Sub-Group Members:  Akinbo Adebunmi, Alan Greenberg, Avri Doria, Finn Petersen, Gary Hunt, Greg Shatan, Jonathan Zuck, Jordan Carter, Keith Drazek, Matthew Shears, Robin Gross, Steve DelBianco (12)

Staff:  Adam Peake, Alain Durand, Bernard Turcotte, Brenda Brewer, Kim Carlson

Apologies:  Roelof Meijer

**Please let Brenda know if your name has been left off the list (attendees or apologies).**



Proposed Agenda

1. Rollcall and review of the agenda

2. Community Powers - budget and strategic plan (Zuck, Gross)

3. Community Powers - recall of whole ICANN Board (Drazek)

4. Any other matters needing further discussion


Addition to the agenda: to review what we will talk about on next Monday's call. 


Community Powers on the budget and strategic plan - Jonathan Zuck and the changes made in this draft


A strawman, making decision about issues that we have not reached consensus on.  The lion's share off comments were supportive, on the right track.  Only one detractor.  Mainly concerns were about implementation


Improve the creation process so the power not necessary.  Improve interaction during the budget development process. And some of this could then be shifted to WS2.


Second issue was about deadlock and how to break that.  The most recent comment being from Cherine, with responses from Jordan and Mathieu


Improve engagement in WS2.  Limit the number of times a budget could be rejected.  Some mentioned capping the process.  Some mentioned the caretaker approach, better for Keith's draft and discussion later.


Important to do before the budget or strategic plan process is agreed. Unwinding the process would be hard given financial commitments may have been made.  Often budgets made without sufficient detail being shared. A specific example is the CWG proposal for clearer information about the IANA budget.


A new third paragraph so there is more buy-in, earlier.  The community further involved in the development of budget and strategic plan.  To address the comment of fixing the problem before it occurs.


The power does not enable the community to make changes to the budget, just halt it going further.  Suggest 2 cycles of rejection.  And this would be met by a requirement to escalate, not a requirement to back down.


To not constantly bringing up new issues, to prevent deadlock.

WS2 review of the engagement process should render the power redundant.


New question: 11b) Do you believe there should be a cap on rejections of a particular plan by the community, requiring escalation to other accountability mechanism, to prevent paralysis?


The business constituency raised the question of running the continued resolution which would mean operating without an authorized budget. Need to be clear, not just paralysis, also running the org under last year's budget. 


Working on last year's budget ok if they were trying to raise the budget, but if they were OK with the current level of expenditure when the community's wish was to reduce the budget then working to last year's budget is not a protection.


The board might delay approving the budget until it is in effect. The period may not exist.

We have the power to reject under a super majority.  Stay with that, and not move to an approval process.  Where it would have to go through a positive approval process each year.  The text has us addressing the right concerns.


Many comments saying need to improve the communications between the community, staff and board to make sure miscommunication does not happen, and the need for the power greatly relieved


Jordan: in my member org the council creates a budget that three months later the community votes on and can reject.  This backstop power shifts the incentives and the board will know that if it doesn't listen it will face problems later.


We might limit the number of returns for the budget, but not the strategic and operations plan.  And do not ask the same questions in proposal 2 as in the first, need more specificity.

The requirement for more engagement and process between the community and board should included in the bylaws, rather than WS2.  And also consider pre-approval and needs of the requirements of the empowered designator model. 


Different ways to get to the same place.

Back and forth between community and the budget.  Came from BC, and were not clear what it means when the limit is hit.  Does the board get what it wants?  Or does it run on last year’s budget?


Not just the BC mentioned. The other option is escalation, to other accountability mechanisms.  While running on last year's budget while that occurs.  Last year's budget would be the rule while other accountability mechanisms are considered.


Going back and forth on the budget does risk introducing instability, and need to avoid introducing any new measures that do the same.  Para 3 talks about WS2, without saying what WS2 would achieve, some text needed make sure the powers stay in place until processes improved in WS2 come into effect.


Minimal change that answers the comments we received, for example the BC comment.  10% cut in budget may not be enough.   And the cuts may be from services the community wants.  Answer, if after 2 rounds to move if necessary to escalation.

Community Powers - recall of whole ICANN Board. Keith Drazak


Power 5.6

Intended as a discussion document. Summary text from the public comment review.  And introduced the CWG dependencies.


Strong agreement to the proposal, almost 90%.  Some concerns, these were about threshold, as 75% or 80%. Majority supported 75%.  And a broad concern about unintended consequences of risk and instability.  Should be a last resort.  Need to clarify the circumstances that may trigger the spilling should be better defined.  Clarify the continuity measures:  a caretaker board, how are they apportioned etc.


Comment identified a clear need for us to be more specific.

CWG: does the CCWG meet the CWG dependencies.  Our response was that it appears to.


Some comments that there could be a quick process to appoint a new board.  But current processes suggest up to a year.  So how can we keep the organization going, and this a major continuity measure.


"There may be situations..." Comments suggest the need specifics.

Suggestion that one reason for silence was that in the member model the members and designators can use any unspecified reason to initiate a recall.  But there are specific reasons we can add.

1st proposal deliberately didn't try to predict reasons, could be any future issue.  Those who support are supporting an unconstrained proposal.


Believes the selective removal is adequate.  But do not need to specify criteria. If we have the power, should be unrestricted by criteria.


Concern, what if we have a very few SO/AC participating, how to deal with non participation and abstention. And the need to ensure that the section is in sync with the model

Whether people participate or not.  Saying 5 of the 7 to petition is high, but appropriate. 


Very high threshold was agreed in comments.


What is meant by a set period of time?

Is there any point at which there should be a deliberative period with the board? There should be some discussion and the opportunity for the board to defend their position. And doing this does protect the stability issues. A point for discussion in Paris

Need to be able to address non participation of SO/AC

Removed the alternative 80% option.

Concerns about the caretaker board concept.  Carefully plan and prepare for the succession process and minimize instability and risk.  Need to further define the caretaker board.

The process for implementing the caretaker board would require an expedited process.  But there can be advice on limits on its actions.


Advice had been that this is a commonly understood issues, and can be dealt with. Can requisition advice on this from the lawyers.


Action: Jordan to approach co-chairs on getting legal advice about the caretaker board

Consider the concern raised on the potential limitation of the pool of candidates. 

Role of the non-voting board members?

"need to elect alternate Board Directors in each Board selection process"

If wrong in picking the original then picking the alternate equally likely to be poor.  They were intended in the proposal to show potential options. Opposed to the liaisons being "promoted" to voting, note GAC in this regard. 


Spilling the board not a simple thing, should not be easy. And may never be possible to use. Need professional advice, and not reinvent the wheel.


The board has the right to remove all liaisons, the new board could do that, except for the GAC liaison.  Some suggestions that the SO/AC chairs/vice chairs are possible director replacements, but they are the ones likely to be leading the removal so a conflict.


Ensure awareness of key CWG dependencies.

The CWG language was written based on the pre BA member model.  Can we check with the CWG chairs, on the substitution of text describing the empowered SO/AC. 


Yes, discuss with CWG about enforceability.  At least in Paris.

Read the CWG as giving a great deal flexibility, though can check.

Is the CWG happy with the new models is the key question.

Not pre-judgeing a member model per-se, just saying the powers should exist. 


Monday call.  2 hours available.



Community powers on the bylaws, the ability to block standard bylaws, Izumi will lead on.   Approval of fundamental bylaws, which is Jordan. Alan to address individual director removal.   And some additional text on the 8 July discussion on the community mechanism.  And review of the papers today.   


Any other outstanding items for Monday or today?


Istanbul, spreadsheet on the super majority thresholds, adjust to consider the different proportions of the different votes available, and what happens should one SO/AC drop out on a particular issue.  Need to be ready for this in Paris.


Paper on community mechanisms, one issue was the critical mass to take action, and need to come to closure on the weighting scheme.


GAC roll in the community empowerment mechanism being considered.  At least something for the GAC to say what it needs.

Waiting for memos from the lawyers.

Action: Jordan to approach co-chairs on getting legal advice about the caretaker board

Issues for Paris:

* About budget, strategic and ops plan, need for some deliberative period with the board before action taken.

* Discuss with CWG about enforceability.

* Adjusted spreadsheet on the super majority thresholds (Istanbul), should be made ready for Paris.



Action Items

Action: Jordan to approach co-chairs on getting legal advice about the caretaker board

Chat Transcript

Kimberly Carlson: (7/10/2015 12:23) Welcome to CCWG ACCT WP1 #17 on 10 July!  Please note that chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: 

  Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone .ng: (12:49) Hi

  Kimberly Carlson: (12:49) Hello

  Gary Hunt - UK Government: (12:57) Hello from London...

  Matthew Shears: (12:58) Hi!

  Keith Drazek: (12:59) After all these calls, I feel like I've developed a personal relationship wtih the conference call operators....

  Greg Shatan: (12:59) Hello all!

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (13:00) Hi all

  Greg Shatan: (13:00) The operators have stopped asking me to spell my last name.  I guess that's a personal relationship of sorts.

  Jordan: (13:00) Peak ICANN Volunteer, Greg.

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (13:01) I"m here. Just on the worst connection I've had in 5 years so I've dialed in via phone as well

  Jordan: (13:01) it's 4 degrees celsius here in Wellington at 7am on Saturday

  Jordan: (13:01) welcome to the weekend, those of you living in the past

  Keith Drazek: (13:01) lol

  Jordan: (13:01) ;)

  Alan Greenberg: (13:02) For once, Montreal is better. Sunny and 28 degrees.

  Greg Shatan: (13:03) Alan, celsius, I hope?  I know Montreal is in the frozen north, but I recall hot summers in the past.  But climate change is a strange thing.

  Alan Greenberg: (13:03) Gregorian Date: June 26th 2015  or maybe the 27th.

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (13:04) just saw it this morning

  Greg Shatan: (13:04) I am a firm supporter of the Gregorian calendar.  Also Gregorian chants.

  Alan Greenberg: (13:04) Definitely Celcius. 82 F.

  Jordan: (13:04) it's too early in the morning for me to correctly identify calendars

  Jordan: (13:05) humble apologies!

  Greg Shatan: (13:06) 28 here in NY in celsius.  82 Fahrenheit.  Just like Montreal!

  Matthew Shears: (13:07) @ Greg - Monteverdi: Vespro della Beata Vergine

  Greg Shatan: (13:09) @Matthew - Gregorian chant on steroids!

  Matthew Shears: (13:11) where is WS 2 does it explcitely call for such improved interaction that would make budget and strategic plan redundent?

  Matthew Shears: (13:12) sorry proposed budget and strategic plan powers

  Jordan: (13:14) Mathew: page 90 in the PC1 report, para 722, item 5

  Jordan: (13:14) Improvements to ICANN's budgeting and planning process that guarantee the abilityfor the community to have input, and for that input to be given due consideration;

  Matthew Shears: (13:16) agree with Steve

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:17) Exactly, Alan!    That's my concern too

  Keith Drazek: (13:17) Good point Alan.

  Jordan: (13:17) So we add text that makes it clear there needs to be a response

  Jordan: (13:18) PC1 = Public Comment 1 report, at

  Keith Drazek: (13:18) Another good point, Alan.

  Matthew Shears: (13:18) do we need to set a timerame for a response from the board?

  Avri Doria: (13:19) given the numer of nasty & underhanded things we think a Board might do, i think it is maybe good none of us are on the board.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:20) If this process leads to paralysis, it is the Board's fault, not anyone else's

  Alan Greenberg: (13:22) I like that. can we write "taking away the Board's milk and cookies" into a new community power?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:22) 5.N ;)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:23) No Cookies Power

  Alan Greenberg: (13:24) No cookies *IS* a powerful incentive!

  Avri Doria: (13:26) doesn't asking questions in the next comment period predetermine the need for a 3rd comment period.  shouldn't we avoid presenting them with questions?

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:26) Question: if we limit number of rejections, does that mean the board gets its proposed budget?  Or do they  just settle-in with the previous year budget?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:26) Avri: even better...

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:26) maybe "Key Points For  Your Attention"?

  Avri Doria: (13:27) i think we need to do our best to create solutions that repsond to the comments we have gotten and then see the pushback.  i think doing another iteration with questions iis not such a good idea.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:27) Robin: we can't put it in WorkStream1 . We have 20 days to finalise the proposal.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:27) Avri: I think that's a really important point -- worth raising in the CCWG meeting on Tuesday?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:29) NO - I am 100% oposed to pre-approval

  Avri Doria: (13:30) while i am not in favor of a mebership model.  if we do go that route, then what jordan says about preapproval makes sense.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:30) well, 90%, subject to our consensus about models

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:32) [we need some flow diagrams for some of these processes - are there any existing such diagrams for ICANN planning processes?]

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (13:33) there are existing processes whereby GNSO policy is approved by GNSO Council and goes to board for approval.  There must be some graphics of that process.

  Avri Doria: (13:33) well we can go with a last years decreas% per year that it carries over.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:33) Avri: that would actually be a nice incentive

  Avri Doria: (13:33) sorry   .. last year's decreased by 10% for eac year where we use last year's budget.

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (13:33) I like the decrease incentive suggestion.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:34) Jonathan, can you re-state the point

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:34) the two rejections rule

  Keith Drazek: (13:34) It can be a percentage variation up, down, or sideways (allocation).

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:34) why don't we highlight that text for debate in Paris?

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:36) I don't favor the budget cut as an incentive to be responsive to the community

  Matthew Shears: (13:39) agre - worries me that we are creating points of leverage against the powers we re seeking if we propose such a thing

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (13:40) k

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:41) Agree with ZUck's proposal that we escalate to our other community powers

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:42) One can consider all of these community powers essentially as nudges in the "right direction" as it were

  Avri Doria: (13:43) even the bag was than worth having.

  Avri Doria: (13:43) ok 25%

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:44) but they won't say either

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:44) that's the logic behind not limiting the number of times for send-back

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:45) and the systemic restraint on the power is the high threshold to exercise

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:48) the ION magazine bit is here

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:51) We would need to as part of implementation develop expedited Board appointment proceses for such a situation

  Matthew Shears: (13:54) would the reasons for dismissal of a director by hte board be the same as for the community

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:55) Board removal of a single director tends to be about compliance with ethics stuff does it not? Not substantive disagreement?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:55) also: individual director removal is out of scope for this discussion

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:57) I agree with Steve's recollection of the logic - I was saying that regardless, I don't mind simply because any such restraints aren't enforceable. that's all.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:57) (I am very happy for us to retain the status quo.)

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:57) Right, Keith.    To respond to many comments we need only explain our reasoning

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:58) (by which I mean - no 'standards' or criteria, even broad/bland references to the bylaws etc)

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (13:58) Agree, Alan

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (13:58) +1 Alan

  Avri Doria: (13:59) yeah then it would be easy to claim it is all Steve's fault.

  Alan Greenberg: (13:59) Well, we know it IS all Steve's fault...

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:00) Which Steve?

  Avri Doria: (14:02) does it matter, a Steve is a Steve for all that.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:02) We do have one Steve who is chair of the Board :)

  Avri Doria: (14:02) i was aware.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:02) the way it is worded as is, is the sum, I thnk

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (14:03) agree

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:03) How far do we need to go in engineering detailed process requirements like this at this stage?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:03) in this report, or in the bylaws drafting?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:03) I also agree, but we do not want someone to mis-read.

  Greg Shatan: (14:03) 241: This also may depend on how the SOs and ACs are weighted.

  Alan Greenberg: (14:04) I read that as a raw yes/no per AC/SO, developed by whatever methodology they prefer.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:04) Maybe it should require a convening of the Public Accountability Forum?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:05) Otherwise we need to explicitly say 2.3 of the voites in the community council and I don't think that was the intent.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:05) Alan, I do too, and 2/3 of the number of the SOs and ACs would have to agree to the matter being raised

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:06) +1 Keith, can it be noted as a point to discuss in Paris?

  Alan Greenberg: (14:06) 2/3 of 7 is 5

  Matthew Shears: (14:06) good point avri

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:07) "Community Mechanism" has nothing to do with the "Model" we have in case we need to enforce a decision

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:07) Model refers to Member, Designator, etc.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:10) Can we get help from attorneys who have handled this for corporations or organizations?   This CANT be the first time anyone has solved this potenital problem

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:11) I have an answer to that, Steve.

  Adam Peake: (14:11) I believe, advice from counsel was that a board is the board, it will have full fiduciary responsibilities of the board.

  Greg Shatan: (14:13) Sorry, I've never spilled a board....  Need to ask corporate governance specialists....

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:14) I've been part of a board spill, but it happened at an annual meeting, so was simple

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:15) @Jordan -- simple to spill, but what happened after the spill?  Interim board or new elections right away?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:16) I would be highly opposed to the Liaisons forming the core of the caretaker BOard

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:16) Steve: there always has to be a Board, so we need both

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:16) and not just a Board made up of the Prez and CE :-)

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:18) Should we require the community to present a slate of new directors at the time they vote on the Spill?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:19) Steve: goodness that sounds utterly awful

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:19) FIFA has a board ...

  Avri Doria: (14:19) i am sure ISOC will offer their board if we ask real nice like.

  Matthew Shears: (14:19) why would we not have the current board continue in a caretaker capacity for 3 months while a new board is appointed

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:19) what if they borrowed the ISOC Board? ;-)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:19) Matthew: it was suggested at some point that any Board that lost a no confidence vote would be most unwilling to be caretakers

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:20) @Jordan -- it will take us some time prepare a slate of new directors, so that time would certainly give the present board a chance to revise their behavior

  Avri Doria: (14:20) disagree with spilling laisions, but agree they should not become the board.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:21) There are limitless models for how we do this caretaker thing is the problem

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:21) Some directors would resign their seats immediately, just to express resentment

  Avri Doria: (14:21) and some would resign immediately to singify their ssubmission to the will of the public.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:21) From the Bylaws: "The ICANN Board of Directors ("Board") shall consist of sixteen voting members ("Directors"). In addition, four non-voting liaisons ("Liaisons") shall be designated for the purposes set forth in Section 9 of this Article. Only Directors shall be included in determining the existence of quorums, and in establishing the validity of votes taken by the ICANN Board."

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:22) I think it's clear only the sixteen Directors are Directors and they are the people who would be removed in a Recall.

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (14:22) San Francisco's current Mayor was appointed to fill the vacant seat when Gavin Newsome went off to greener pastures.  The to-be-appointed mayor promised once there, he wouldn't run for the seat in the next election, so he'd be safe to appoint.  After he was appointed, he changed his mind and decided to run in the election to keep the seat.  Word of caution here.

  Matthew Shears: (14:22) lets ask for the at advice by Paris and park this one

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:23) well, even if we removed the CEO from the Board, we should be careful we don't remove them from the CEO role..

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:23) (in my country it is quite unusual for a CEO to be a member of a Board.)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:24) A random side issue - should there be term limits on Board liaison members, as there are on Directors generally?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:24) they are appointed annually, but can end up being around fo ra very long time, it would help keep a decent rotation up around the Board table were term limits imposed

  Greg Shatan: (14:24) The CEO serves "ex officio" (i.e., by nature of the office).  I'm not sure he (or she) can be spilled.

  Avri Doria: (14:24) Could a trusttee be predetermined.

  Matthew Shears: (14:25) would board spill affect the nomcom?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:25) We can't have caretakeer WS2 unless we make the whole power WS2, but we could have an "interm caregaker model" and develop it in WS2

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:25) and this could be an issue vs the CWG requirements of the CCWG

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:25) RE postponing to WS2

  Alan Greenberg: (14:26) @Greg, the CEO could be removed, but like a jack-in-the-box, would pop back up again until he/she were releived of the job.

  Matthew Shears: (14:26) can't postpone to WS2 - for reasons Keith is just reading

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:26) yeah - I don't think we can remove it to WS2, based on the text in yellow here. It does appear to be a CWG dependency.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:26) we can do a

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:26) "quick and dirty" caretaker mech.

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:28) correct re Lise

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:29) @Jordan - correct

  Matthew Shears: (14:29) don't support this going to WS2 - lets s what counsel comes back with

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:29) @Jordan -- i suggested changing the yellow words "by the related creation of a stakeholder community / member group" 

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:29) +1 Alan

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:29) to:  "empowered AC/SO mechanism"

  Keith Drazek: (14:29) I don't think the CWG was indicatinig a requirement or dependency for membership, rather, a need for the powers.

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:29) +1 Alan

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:29) Steve: those yellow words are in the CWG Proposal, and aren't going to change, but they don't provide any problem wit us.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:30) Steve: the words don't matter - the CWG hasn't created a requirement for Membership in the legal sense

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (14:30) we've talked a lot about how the community will the 6 powers we asked for.  But it seems we need to discuss how the community will use the powers given to us by statute under membership model, but that we didn't ask for.  Like derivtive law suits and obtaining documents.

  Avri Doria: (14:31) th CWG never presupposed a MEMBER model

  Matthew Shears: (14:31) agre with Avri

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:31) +1 Jordan

  Alan Greenberg: (14:31) I didn't think we were even talking about asking for changes, just verifying that it was a very generalized request - which I beleive it was.

  Matthew Shears: (14:32) need to focus on how we deliver the power

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:32) Robin: those are listed in the "Sam Eisner Memo" and would indeed need to be very clearly understood if the CCWG was inclining towards the membership model

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:32) Exactly -- CWG was not saying "Member", and so they could live with empowered community of AC/SOs as long as they have the board spill power.   Are  we all really agreeing on this

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (14:32) Jordan, any idea when they will be addressed?  They may play a role in the making of the decision to choose membership or not.

  Gary Hunt - UK Government: (14:33) Would the GAC have a role in the CEM and if so would it be seen as being an equal role?

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:34) @Gary -- since day 1, we've shown the GAC as an equal stakeholder in the CEM.   Is the GAC likely to be able to exercise that power by coming up with votes?

  Gary Hunt - UK Government: (14:36) @SteveDB: That remains to be seen! But what I am saying is will it be seen as being equal?

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:38) well, the GAC would get 5 votes, just like GNSO, ALAC, ccNSO, ASO.  An equal stakeholder.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:39) No question that is equal, Gary.  The question is whether the GAC wants to weigh-in with votes on matters like bylaws, board spill, budget, etc.

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:39) It does change the nature of what GAC deals with, which is presently constrained to "public policy"

  Alan Greenberg: (14:40) @Jordan, the hardest part of the drafting is the analysis of the PCs. ANything you may have done on that would be helpful.

  Gary Hunt - UK Government: (14:42) I am content.... but I just wanted to raise the issue of the GAC having potentially five empty seats. This could change the ratio of any votes....

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:42) Agreed, Gary.  THat's why I asked Jordan to disinter his spreadsheet!

  Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone .ng: (14:42) Bye

  Robin Gross [GNSO-NCSG]: (14:42) thanks, Jordan.  Bye, all!

  Greg Shatan: (14:42) How we deal with empty seats is a matter for discussion.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:43) See you all

  Greg Shatan: (14:43) Bye all!

  Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:43) bye ALL

  Gary Hunt - UK Government: (14:43) Bye!

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