Members:    Alan Greenberg, Becky Burr, Bruce Tonkin, Cheryl Langdon-Orr, Fiona Asonga, Izumi Okutani, Jordan Carter, Jorge Villa, Julia Wolman, Julie Hammer, Leon Sanchez, Lyman Chapin, Mathieu Weill, Olga Cavalli,  Pär Brumark, Robin Gross, Samantha Eisner, Sébastien Bachollet, Steve DelBianco, Suzanne Radell, Thomas Rickert, Tijani Ben Jemaa   (22)

Participants:  Alissa Cooper, Allan MacGillivray, Andrew Harris, Andrew Sullivan, Anne Aikman-Scalese, Avri Doria, Barrack Otieno, Brett Schaefer, Cherine Chalaby, Chris Disspain, Christopher Wilkinson, David McAuley, Edward Morris, Eric Brunner-Williams, Erika Mann, Farzaneh Badii, Finn Petersen, Greg Shatan, Harold Arcos, Jeff Neuman, Jonathan Zuck, Jorge Cancio, Kavouss Arasteh, Keith Drazek, Malcolm Hutty, Markus Kummer, Mary Uduma, Matthew Shears, Megan Richards, Mike Chartier, Milton Mueller, Niels ten Oever, Paul Szyndler, Pedro Ivo Silva, Phil Buckingham, Philip Corwin, Tatiana Tropina, Tom Dale, Tracy Hackshaw   (39)

Legal Counsel:  Holly Gregory, Michael Clark, Nancy McGlamery, Stephanie Petit, Steven Chiodini   (5)

Staff:  Alain Durand, Alice Jansen, Bernie Turcotte, Berry Cobb, Brenda Brewer, Hillary Jett, Karen Mulberry, Nigel Hickson, Tarek, Kamel, Theresa Swinehart, Trang Nguyen Xavier Calvez, Yuko Green

Apologies:  Martin Boyle, Mark Carvell, Eberhard Lisse

**Please let Brenda know if your name has been left off the list (attendees or apologies).**




1. Welcome, Roll-Call, SoI (2 min) 

2. Recommendation 1 - Inspection rights (45 min) 


3 Recommendation 2 - Escalation timeframe (45 min) 


Break (10 min)

4. Recommendation 4 - Budget (IANA) (45 min)


5. Recommendation 5 – Mission (45 min) 

Refer to public comment summary - 

6. AOB (3 min)


These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript.


1. Welcome, Roll-Call, SoI TR (2 min)

  • No one on dial only - no changes to SOI.

2. Recommendation 1 - Inspection rights MW (45 min)

See:    community/2016-January/009306.html

  • MWeill - ICANN concern this could consume extraordinary amount of resources. We have also received a memo from the lawyers on this topic - relevant extracts have been included in the above noted document. Firstly scope and limitation of inspection rights. Secondly criteria for deciding to use the inspection - Sole Designator. Thirdly which is not related to inspection is the admissibility of the GAC to the Empowered community.
  • MWeill - Our lawyers have advised as to which documents inspection rights apply to. These could be included in our report and could address some of the concerns from the Board. Are there any issues with this regarding the scope and limitation. Support in the chat.
  • BTonkin - requirement for more clarity given the basic accounting GL information would not be helpful. In trying to provide additional information to be useful but needs to be framed so it is not unlimited.
  • MWeill - Adding recommendations from the lawyers would seem to meet some of the requirements.
  • BTonkin - need to look at this not from the POV of a California court but rather from an IRP panel - needs to definition of terms. Best approach may be for the Board to provide some suggested red-line text to be clear.
  • MWeill - Second issue - Thresholds for making a request - The third draft proposed that the SD would submit a request requested by a single SOAC. Board requested standard support level similar to the thresholds for other powers.
  • JCarter - The lawyers position seemed more reasonably which did not require a high threshold vs what the Board require.
  • AGreenberg - Answer to this depends on what there is a right to request - so the two issues are related. My position is between the Board and JC's position. It is not reasonable, personal opinion, allowing a single SOAC to request. Cal law is clear that this should not be for business interests. Would need at least 2 SOACs to approve. Board is overreacting but the current proposal is overly liberal and open to abuse.
  • JCarter - supports lawyers position on principal. This is not really a power, it is the result of the compromise for moving away from membership. Disagree with AG that this will be abused by the gNSO given their internal processes.
  • EMorris - Agree with JC. Need to keep things simple so it can be used and not allow it to be twisted by the Board or staff to delay or block requests. Similarly for who can make a request. DIDP request example. Making it too complicated is not useful.
  • MWeill - comment by Holly - Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): if requested information is reasonable related to a community power or right, Alan's concern about improper use of inspection rights to obtain commercial information is addressed
  • GShattan - Follow on Holly - AG's concerns may be misreading counsel comments on this. gNSO is not made up of single intent group. Gaining commercial advantage via this information should not be allowed.
  • MWeill - space is already pretty narrow.
  • CChelaby - Board sees it as a community power vs a designator power. As such using the standard thresholds would make sense. On fraud or mismanagement a third party could be hired to make the determination if there was fraud or mismanagement.
  • MWeill - The proposed investigation power proposed by the Board is good and should be noted in our proposal. CC are things clear.
  • CChelaby - heard but it does not seem that the standard thresholds should apply.
  • BTonkin - The example EM gave was instructive. Accounts will tell you how much we paid a supplier vs a document inspection right which could show if a contractor has met the requirements of the contract. So standard financial records it could be ok to have a single SO or AC. For anything more complex a higher threshold.
  • MWeill - This sounds like an interesting way forward.
  • HJGregory - interpretation of our advice has been correct. There may be confusion on what is covered by inspection rights which does not cover investigations. We were simply trying to match what members would be allowed under Cal. law.
  • KArasteh - (no sound)
  • MWeill - different levels of requests would require different approval.
  • SDBianco - discussion of sole member vs sole designator - thresholds would of applied to the sole member so this is consistent. If we had a sole member we would be having the same discussion.
  • MWeill - will update the document to reflect low thresholds for accounting records and then include higher thresholds for investigations and include restrictions for vexatious or frivolous request in implementation should be allowed to be dismissed.
  • MWeill - not allowing the GAC to be a decisional member. Until we receive formal GAC input on this we should not discuss this at this point but rather once GAC input has been received.
  • RGross - Caution if we have before NTIA and Congress if we present a proposal with the GAC being a decisional participant. which could undermine the transition. Also consider rec. 11.
  • MWeill - This discussion will be taken up at a later meeting.
  • KArasteh - We must wait for the GAC to take a position. There is a big difference bet rec. 1 and rec. 11.
  • MWeill - The inspection rights are as discussed here. DIDP is not a community power and is available to all. This concludes this section.

3. Recommandation 2 - Escalation timeframe LS (45 min)


Discussion points:

  • Notice and opportunity to comply extend periods
  • Extension of deadlines
  • Empowerment of Councils or Charis for the initial steps
  • Removal of certain process steps (simplification)
  • JCarter - 15 day deadlines originally proposed with few steps. Dublin increased the number of steps substantially. Keeping deadlines short may not allow the use of such powers. Overextending the timelines may imply its too long to be of any use. The proposal in the document offers 4 options as noted above. Having examined these it seems that merging the conf. call and forum steps and extend deadlines. This could allow for extending timelines to 30 days.
  • LSanchez - Opens to questions and comments
  • AGreenberg - Empowerment of councils in unclear. Re merging the levels no major issues except, need to specify reasonable processes to socialize the intent to use a power.
  • LSanchez - way forward is to include a requirement to socialize any proposed use of a power in the next draft. We could also include JC's proposal for discussion in the next call.
  • LSaanchez - ALAC objection to threshold adjustment proposal - AG should present.
  • AGreenberg - Clarification objected only for the Board removal. ALAC was ok for approving changes to fundamental Bylaws. Board removal is as revolutionary as you can get. It generates issues which make no sense especially if it allows 3 SOACs to remove the Board.
  • TBenJemaa - Removing the Board is dramatic - and there is no need to reduce the threshold. 3 is not acceptable. Also for other powers. The reduction proposal is not acceptable. Original version was better.
  • ASullivan - concerned trying to apply a 3 value system to a 2 value decisions system. I do not care how this works out - if people can abstain then you have to adjust accordingly.
  • JCarter - The scenario that gave rise to this was not an abstention - the issue was trying to deal with an SOAC that cannot decide (but we have not defined what counts as an abstention vs not participating). In this case it ends up requiring unanimity for using a power which is against the base principles of the CCWG.
  • SDelBianco - explanation from Dublin, need strong support in absence of clear objections. SOACs have 4 options, support, against, abstain or just communicate to the community.
  • AGreenberg - RE JC comment - we should not psychoanalyze SOAC if they have no answer. Similar comment. Unrealistic that if someone says no they could enable the action to go forward.
  • JCancio - unfortunate we are discussing the participation of the GAC. Remind everyone this is about the exercise of community power and this is only sensible if supported by the community at large - so lowering thresholds is not good and would undermine this exercise.
  • MWeill - Useful debate - threshold on fundamental bylaws could paralyze the company, and it is special because it is special given it is an approval vs a veto. We could simply lower fundamental bylaw approval thresholds. this could be a way forward.
  • TBenJemaa - are we reconsidering the Dublin? this should not happen. Abstention is participation. Thresholds have to be kept as per Dublin.
  • Seun - Supports TBJ and give rationale - we have recall to SOACs have their own processes to reach agreement. We should avoid reducing thresholds and am in favour of unanimity to remove the entire Board. Fundamental Bylaw is critical and threshold should not be reduced. Participation by GAC - why is this still an issue.
  • LSanchez - going forward co-chairs will redraft with the proposed amendments by MW and test this on the list to understand if this is acceptable to the CCWG.
  • LSanchez - Board suggestion regarding the changing of the number of SOACs.
  • BTonkin - The concept is that ICANN may involve in the future - as such it would be prevent uncertainty.
  • AGreenberg - I have distributed a chart showing the Board proposal if there is a decrease will not work. Adding units may really depend on circumstances. We should not cast in concrete needs to be a case by case, it should be a guideline.
  • JCarter - Agree with AG. We will have to consider anyways given adding a new SOAC will require a change of Bylaws.
  • TBenJemma - agree with AG but also agree with Board that it has to evolve with the changes.
  • LSanchez - co-chairs will draft recommendation based on the discussion and circulate to consideration by the CCWG.
  • SdelBianco - in considering adding SOAC implies a change in Bylaws but a change of thresholds are a fundamental bylaw and require approval by the the Designator.
  • Lsanchez - reasonable and to be taken into account at time of drafting.
  • LSanchez - Is this approach in line with the concerns of the Board?
  • BTonkin - will consider the written text early next week.
  • LSanchez - concern of = weight between SO and ACs. Still waiting on input from gNSO on this - as such would recommend this be a pending issue and discuss it when the gNSO input is recieved so all comments can be concerned.
  • LSanchez - this concludes this section and we can go to the Break.

Post break notes.

4. Recommendation 4 - Budget (IANA) TR (45 min)


TRickert - subjects:

1.  Confirm clarifications requested by CWG regarding transparency, rationale and role of CWGStewardship in elaborating a process for IANA Budget (see pages 5 and 6)

2.  Discuss and refine role of operational communities in IANA Budget veto power as suggested by Icann Board and taking into account IAB specific input (IAB does not want “a direct voice in the budget, either regularly or on its rejection”) (see page 6, paragraph 22)

3.  Discuss whether to provide clearer guidelines on caretaker budget or leave it to implementation (Draft Report was mentioning that details are “under development”)

4.  Discuss input regarding inclusion of Budget power as a Standard (instead of Fundamental Bylaw) (as suggested by NiRA, AFTLD)

  • Trickert -  On the first point, this was included in the second draft but unfortunately not carried over to the third draft. As such we propose to simply re-introduce the text from the second version.
  • Seeing no objection this will be carried forward.
  • TRickert - On the second point - IANA Budget Veto. Note from IANA says it does not wish to participate in a Budget veto. (reads suggested text in the above document).
  • AGreenberg - Comment, should the IANA budget be vetoed it is of concern to all of the community and not just the operational community. As such do not agree with the Board recommendation.
  • IOkutani - The ASO believes the third version of the CCWG proposal meets the needs of the ASO. The fees are adequately addressed by the SLA bet. ICANN and the ASO. This element of the proposal should not block the transition.
  • JCarter - originally thought this was useful comment by the Board. In WP1 this was not of interest. Also the IAB and ASO positions it would seem the third draft would be acceptable. Agree with AG.
  • ASullivan - uncomfortable with para. 22. The relationship bet the IETF and ICANN is managed by the IAB on the IETF side and the IAB does not want to participate in budget discussions because they have an SLA for services. The IAB suggested a different approach in the second draft - that the budget of the IANA operation be frozen over a fixed period. For us this is a straightforward supplier service agreement.
  • TRickert - AS how can we reword to satisfy the IAB.
  • ASullivan - need to to consider contractual commitments.
  • CChelaby - Board perspective - the idea agrees with the work on the budget - but IANA is a service to customers so it made sense to have those communities oversee this. Takes note of AG comments. Comfortable with proposal para 22 and removing IETF/IAB.
  • KArasteh - the only non-SO is IETF - other communities must be involved beyond the operational communities
  • BTonkin - The last sentence is the key and may have to improved. Have to understand how the caretaker budget functions. Elaborating further that allows it to deliver on its contracts and SLAs and services for the security and stability of the Internet.
  • TRickert - the essence of para 22 seems ok but needs some finessing as per the discussion above. The next draft should go to the mailing list.
  • TRickert - Thrid point - caretaker budget - more details in the proposal or leave it to implementation? JC to provide background.
  • JCarter - not much to add. there has been good discussions and the principles are solid. There is not much difference between the options. No view on either option. JZ?
  • JZuck - principles are mostly agreeable for the community. Agree with JC much of this is going to be technical and such be left to implementation.
  • TRickert - we are doing the third question under budget.
  • CLangdon-Orr - for those not involved in CWG work, there is DT0 which is working on the caretaker budget. Leave the details to implementation - which the CWG is currently working on.
  • CChelaby - Agree with JZ, and the proposal, caretaker budget should be part of the fundamental bylaw which was included in the Board comments.
  • JZuck - need to not have too many details in the bylaws. but high level is fine.
  • CChelaby - makes sense.
  • TRickert - it seems clear this is fit for implementation with the amendments as per the above discussion.
  • TRickert - 4th point - Fundamental vs standard bylaw - Strong wish from the Board for fundamental. Also CWG requirement makes this a requirement for a fundamental bylaw. Additionally this has always been presented as a fundamental bylaw. As such it would not seem advisable to make it a standard bylaw. Would like to hear from those wanting a standard bylaw.
  • AGreenberg - changing now does not seem wise.
  • Trickert - this would close this section.

5. Recommendation 5 – Mission MW (45 min)  refer to public comment summary -


Deck Meeting #75 MIssion Statement

  • MWeill - I will hand it over to Becky to deliver her presentation.
  • BBurr - presentation of the slides - Straw men/persons:
  • GAC Advice, PICs, Contract Provisions: Questions
  • In what way does/should ICANN’s Mission Statement constrain the Board’s ability to comply with GAC Advice?
  • Proposition:  The GAC may provide Advice on any matter it sees fit; ICANN must duly consider such Advice in accordance with the Bylaws, and if it decides to follow such Advice, must do so in a manner consistent with ICANN’s Bylaws, including its Mission Statement.
  • How does/should the Mission Statement limit the permissible scope of ICANN’s agreements with contracted parties?
  • Proposition:  ICANN’s agreements with contracted parties may reflect:           (a)  bottom-up, consensus-based, multistakeholder policies on issues for which uniform or coordinated resolution is reasonably necessary to facilitate the openness, interoperability, resilience, security and/or stability of the DNS; and (b) other provisions in service of that Mission.
  • GAC Advice, PICs, Contract Provisions: Questions
  • Who should be able to challenge whether or not a contract provision is in “service of” that Mission, and under what circumstances?
  • To what extent should contracted parties be free to propose or voluntarily accept (and obligated to comply with) contract provisions that exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission, e.g., to serve a specific community, pro-actively address a public policy concern?
  • If “voluntary” commitments may exceed the scope of ICANN’s Mission, how do you ensure that such commitments are truly voluntary?
  • Proposition:  Individually negotiated commitments will be deemed to be voluntary.  Existing RA and RAA language (including standard PICs) are “grandfathered” (as defined in Notes).  Going forward, a mechanism should be available to permit contracted parties to enter into agreements without waiving the right to challenge (collectively) a contract provision on the grounds that (a) it exceeds ICANN’s Mission and (b) was extracted by ICANN on an other than voluntary basis.
  • Contracting and Regulatory Prohibition:  Questions
  • The ICANN Board asserts that the prohibition on regulation of services that use the Internet’s unique identifiers, or the content that such services carry or provide is “not appropriate for inclusion of the Mission Statement.”  The Board further suggests that the CCWG should direct the Bylaws drafting team to incorporate limitations on the reach of Registry and Registrar contracts in another part of the Bylaws. 
  • Where?  GNSO Section?  General Provisions (Article XV)?
  • Include challenge mechanism to test voluntariness?
  • Impact of this change?
  • KArasteh - Did the GAC identify any limitation of    ICANN accepting GAC advice. Suggest there should be language to accept requirements of GAC. Second question ICANN Board proposes mission should be precise and concise - rest should go to scope etc. - is there a proposal how to do this.
  • BTonkin - Board did not object on GPI - Board has simply stated they will need to consider GPI if their concerns are not addressed. Also yes we need a specific mission. gTLD specific issues should probably be in the gNSO. The other parts can be included in the respective parts.
  • AGreenberg - on consumer trust - AOC text on this is only an interpretation, and ALAC feels this is important. Much of the policies should be bottom up vs invalidating PICS which are not bottom up. RE Picket Fence - policies have certain qualities - and have to remove these from the mission.
  • BBurr - no one is thinking of specs 1 and 4 should be in the mission - they are only notes for drafting. Current text provides a handle to address the non-bottom up concern of AG.
  • MMueller - the current mission has had consensus for the three rounds. We are not discussing if the mission is narrow and limited but rather talking about how best to do this and we cannot move away from this without risking consensus on everything. Agree with implication of BB analysis. GAC concern re advice Do GAC believe there should be no mission limitations? GAC advice against mission vs new TLDs would be an involuntary criterion.
  • MWeill - have to close.
  • MHutty - Agree with BB and Milton. One problem vs voluntary commitments. We need to work things we can get through and not worry about the things we will not.
  • JCancio - (GAC Switzerland): @staff Please include this on the notes as probably I won't have time to speak: jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): Dear all: I feel for policy maker what the GAC and others are seeking is quite simple, which is an impact assessment of the proposed changes. This is current practice and should be acceptable without any doubt. In the GACs input a series of elements are identified which should be part of that impact assessment. Otherwise we have no clarity at all and no objective and neutral assessment at hand which would allow us to determine whether the proposed changes (which have been subject to last minute changes for a long time) outlaw certain important instruments which are available now, such as the PICs
  • MWeill - need to keep working on this complex issues. BB should take up the discussions.

6. AOB LS (3 min)

  • Friday CCWG meeting prior to ICANN 55 Maraketch is confirmed


Action Items


Adobe Chat

  Brenda Brewer: (1/7/2016 12:24) Welcome to CCWG Accountability Meeting #75 on 7 January 2016 @ 19:00 UTC!  Please note that chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: 

  Brenda Brewer: (12:50) Hi Jonathan!

  Brenda Brewer: (12:50) Audio works!

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (12:51) Always feel like i need to check. Thanks Brenda!

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (12:52) hI Brenda

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (12:52) Hi evry body

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (12:57) hello everyone

  Becky Burr: (12:58) good day all

  andrew sullivan: (12:59) hi everyone

  Olga Cavalli - GAC Argentina: (12:59) Hi all!

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (12:59) hi

  cherine chalaby: (13:00) Hi Everyone

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:00) hi all

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:00) Hello everyone!  just a note that we have provided comments an Annexes 1, 2, 4 and 12 to staff and co-chairs for posting today. 

  Konstantinos Komaitis: (13:00) hi everyone

  Erika Mann: (13:00) Can't hear a tone ....

  nigel hickson: (13:00) good evening

  Pär Brumark (GAC Niue): (13:00) Hi all!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:00) hi al

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:01) *all

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:01) Hello all

  FIONA ASONGA (ASO): (13:01) Hallo All

  Markus Kummer: (13:01) Hi everyone

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:01) Hi

  Sébastien (ALAC): (13:01) Echo

  Alice Jansen: (13:01) Please mute your line if not speaking

  Keith Drazek: (13:01) Getting a bit of an echo. Mute please.

  Olga Cavalli - GAC Argentina: (13:01) thre is an echo...

  Tatiana Tropina: (13:02) Hi everyone

  Gangesh Varma: (13:02) Hello everyone

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:03) it's ok now

  Alan Greenberg: (13:03) Echo ok now from here.

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:03) Echo has gone

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:03) Hello everyone

  Greg Shatan: (13:03) Hello, all.

  Niels ten Oever: (13:04) Hi all

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:04) Greetings from San Francisco!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:05) I have terrible connectivity, apologies in advance if I d

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:06) drop off

  Philip Corwin: (13:06) Complying with inspection righst shoulkd be viewed by the Board as part of operating normally

  Alice Jansen: (13:06) The discussion document are available on this page

  ebw: (13:07) agree with phil, inspection is a continuous right, not exceptional, so part oə normal operations.

  Edward Morris: (13:08) +1 Phil. AS you know Inspection Rights are a statutorily required part of the governance of one type of California PBC. They are not extraordinary.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:09) Agreed.  I do not support the board's mitigation of inspection rights.

  Edward Morris: (13:09) Fully support Mathieu

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:09) I'm a bit astonished about this formulation: "Thridly which is not related to inspection is the admissibility of the GAC to the Empowered community."

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:09) May we ask Bruce to comment

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:09) On scope, I find the language in paragraph 21 on page 5 a bit unclear, specifically the phrase that inspections will be to records and minutes “that are related to the exercise of Community Powers”

  Edward Morris: (13:10) +1 David. I also have that problem, which is part of the Board's proposal.

  Malcolm Hutty: (13:10) Hello, sorry I'm late

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:10) The sound quality is poor

  Erika Mann: (13:10) Chris, Markus and myself - Erika- are on the call as well

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:10) 6333.  The accounting books and records and minutes of proceedings of the members and the board and committees of the board shall be open to inspection upon the written demand  on the corporation of any member at any reasonable time, for a purpose reasonably related to such person's interests as a member.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:10) David, I read that a huge elimination of the rights.  We always say that these powers we are creating are such that we rarely use.  so we rarely have inspection rights under board's formulation.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:11) A lot of this could be eliminated if transcripts of the Board meetings are made publicly availablwe

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:11) available

  Brett Schaefer: (13:11) Agree David, it should be records, minutes and other  materials consistant with Califonia Corporations Code 6333

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:12) Mathieu perhaps better to say "participation of GAC" rather than admissibility when addressing this issue later

  Erika Mann: (13:12) I just can't talk. I'm at a location where people could hear me.

  ebw: (13:12) @bruce, the ledger package is "brightlines"?

  Becky Burr: (13:12) @Jorge - what document are you referring to?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:12) Jeff, there are calls for a WS2 issue of "transparency in board deliberations".  Hopefully that will get in.

  Milton Mueller: (13:12) Erika: think of it as broadening participation in ICANN!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:13) Milton: who would wish that on anyone?


  Milton Mueller: (13:13) I have a few people i would wish that on....

  Erika Mann: (13:13) Good point Milton ...

  Milton Mueller: (13:14) Jordan made a better point ;-)


  Milton Mueller: (13:14) Kavouss, I think your caps lock is on

  Avri Doria: (13:14) Did the Board take the legal memo into account in deciding that what we had was inadequate?

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:15) +1 Avri

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:15) Could VBruce explain why there is a need to have two SO/AC

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:16) to be consistent with our other power thresholds, we should also say "and no more than one AC/SO objecting" right?

  Chris Disspain: (13:16) that makes sense Steve

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (13:16) +1 Steve

  Milton Mueller: (13:17) Inspection right should not require consensus across SO/ACs. That's absurd

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:17) i am back on the call

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:17) There is difference between asking inspection and excersing other power

  Milton Mueller: (13:17) YEs, Kavouss is right

  Matthew Shears: (13:17) agree

  Avri Doria: (13:17) One SOAC requesting should be enough.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:18) I see a point in what Milton and others say

  Brett Schaefer: (13:18) +1 Avri

  Avri Doria: (13:18) If transparency is our default postion, then it should not be overly difficult to get documentation that has not yet been released.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:18) Could we ask Bruce to explain what is the problem if only one SO/AC asks for inspection? a

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:19) The inspection rights are "preventative" - the transparency prevents bad things from happening.  The other powers tend to be "reactionary" to something that has been done.  So only one SO or AC should be able to have inspection rights.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:19) I completely disagree with Alan and do not like the suggestion that the GNSO is controlled by the registries

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:19) indeed. if inspection becomes "frivolous or excessive" that is another issue but seems to be a basic right as per the sidled assessment

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:19) why ? why do we need 2 SOAC ? to make it more difficult?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:19) What is their logic for their proposal . Inspection is a fundamental rights and one SO/AC seems to be more than sufficient

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (13:19) +1 Jordan

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:19) sorry sidled = Sidley

  Avri Doria: (13:19) This is a power but part of the attmept to achive adequate transparency

  Greg Shatan: (13:19) +1 Jeff.

  Malcolm Hutty: (13:20) Alan's clam that SOs are controlled by "specific business interests" is quite wrong, and an unwarranted attack on the inclusive multistakeholder nature of the gNSO

  Avri Doria: (13:20) this is not really a pwoer but ...

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:20) +1 Malcolm

  Milton Mueller: (13:20) Getting an entire SO to agree to request something is not exactly easy

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:20) +1 Jordan

  Alan Greenberg: (13:20) @Jeff, I did not say it was controlled by registries. I said it was almost controlled by contracted parties, and of course that depends on what voting thresholds are used for the SO to make the decision.

  Matthew Shears: (13:20) + 1 Jordan

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:20) if requested information is reasonable related to a community power or right, Alan's concern about improper use of inspection rights to obtain commercial information is addressed

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:20) Someone forgot to tell me that I was controlled by contracting parties! ;-)

  Brett Schaefer: (13:21) +1 Jordan

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:21) I agree with Holly.  I am not sure how requesting an accounting or the books and records could be used for a commercial advantage

  Alan Greenberg: (13:21) @Holly, yes, I said it does depend on exactly what we have inspection rights to.

  Milton Mueller: (13:21) Yes, Alan's persistently repeated view that GNSO = registries and registrars is factually wrong if not bordering on offensive

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:21) Just look at all the DIDP requests that are denied

  Avri Doria: (13:22) well, 3 our of 4 SGs are commercial

  Avri Doria: (13:22) 3 out of 4

  Milton Mueller: (13:22) But 2 are not supply-industry

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:23) and the idea that ccTLD registries are all businesses doesn't quite match the diversity I see in the ccNSO

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:23) Mathieu

  Avri Doria: (13:23) And a decsion can be taken n the GNSO which has not non commercial support.  Stil i think that one SAC is sufficinet, i just don't think seeing the GNSO as predominantly commercial is such an offensive thing to perceive.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:23) The quality of sound is poor

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:23) Using the most general definition of "commercial"  I could argue that part of the NCSG (NPOC) also engages in commercial activity :)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:23) I keep losing AC room connection every five minutes or so :(

  Philip Corwin: (13:23) +1 Ed

  Avri Doria: (13:23) Jeff, that would only strengthen Alan's point

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:24) Agree with Ed.

  Brenda Brewer: (13:24) Kavouss, the sound quality is quite fine.  Would you like for us to call you again?

  Alan Greenberg: (13:24) @Milton, my comment today is substantially different from others I have made in the past. In the past, I have said that contracted parties have an effective veto to stop the Council from doing something, and that is factually correct. In this case we are talking about TAKING action, and that will depend on how the vote to exercise that power is structured - something that has not been addressed by the GNSO as far as I understand.

  Brett Schaefer: (13:24) +1 Ed

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:24) @Avri, the point I was making is that if the request is related to exercizing a comminty power, it does not rise to the definition of "commercial" in the California Code

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:24) May we categorize the inspection based on their scope and  then for some having one SO/ac AND FOR OTHERS 2 So/AC

  Avri Doria: (13:25) Jeff, we are discussing what works for ICANN, not what is technically defined in the California code.

  Alan Greenberg: (13:25) For the record, I was referring to commercial activities where ICANN is one of the parties in a transaction.

  Milton Mueller: (13:25) Alan: Noncontracted parties also have a veto power to prevent GNSO from doing anything.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:26) @Milton:  correct

  Alan Greenberg: (13:26) @Milton, yes they do under today's voting rules, IF they act in concert.

  Keith Drazek: (13:27) Is providing travel funding a commercial activity? Are the recipients involved commercially with ICANN?

  Greg Shatan: (13:27) We'll try to do more of that Alan, where we can.... :-)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:27) but Cherine, the whole point is that it should have a lower threshold because it is a precursor

  Milton Mueller: (13:27) whatever, Alamn I really don't see the discussion of GNSO related to inspection powers. If an entire SO or AC wants to inspect, they should be able to do so, that is what we are discussing now

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:27) Mathieu, are you saying that we have only two cetegories of inspection`?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:27) it should not be the same route and should not logically have the same threshold, given your own argument that it's a precursor to using one of the main proposed community powers

  ebw: (13:27) aha. as a manifestation of community power the more-than-one rule is sensible.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:27) Yes, scope is limited.

  Edward Morris: (13:28) Requests would be made by the sole designator. The SD, applying community powers, certainly can implement this power by making a request upon the the application of a single SOAC.

  Keith Drazek: (13:28) +1 Jordan

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:28) We should not limit the scope of the inspection rights to ONLY community powers.  That is a signficant narrowing that  has not been shown necessary.

  Edward Morris: (13:28) +1 Robin

  Tatiana Tropina: (13:28) +1 Robin

  Alan Greenberg: (13:28) @Keith, I would not think that funding travel is a commercial activity,  but it is a dandy thing that we might want more information on if we feel it is being abused.

  Greg Shatan: (13:29) Someone is buzzing...

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:29) Are we defining commercial activities now ? oh that would be as hard as GPI. good usage of it can halt everything I believe :)

  Malcolm Hutty: (13:29) Given how narrow and limited these inspection rights are, I'm mystified that the Board wants to constrain them further. I would have thought it would be an easy one to agree, to demonstrate cooperation and good faith, in an attempt to buy good will for their more serious opposition elsewhere

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:30) we don't have to tether them to the community powers but it is clear that that is their most likely use, in my opinion.

  Anne Aikman-Scalese (IPC): (13:30) Agree that inspection may be necessary for one SO/AC to discuss whether it wants to intitate a development of consensus of exercise of a power.

  Milton Mueller: (13:30) of course, Jordan

  Milton Mueller: (13:30) but it could also be used in connection with general accountability concerns

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:30) and Cherine's logic actually leads you to saying it should have a lower threshold.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:31) It really is simply an implementation issue to prevent vexatious overuse.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:31) Mathieu

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:31) the inspection rights are for transparency so bad things don't happen.  They are in no way tied to community powers.  There isn't a logical connection to that proposal to narrow them.

  Milton Mueller: (13:32) I oppose overuse, especially when it is "vexatious" :-) but getting a request through an entire SO already filters out a lot

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:32) That is in line with my suggestions to gategorise the inspection?

  Keith Drazek: (13:32) 1 Milton

  Keith Drazek: (13:32) +1

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (13:32) yep

  Brett Schaefer: (13:33) Yes, I also think it would filter out baltant self-interest along comercial lines like Alan is worried about

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:33) Yes Kavouss, adding a new category here following Board comment

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:33) I don't think we should expand these rights to the sort of rights Bruce discussed tbh

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:33) if we want to add them, it's not inspection, it's something new (and as Holly says, good!).

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:34) I am interruped pls read my suggestion on chat

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:34) have we addressed the Board claim that: " Code Section 6333 should not be cited in the Bylaws, as it references inspection of documents related to “interests as a member,” and membership rights and interests do not exist in ICANN. If the reference to membership rights remains, this would leave Independent Review Panels or courts to interpret questions of how California Non-Profit Membership interests might translate into the ICANN Designator model" ?


  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:35) Yes Farzaneh, no need to quote this in Bylaws

  Milton Mueller: (13:35) @Keith: 1 Milton, 1 World, 1 Internet ;-)

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:36) Thank you Mathieu

  Julia Wolman (GAC DK): (13:37) I am sorry for joining late

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:37) yeS i AGREE

  Philip Corwin: (13:37) I am less concerned with rights to see accounting documents than the right to see how ceration contracts are awarded -- especially if it has been done on a sole source, non-competitive basis and appears to have unduly generous terms.

  Edward Morris: (13:37) Sounds good in principle Mathieu

  Philip Corwin: (13:37) certain contracts

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:37) Phil, I am not interested in that at all - surely that's a governance responsibility of the Board and staff?

  Edward Morris: (13:38) I agree with Phil, particularly if there are allegations of malfeasance or impropriety in the award of contracts.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:38) good summary Mathieu, thank you.

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:38) Governance responsibility of a monopoly ? with no one else to hold them accountable ?

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (13:39) + 1 Jordan about the summary. I agree with this suggested approach

  Philip Corwin: (13:39) @Jordan, respectfully disagreeing, what if community believes that a Board decision to award such a contract is suspect

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (13:39) It must be up to the GAC to decide whether the GAC wants to be is a decisional participant in the Community powers. The Danish government thinks that the GAC should not be involved in the decision-making part of the CF.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:39) I full support Mathieuy

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:39) Farzaneh, the whole framework we are building is to hold the Board to account. If it doesn't govern ICANN properly it should be removed.

  Chris Disspain: (13:39) what Jordan is talking about is inspection rights...Phil and Ed are talking about doc disclosure which is a different thing IMO

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:40) Agree with Jordan. 

  Matthew Shears: (13:40) It would be good to hear from the GAC sooner than later on this matter

  Chris Disspain: (13:40) the inspection rights piece is intended to be as per the rights of a member

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:40) GAC consensus on this issue met no objection....

  Chris Disspain: (13:41) DIDP is a separate discussion

  Milton Mueller: (13:41) GAC consensus in which matter, Jorge?

  Milton Mueller: (13:41) @Chris: inspection does not involve document disclosure?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:41) +1 Chris

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:41) sorry Holly, you agree with Jordan on what aspect?

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:42) GAC consensus on participation in engage and escalation process

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:42) Milton: on participation in the empowered community (see my email on list)

  Milton Mueller: (13:43) " The Danish government thinks that the GAC should not be involved in the decision-making part of the CF." what is CF?

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:43) community forum I guess

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:43) To be fair @Kavouss, when you want to mandate that the Board implement GAC

  Milton Mueller: (13:43) So GAC has agreed not to become part of the Sole Designator?

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:43) From a role perspective the role of the Empowered Community is to hold the Board accountable, not to second-guess board decisions.  From a legal perspective the Board is charged with managing and directing the affairs of ICANN and the goal of the Empowered Community is to hold them accountable in doing so. 

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (13:43) "Advice", thatis not longer advisory

  Becky Burr: (13:44) i don't think that the GAC has made a formal decision Milton

  Milton Mueller: (13:44) @Becky - I guess I am confused then about what Jorge and Pedro are saying

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:44) But Holly, the community must be able to CHALLENGE a board action IN ORDER TO hold the corportation accountable to the community

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:45) Nice seque Mathieu

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:45) Agree Steve

  David McAuley (RySG): (13:45) segue

  Holly J. Gregory (Sidley): (13:45) Steve, that is what the community powers are all about

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (13:45) Thanks, at lelast someone noticed ;-)

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:45) I do not belive it should be up the GAC alone if it is provided with decisional authority.  It should be a community decision, since the community will have to live under it.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:46) it is a community decision - this CCWG has proposed GAC be decisional three times in a row

  Brett Schaefer: (13:46) +1 Robin

  Milton Mueller: (13:46) Jordan, if you consider 1/4 of the CCWG to be irrelevant, that is true

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:46) Jordan, what I am saying is that it needs to be reconsidered. 

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:46) I don't consider that irrelvant, but 1/4 don't beat 3/4

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:47) We may reconsider reviewing the deadliones but we should not increase or decrease any deadline in isolation from the other, in other words we should havean overall review of time line

  Milton Mueller: (13:47) So don't speak for "this CCWG" just come out and say "we have more votes than you and are choosing to not pursue consensus

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:47) Leon

  Thomas: (13:47) Empowering the community (the whole community including the GAC) has enjoyed overwhelming support in our previous reports. Let's not reopen that discussion, please. We are talking about limited community powers.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:47) i said, the CCWG put it in its reports. I am clearly not a spokesperson for the ccwg

  Milton Mueller: (13:48) Further, it's not clear how much of the CCWG actually SUPPORTS that, only that some of them think GAC will vote against the solution if they don't go along with it

  Thomas: (13:48) Sorry, I only typed in my first name. Thomas Rickert that is.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:48)  ARE YOU GOING TO DISCUSS the Board's suggestion to change the weighting threshold ,See their comments on Rec. 2

  Becky Burr: (13:48) I thought that our recommendation permitted the GAC to participate in a decisional mode, but I don't think the 3 drafts can fairly be read as recommending GAC participation as a decision-maker.  rather, that decision was left to GAC

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:48) And the decision was taken in opposition to public comment.  Straw polls of mostly GAC members should not be allowed to get proposals into our draft.  That is not the way the charter works.  Members are supposed to polled on such issues, not the masses on any particular call.  We made a mistake and we need to fix it before it is too date.

  Brett Schaefer: (13:49) Jordan, the GAC has not even decided that 

  Matthew Shears: (13:49) agree Becky

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:49) too "late", rather.

  Milton Mueller: (13:49) @ Becky: and I am still confused about what the GAC is choosing to do

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:49) Jordan + 1

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair, ALAC): (13:49) Yes Kavouss, we will try to disscuss all 4 points of discussion

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:49) Milton: here is the GAC consensus input from 21 december on this issue:

  Becky Burr: (13:49) ok Milton, reread Jorge's comments and I am confused as well

  Edward Morris: (13:49) +1 Milton. The difference in private conversation and public position on GAC participation is quite stunning.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:49) agreed with no formal objection of course :-)

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:50) one day GAC will decide that they want to participate, and then we ought to say oh ofcourse you can participate whenever you want

  Milton Mueller: (13:50) thanks, Jorge

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:50) Milton, do not confused. you need to allow GAC to make its comment

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:50) and here is the relevant text: Establishing an empowered community for enforcing community powers(RECOMMENDATION 1)The GAC anticipates that it intends to participate in the proposed communitymechanism with the following qualifications.The GAC would focus on participation in the processes of engagement andescalation detailed in Recommendation 2 with a view to supporting dialogue andmutual understanding that would lead to resolution of disputes rather thanescalation.GAC participation would be primarily guided by a careful and prudent analysis ofwhether the issue under consideration has public policy and/or legal implications.The GAC’s participation at the enforcement stage as appropriate is still underdiscussion.

  Brett Schaefer: (13:50) Milton, this is the GAC comment on EC participation: The GAC anticipates that it intends to participate in the proposed communitymechanism with the following qualifications.The GAC would focus on participation in the processes of engagement andescalation detailed in Recommendation 2 with a view to supporting dialogue andmutual understanding that would lead to resolution of disputes rather thanescalation.GAC participation would be primarily guided by a careful and prudent analysis ofwhether the issue under consideration has public policy and/or legal implications.The GAC’s participation at the enforcement stage as appropriate is still underdiscussion.

  Becky Burr: (13:51) so if it participates in the escalation process, isn't that participating as a decision maker?

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:51) The GAC input is clear about GAC willing to participate in engagement and escalation processes as indicated in the 3rd draft report...

  Milton Mueller: (13:51) My point exactly

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (13:51) which includes the decisional step as well...right, Becky

  Alan Greenberg: (13:52) Question on meaning.What does "empowerment of Councils" mean. Aren't the Councils (or committees) the only entity with power already, regardless of their internal rules for making decisions?

  Brett Schaefer: (13:52) It could "participate" by providing advice through the steps like SSAC or RSSAC


  Becky Burr: (13:53) wait, but Kavouss and others have said that the GAC hasn't decided about participating as a decision-maker, but this suggests that at least in some contexts the GAC will participate as a decision-maker

  Milton Mueller: (13:53) As I understand it GAC participates in CF to help determine whether something has "public policy" or legal implications.

  Matthew Shears: (13:53) I assume that when it says "GAC’s participation at the enforcement stage" that refers to the final decison-making stage?

  Milton Mueller: (13:53) And  everything and anything has public policy implications, since public policy means (according to GAC) whatever GAC wants it to

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:53) where there is broad AC/SO support for a power, we could move much FASTER than extended deadlines.   For example, we could accelerate where we have met the threshhold of AC/SOs

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:53) dear colleagues: engage, escalation and enforcement are defined in our CCWG report

  Becky Burr: (13:53) but having a view that counts in consensus making is DECISIONAL under the proposed model

  Becky Burr: (13:54) consensus making re escalation, for example

  Becky Burr: (13:54) If GAC blocks escalation of an issue, that must be seen as decisional

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:54) and all I am saying in this debate on the chat, which bears not much relationship with what we are discussing in the audio, is that the CCWG has clearly held open the door to the GAC being a decisional participant. That shoudln't be a controversial point.

  Milton Mueller: (13:55) +1 Becky

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:55) on the audio -- does anyone have strong views on this?

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:55) Becky: what counts as a GAC position is the text of the GAC position and the last one is the one from 21st december. easy, right?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:55) Jordan, making GAC decisional has been controversial since day 1, despite attempts to ignore the concern.

  Becky Burr: (13:55) not disagreeing that the door has been held open to this, but i don't think it is accurate to say (as some GAC members have said) that the GAC will remain advisory

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:56) Contravesial on what ground'

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:56) I didn't mean the substance isn't controversial

  Julia Wolman (GAC DK): (13:56) @ Milton It si the Danish view that the GAC should take part in what we view as the non-decional steps/parts of the CM not step 6 and 7

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:56) I just meant that saying what 's been in the three proposals shouldn't be controversial

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:56) sorry for not being clear

  Becky Burr: (13:57) Julia, very important question - if the GAC can block a escalation, isn't that decisional?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (13:57) it is a point which received signficant opposition to in each public comment period, and yet the concern is just swept under the rug

  Brett Schaefer: (13:57) Jordan, it has been controversial in every draft

  Matthew Shears: (13:57) Sorry - what are we doing vis-a-vis the concerns related to the timelines etc. for escalation?

  Milton Mueller: (13:57) Jordan it has been controversial in every draft

  Keith Drazek: (13:57) My understanding is that the GAC has not yet, and may not ever, reach consensus on the question of becomeing decisional. The question is how we all define "decisional" in the context of the community mechanism/powers.

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (13:57) shouldn't the bottom up multistakeholder community involve all those possible at all possible stages ?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:57) But it has made it through in every draft. So maybe we need to get a decision made by the CCWG members and know the score either way.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:57) Robin, How you count that opposition being Significant?

  Becky Burr: (13:57) I'm just trying to be sure we are absolutely clear about the role that the GAC has decided to play.  We should not call it advisory IMHO

  Milton Mueller: (13:57) @Megan: involve in the policy development process, sure

  Farzaneh Badii: (13:57) Controversial means some strongly were opposed GAC having a decisional role .

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:58) In any case, our final report has to either define GAC as decisional, or as not decisional. There is no fudging this. And it can't be a case of SOs and ACs being able to make the decision themselves.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:58) What is meant by some

  Thomas: (13:58) All, can we please have ONE discussion at the time :-)?

  Milton Mueller: (13:58) But Jordan, That is exactly what GAC is proposing (they will make the decision themselves)

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:58) Some could be 1 or 2 or 3 or ...

  Matthew Shears: (13:58) well we don't know yet if he GAC is going to be advisory or decisional - right?

  Milton Mueller: (13:58) Thomas: No.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:59) We need to really investigate the matter. W

  Milton Mueller: (13:59) It's a mult-threaded, multistakeholder, multitasking discussion

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (13:59) I feel some just are eager to ignore the position expressed by the GAC in a consensus fashion on 21st of December... why?

  Milton Mueller: (13:59) I am playing the violin also

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (13:59) Milton: they may well be saying that. My point is that they have to decide in time for the final report of this group.

  andrew sullivan: (13:59) No, it doesn't say that

  Milton Mueller: (13:59) and conferring with a student

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (13:59) those which have not commented are also to be taken into account

  Thomas: (13:59) thankfully, your mic is muted, Milton

  andrew sullivan: (13:59) If people are abstaining, they're not positively supporting

  Milton Mueller: (13:59) just kidding Thomas. I am focused like a laser

  Becky Burr: (13:59) Matthew - my point is that the GAC has decided that it WILL participate in the escalation process, which includes a decision whether or not to escalate and so the GAC has in fact decided to participate as a decision maker

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:00) Milton: nice multitasking

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (14:00) we need to decide if the GAC has the right to participate before the final report, not whether they want to or not

  Thomas: (14:00) Milton :-)

  Chris Disspain: (14:00) you're right Andrew...and that is a fundamental,metal problem with abstentions.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:00) No Andrew, that is not the definition of abstention=

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:00) Chris

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:00) abstention certainly is a lack of affirmative support, among other things

  andrew sullivan: (14:00) @Chris: only if you have a 2-value logic

  Matthew Shears: (14:00) Becky - good point

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:00) There is fundamental problem in understading abstention.

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (14:01) right Tidjane

  Alan Greenberg: (14:01) @Andrew, correct. So being ableto remove the Board over 1 objection (+ 1 abstention), but NOT being able to do it with 3 for and two abstention) is backwards.

  Greg Shatan: (14:01) Declining to be a voting member is different from abstaining.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:01) The meaning is quite clear .It signifies that those who anstains have neither oppose nor support the issue

  Becky Burr: (14:01) So I would say, Jonathan, that we have (over objections) contemplated GAC participation as a decision-maker.  Now we have a GAC decision on what role it wants to play, it is not advisory, so are there consequences that need to be discussed.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:02) +1 Becky

  Becky Burr: (14:02) I do think one consequence of this was discussed on the list this morning, and it is an important issue.

  Alan Greenberg: (14:02) 3 positives in the presence of an objection should not be more powerful than simply 3 for.

  Matthew Shears: (14:02) in issues of this import the value of abstantion is questionable

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:02) Dear all, If some of you wish to have a new definition for abstention which is inconsistent with general practice, it seems a new motion

  Avri Doria: (14:03) 2 values with 2 names for one of the values?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:03) Not at all, the abstention has a value.

  andrew sullivan: (14:04) @Avri: well, yes, if you're going to insist on counting "abstension" as "negative"

  Brett Schaefer: (14:04) Yes Jordan, very important when you need 4 votes to exercise key powers

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:04) In many instances, if the number of abstention is more than those in favour or oppose then the process is invalid

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (14:05) @Becky: if we are going to have such a discussion (re consequences of GACs participation in community mchanism), this discussion should be held for all other SOs/ACs as well

  Matthew Shears: (14:05) hopefully by the time the decisional phase is reached people will have made up their minds

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:05) PEDRO + 1

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:06) especially if we lengthen deadlines while simplifying steps

  Farzaneh Badii: (14:06) No Pedro I disagree . GAC is changing its role in the governance structure. not other SO/ACs

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:06) Andrew: we do count abstention as "not yes"

  Becky Burr: (14:06) sure Pedro, but no other SO or AC can give Advice that imposes obligations on ICANN outside of a policy development process

  Keith Drazek: (14:06) The RySG strongly supports lengthening deadlines and simplifying steps.

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (14:06) @Pedro, that doesn't make any sense. GAC as a decision maker is a structural change.

  Edward Morris: (14:06) Completely agree Steve.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:06) our thresholds are about adding up the number of SOs or ACs that support a power, to exercise it

  Matthew Shears: (14:06) + 1 Keith

  Brett Schaefer: (14:06) +1 Becky

  Keith Drazek: (14:07) +1 Becky

  Becky Burr: (14:07) also +1 Keith

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:07) you can't psychoanalyse it. The point is just the act of notmaking one, Alan.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:07) I was not looking at motives or assigning any rationale.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:08) I agree it would be a dangerous road, Fortunately it was nothing to do with what I was saying.

  andrew sullivan: (14:08) I don't get the argument why, if it's hard to get ACs or SOs involved, then the threshold needs to be lower

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (14:08) @Farnazeh: all ACs/SOs are changing their roles since this accountability system is completely new

  andrew sullivan: (14:08) this is supposed to be a community decision.   If you can't get a majority, surely that's a sign that the community isn't actually in

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:08) it was to avoid paralysis, Andrew.

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (14:08) and the community as whole is being empowered

  andrew sullivan: (14:09) @Jordan: but paralysis where some SOs or ACs are uninterested is a sign that in fact you should be paralysed

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:09) In terms of  ASO, we discussed and confirmed that we intend to participate in the procees which require votes (which may include abstaining as a decision). I note that's a different issue from what Jordan explained that a particular SO/AC cannot reach a decision but I just wanted to share the expected participation from ASO for the record. In case anyone is interested, in terms of its impact on vote counts.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:09) andrew: perhaps :-)

  andrew sullivan: (14:09) No action is still an outcome

  Milton Mueller: (14:09) Not necessarily, Andrew.

  Alan Greenberg: (14:09) @Jordan, the paraplysis example was inability to change Bylaws, and the ALAC supported a lower threshold there.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:09) Unless it marks an institutional or structural feature or limitation of that So or AC.

  Milton Mueller: (14:09) It may just mean that certain ACs don't care

  Avri Doria: (14:09) Will the SO be using PDP methods to make descision related to the community powers?

  Milton Mueller: (14:09) or have no dog in the hunt

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:10) Alan: true

  andrew sullivan: (14:10) @Milton: if they don't care, and only a minority cares, then you're not convincing the community that the board mechanism or the bylaw or whatever is not in the community interest

  Milton Mueller: (14:10) However, I agree with Andrew that the way of defining the thresshold is not well thought out.

  andrew sullivan: (14:10) What worries me of course is goring one community at the expense of others

  andrew sullivan: (14:10) but that's a problem with representative systems like this

  Milton Mueller: (14:10) Are we talking about X level of positive support, or about the absence of objection?

  Avri Doria: (14:11) If not, then the use of those procedures by the GAC accorign to their own consnesus defintions is no different that the GNSO using it methods to decide how it will go in elation to community pwoers.

  Nick Shorey - UK GAC: (14:11) @Jorge - agree

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:11) Avri: haven't we allowed the SOs and ACs to make their own decisions re procesS?

  Avri Doria: (14:11) yes

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:11) Agree, Jorge.  GAC has the right to be a community participant -- like any of the AC/SOs created in ICANN bylaws

  Alan Greenberg: (14:11) Perhaps a Board memeber would like to intervene, since they also objected to lowering the threshold for Board removal.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:12) Milton: they are reasonably carefully thought out actually.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:12) At least, that was my impression of what the group dealing with these as Dublin did.

  Avri Doria: (14:12) and since these are all new pwoers, what we do or don't do in exercise of PDPs is irrlevant.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:12) If some people wishes to exclude GAC in exercising its power then we would have  inconsistencies with core values

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (14:12) The thresholds must be clarified so a small minority cannot block the rest of the community from acting.

  Farzaneh Badii: (14:12) you think so Avri?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:12) they already do that, don't they Robin?

  Brett Schaefer: (14:12) Disagree Steve, the Sole Designator authority derives from its power to appoint to the Board, GAC does not.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:12) It requires more than one SO or AC to object to block any of the powers

  Keith Drazek: (14:13) Speaking personally, I have no objection to the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. But in doing so, there are implications (as discussed on the CCWG list earlier today) with the 2/3 threshold and whether the GAC can involve itself in a community challenge to the Board's acceptance of said GAC advice.

  Milton Mueller: (14:13) Jordan - that's good. But the board has proposed a higher threshold

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (14:13) Jordan, it needs to be clearer, in light of the lack of decision of participation of which SOAC will vote on a matter.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:13) +1 Keith.    

  Matthew Shears: (14:13) agree Keith

  Brett Schaefer: (14:13) +1 Keith

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (14:13) +1 Keith

  Alan Greenberg: (14:14) @Brett, the "Sole Designator is the entity that we have chosen to exercise the other community powers.  We could have invented a 2nd UA to do this.

  Milton Mueller: (14:14) @Robin - another good point. We have to have a fixed "electorate" to know what the threshold is

  Keith Drazek: (14:14) Perhaps we need to carve out the GAC's participation in that specific case.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:14) Robin the whole framework is premised on clarity for that.

  Brett Schaefer: (14:14) GAc shoudl have to choose between participation or priviledged advisory power to the Board

  Keith Drazek: (14:14) If it wants to retain the 2/3 threshold obligation.

  Becky Burr: (14:14) not acceptance Keith - implementation!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:14) If we change the decisional SO/ACs, we have to review the #s in the table.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (14:14) Keith: would agree if we apply the same rule neutrally to all SO/AC with a 2/3 threshhold for Board rejection

  Brett Schaefer: (14:14) Edit -- GAC should

  Keith Drazek: (14:14) Yes, thanks Becky. I stand corrected.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:14) Milton: we do have a fixed (s)electorate.

  Avri Doria: (14:14) how different is desingating a non voting member to the board from a voter on the board.  I guess that is a legal qquestion.  Are non voting board members not designated?

  Milton Mueller: (14:15) GAC is not an SO for policy development. It is an AC.

  Becky Burr: (14:15) Jorge - just as soon as you give each SO the right to provide advice that the Board cannot reject without a supermajority

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:15) Brett: that argument has been run several times but hasn't succeeded in convincing the CCWG has a whole. I don't think views on it are unstable.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:15) Mathieu , the fundamental  Bylaws MUST have some sort of stability thus can not have the same threshold as standrad Bylaws since there would be no difference between the two

  Avri Doria: (14:15) these pwoers are not policy development processes.

  Becky Burr: (14:15) and PDPs are not the same as Advice

  Becky Burr: (14:15) +1 Avri

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:15) Kavouss -- Mathieu's suggestion relates to the fundamental bylaws power being a co-approval process, after public consultation etc.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:15) @Kavouss: big difference is that Fund Bylaw is a prior approval power

  Alan Greenberg: (14:15) WE are in the curious position of saying we want the community to take responsibility for important issues, but are worried that they would not care enough to do anything.

  Milton Mueller: (14:16) Avri, they can be PDP powers, but they can also remove board members. How is it that the bylaws bar GAC from appointing a board member but allow them to vote on removing one?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:16) If they may not case, why do we wantto give them power?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:16) case = care

  andrew sullivan: (14:16) @Alan: I agree, but to me that's a reason why  "default fail" is ok

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:17) Jordan, No problem for that but the threshold for FBL Must be higher than SBL

  Milton Mueller: (14:17) Alan: this is the problem you created by creating a single member or single designator

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:17) we have considerred it, Tijani. more than one abstention SHOULD kill the power.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:17) that's the judgement that has been made.

  Milton Mueller: (14:17) Some SOs may care very much, others not, but the "Sole" means that they have to act together

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:17) Kavouss: why?

  Matthew Shears: (14:17) @ Jordan - is that explicit?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:18) @Milton, *I* didn't create it. We did. But the result of multiple whatevers is the same. We would just count the "votes" differently

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:18) Matthew: would need to check

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (14:18) at least we stopped pretending we are no longer "voting"...

  Avri Doria: (14:19) you win

  Brett Schaefer: (14:19) @Robin, don't remind everyone

  Thomas: (14:19) Robin, we are discussing consensus based decision making with qualifications

  Avri Doria: (14:19) it is unfortuante, but that is what the group seems to want.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (14:19) a vote by any other name, still smells the same ;-)

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:20) Robin -- the expression of preference is still a vote.   But we are NOT counting votes to determine a simple majority or supermajority.  That's how we departed from the earlier voting scheme

  cherine chalaby: (14:20) The Board said in its comments that it would not support vlowering of any of these thresholds because these community poers represent th voice of the ICANN community.  A reduction of the threshold could risk that a decision does not reflect the community's will.

  Avri Doria: (14:20) once we moved to counting postive votes, we moved away from consensus into voting.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:20) please can we keep in mind that Fundamental Bylaws and Standard Bylaws are *totally different* processes.

  Milton Mueller: (14:20) No, 3 SO/ACs vs. 2 is not counting at all, it is Steve?

  Avri Doria: (14:21) then again in the GNSO consensus alwasy means voting.

  Nick Shorey - UK GAC: (14:21) As an aside, did we reach any conclusion on the discussion around timelines? Grateful if someone could PM me to clarify.


  Milton Mueller: (14:21) A raising of the thresshold makes it more likely that ICANN can do things that don't reflect the community's will. There will never be unanimity about anything

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:21) it can't with ffundamental bylaws, Milton... quite the opposite

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:21) and there is no requirement for unanimity on any power, Milton

  Avri Doria: (14:21) why will there never be unanimity?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:22) I did send a chart showing impact of percentages. Perhaps it couldbe displayed.

  Brett Schaefer: (14:22) Yes, also curious about timelines Nick.

  Matthew Shears: (14:22) same

  Avri Doria: (14:23) in a 3 value voting system, one can have just positve and absention but no objection and thus have consensus without counting.

  Farzaneh Badii: (14:23) AC on human rights ???? what a great idea!

  Avri Doria: (14:23) Farzi, i like that idea.

  Greg Shatan: (14:23) It's likely we would need to revisit these powers if new ACs or SOs are created.  Don't really need to put in percentages now (if ever).

  Keith Drazek: (14:23) The timelines are a crucial issue. The RySG views the current timeline as unworkable in the context of the GNSO's ability to establish a consensus position in a bottome up manner, relying on its SGs and Cs.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (14:23) it's a cut hand

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:24) I think the decision regarding timeframes was to write up the idea of combining some steps with longer timeframes

  Milton Mueller: (14:24) @Jorge - are we cutting off each other's hands now?

  Greg Shatan: (14:24) +1 Alan (consistent with my note above).

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:24) and bounce it back to the list for review

  Greg Shatan: (14:24) This is not a rote exercise in expansion.

  Keith Drazek: (14:24) Ok thanks Jordan, support that approach.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:24) +1 Alan

  Brett Schaefer: (14:24) Thx Jordan, looking forward to seeing it.

  David McAuley (RySG): (14:24) And possibly remioving hard edges Jordan?

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:25) Actually Alan - @RSSAC and @SSAC both have very limited scope, comapred to ALAC or GAC.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:25) David: is that code for something?!

  Matthew Shears: (14:25) does anyone know what "an extensive engagement process" by the Board means - para 1

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (14:25) @Milton--- better to cut deals :-)

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:25) The concept of an advisory committee is really that we want ta standing group of experts becuase we frequently seek advice ona particular topic area.

  David McAuley (RySG): (14:25) combining steps but making timelines general within the overall limit

  David McAuley (RySG): (14:25) I thought I heard that

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:25) That would be helpful Jordan, about writing up the timeline. From your explaination, it makes sense and prgamatic.

  Keith Drazek: (14:26) Jordan is correct. Any new SOs or ACs would require a bylaws change anyway, so case-by-case is logical.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:26) We perhaps maintain what we have now and having an alternative option outlining one or two AC(SO as an informative suggestion which could be implemented if such circumstances arise

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:26) + 1 Keith

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (14:26) +1 Jordan

  Matthew Shears: (14:27) + 1 both

  Chris Disspain: (14:27) if we don't go with % then we must draft a process for dealing with changes

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:27) Chris: no, we don't

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:27) Chris, this is the Fundamental Bylaw change process


  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:27) we don't need to do that any more than we need to draft a new process for changing any of the rest of this tramewrok

  Chris Disspain: (14:27) ok then will we deal with changes?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:27) to the fundamental bylaws?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:27) @Chris, doesn't that go along with having to change the bylaws to allow for the new AC/SO?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:27) as per the processes set out in this report.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:27) to the standard bylaws? as per the current process.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:27) +1 Alan

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:28) I'm not 100% sure if the creation of a new AC requires bylaws changes......

  Alan Greenberg: (14:28) As I said, the percentages woud be a fine default or guideline.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:28) but defining decisional participants in the acountability sole designator would definitely be a change to fundamental bylaws.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:28) Jordan+ 1

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (14:29) I agree with you Steve

  Megan Richards, European Commission: (14:29) thanks for clarification Steve

  Greg Shatan: (14:29) Jordan, since ACs are created by the ICANN Bylaws, I am virtually 100% sure that it would require Bylaws changes to do so.

  Chris Disspain: (14:30) You're right Greg

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:30) If the expansion of the organisation is tied with change of BYLAWS ,it may put some ostable to meet the future community requirements

  Chris Disspain: (14:30) you can't create a new SO at AC absent the bylaw

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:30) ARTICLE XI: ADVISORY COMMITTEESSection 1. GENERALThe Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board.

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:30) The concept was that using a threshold percentage at a fundamental level - would avoid the need for changing a fundamental bylaw when chaning a bylaw somewhere else regarding adding an advisory committee.

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:31) Unless of course adding or substracting an advisory comimttee is a fundamental bylaw change.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:31) i'm 100% confident I am correct, Greg. :-)

  Chris Disspain: (14:31) Correct Jordan...which illustrates the point about not all ACs being equal

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:31) Jordan 1 1

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:31) Certainly the oroiginal intent I think is that Acs could be created as need to give the community "advice".   It seems we have moved to these advisory bodies having decisional powers.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:31) any change to the set of SOs or ACs that can make decisions on the community powers would require fundamental bylaws changes, yes.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:31) I don't think that's an accident.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:31) But Bruce, many of us believe that a change to AC/SO numbers SHOULD trigger a discussion of whether/how to adjust threshholds for community powers

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:32) but the Board could still create new ACs as per the bylaws, no problem. that's as it should be.

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:32) Yes understand @Steve.   It seems there is a concern about dilting the pwoer of the incumbent decisional bodies :-)\

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:33) Bruce: or a concern with not allowing the Board to stack the decisional process with new ACs.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:33) I don't think either observation is likely, or helpful, to be honest.

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:33) @Jordan - ah OK - so you are essnetially suggesting classes of ACs.  SOme tiwht decisional pwoers and some purely with advisory powers.  

  Chris Disspain: (14:33) but you still felt the need to say it!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:34) Bruce: yes, because that is what we have already proposed, based on the requests of two of the ACs. Doesn't seem like a problem.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:34) Chris: sometimes examples help make a point. *smiles sweetly*

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (14:34) let's have the break folks... insane bunch... ;-)

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:34) @Jordan - Yes I can see the other side from a trust perspective as well.  

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (14:34) except that they are "advisory" committees before and now they are "decisional" committees

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:35) and since neither community nor board can change fundamental bylaws on their own, there's a nice symmetry there, I would have thought.

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:36) @Jordan - Yes, I now undertand the thinking behind the CCWG recommendation - thanks.

  Chris Disspain: (14:36) Agree Bruce..

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:37) cool

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:37) We were trust trying to allow the org to evolve - But I can see that we are sepaerating out advisory committee granted community pwoers in the fundamental bylaws, with an advisory committee that may not have such powers.   At some poit we might want to improve our terminaology - but at least I udnerstand the distinctin.

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:37) I don;t have a particular problem with it - just worth understanding the rationale.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:38) yeah

  Chris Disspain: (14:38) it's the crux of the issue we have just put off discussing

  Chris Disspain: (14:38) equal weight

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:38) it's also why we were keen to make sure that by accident we don't lock those bylaws down too tight

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:38) which is why I actually think Mathieu's suggestion to lower that threshold makes sense (rather than the variable model for 4 vote thresholds we had mentioned)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:38) should break!!!

  Brenda Brewer: (14:39) On break, will reconvene at 15 minutes before top of hour.

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:40) or in 5 minutes from now

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:46) welcome back to the madhouse

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:46) We are back indeed...

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (14:46) yeah

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:47) makes sense to re-add

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:48) Kavouss: that's the next point we are discussing.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:48) we are currently on point 1, not point 2.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:49) it seems uncontroversial to add back former text to give the CWG comfort.

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (14:49) agree to re-add

  Matthew Shears: (14:50) yes

  Bruce Tonkin: (14:50) Paragraph 10 looks fine to me.

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:50) ICANN proposed that IETF be involved

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:50) Who represts IETF?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:50) the IETF does, presumably? IAB?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:51) How IAB is participating?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:51) they don't want to - they have been clear about that

  ebw: (14:52) two nits: there could be a threshold, under which no need to "include the voice" of anyone.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (14:52) @Alan = can you explain why?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:53) May we ask Bruce to justify the Board^'s proposal

  ebw: (14:53) second nit, the ietf may not be the sole party with an interest in "protocol parameters" curated by the iana function operator.


  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:54) Yes Kavouss.

  andrew sullivan: (14:54) Eric is quite right about the parameters: in principle, IANA may provide for others (some think they do already)

  andrew sullivan: (14:54) (provide that same function)

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:55) That is consistent with current wording Andrew right ?

  andrew sullivan: (14:55) I think so.  I have a different issue :)

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:55) ok fair enough ;-)

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:56) In exercising the power, CCWG referred to SO/Ac AND NOT OPERATIONAL COMMUNITY.

  Matthew Shears: (14:56) the use of the word "must include" could cause issues if one or more of the OCs decide for whatever reason not to participate?

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:56) "should" include

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:56) ?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:57) In fact 3 of 4 operational communities mentioned by ICANN are alread in ASO , GNSO and cc NSO the only community needs to addressed is IETF

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:58) must be able to include / must take into account views expressed by.... (but this may be subsumed by Andrew's comments)

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (14:58) Then how IAB is to be considred to be part of the existing SO/AC

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:58) it isn't, Kavouss

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (14:58) Andrew is explaining why, now.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (14:58) And they are not asking to be

  Chris Disspain: (14:59) Question for clarification: Is it correct that the community could block ICANN from performing its obligations under its SLA with IETF?

  Chris Disspain: (15:00) by vetoing the IANA budget?

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:00) no chris

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:00) hard to see how given that a block would only lead to the caretaker budget coming into operation

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:00) those would be part of the caretaker budget

  Chris Disspain: (15:00) Andrew is just saying

  Chris Disspain: (15:01) excellent

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:01) yah

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:01) I think ther eis a differece between how we treat IANA under a caretaker budget versus the broader budget

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:01) yes, but no questino about what the principle is.

  Alissa Cooper: (15:01) agree with Andrew (as an individual IETF participant)

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:02) yes bruce but in both cases essential services and contracts would be upheld

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:02) and clear need for implementation to define the contours of the caretaker - which in all cases has to protect the ability to deliver contractual obligations, right?

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:02) yep

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:02) JZuck said it better with fewer words :)

  Matthew Shears: (15:02) replace "must" with "should" and delete the secnd sentence

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (15:03) It is the same logic for the numbers community as well, that we have the  new SLA in place which addresses IANA Numbering Sevices related matters. As long as IFO can deliver the services required with the cost  (in our case, max fees cap) defined in our SLA that's OK.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:03) The Registries are responhsible for a substantial part of the budget and they pay the costs.  Unfortunately the registries do ot have SLAs with the Registries (yet)

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:03) That could be an enhancement ot the last sentence that ICANN contonues to meet the SLA for IANA. - certainly as part of a caretaker budget

  ebw: (15:03) i think so too bruce, and the caretaker budget can't anticipate any panding request to expand the existing service, so it is, as chris suggests, supra, a means of frustrating a portion of the relationship, not yet covered by an sla (or an implemented service to provide an sla).

  Greg Shatan: (15:03) This is the ICANN community.  Also, keep in mind that this is a requirement of the CWG.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:03) I think the comments thus far as being based on the relationship with the IETF and the numbering community, but does not reflect the relationship with the registries

  andrew sullivan: (15:04) @Jeff: correct: I was only talking about the IETF's views

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:04) there will be SLEs in place tho, right, Jeff? as per CWG process....

  Alissa Cooper: (15:04) I would say "may" rather than "should" if the sentence cannot be deleted

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (15:05) @Jeff : registries are already included since ccNSO and gNSO are fully part  of the process AND the CWG-Stewardship has reminded us THEY are drafting a naming process

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:05) @Jordan, that is true and I have been working with you on that...but that is not in place yet

  Phil Buckingham: (15:05) yes  I agree Bruce .  Andrew , I agree the IANA  budget should be fixed  and ring  fenced , completely  separate .

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:05) the point is, the decision maker shouldn't ignore the views of the operational communities

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:05) we are looking for a commitment to listen and take those views into account if offered, right.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:05) not trying to force IETF/IAB into a decision role they don't want.

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (15:06) I want to also clarify Discussions Notes on the ASO part. We are not opposed to incorporating process for OCs to be involved in IANA budget as long as it doesn't affect the timelines for CCWG to deliver the final proposal, and would not cause concerns for other stakeholders.

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:06) Phil sources of funds prevent complete seperation in some cases but we've already specified they are separate veto processes

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:06) so, disagree with what Kavouss has just proposed.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:06) +! Jordan.....we just want to make sure that special attention is paid to the "customers" of IANA

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:06) Jeff: as one, I couldn't complain. :)

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:07) +1 Bruce

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:07) the SLA will probably go a long way to dictate the caretaker budget details

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:08) Bruce: hard to see how anyone would veto that tho, right?

  andrew sullivan: (15:08) Look, clearly it isn't that the IAB or IETF "doesn't care".  It's that there's a service-provider function here

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:08) andrew: and you want to run that in a normal, logical way

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:08) +1 Andrew

  andrew sullivan: (15:08) My customers don't get to tell me how to deliver on the SLAs I have

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:08) and not micromanage or interfere in the internal affairs of your service provider

  andrew sullivan: (15:08) and we think we want to maintain that arrangement between ICANN and IETF

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:08) exactly

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:08) makes 100% sense.

  andrew sullivan: (15:08) Yes, exacty

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:09) [if only we registries had the same arrangement :) ]

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:09) exactly Jordan

  Alan Greenberg: (15:09) The concept that the non-operational communities (ie the GAC and ALAC which are the only ones left)  try to veto a firewall over travel conveys a rather sad image of the ACs. And besides, we do not have enough power amond us to invoke ANY community power.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:09) and why would you want to, anyway, Alan?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:10) everyone's interests are served by a stable and secure DNS

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:10) it's a strange straw man to consider

  Alan Greenberg: (15:10) Clearly because we value world travel over stability of the Internet! Or so some people feel.

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:10) and would probably be necessary to uphold the contract

  Alan Greenberg: (15:11) But regardless, without support of at least some SOs (ie part of the operational community), we have no power anyway.

  ebw: (15:11) the notion that a fragile stateful device (aka "firewall") is an unexamined good is just as unfortunate as the notion that travel is optional.

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:13) What paragraph are we discussing now?

  Phil Buckingham: (15:13) + 1 Bruce  to a new firewall . Jonathan  put in a transfer pricing policy / strategy between ICANN / IANA . Implemen

  ebw: (15:13) bruce para 22

  Phil Buckingham: (15:14) Implementation  issue  totally.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:14) as noted in audio, pretty relaxed either way.

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:14) Ah thanks ebw - I thoght we had moved on from that.

  ebw: (15:14) wishfull thinking

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:14) we are actually on point 3

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:15) of the key discussion points

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (15:15) (page 1)

  Phil Buckingham: (15:15) CLO +1  lightly on the words

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:17) I agree with Jonathan

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:17) and think too that it makes sense

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (15:18) As a Member of the forementioned by me DT-0 of the CWG   I would be happy with the approach Charine  just outlined

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:18) get the framework represented there

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:18) but not overload the fundamental bylaws with details

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:18) Agreed @Jordan

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:18) just a quick response on this

  Keith Drazek: (15:18) +1 Jordan

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (15:19) Yup!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:20) not in favour of making it standard.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:20) it has to be fundamental, along with the rest of the governance framework

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:20) and the PTI framework, which CWG also requires to be fundamental

  Avri Doria: (15:21) agree with Alan

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:21) I'm in favor it being a fundamental bylaw.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:21) I got the impression that those comments were a little confused re interaction with CWG requirements

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:21) (both comments were identical)

  Jonathan Zuck (ACT): (15:21) have to get back to CES. Thanks folks!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:21) ciao Jonathan!

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:22) For info: this is the full text of the GAC consensus input of December 21st on recommendation 5: Changing aspects of ICANN’s Mission. Commitments and Core Values (RECOMMENDATION 5) The GAC notes that legal advice is being sought by the CCWG to clarify the practical effect of this Recommendation, and believes this is appropriate. The GAC expects that any changes will not reduce the current role of the GAC in providing advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN’s policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues (as provided in the current ByLaws). This includes issues such as consumer protection, the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and law enforcement. The GAC further expects that changes to ICANN’s mission and core values should not constrain the Board from accepting and implementing GAC advice. In addition, ICANN’s ability to enforce con

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:22) contracts.

  Avri Doria: (15:22) How do we confirm that mission clarifications do not change the mission from what it is today.

  Avri Doria: (15:23) or are changes to the mission in scope for WS1?

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:24) I don't understand that last line on this slide.

  Phil Buckingham: (15:24) Got to drop off the call. Thanks.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (15:24) Thanks Phil ! TTY soon

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:24) sorry, last GAC para was as follows: "The GAC further expects that changes to ICANN’s mission and core values should not constrain the Board from accepting and implementing GAC advice. In addition, ICANN’s ability to enforce contractual obligations and act upon the public policy advice of the GAC should not be inadvertently impacted."

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:25) Jorge - Is the GAC basically saying that anything the GAC Advises on should always be deemed to be within the Scope of ICANN and be implemented?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:26) I doubt that is what GAC is saying.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:26) @Jeff: I wouldn't read that into the GAC input

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:27) @Jorge - Thanks


  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (15:27) The Board can of course only take decisions based on the GAC advice that is within the ICANN’s mission. But what we need a clear answer to is if the proposed changes to the Mission Statement would imply that the Board in future would be further constrained in taking the GAC advice into account, for example à la the advice the GAC has given on “sensitive strings”

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:28) +1 Finn


  Brett Schaefer: (15:28) The fact that people are confused, indicates that clarity is needed. I think it should be made clear that Board Decisions based on GAC advice are subject to IRP and the limits of ICANN's mission and core values.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:29) I think Becky gave the answer which is that the Board would take that advice but implementation of that advice must be in accordance with the ICANN mission

  Brett Schaefer: (15:29) Jeff,

  Brett Schaefer: (15:30) Jeff, yes that is what was discussed in e-mail and here, but it shoudl be made explicit to avoid confusion and to make sure that is understood in the drafting of bylaws.

  Keith Drazek: (15:30) +1 Becky, Jeff and Brett

  Matthew Shears: (15:32) what kind of scope? business, operational, ....?

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:33) @Jeff: broadly yes, but be careful with the term "take that advice"; if the advice were inherently inconsistent with the Bylaws, the Board's duty would be to reject it.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:33) But why focus only on ICANN's implementation of just GAC advice?   Don't we want the corporation to be limited in implementing any policies that exceed its mission?

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:33) @Steve, agree

  Matthew Shears: (15:33) + 1

  Keith Drazek: (15:34) Yes. Implementation of any policies to inlcude those resulting from GAC advice.

  Brett Schaefer: (15:34) Steve, yes, all Board decisions should be subject to IRP and be limited by ICANN's scope and mission. The GAC's statemtn raises questions about whether  GAC agrees with that, which is why we have focused there.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:34) @Malcolm and @Steve...yeah I was not clear.  By "take", I literally meant that the Board can receive the GAC Advice (literally).  Nothing would prevent the GAC from giving that adviceto the Board.  But you are right, the Board should not accept such advice unless it is within ICANN's mission

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:34) Dear all: I feel for policy maker what the GAC and others are seeking is quite simple, which is an impact assessment of the proposed changes. This is current practice and should be acceptable without any doubt. In the GACs input a series of elements are identified which should be part of that impact assesment. Otherwise we have no clarity at all and no objective and neutral assesment at hand which would allow us to determine whether the proposed changes (which have been subject to last minute changes for a long time) outlaw certain important instruments which are available now, such as the PICs

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:35) I disagree with characterisation of "rising to the level of a GPI"; it's more "doesn't offer a better justification than the bare assertion of GPI"

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:35) Agree with Malcom.

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:35) Just to be clear we did not say we objected to parts of the mission on "pubklic interest": grounds.   WE gave specific rationale for each of our comments.

  Brett Schaefer: (15:35) Edit- statement/comment

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:36) Right, Becky.   Picket Fence just defines things that can be imposed upon existing contracts.   ICANN's scope is broader than just what's in that fence

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:36) In other words, I think we shoud place *less* weight on their repeated but unsupported objection, not more weight than to those for which they give articulated reasons

  Chris Disspain: (15:36) exactly Bruce...and we said that absent any change we would then need to consider the public interest

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:36) @Jorge - the "sensitive string issue" and others are hard to do an impact analysis on.  Yes, the GAC has given that advice, but I think there is still a debate on whether and how ICANN can implement that advice.  I know that sounds controversial and I do not mean it to be, but I believe there are still IRPs out there listening to these cases.

  Chris Disspain: (15:37) Malcolm..please read our comments...ALL have rationale

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:37) We agree taht it is important to procvide clarity on ICANn's mission, but the text shoudl result in parts of ICANN's core operations with IANA a, and gtld policies are not inadvertently made void.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:38) why is always "grandfathering"?  what about "grandmother"?   Doesn't she count?  ;-)

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:38) @Jeff: there are much more complicated issues where policy people do impact assessments... what we cannot do, is to endorse a change without knowing what implications it has

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (15:38) is "grandpersoning" acceptable ?

  Chris Disspain: (15:38) how about 'grandpersoning' Robin ;-)

  Chris Disspain: (15:38) snap!

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (15:38) Great minds Chris...

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:38) :-)

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (15:38) If you are “grandfathering” the existing PICs, you indicate uncertainty as to whether PICs in new registry agreements can be included and enforced.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:39) @Jorge - Understood. But you asked specifically about "sensitive strings" and I agree with Becky that nothing should stop an aggrieved party from challenging whether that advice/implementation was within ICANN's mission

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:39) +1 Finn (again)

  Keith Drazek: (15:40) @Finn: Yes, future New gTLD RA PICs should be subject to a mission test.

  andrew sullivan: (15:40) @Robin: some people apparently like to call the same thing "accepted as established"

  Keith Drazek: (15:40) Particularly non-voluntary PICs.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:40) @Jeff: no problem with that. The question is: what is the impact on these questions in the future if we are rewriting the limits of what is acceptable, i.e. the Mission

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:40) +! Keith.

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:40) Very well explained Becky

  Greg Shatan: (15:42) Agree with Finn -- the "elephant in the room" is which current ICANN practices, if any, are arguably outside the Mission?

  Julia Wolman (GAC DK): (15:42) I think an impact assessment would be a prudent thing to do

  Alan Greenberg: (15:42) It is not so much outside of ICANN's MISSION, but other parts of Article I - commitments such as bottom-up.

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:43) So am I

  Greg Shatan: (15:43) In particular, are there "booby traps" set in the revised Mission intended to eliminate particular current practices?

  Nick Shorey - UK GAC: (15:43) @Julia +1 this sounds like a sensible idea

  Alan Greenberg: (15:43) Greg, perhaps not "current" practices, but those that have been used in the past and are now enshrined in contracts.

  Keith Drazek: (15:44) Is the GAC volunteering to conduct an impact assessment? ;-)

  Greg Shatan: (15:44) It anyone has put in such "booby traps," it would be nice to know, rather than have to bring in the bomb-sniffing dogs (or lawyers)....

  Greg Shatan: (15:44) Alan, I would absolutely count those as "current."

  Alan Greenberg: (15:44) Greg, look at stress tests 29 and 30 (I think those are the numbers)

  Avri Doria: (15:44) Greg, could well be.  until someone does a n analysis between the existing mission and the proposed mission, we won't know.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:44) As long as the Impact Assessment is not deemed in any way a waiver by any aggreived party to challenge any existing policy or practice as being outside even the current mission

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (15:45) @Keith: Why should future New gTLD RA PICs  be subject to a mission test. ?

  Keith Drazek: (15:45) @Finn: Why shouldn't they be?

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:45) @Finn....everything ICANN does should be subject to a mission test

  Malcolm Hutty: (15:45) This "voluntary" question is a red-herring. It only seeks to protect registries from undue burden. But the main thrust of community comment is not aimed at that, but at preventing ICANN from acting outside the Mission even in conspiracy with registries

  Greg Shatan: (15:45) Alan, I think Stress Tests 28 and 29 are abominations (though improved greatly from the second draft).  But I agree that they serve as "markers" for certain booby traps.

  Greg Shatan: (15:46) I would love to banish the word "voluntary" from this discussion.  BUt it does distinguish one class of PICs from another.

  Milton Mueller: (15:46) There can be no scientific or conclusive "impact assessment" - it is assuming that we can predict all cases that will arise in the future, what will be challenged, and what will be ruled ouside of the mission

  Brenda Brewer: (15:46) Scroll for all

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:47) I agree with Milton

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (15:47)  @Keith:  I asked first-:)

  Keith Drazek: (15:47) :-)

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:47) @Keith - Finn got you there

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:47) @Milton: are you suggesting to take a decision without knowing the impact of the changes?

  Chris Disspain: (15:47) Becky, Mathieu, may I suggest this topic deserves a separate call of its own?

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (15:48) Suggestion noted Chris. Sensible

  ebw: (15:48) +1 on a separate call

  Milton Mueller: (15:48) Jorge: I am saying we should implement a principle that ICANN's mission and scope should be limited.

  Milton Mueller: (15:48) You are asking us to predict what exactly will be ruled out of mission, without even knowing specific cases

  Avri Doria: (15:48) I disagree with Milton on Impact assesment.  while no Impact assesment can be 100%, the blindness that ensures from not doing impact analysis can be 100%

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (15:48) @Keith: Thx for the clear answer!!

  Milton Mueller: (15:48) impossible

  Greg Shatan: (15:48) No impact assessment can ever do that, but that does not mean impact assessments are useless.  Perhaps "impact assessment" is too heavy-duty a characterization for the task of figuring out what if anything is going to find itself "out in the cold" as a result of this non-change in the Mission.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:48) Milton: that is fine, but that is not what is being proposed

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:49) what is being proposed is to change the Mission

  Greg Shatan: (15:49) Agree that a separate call is necessary and appropriate.  I have a hard stop at the top of the hour.  For another ICANN call.  :-(

  Milton Mueller: (15:49) No, what is being proposed is to define and limit the mission to what is was always supposed to be

  ebw: (15:49) i've a nit with the specific reference to the dns in this section.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:50) @Kavuouss - even the current Mission constrains ICANN's ability to implement GAC Advice

  Keith Drazek: (15:50) The introduction of non-voluntary PICs was a terrible procedural development. Any future attempt to impose PICs should be subject to a mission test. I'm not sure why that is controversial.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:50) Sorry I should have put "may constrain"

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:50) Milton: that is a very academic assessment I feel. We are changing a legal document. That has legal implications and legal consequences on what is permissible. The question is which ones?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:50) Agree with Keith.

  Becky Burr: (15:50) GAC can provide whatever Advice it wants.  there are NO constraints on that.  ICANN must act consistent with its Bylaws when implementing GAC.  That is absolutely clear, i honestly do not understand the confusion here

  ebw: (15:51) "openness, interoperability, resilence, security and/or stability (now blue text) of the DNS;"

  Greg Shatan: (15:51) This reminds me of the time when we "clarified" the boundaries between the neighbor's property and ours.  While the boundaries had never changed, we found that they built their fence on our land.

  Milton Mueller: (15:51) @ Avri, I am not proposing unawareness of impact. The assessment of the impact of the mission limitation has been discussed and assessed at great length.

  Greg Shatan: (15:51) Unfortunately we are not dealing with somehting so tangible as the metes and bounds of real property.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:51) @Keith - I agree - Registries that had spent millions of dollars to apply were led to believe that if they didnt adopt "voluntary PICs", there applications for those TLDs would be rejected by ICANN

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:51) we will have to come back to this on another call

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:52) Milton: where is such an assesment? based on legal grounds? and from a neutral party?

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:52) there isn't

  Milton Mueller: (15:52) @Jorge: which ones? It would prevent ICANN from extending its monopoly on DNS to control services and content simply because they use a domain name

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:52) @Jeff -- wasn't the leverage that GAC might object to the application if PICs were not adopted?

  Becky Burr: (15:52) BRUCE - I said you thought the regulatory prohibition wasn't appropriate in the Mission statement and that its inclusion could raise public interest concerns.  I think the only issue that rises to that level is the regulatory prohibition

  Greg Shatan: (15:52) And of course, there are no end of border disputes in the real world.  Border disputes regarding ICANN's mission may well become a sport after this, even more than in the past.

  Becky Burr: (15:52) contracts are not policy

  Becky Burr: (15:53) so i would be more inclined to put it in the general provisions relating to contract

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (15:53) While I was working for a former employer, personally I can tell you that the pressure to adopt "voluntary PICs" was enormous in the sense that many felt if they did not adopt these "voluntary PICs", they would lose the millions of dollars they already invested

  Keith Drazek: (15:53) Yes Jeff. It was an 11th-hour development that was not part of the guidebook.

  Becky Burr: (15:53) single line for ALL FUNCTIONS?

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:53) Milton: now that is overly broad and political. We need a neutral, objective assesment of what those changes imply. Perhaps we all like the conclusions. Perhaps we do not. But we need that

  Chris Disspain: (15:54) I don't think Bruce was being literal, Becky

  Brett Schaefer: (15:54) Becky, it arises from the GAC comment which states, " "The GAC further expects that changes to ICANN’s mission and core values should not constrain the Board from accepting and implementing GAC advice." It is not clear that teh GAC sees the issue as black an white as you do. We shoudl resolve any uncertainty now rather than leaving this as a possible dispute later.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:54) Jorge: isn't that what this group is for?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:54) "voluntary PICS" allow ICANN "to make you an offer you can't refuse"


  Milton Mueller: (15:55) Bears repeating: "if they did not adopt these "voluntary PICs", they would lose the millions of dollars they already invested"

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:55) @Becky - in our email dialgoue I was referring to the facor that ICNAN doesn't use the term "egulator" to descibe its role,  I think the exact term used in the bylaws is a drafting issue.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:55) Jordan: we have very different interests and also different degrees of insider knowledge. On other legal issues (and this is also one) we have sought third-party advice. Why is there such resistance to do the same here?

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:56) The ICNAN lawyers are coencerned about how describing ICANn as a regulator may have with repsect to various legal disputes that happen in the USA jurisidction.

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:56) I think our principles are:

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:56) - have a simple mission statement

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:56) - have a clear set of scope limitations on that mission

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:56) I find it shocking that ALAC does not support "bottom-up" policy development.

  Milton Mueller: (15:56) @Bruce - if your lawyers concerns are valid, then you should strongly SUPPORT a mission statement that bars ICANN from regulating things outside its mission

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (15:57) jorge, i'm not resisting anything, just asking a question :)

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:57) jordan: I did not mean you :-)

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:57) - incorp-orate some text in the bylaws that is smuch more specific to the gTLD policy developmand and gTLD contract element that is very clear that gTLD poloices need to be bottom up, etc (from the existing registry and registrar agreements), and ensure that ICANn cannot get into regulating content that is referred to byu the Intrent unqiue identifiers.

  Bruce Tonkin: (15:58) agreed @Milton - it was more that the current activities of ICANn were described as a regulator.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (15:59) @staff Please include this on the notes as probably I won't have time to speak: jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): Dear all: I feel for policy maker what the GAC and others are seeking is quite simple, which is an impact assessment of the proposed changes. This is current practice and should be acceptable without any doubt. In the GACs input a series of elements are identified which should be part of that impact assesment. Otherwise we have no clarity at all and no objective and neutral assesment at hand which would allow us to determine whether the proposed changes (which have been subject to last minute changes for a long time) outlaw certain important instruments which are available now, such as the PICs

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:59) We (ICANN) created a new gTLD Guidebook that gave GAC unconstrained power to object to applications/strings.  No wonder the GAC insisted on top-down commitments (PICs).  And registry applicants had to accept those PICs to avoid incurring a possibly fatal  objection from GAC

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:59) We don't use that Guidebook anymore.  So let's not try to un-ring that bell.

  Bruce Tonkin: (16:00) @Milton - the Board agrees that ICANn shoudl have a narrow limited mission.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (16:00) And despite the mistake of empowering GAC in the GTLD process, we (CCWG) propose a signficant further empowerment of GAC.

  Nick Shorey - UK GAC: (16:00) @Jorge agree

  Avri Doria: (16:00) But does that mean the mission should be changed to be narrower than it currently is?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (16:00) Mathieu

  andrew sullivan: (16:00) I'm afraid I have another call now, and need to drop

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (16:00) (I have to go for another call)

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (16:00) The show is over

  Alan Greenberg: (16:00) @Milton, who is advocating that we should NOT have a narrow mission?

  andrew sullivan: (16:00) Thank you all

  Greg Shatan: (16:00) Can we pick this up, please.  Dropping off....

  Avri Doria: (16:01) the issue is narrowing the mission beyond it current narrowness

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (16:01) @Steve - I dont beleive the community ever agreed to give the GAC unfettered rights to reject new gTLD applications.  ICANN staff added that into the guidebook...Ito say that the community approved that is not quite right.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:01) need to stop Milton to wrap the call

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:01) and come back to this next time

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (16:01) We need to end this didcussion as it is 23,00 hours

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (16:02) @Jeff -- er, okay.  But do you agree with how I characterized the rest of what happened?

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (16:02) May we continue this very interesting discussion at our next meeting

  Becky Burr: (16:02) @Jeff - ICANN staff added the strong presumption language? 

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (16:02) Agree with Milton.

  Edward Morris: (16:03) I agree with Milton's comments concerning what may be some unintended consequences.

  Milton Mueller: (16:03) my sound went off, can't hear anything

  Alan Greenberg: (16:03) For the record, COMPETITION is already covered in the Bylaws. What is harm in adding consumer trust? Why is it being fought so much?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:03) please can we stop now?

  Julia Wolman (GAC DK): (16:03) With regard to GAC advice related to consumer protection, incl PiCs, in relattion to the ICANNs decision to open up a new round of gTLD without taking into account the GAC Principles for new gTLDs from 2007 , cannot be such a surprice

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (16:03) @Becky - In earlier drafts the presumption was more easily rebuttable....

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (16:03) Mathieu

  Milton Mueller: (16:03) Alan: Trust per se implies a positive regulatory mandate

  Julia Wolman (GAC DK): (16:03) Sorry for the typos

  KAVOUSS aRASTEH: (16:04) Pls kindly confirm that by the third meeting we have a firm reply from ICANN about our f2f meetinfg

  Becky Burr: (16:04) i knew that one was going to be controversial - perhaps we can tackle this on the list?

  ebw: (16:04) @becky, thanks for the deck and presentation.

  Alan Greenberg: (16:04) @Milton, and is a reasonable end-target, regardless of whether we are a "regulator" or whatever words we want to use.

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (16:04) @Becky - Yes, thanks for the presentation


  Milton Mueller: (16:05) Consumer trust is not directly related to coordination of the DNS root zone

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (16:05) I pass then if my comment is added to the notes

  Alan Greenberg: (16:05) And it is currently verbatim in the Compliance Mission.

  Becky Burr: (16:05) will do so

  Matthew Shears: (16:05) Thanks Becky for a great way of presenting the various issues in the mission to be discussed

  Malcolm Hutty: (16:05) @Becky, Yes, I agree we should continue on this list. Main list or WP2 list?

  Edward Morris: (16:05) Good idea Kavouss. CT needs some dates for travel.

  Milton Mueller: (16:05) Stability of the DNS implies a kind of trust in its functioning, but ICANN shouls have no obligation to ensure that all the businesses or people who use thge DNS are trustworthy - that's way beyond its scope

  Finn Petersen, GAC - DK: (16:05) Milton:We are not asking for the Board to take decisions based on the GAC advice that is outside the ICANN’s mission. We are asking for clarity!

  Alan Greenberg: (16:05) I think we need to separate the issues to the extent that we can.

  Becky Burr: (16:05) let's use the main list

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (16:05) I would encourage use of the main list as some are not on the WP2 list

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:06) +1 Main List

  Becky Burr: (16:06) thank you Finn, that is clear and helpful.


  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (16:06) Yes  agree

  Keith Drazek: (16:06) Yep. Thanks everyone.

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (16:06) +1 again to Finn... beating up strawmans is way to easy (and unproductive...)

  Milton Mueller: (16:06) Finn: it sounds very much as if you are asking to ensure that if you give it advice outside its mission it will be able to follow it.


  David McAuley (RySG): (16:06) Thanks all

  Jeff Neuman (Valideus): (16:06) Thanks Finn.  That does help clarify your views

  Brett Schaefer: (16:06) +1 Milton, needs to be clarified

  Becky Burr: (16:07) Jorge, sorry you don't appreciate straw mans, but this has been hard to discuss

  Becky Burr: (16:07) and needs to be concrete

  Matthew Shears: (16:07) good news on the Friday meeting - thanks

  Alan Greenberg: (16:07) @Milton, concern with some of the ARTICLE I changes have othing to do with the MISSION. There are other parts to that Article.


  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:07) thanks everyone

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:07) good work

  Jordan Carter (.nz, WP1 rapporteur): (16:07) ciao

  David McAuley (RySG): (16:07) Good bye all

  Matthew Shears: (16:07) bye

  Bruce Tonkin: (16:07) Bye all

  Edward Morris: (16:07) THanks everybody. Great job Chairs.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO)  ALAC - APRegional Member: (16:07) Good call everyone talk again soon... Bye for now...

  Avri Doria: (16:07) thanks, bye

  Tracy Hackshaw (Trinidad and Tobago): (16:07) bye all

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (16:07) Thanks, all, bye!

  Gangesh Varma: (16:07) Thanks. Bye

  jorge cancio (GAC Switzerland): (16:08) ciao

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