AT-LARGE GATEWAY
At-Large Regional Policy Engagement Program (ARPEP)
At-Large Review Implementation Plan Development
Page History
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- State authorities catching up on the Internet
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From its inception, ICANN was meant to operate according to an innovative model of governance, based on equivalent duties and responsibilities for all stakeholders, including state authorities (“governments”) represented in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC).
In the first decade of ICANN’s history, state authorities demonstrated an unequal degree of interest in the GAC, but most have become aware of what is at stake, and are now engaged in a debate about their role, with particular emphasis on public policy.
In this debate, some countries have articulated specific proposals aimed at strengthening the role of states in ICANN. The most recent, proposed by India /provide references/, calls for the setting up of an international body under the aegis of the UN, which would be the ultimate locus of decision in matters of Internet governance.
In ICANN’s historic and current structure, the role of states is “advisory”, whereas the proposal by India, and others, would aim at placing them above the other stakeholders, thus initiating a complete departure from the very principles on which the multi-stakeholder model is built.
Some states, aware of having given insufficient attention to Internet matters in general, and to their own representation in the GAC, are now tempted to make up for lost time by proposing or supporting models which would allow them to demonstrate to their population how involved they are, even at the cost of jeopardizing the multi-stakeholder model.
- The dilemma of states, between laisser faire and interventionism (JJS)
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*\[ refer to ITU activity, Russian complaints, Strickling scoldings \ ]*unmigrated-wiki-markup
*\[ Why did ICANN need to “affirm its committments”? Who else has ever needed to do that? \ ]*
In trying to compensate for past indifference or neglect towards Internet matters, a number of states are now reasserting the primacy of the inter-governmental model they are most comfortable with. For some states, the easy way out is to designate an existing inter-governmental body, such as the ITU in Geneva. In this regard, the position of the USA seems to have become ambiguous.
Why did Washington engineer an “Affirmation of Commitments” (AoC) with ICANN? Was Washington afraid that other governments might want to hand over Internet governance to an inter-governmental agency which would jeopardize the multi-stakeholder system? Was it just a way of extending the previous “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) between the US and ICANN, in a way that softly re-asserted Washington’s oversight?
Implementing the right model is of importance not only in Internet governance. Some of the major challenges of our time require exactly the multi-stakeholder approach on which ICANN was built, in order to spare our ecosystem and to ensure the sustainability of human activity. The recent international conference on Climate Change (COP-17 in Durban, 5-9 December 2011) was a case in point, and it is the failure of some states to acknowledge the scientific evidence that delivered a mediocre result. In this sense, the Internet has evolved into a structure analogous to our planet’s ecosystem: it is pervasive, and each of its components has an impact on all the others. It is striking to note to what extent some national positions are over-determined by financial and industrial interests, whereas the challenges we face are of greater magnitude than those interests, and deserve a longer-term view. On Climate Change, with Obama as President, the United States (and indeed Canada) are now defending positions on which even China has evolved. On freedom of speech and the protection of human rights on the Internet, the Patriot Act and other features of Homeland Security now place the USA in the same category as Russia, China, Iran...
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- Reduced growth of volunteer communities
After an initial growth spurt, interest in ICANN from volunteer communities (that is, those with neither direct nor indirect financial interest in domain-based transactions) is waning. The number of new At-Large Structures joining is only a few per year -- in part thanks to a major reduction in ICANN outreach programs, but also because existing volunteers have felt excluded from the decision-making process. (That is, they must be part of a four-level At-Large infrastrcuture which itself has only advisory capacity through ALAC and has extreme difficulty getting heard (let alone heeded).
In addition, some organizations wanting to become more fully part of the policy-making process are being shut out. The U.S. Olympic Committee, was refused entry to the Non-Commercial Stakeholders Group of GNSO because its “perspective” was seen by existing NCSG members as too commercially oriented. Being that the USOC -- regardless of its perspective -- is a non-profit entity, such a refusal indicates obstacles to new ideas that may be threatening to the status quo. Keeping such bodies out of the decision-making process only enforces perceptions of ICANN being controlled by an elite group, resisting “contamination” with unorthodox views. - Disenfranchised stakeholders
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*\[TBA\]* - Staff turnover as an indicator of cohesiveness
The current CEO of ICANN has on several occasions countered allegations that staff turnover was unusually high on his watch, by producing tables and figures. Yet many in the ICANN community believe that, as a result of some management choices and style, the cohesiveness within the organization has been eroded. Grievances point at the creation by the CEO of an additional office in California, close to his home; his subsequent absence from ICANN headquarters; the formation of a coterie around the CEO; and significant areas, including international and public relations, being entrusted to personal advisors, with questionable results.
What is also at stake is the way in which the ICANN Board, and foremost its Chair as the natural interlocutor of the CEO, failed to exercise proper oversight over a substantial period (e.g. when the CEO informed the Board that one of the most senior members of ICANN’s leadership was resigning, barely before the news was out; Directors were dismayed that there had been no prior consultation between the Chair and the CEO).
- ATRT breaches
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1.4 Crisis of Credibility
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2.1 Basics of the issues:
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\[ This section probably has to be merged into the others, it's redundant \ ]
- Primary versus secondary stakeholders
ICANN has clearly established itself as supporting the needs and priorities of the domain industry (Domain operators, registrars, resellers and consultants) over those of the general public which is not involved in the domain name trade.
The very structors of its “supporting organizations” are limited to the creators, sellers and buyers of domains.Wiki Markup - What is the “public interest”
A debate has recently been launched about ICANN’s commitment to upholding the public interest, as was recommended in the document on “Improving Institutional Confidence”Wiki Markup Wiki Markup
If ICANN is to become a truly international entity, providing for an ever wider diversity of users, usages and cultures, it must evolve beyond its US origins to engage the world. But trends are pointing the other way: there is a growing discrepancy between a small number of (largely US) dominant players in the domain name business, and the unfolding reality of billions of Internet users who are emerging mainly in Asia, Africa, the Middle East. If the US were to implement the SOPA draft legislation, its fallout would be felt not only in the US, as countless individuals, communities and businesses around the world would be adversely affected. The rationale behind SOPA is preposterous: what the US will decide, the world shall implement.
- Do domains “add value” to the Internet
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\[TBA\] - Commodity versus identity
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\[TBA\] - Diversity versus confusion
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2.2 Consequences of misunderstanding “consumer trust”
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- The disjoint between countries and ccTLDs
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\[TBA\] - Treatment of the JAS group recommendations
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\[TBA\] - Marketing of defensive domains
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\[TBA\]
2.3 Different classes of stakeholders
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2.5 The travelling circus that is ICANN meetings
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2.6 Systemic Challenges
- The ICANN Board’s fiduciary duty
The issue of fiduciary duty is core to the operations of the Board, and in ICANN it is problematic. The main duty of ICANN directors is to ICANN itself, not to the public interest.# Such an inference would cause ICANN to engage in practices which provide the greatest amounts of revenue (and revenue stabiliy), even if doing so results in practices with consequences that may adversely affect end users, law enforcement, and other constituencies not directly represented within ICANN. - The ICANN Board’s composition and conflicts of interest
The Board is so full of such conflicts, that nearly half of the Board’s members needed to recuse themselves from voting on a resolution assisting access to TLDs in developing economies. Such a large proportion of the Board declaring itself ineligible to vote on such a major issue indicates severe shortcomings in the current regime that populates the Board. How can ICANN pretend to the world that it represents the public interest when so many of its own Board self-identify with the domain-name industry?
- Systemic bias towards the domain industry
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\[TBA - maybe redundant with 2.3? \ ]
- Empire building and expansionism
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\[TBA\] - Institutionalized silos
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\[TBA\] - Internet colonialism
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\[TBA\]
3. Proposed Remedies
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3.1 Core bylaw changes
- Eliminate distinctions between “advisors” and “policy makers”
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