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In this light, we strongly endorse the demand of Scorecard (#1) to completely eliminate the existing AG's Module 3 relating to what is now obscurely called "Limited Public Interest" objections. As a replacement we endorse Scorecard (#2.1) with the following conditions:

1. A similar objection mechanism must exist for non-governmental organisations organizations to launch objections (either a better-resourced branch of ALAC, a revised version of the Independent Objector, or something similar)
2. The GAC (and other bodies able to raise objections) should satisfy the broader community that objections it will raise -- as a global advisory body -- reflect a reasonable consensus between members and do not just reflect the whim of a small number of advocates
3. The community must be given due process to "object to the objection", and offer arguments counter to the recommendation to reject a string
4. If the objector does not pay a fee to object, the applicant must not be charged a fee to respond
5. Neither the Board nor ICANN staff can raise an objection without it being vetted by one of the above processes; specifically
6. All objection processes must be transparent; specifically, anonymous objections are explicitly NOT allowed
7. The Board must have ultimate decision making authority with the unimpeded right to override objection advice; as ICANN's Bylaws already allow, it may contract external expertise to advise on principles of international law and treaty
8. Split decisions -- in which even rough consensus between the GAC, ALAC and other stakeholders is impossible -- should weigh in favour of approving the string under objection. Globally blocking a TLD string on public interest grounds requires, in our view, consensus that the very existence of the string damages the public interest.
9. Insult or disrespect alone should not be suitable grounds for a successful objection.

In agreeing with Scorecard (#12), we also believe that it is simple common sense to be able to alert TLD applicants, as early in the application process as possible, to potential objections. Furthermore, applicants should be given the ability to suspend the application process (ie, a "time out") while such disputes may be resolved at such an early stage. Applicants, having entered such good-faith negotiations with potential objectors, should be able to make minor changes to their applications in order to comply with a negotiated settlement.

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We support many of the Scorecard's name-protection measures which are consistent with the STI consensus recommendations and even a few that go beyond.

• All of Scorecard (#6.1), including (#6.1.7.1) so long as such use of the Trademark Clearinghouse does not delay registrations
• Simplified complaint format (#6.2.2)
• Decisions should not require full panels (#6.2.3)
• Six month deadline for filing an appeal (#6.2.10.2)
• A successful complainant should have first right of refusal for transfer (#6.2.12)

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We also note specifically that the Post Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedures (Scorecard #6.3) was not the product of the STI community consensus, but a disgraced remnant of the IRT effort that was demonstrated to act counter to the public interest and against overall Internet domain stability. The problems it seeks to remedy can be addressed by the UDRP mechanisms and sufficient enforcement of agreements. We strongly oppose the re-introduction of the PDDRP and ask the GAC to re-evaluate its consideration of the public good in this matter.

On Post-delegation disputes (Scorecard #7): ALAC agrees with the GAC position.

On consumer protection measures (Scorecard #6.4, except for #6.4.4, see below): ALAC strongly agrees with the GAC positions (though we also agree with the "due care" response from the Board related to #6.4.2). At-Large has long indicated to ICANN a dissatisfaction with enforcement efforts, and re-enforces the sentiments behind #4.2.3.

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Applicants from developing economies requiring relief (#10): ALAC has long been of firm belief that ICANN should offer a beneficial pricing to applicants who meet a rigid criteria regarding location, local ownership, community service and financial need. We continue to charter and encourage the "JAS" working group to explore ways to reduce barriers within the ICANN application framework, and advocate cost reduction for worthy applicants. We reject the scenario, envisioned by some ICANN stakeholders, that would establish a subsidy fund and/or engage in external fundraising. The effort of ICANN to empower applications from all parts of the world must not be one of charity, it must not pit applicants against each other to demonstrate who is most "worthy" for a limited pool of subsidy funds.ICANN staff's refusal to even discuss the concept of differential pricing has seriously impeded efforts to research potential areas of cost saving within the current application framework. And while the Board response to Scorecard (#10) is to await the final work of the JAS, we note that it has already explicitly rejected early JAS appeals for lowered pricing at a previous meeting. We strongly endorse the GAC's effort to request the ICANN Board to reconsider this regressive and anti-competitive position. And we encourage ongoing monitoring of the costs to administer the gTLD program to determine where price reductions may be enabled for these applicants while maintaining general principles of overall cost-recovery (see Theme 4 below).

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ALAC shares all of the GAC concerns and recommendations related to ICANN's readiness to expand the Root Zone, sufficiently to accommodate the large expansion of gTLDs envisioned by the number of current applications-in-waiting. We note that only the vested interests within ICANN are pushing for a massive round of simultaneous applications and approvals. ALAC advises a more staggered approach, with a steady timetable of approvals and delegations. Doing so would be consistent with the controls advocated in the GAC's September 23rd letter to the ICANN Board. It would also allow for the kind of careful technical monitoring (and appropriate resource allocation) demanded by the GAC recommendations, and would also have the side-benefit of providing more precise cost calculations for administering the approval/delegation process. Such calculations will be of great value to the efforts to determine what cost reductions are possible for applicants to whom current pricing is an unreasonable obstacle to entry (Scorecard #10, Theme 3 above).

Theme 5: Business and Market Considerations

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Regarding market and economic impact (Scorecard #4): ALAC believes that the market and the public interest is best served by a variety of strings and (well regulated) business models. ICANN should not be in the business of evaluating business models beyond their sustainability (which is an Internet stability issue). Applications much have contingency plans of what to do in case of registry failure, and ICANN must have similar default plans that result in minimal disruption for owners of domains in financially failing TLDs. However, we believe that "public benefit" declarations within TLD applications will be of dubious benefit, and in any case subject to substantial modification (and difficulty of enforcement) post-delegation. We have already seen registries such as .pro significantly alter their business models from what existed at launch -- while perhaps unfortunate, such market-driven practice cannot and should not be unduly constrained. The only exception to this are self-declared community applications, in which we support the GAC call for "Due diligence or other operating restrictions to ensure that Community-based gTLDs will in fact serve their targeted communities".

Regarding cross-ownership between registries and registrars (Scorecard #5): The At-Large Community was an active member of the ICANN Vertical Integration Working Group. Our participants in that group were as split in their opinions as the working group was in general when it failed to reach a consensus recommendation.

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Regarding the ability of applicants to seek legal redress (Scorecard #9): ALAC understands and appreciates the desire of ICANN to reduce its legal exposure by asking for waivers from legal redress by applicants. However, we note the GAC Scorecard statement that such requests may be legally difficult. ALAC considers this issue to be more of a legal matter than one of policy, and will not offer an opinion on it.

Regarding the role of law enforcement in the due diligence evaluation of applicants (Scorecard #11): ALAC generally supports the GAC position on this issue. Public confidence requires that the criminal background of applicants should be a factor in TLD evaluation, especially in the case of sensitive strings that connote services or communities requiring enhanced trust (ie, medical and financial services). We absolutely endorse the requirement (and ongoing auditing) of accurate WHOIS data for all registrants, as well as the request for transparency and public availability of results of the due diligence process for applicants.

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