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To many peoples' delight, this joint working group achieved a phenomenal (in my opinion) amount of consensus between the three groups (ALAC, GAC and GNSO) which included some *very* divergent points of view. We need to be careful to say that the consensus was reached between individuals, most of whom are members of At-Large, the GNSO and the GAC. To date, the GAC, the GNSO Council and the various GNSO SG/Const. have not formally endorsed it. And I think that the reality is that few will - not because they disagree, but simply due to the relative complexity of doing so.  We didn't agree on everything, but we did agree on some very specific points. Most important of these points was to recommend against the use of Dispute Resolution Service Providers as described in the current Application Guidebook<http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-clean-28may10-en.pdfImage Removed>(sections >3.1.2.3 and 3.4.3). This has been replaced with a complete consensus that ultimate decisions on contentious strings rests with the Board alone (assisted by independent experts offering opinion on applicability of international law and treaty).

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 This wording is vague, and by some interpretations it enables the Board to repudiate some of the important points of consensus. Accordingly, we may want to emphasize the broad community support behind the WG's initiative.

 Agree  Agree as noted above.

 There  There was another part of the gTLD motion that is very relevant - 2.7

 2.7 Role of the Board

  The Board intends to approve a standard process for staff to proceed to contract execution and delegation on applications for new gTLDs where certain parameters are met. Examples of such parameters might include: (1) the application criteria were met, (2) no material exceptions to the form agreement terms, and (3) an independent confirmation that the process was followed.

he The Board reserves the right under exceptional circumstances to individually consider an application for a new gTLD to determine whether approval would be in the best interest of the Internet community, for example, as a result of the use of an ICANN accountability mechanism. The Board approves the inclusion of a broad waiver and limitation of liability in the application terms and conditions.  This motion gives staff the responsibility to approve applications is certain (presumably common and not very controversial) cases, but even in such cases, the Board reserves the right to intervene. It is not clear whether it was deliberate or an oversight, but the motion does not give staff the right to refuse an application. If this motion stands, and is interpreted as I have, this means that all refusals must come from the Board - pretty much what many on the CWG were asking for.

I think that we need to explicitly support this notion so that if the Board later changes it, we have a history trail to point back to.

I welcome members of this -- the At-Large working group on ICANN gTLD policy -- to discuss the report here. as well as to help draft a satatement which >ALAC would be asked to endorse and and send as official community comment.

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