explicitly rejected the GAC (along with ALAC) explicitly and directly calling for fee reductions for qualified TLD applicants from lesser developed economies. In its place, the ICANN Board insisted upon its staff’s own formula (never initiated or supported by any stakeholder group) of having needy applicants compete against each other for support from a fixed fund.
    GAC concerns about the need for better involvement of law enforcement related to public protection in matters related to ICANN have been resisted by the domain industry, as witnessed by the curt and argumentative exchanges on the issue during the GAC / GNSO meeting held at the Dakar ICANN conferece in late 2011#.
  • ICANN’s stewardship over the domain name system has already started to see seen its first private sector challenges. After initially denying the request for an .XXX top-level domain, an independent review (launched in response to a complaint by the .XXX applicant) indicated that ICANN broke its own rules in the rejection#. Fearing a subsequent lawsuit by the applicant, ICANN approved the domain and is now the subject of multiple lawsuits from within the industry intended to be served bt the .XXX domain#.
    As well, the Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse (CADNA), supported by major advertisers and brands has been a major critic of the new gTLD program, has made representations against the program before the US Congress, and called for a full-scale audit of ICANN’s decision making processes#. It has hinted about the possibility of legal action to stop the launch of the program.

1.2 Threats to the relevance of the DNS

Most of ICANN’s documentation about “competition” and diversity of choices are limited to that within ICANN’s sphere; numbers of registrants, variations in domains and how to sell them, and similar factors. But these choices and innovations are only relevant to domain buyers (registrants) and have no relevance to how end-users interface with the Internet.

We suggest that the choice for end users is not “which domains to use” (because the end-user rarely has a choice of that kind) but rather “whether to use domains at all”. In the past decade a number of innovations and techniques have become available to Internet end-users which allow them to completely bypass the need to find Internet content

• Search Engines: Google, Bing, and a number of other general and specialized search and portal sites will allow users to enter the name of a destination (company, place, individual) and find matches. The engine supplies sufficient detail to enable the user to find the appropriate destination regardless of its domain name, or if multiple choices exist. Cybersquatting is virtually eliminated for users who get to sites using this method; misspellings are usually pointed out to the user rather than sending them to “typosquatting” sites, and dangerous sites are flagged or removed
• Web browsers: Incorporating the search engine advantages listed above, both Firefox and Internet Explorer have integrated search engine windows right next to where one would type in a domain name. In Chrome the two are integrated into a single window, so a user need not know the domain of a destination to get there
• URL shortening services: Thanks to these relatively new services, a user need only remember a single domain name (usually very short ones such as “bit.ly” or “goo.gl”) and a code that could be either meaningless or completely descriptive (ie,  bit.ly/companyname)
• Social Media: Most Internet users now need go no further than a single domain to get to most of the Internet content they need: facebook.com. This, along with other social media sites such as Twitter, Google+ and Linkedin, enables end users to find the destinations they want through personal and organizational “home pages” on these sites. Often these sites verify identity for high-profile members, which instills more end-user trust than ICANN’s lax WHOIS system.
  Indeed, both Facebook and Twitter have enabled provided mechanisms by which individuals and companies (Facebook only) can “verify” their accounts. Such verification measures enable users to distinguish “official” sites without preventing fans and critics to offer their own onofficial forum areas. Such mesures, which are provided free of charge and reasonably easy to implement, offer a level of security to individuals and trademark owners while maintaining freedom of comment and end-user trust in the ability to quickly distinguish between primary sites and unofficial ones. There is much for ICANN to learn from these methods from the point of view of enhancing trust of information providers as well as end-users.
• Transition to mobile: As conventional cellphones are increasingly replaced by smartphones with browsing capability, newer methods are used to access web services without any end-user knowldge of the web domains being used. QR codes can be scanned from printed materials, and hundreds of thousands of standalone software applications make use of the Internet without the end-user ever needing to know a domain.
• The Wikileaks case: When Julian Assange made public what turned out to be the largest trove of classified raw material in modern times, the federal authorities in the USA reacted swiftly, condemning the exposure, warning students and military personnel that consulting Wikileaks could lead to prosecution, and blocking access to the website www.wikileaks.org . To counter this act of censorship, many individuals created and posted “mirror” sites on which Wikileaks could be consulted (e.g. www.wikileaks.ch ), with the hope that multiple replication would protect the project against authoritarian removal. Indeed, at one point when wikileaks Internet domains were being blocked by govrenments, organizers encouraged the public to access the site through its IP address, bypassing the domain name service completely. The influence of Wikileaks cannot be overstated, when considering the role it played in documenting the plutocratic practices rampant in, say, the Middle East, and which in turn encouraged activists using social media, who thus bypassed the constraints of the DNS in launching the “Arab Spring”.

1.3 Internal threats

• Reduced growth of volunteer communities
  After an initial growth spurt, interest in ICANN from volunteer communities (that is, those with neither direct nor indirect financial interest in domain-based transactions) is waning. The number of new At-Large Structures joining is only a few per year -- in part thanks to a major reduction in ICANN outreach programs, but also because existing volunteers have felt excluded from the decision-making process. (That is, they must be part of a four-level At-Large infrastrcuture which itself has only advisory capacity through ALAC and has extreme difficulty getting heard (let alone heeded).
  In addition, some organizations wanting to become more fully part of the policy-making process are being shut out. The U.S. Olympic Committee, was refused entry to the Non-Commercial Stakeholders Group of GNSO because its “perspective” was seen by existing NCSG members as too commercially oriented.  Being that the USOC -- regardless of its perspective -- is a non-profit entity, such a refusal indicates obstacles to new ideas that may be threatening to the status quo. Keeping such bodies out of the decision-making process only enforces perceptions of ICANN being controlled by an elite group, resisting “contamination” with unorthodox views.
• Disenfranchised stakeholders
  [TBA]
• Staff turnover as an indicator of cohesiveness
  The current CEO of ICANN has on several occasions countered allegations that staff turnover was unusually high on his watch, by producing tables and figures. Yet many in the ICANN community believe that, as a result of some management choices and style, the cohesiveness within the organization has been eroded. Grievances point at the creation by the CEO of an additional office in California, close to his home; his subsequent absence from ICANN headquarters; the formation of a coterie around the CEO; and significant areas, including international and public relations, being entrusted to personal advisors, with questionable results.
  What is also at stake is the way in which the ICANN Board, and foremost its Chair as the natural interlocutor of the CEO, failed to exercise proper oversight over a substantial period (e.g. when the CEO informed the Board that one of the most senior members of ICANN’s leadership was resigning, barely before the news was out; Directors were dismayed that there had been no prior consultation between the Chair and the CEO).

• ATRT breaches
  [TBA]
• Reduced morale (and willingness to defend the MSM)
  [TBA]

1.4 Crisis of Credibility

• Conflicts of Interest
  The rapid career change of the Board Chair towards a consultancy for registry parties -- immediately after pushing through a Board vote that will directly benefit his new employer -- may not violate any internal ICANN rules. However, it caused shock within the greater comnmunity and called ICANN’s reputation as a legitimate steward into question. Current practise throughout the policy making processes enables vested interests to actively influence outcomes as long as their interest is declared and made available publicly.
  Indeed, in contract negotiations between ICANN and domain registrars, the registrars (as a major component of the contract-development mechanism iof ICANN) “sit on both sides of the table”. The Vice President of ICANN has said, in testimony to the US Congress, that he must consult with registrars before implimenting a policy recommendation. And while most ICANN meetings are open to the public, a select series of meetings with registrars is closed.
  We note that registrars and registries do not have an independent trade association to  represent their interests within ICANN. The argument has been made that such a trade group is unnecessary because ICANN itself serves such a purpose.
  When this apparent level of control is coupled with ICANN’s poor track record of enforcing its regulations with registries and registrars, and why it tolerates inaccurate WHOIS and other record, the result is a very poor public perception of ICANN as a trustworthy independent agent of governance.

• Failure to be seen as a steward of the public interest.
  Steering ICANN has never been simple. Many in the domain name business (who prefer the term “industry”) argue that although their companies provide the largest part of ICANN’s budget, they have to accept the highly constraining process of a multi-stakeholder structure. Most in the At-Large community consider, on the contrary, that ICANN’s budget is provided for by users worldwide, so that registries and registrars, most of them in affluent countries, are simply intermediaries who take their due on the way, often with huge profit. Objectively, this complexity of the ICANN ecosystem makes it sometimes difficult to reconcile divergent views.
  ICANN, in its ambition to become truly international, should prove, through its action and discourse, that  indeed it considers itself the steward of the public interest.

• Lawsuits and more lawsuits
• What works is threatened by what’s broken

2. Causes/Analysis

2.1 Basics of the issues:

[ This section probably has to be merged into the others, it's redundant ]

• Primary versus secondary stakeholders
  ICANN has clearly established itself as supporting the needs and priorities of the domain industry (Domain operators, registrars, resellers and consultants) over those of the general public which is not involved in the domain name trade.
  The very structors of its “supporting organizations” are limited to the creators, sellers and buyers of domains.
  [ More TBA ]
• What is the “public interest”
  A debate has recently been launched about ICANN’s commitment to upholding the public interest, as was recommended in the document on “Improving Institutional Confidence” [provide reference], and later enshrined in the “Affirmation of Commitments” [provide reference]. Those who fear that this might somehow stint business opportunities, are now questioning the very notion of “the public interest”, and are resorting to the tactic of demanding its legal definition. And indeed, the difficulty in providing a single definition acceptable to all stakeholders is a convenient tool for procrastination. This demand for definition is reminiscent of the delaying tactics regarding new gTLDs, when some large incumbents, anxious to avoid any disruption to their acquired dominance, argued that additional “economic studies” were required before any step forward. Their views, and business interests, were ably relayed by some politicians at a federal level in the USA.
  If ICANN is to become a truly international entity, providing for an ever wider diversity of users, usages and cultures, it must evolve beyond its US origins to engage the world. But trends are pointing the other way: there is a growing discrepancy between a small number of (largely US) dominant players in the domain name business, and the unfolding reality of billions of Internet users who are emerging mainly in Asia, Africa, the Middle East. If the US were to implement the SOPA draft legislation, its fallout would be felt not only in the US, as countless individuals, communities and businesses around the world would be adversely affected. The rationale behind SOPA is preposterous: what the US will decide, the world shall implement.

• Do domains “add value” to the Internet
  [TBA]
• Commodity versus identity
  [TBA]
• Diversity versus confusion
  [TBA] 

2.2 Consequences of misunderstanding “consumer trust”

Much is made within ICANN about enhancing “consumer trust”, the phrase is used eight times in its Affirmation of Commitments#. However, ICANN has through its actions has a demonstrated track record of inaction in gaining the trust of the global Internet end-user:

ICANN remains ambiguous regarding whether its definition refers to Internet end-users (meaning consumers who view and create content, and perform various other transactions over the Internet) and ICANN’s own consumers (that is, those who buy domains and are therefore the source of ICANN’s revenue).

Various statements by ICANN officials and community members have indicated that both definitions are commonly used, making real evaluation difficult since the goals are so different. However, recent efforts such as the Consumer Metrics Drafting Team have indicated an perfered emphasis on ICANN’s own consumers by seeking to evaluate diversity among sellers of domains (registrars and registries). Such metrics certainly matter to domain buyers (registrants) but are irrelevant to the end-user who has no interest in domain name ownership.

Frequently, when the issue of public interest is raised, industry sources demands for detailed definitons of “what is the public interest” have distracted and usually diffused any real engagement on the issues related to end-users#.

In its concentration on its own consumers -- and bypassing evaluation of the needs of end-users who don’t buy domains -- ICANN has done a major disservice to the global community outside its own vested interests. This paper will attempt to identify the issues that do matter to the public, issues that ICANN must address directly if it is to truly hold to its commitment to uphold and indeed improve consumer trust.

• ICANN gets it right in areas of little financial interest
  In certain technical areas of securing the stability of the Internet, ICANN has done excellent work. Its Stability and Security Working Group is notable for the efficiency and quality of its output, due to the lack of  interferance by ICANN’s traditional vested interests. ICANN is at its best when tackling such technical standards in forums of little direct financial interest to its stakeholders.
• “Trust” is not the same as “choice”, “competition” or “innovation”
  All too often in ICANN contexts, “consumer trust” is mentioned together with, seemingly interchagably, “consumer choice”, competition and innovation. We believe that the ICANN’s ability to actually engender trust amongst Internet end users is adversely affected by its inability (or unwillingness) to separate these individual concepts. Indeed, the concepts of “competition” and “innovation”, while generally valuable, in a consumer context indicate a supplier-biased perspective that is not useful. Indeed, even the concept of “consumer choice” cannot be linked to “trust”, for a broad diversity of choices does not guarantee that all choices -- or any -- are necessarily trustworthy. The mere provision of innovation, by itself, does not ensure or improve trust if the innovation exists simply to increase revenue or offer features that end users find unhelpful, misleading or confusing.
• WHOIS accuracy is a matter of consumer trust
  When WHOIS data is incorrect -- especially if it is perceived to be deliberately incorrect or obfuscated -- the entire reputation of ICANN, and the trustworthiness of the DNS, is impacted. ICANN’s lack of vigor in ensuring correct WHOIS data, while irrelevant (or in some cases beneficial) to registrars and registrants, indicates an unwillingness to enforce its rules and makes domain addresses less trusted than other ways for end-users to find Internet content

There are many circumstances that may lead consumers to need to know the contact information for an Internet domain:

• • Fraudulent or otherwise illegal activity
  • A need to undo or modify a transaction
  • Conventional customer service
  • Spam or other unsolicited communications originating at the domain
  • Comments about offensive content
  • Compliments about praiseworthy content
  • Warnings of possible security-related news
  • Breach of ICANN or registry rules

• The disjoint between countries and ccTLDs
  [TBA]
• New gTLDs
  [TBA]
• Treatment of the JAS group recommendations
  [TBA]
• Marketing of defensive domains
  [TBA]

2.3 Different classes of stakeholders

By design, the initiators and primary developers of ICANN policy on its most high-profile activities (the GNSO) is essentially a compact comprised of domain buyers, domain sellers and service providers:

• Registries (top level domain operators)
• Registrars (first-level sellers of domain names)
• Resellers (in ICANN parliance, sub-agents of registrars who are unregulated by ICANN
• Internet Service Providers
• Commercial Domain Buyers
• Non-commercial domain buyers

It is this body -- generally concerned with maximizing revenue from the creation, sale and propagation of as many domains as possible, while protecting the privacy interests from domain buyers (and Internet content providers) interested in hiding from public view#. It is this same policy-making body that has recommended a massive expansion of many hundreds of new gTLDs compared to the 22 available now. This expansion -- complete with a fully formed timetable -- is already underway, despite substantial concerns that ICANN is not even enforcing the regulations existing for the 22, and a number of significant implementation details (objection processes, facilities for applicants in developing economies, etc).

ICANN’s dependence on a business model based on high-volume, low cost Internet domains has made it dependent on the “domain industry” -- the very industry that it is charged with regulating.

With regard to country code top-level domains the situation is even worse. ICANN has little authority on country-code administratorsm due to the casual and irreverent manner in which they were originally assigned. Participation by these bodies within ICANN is optional, so ICANN does little about them beyond helping them sell more domains through better contact with domain sellers and service providers. The ccNSO, has even less governance and multi-stakehoder participation than the gNSO.

In this structure, the two bodies created by ICANN to represent the public interest -- the “at-large community” and governments -- are relegated to “advisory committees”. They react to what the policy making bodies produce, usually affecting said policy only slightly at best.

The reactionary nature of the advisory committee activities lead to the public interest, at best, being added onto ICANN policy as an afterthough rather than embedded into its core design phases. This need for such length band-aid efforts such as the supplemental working groups on Applicant Support, Objection procedures and trademark issues have caused needless delay without clearly asserting the public interest to the satisfaction of the government and at-large constituencies.

Indeed, ICANN has only responded in earnest to the Government Advisory Body when threatened with its very legitimacy, which governments are able to eliminate; and even so its advice is usually adversarial and after-the-fact. And the vast majority of advice given by the At-Large Advisory Committee remains unheeded; an alarming amount of its work has not even been acknowledged to have been received, let alone considered.

2.4 A "Nominating Committee" that doesn't nominate

Institutions thrive on ambiguity, and ICANN is no exception: although the NomCom performs the essential task of vetting and selecting candidates, the actual appointment of individuals to the Board, to Advisory Councils (ACs) and Supporting Organizations (SOs) is enacted in a Board Resolution. The current process is not without fault, in terms of accountability, transparency and the ability to resist “capture”:

- In ICANN, the Board Governance Committee (BGC) has acquired a position which, in fact, places it above the other Board Committees. The BGC, acting on its own judgment, is free in proposing how to populate the various Board Committees, and submits to the Board its candidate for Chair of each Committee. This seemingly neat solution has some serious flaws: the BGC itself is populated by a process which, for lack of transparency, is not free from capture by special interests; the criteria used by the BGC in selecting the candidate for NomCom Chair (or Chair of any other Board Committee) are not made public, nor are reasons provided for its choice; the most likely outcome is for  the Board to simply confirm the proposal of the BGC, if only to avoid embarrassment among colleagues.

- Some in the ICANN community consider that, as a matter of principle, the Chair of the NomCom should not be selected among parties with a potential conflict of interest. In fact, they are concerned that the appointment of the 2012-13 Chair, who comes from the domain name industry, sends the unfortunate signal that ICANN is beholden to that segment of its stakeholders, instead of serving the wider public interest (it must be noted here that the argument is not about that or any other individual’s worth or character, but about the necessity of avoiding any potential conflict of interest, and perception thereof, in the first place).

2.5 The travelling circus that is ICANN meetings

[TBA]

2.6 Systemic Challenges

• The ICANN Board’s fiduciary duty
  The issue of fiduciary duty is core to the operations of the Board, and in ICANN it is problematic. The main duty of ICANN directors is to ICANN itself, not to the public interest.# Such an inference would cause ICANN to engage in practices which provide the greatest amounts of revenue (and revenue stabiliy), even if doing so results in practices with consequences that may adversely affect end users, law enforcement, and other constituencies not directly represented within ICANN.
• The ICANN Board’s composition and conflicts of interest
  The Board is so full of such conflicts, that nearly half of the Board’s members needed to recuse themselves from voting on a resolution assisting access to TLDs in developing economies. Such a large proportion of the Board declaring itself ineligible to vote on such a major issue indicates severe shortcomings in the current regime that populates the Board. How can ICANN pretend to the world that it represents the public interest when so many of its own Board self-identify with the domain-name industry?

• Systemic bias towards the domain industry
  [TBA - maybe redundant with 2.3? ]

• Empire building and expansionism
  [TBA]
• Institutionalized silos
  [TBA]
• Internet colonialism
  [TBA]

3. Proposed Remedies

[ need major cleanup ]

3.1 Core bylaw changes

•  Eliminate distinctions between “advisors” and “policy makers”

3.2 Structural changes

• The Board should strive to be the “executive committee of the community”
• The Board provides direction and oversight; the CEO proposes, implements and controls
  As a guide to future action, lessons must be learned from recent difficulties:
  - The Board must ensure that the search for the next CEO will be conducted in a transparent and fair way, as called for in a letter to the Chair from ten “friends of ICANN” from various countries (in November 2011, the Board did indeed start implementing these recommendations).
  - The Board, through its Chair, must exercise adequate oversight over the CEO, not through micro-management, but in making sure that the main areas of responsibility are well discharged. Reporting by the CEO to the Board is an indisputable obligation.
  - The CEO being seated as a voting Board member creates unnecessary ambiguity, as his/her employment, salary and benefits are entirely “at the pleasure” of the Board. The CEO should be invited to attend Board meetings as a matter of course, but membership on the Board is not in line with best practices worldwide, and is not dictated by necessity. The By-laws should be amended to this effect.

• From Nominating Committee (NomCom) to Selection Committee (SelCom)
  As ICANN enters its second decade, a few modifications would enhance the transparency and credibility of its process of recruiting for volunteer positions:

- To be entirely credible, the process of appointment of the NomCom Chair requires, upstream, a normalization of the BGC (selection process to the BGC and other Committees).
- The stability and effectiveness of the ICANN ecosystem rests on a delicate balance among stakeholders. Because of this, members of the Board proposed by the NomCom should not have, even potentially, a conflict of interest in serving the public interest, as opposed to corporate or other narrower interests. The NomCom pre-selects and selects; it does not in fact nominate or appoint.
- In selecting the Chair of the NomCom, the BGC (or whatever entity has the task of submitting the short list of candidates) should refrain from selecting a person from a stakeholder community already represented in the Board line-up, so as not to skew stakeholder balance.
- Finally, the name of the NomCom should be changed to “Selection Committee” (SelCom), which would more accurately describe its important task.

• Regional balance using ALAC’s five-region model (or something similar) instead of NomCom direction
• Board meetings are all open for public listening/reading, WG meetings open by default
• Staff acts as liaisions between the various stakeholders, and provides tactical support
• Disclosures of CoI issues not enough

3.3 Policy making process

In order to more truly have ICANN reflect the public interest, its policy making process actually needs to be substantially modified.

• Eliminate the distinction between "Supporting Organizations" and "Advisory Committees"
  ICANN policy should be made by a body with four constituent groups of roughly equal influence:
  - Governments
  - Internet end-users
  - Domain buyers
  - Domain sellers
• Country-code TLDs -- especially those acting as generics -- must be held to the same standards as generic TLDs
• Any stakeholder should be able to participate in any issue, subject to expertise and availability
  Precautions need to be added to that discussions are not dominated by vested interests at the expense of voluntarily participating stakeholders

3.4 A more-independent watchdog / ombudsman / review regime

• Self-evaluation by Staff of its own progress is not sufficient
  results should be assessed indepently
• Periodic “reviews” are more self-examination as to needs
  External resources should provide assistance and guidance
• Merge Ombudsman office with “Independent Objector”
• Facilitate whistleblowing regarding CoI issues
• Should monitor and be sensitive to capture issues

3.5 A different approach to stakeholder relations

• Streamline Public Comment process through defines stakeholder groups
• Permanent staff/community liaisons with IGF, ITU, WIPO, ISOC

• Dedicated staff to facilitate all stakeholders to be involved
• Only 1 general meeting each year but the WGs meet more frequently as needed
• Eliminate separate ICANN meetings for domain sellers
  but participate in their industry events