Transcript

Transcript CCWG ACCT - ICANN Board 15 May.docx

Transcript CCWG ACCT - ICANN Board 15 May.pdf

Recording

The Adobe Connect recording is available here:  https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p788h5fy5qh/

The audio recording is available here:  http://audio.icann.org/gnso/gnso-ccwg-acct-15may15-en.mp3

Notes

CCWG-Accountability - ICANN Board - 15 May 2015

Notes/Action Items - These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript.

- Board introduction: The Board is preparing comments on the CWG as well as CCWG proposals. The Board has yet to form a position on the CCWG proposal. This call will help Board members get up-to-speed on key elements of the proposal and provide context for the formal response. This will also be an opportunity to ask questions. 

- CCWG introduction: The public comment period does not represent consensus yet. We are seeking input on whether moving in the right direction. The comment period will end on 3 June. Bruce Tonkin has played an outstanding role in providing information. 

The Bigger Picture

There are two tracks. The CCWG will be relayed to NTIA. Linkage between CCWG and CWG is extremely important. Lise Fuhr is on the call if any questions on linkage. 

Questions can be asked directly and no room for misinterpretation - we hope this dialogue will continue.

Goal & Scope of Group

Work Stream 1: within timeframe of transition.

Timeline

We started work in December by assessing the current situation. In January, the group came up with requirements for WS1. This was discussed in Singapore, including with Board, and was refined in Istanbul. 

We have had opportunity to have independent legal support and acknowledge that this was very useful for the process. 

Four Building Blocks

We acknowledge the outstanding commitment from group and rapporteurs. 

We established status quo in first stages of our work i.e. inventory of existing mechanisms and community input with respect to accountability using the public comment report produced by ICANN. We came up with requirements. 

Here are the four building blocks upon which can build the accountability mechanisms that are needed:

- Empowered community (legislative)

- ICANN Board (executive)

- Bylaws (constitution)

- Independent Review Mechanisms (judiciary)

Fundamental Bylaws

To make sure the Board does not change principles and remove judiciary or jeopardizes changes etc, the concept of Fundamental Bylaws was suggested. Suggested Fundamental Bylaws include:

- Mission, Commitments & Core Values

- IRP

Power to veto non-fundamental Bylaw changes and to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws

- Reviews required by the CWG-Stewardship

- New community powers

Empowered community

5 powers

We are using building blocks already in place - we are amending them to provide more accountability.

Empower community is one of major themes in accountability work.

Reconsider/Reject Budget or Strategic/Operating Plans

The ICANN Board and staff will provide draft budget that will go for public comment . Board approves budget. If SO/AC objects to budget, it will be brought to empowered community for vote. 

All SOs, GAC, At-Large get 5 votes - SSAC/RSSAC 2 votes.

Higher voting threshold for subsequent version. 

Reconsider/Reject Changes to ICANN Bylaws

Board is to take on board community wishes 

Approve Changes to Fundamental Bylaws 

75% of votes need to be cast in favor of Bylaw change.

Removal of Individual Board Directors 

- SO/AC appointed Directors - process lies in hands of SO or AC. Appointing body is removing body.

- NomCom appointed Directors - At least 2 SO or ACs need to request – To be determine whether NomCom would be called upon to vote in favor of dismissal (75%)

Recalling the Entire ICANN Board

High entry required: 3 SO/ACs. We need at least 1 AC - 2 SOs or 2 ACs 1 SO. Other groups would deliberate and through consensus or vote decide on removal of entire Board.

Feedback: 

- (Kavouss Arasteh) Who participates in recalling individual Board members? 

--> There needs to be a legal vehicle for communities to enforce different rights and powers. Anyone that appoints a director conforms the entity to vote. 

Various options offered throughout the report are based on assumption that SO/ACs would form unincorporated associations. It is not for us to decide who would join and who would not but we are giving equal treatment. 

- (Steve Crocker) Board is impressed and grateful for amount of work put into this. We are strongly in favor of accountability. With respect to recalling individual Board members, it appears the underlying notion is that Board members are representing SO/ACs and ground to initiate is that not representing SO/AC. In our Bylaws, training of Board members and discipline, it is clear that Board members serve entire organization and community, not their individual appointing bodies i.e. acting in the best interest. Creation of recalling individual Board Directors pushes into the direction of a representative legislator as opposed to cohesive oversight process. 

--> Possibility to remove individual Directors was set as a measure to remove directors who did something entirely wrong We are cognizant that it is a big stick that we should not apply lightly. 

- (Steve Crocker) There is a broad principle of proportionality. The community already has a mechanism to remove individual Board members: if a Board member is not handling information appropriately etc. What criteria would be used to remove a Director? What information would be available? It requires clarification.

--> The processes shall be defined by different SO/ACs - nothing is prescribed. We will consider 1) current mechanisms ; 2) giving guidance to SO/ACs and set ting guidelines for processes. 

- (Cherine Chalaby) There are two classes it seems : 1) SO/ACs - 2) NomCom - that is a contradiction to Board members being accountable to all stakeholders. There should be one process - a unique standard of review - for all Board members. 

--> There are legal implications 

ACTION ITEM - CCWG to provide more legal feedback on this point. 

-  (Rinalia Abdul Rahim ) If SO/ACs move forward and create Unincorporated Associations, would the process involve reviewing their own accountability mechanisms, or even strengthening it?

SO/AC Membership Model 

Legal adivce received from lawyers point that this is the most effective way to provide community with powers. There needs to be a legal vehicle for community to enforce different rights. Two ways: 1) a membership model; 2) a designators model. Designators cannot accommodate all powers. The membership model is the preferred model as a result. There would a petition by SO/AC. First need to see if petition meets required threshold, then would move on to voting. 

Unincorporated Associations 

Legal entity will provide vehicle for SO/ACs to exercise powers. They are lightweight structures. The governing document would be set by each of SO/ACs. This would be filed upon State of California Law. Unincorporated Associations is easiest way to provide this vehicle but it is not the only way.

IRP

Proposed amendments include: decisions would be binding - allows for review for both substance and produre - is more accessible - has lower cost - standing panel of seven.

The new IRP panel 

Judicial body that would function for ICANN community. Culturally and geographical diverse, independent of ICANN (inc. SO/ACs), fixed term, term limited, compensated by ICANN (how do we achieve independence?), composed of significant experts in international arbitration and ICANN. 

Third party international arbitral bodies would nominate candidates. The Board would consider and suggest panelists which the community would then confirm. 

Filing an IRP

Anyone can initial an IRP. Board inaction/inaction that materially harms anyone. First step would be for parties to resolve - if no arrangement can be found, IRP is triggered. 

IRP decisions

We have standing IRP panels made of 7 members. Formula:

- 1 person panel

- 3 person panel

ICANN and complaining party would agree on panelist. 

Decision characteristics include:

- binding on ICANN, not subject to appeal (except on limited basis)

- Documented

- Delivered in timely fashion

- Existing precedent in decision-making should be considered. 

Request for Reconsideration 

Reconsider a Board or staff decision. 

Scope has been expanded (standing), broadened goals, more Board engagement (less legal), transparency requirements, accessibility is improved (15 to 30 days)

Feedback

- (Bruce Tonkin) Step 2 of process (anyone materially harmed) - would a test be run? Would a threshold need to be reached before going into process?

--> It is the standard that exists today - it is not a change. There is a requirement for constructive engagement and ability to invoke a mediator. 

- (George Sadowsky) Is the Board ultimately responsible for harm although it comes from a different party? 

---> Language is Board/staff action or inaction. Theoretically yes - SO/ACs don't have power unilaterally to cause material harm. Ultimately it will involve action/inaction of Board/staff.

Affirmation of Commitments Reviews

The AoC could disappear in future, hence the recommendation to bring reviews into ICANN Bylaws. Amendments include:

- ability to sunset reviews and create new reviews

- appointments to reviews made by SGs

- access to internal documents

- require Board to consider approval and begin implementation

- Board decision could be challenged.

Stress Tests

We have been defining contingencies - 26 risks were identified and ran again current accountability system and the proposed accountability framework. It is subject to proposals.

Linkage with CWG-Stewardship

It was oulined in various correspondence: accountability powers, transparency around budget, IANA function review to be moved into Bylaws as fundamental, review panels should not interfere with delegation/redelegation.

Timeline

Public comment ends on 3 June. The CCWG hopes to share conclusions in BA and to further investigate proposals where needed. Second period is planned for July in time for approval in Dublin. 

We have started considering how much time it would take to implement various proposals. 

Board members and community are encouraged to read report - there is a lot of detail.

BA sessions:

- F2F on 19 June 

- CCWG/Board on 21 June

We will engage each SO/AC

The Board plans to send a comment period and believes this is a highly important process.

Action Items

ACTION ITEM - CCWG to provide more legal feedback on this point. 

Documents Presented

Chat Transcript

Kimberly Carlson: (5/15/2015 06:31) Welcome to the CCWG ICANN Board call! Please note that chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards

  Bruce Tonkin: (06:56) Good evening Kimberly

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (06:56) Hello everyone

  Pär Brumark (GAC Niue): (06:56) Hi all!

  Carlos Raul Gutierrez: (06:56) Good morning

  Sabine Meyer (GAC - Germany): (06:57) hello there

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (06:57) Hello, CCWG.

  Sabine Meyer (GAC - Germany): (06:57) and good afternoon :)

  Alice Jansen: (06:57) Please mute your line if not speaking

  Markus Kummer: (06:58) Hi everyone

  Chris Disspain: (06:58) Gretings All,

  Matthew Shears: (06:58) Hello

  Sivasubramanian M: (06:59) Hello

  Lise Fuhr: (06:59) Hi all

  James Bladel - GNSO: (06:59) Good morning.

  James Bladel - GNSO: (06:59) Nice job Wednesday, Matt. :)

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (06:59) Greetings, people of Earth...

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (07:00) Did you just come back from Space, Jonathan?

  Keith Drazek: (07:00) Take me to your leader.....

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:00) come back?!

  Sabine Meyer (GAC - Germany): (07:00) I see that house hearing had a humbling effect, Jonathan :)

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (07:00) hello all

  ARASTEH: (07:01) Hi Everybody

  Keith Drazek: (07:01) Everyone please mute phones and computers when not speaking.

  Suzanne Radell (GAC): (07:01) Hello everyone

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:01) Chris, you may express your satisfaction with the proposal in the traditional italian way...

  Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair: (07:02) Hi all!

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:02) Bruce, I think we're all here, ready when you are

  ARASTEH: (07:03) May the chair introduce himself pols

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:03) (on CCWG side I meant)

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (07:03) Takes a bit more time for us to get organized.

  ARASTEH: (07:03) is leon attending

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:03) He is Kavouss

  ARASTEH: (07:04) There aRE MANY LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED

  Jordan Carter: (07:04) hi all

  George Sadowsky: (07:04) ECHO!  ECHO!

  Keith Drazek: (07:05) I'm not getting an echo.

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (07:05) No echo here.

  George Sadowsky: (07:05) Sorry, my problem

  ARASTEH: (07:05) WHO IS CHARING THE MEETING PLS

  Chris Disspain: (07:05) Bruce Tonkin from the Board side...

  Alice Jansen: (07:07) Public comment period: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-2015-05-04-en

  Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair: (07:07) FYI - we are using the slides we have been using for the webinars, i.e. you are seeing what we presented to the community during the webinars previously held.

  Leon Sanchez: (07:08) @Kavouss some of the legal questions raised are pending answers by the lawyers. Some have been answered and I will be addressing them. But just to give you a heads-up, some still are pending

  Becky Burr: (07:10) good morning all

  Adam Peake: (07:10) The executive summary and graphics that accompany the proposal are available in the six UN languages and Portuguese.

  Sivasubramanian M: (07:10) (After covering the agenda items for this meeting)  How did hte congressional hearings go?

  Adam Peake: (07:10) https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability

  Asha Hemrajani: (07:11) Hello everyone

  Lise Fuhr: (07:11) @Mathieu thank you for the introduction

  Jordan Carter: (07:15) we're here to help if required :)

  Keith Drazek: (07:15) Is Fadi planning to join today's call?

  Kuo Wu: (07:20) Sorry to join late.

  Jordan Carter: (07:29) I thought that this was for ICANN Board members to ask questions

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:30) Yes that is the intent Jordan - I am assumng the call is not for the CCWG to continue to debate the draft :-)

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:30) Oh God, I hope not!

  Jordan Carter: (07:31) It would strike me as being an unconstructive use of time

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:31) Just a reminder to put your phone on mute if you are not speaking - sounds like someone typing in the background.

  Carlos Raul Gutierrez: (07:31) How much time has been assigend for this call?

  Keith Drazek: (07:32) 90 minutes

  James Gannon [GNSO-NCSG]: (07:32) I think we need to allow the board to ask their questions.

  Jordan Carter: (07:32) Kavouss, I wish you would not participate like this

  Jordan Carter: (07:33) it is not the purpose of this meeting.

  Jordan Carter: (07:33) I do not support the co chairs accepting questions or answering questions from anyone who isn't on the ICANN Boar.d

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:33) +1

  Carlos Raul Gutierrez: (07:34) and I beg the Co Chairs to try to get torugh the presetnation faster

  Leon Sanchez: (07:34) @Carlos we'll do it as fast as possible .-)

  cherine chalaby: (07:35) Thomas I have a question

  wolfgang: (07:35) Did the GAC accpeted the proposed roles with five votes our of 29?

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:36) @Wolfgang : there is no acceptance by anyone on the interim proposals.

  Tijani BEN JEMAA: (07:36) Kavous, for the individual board members, only the appointing body can recall a board member

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:36) Not by the GAC, nor others at this stage

  Tijani BEN JEMAA: (07:37) means a board member appointed by ALAC can only be recalled by ALAC

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (07:37) <Question> In forming Unincorporated Association, would the accountability mechanisms of the community itself (SO/AC) be affirmed and strengthened?

  Jordan Carter: (07:37) There's no intention to change the fiduciary duty on Board members to act in the corporation's whole interests. A removal process could make that harder, but doesn't undo it.

  Tijani BEN JEMAA: (07:37) so those who do not appoint directors can't recall individual board member

  Leon Sanchez: (07:38) @Rinalia forming an UA would enable the community to excercise the powers, therefore accountability mechanisms be affirmed

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:39) @Rinalia : your question is a bit general, difficult to respond clearly. Is there an underlying concern ?

  Jordan Carter: (07:40) Thus the high threshold for individual board member removal, and we're interested in other suggestions  e.g. preventing an ongoing / endless series of challenges against an individual director

  Keith Drazek: (07:41) Agree that criteria could be helpful.

  Jordan Carter: (07:41) A last thought - since all Board members have to uphold fiduciary responsibilities, if an SO removed its appointed members for not "doing what it wants", tney would simply be appointing a new board member who was in the same position with the same duties. So I think this power would more likely be used in a case where the Board member was contributing to the company's overall direction in a fashion the SO/AC didn't support...?

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:42) And remember the stress test methodology demands we not rely solvely on previous experience

  Avri Doria: (07:43) i think it rests on the the understanding of fiduciary responsibility.  Different groups might have different ideas of what it means for a director they elect to serve their  fiduciary responsibility ad may decide that even though they fit into the Board's group think of what is appropriate, the electing group might have a different view.

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (07:44) Yes, to my mind, enhancing ICANN accountability means tackling accountability at all levels.  Most or all of the proposals are targeted at the Board.  What about the community?  We have structures in place.  Are the accountability mechanisms of the community structures sufficiently strong?  Irrespective of yes or no, when you move towards forming unincorporated association, does the process entail reviewing the structure's accountability mechanism, affirming it and even an opportunity to strengthen it?

  Avri Doria: (07:44) not all board members are elected by the same process.  is that wrong?

  Avri Doria: (07:44) or rather (s)elected

  Jordan Carter: (07:44) The law is clear that it is the appointing group that can remove the individual director

  Jordan Carter: (07:44) it's very hard to have non-appointers doing the removing, in the case of individuals

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (07:45) AC/SO Board members ten to be selected in a completely open visible process. Perhaps we should demand that the same be true for the NomCOm selected Board members - if equity is paramount.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:45) @Rinalia : understood now. Hard to respond in chat

  Jordan Carter: (07:45) Alan: you stole my green! Going purple instead :)

  Sabine Meyer (GAC - Germany): (07:45) hey now.

  Jordan Carter: (07:46) oh dear.

  Sabine Meyer (GAC - Germany): (07:46) :)

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (07:46) @Jordan - actually, you stolle my green - and inherent part of my persona (as per my name). But I have generally  and generously allowed you to use it....

  Greg Shatan: (07:47) Jordan, that is my understanding of US law as well -- under California non-profit law (and US non-profit law generally, to my knowledge), the member (or designator) that appoints a Board member has the right to remove that Board member.

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:47) Just a time chekc that we are half way through the 90 min call.   So far we have covered

  Avri Doria: (07:48) Rinalia, what do you mean about community reposniblity.  like a test before the people are allowed to vote.

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:48) I think it is important to also cover some of hte changes to the IRP process as well

  Greg Shatan: (07:48) @Alan, red would be appropriate for me, given my last name....

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (07:48) I still do not understand why the AC/SO Chairs (or their delegates), as real people with legal rights, cannot act on behalf of their AC/SO and remove the need for the UA.

  wolfgang: (07:49) If you change the NomCom process and make it open you turn a selection process into an election process with public election campaigns by the candidates, as we had in the 2000 eletions. This could have unitended side effects and has to be stresstested in advance as well..

  Greg Shatan: (07:50) @Alan, that would require amending the bylaws regarding membership every time a Chair left office.

  Ray Plzak: (07:50) The ASO is function is performed by the NRO which is an unincorporated association

  David McAuley: (07:50) +1 @Bruce re IRP

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:50) @wolfgang : is that what you read through our proposal ? CHange nomcom process ? Or have I missed a step ?

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (07:50) @Wolfgang. You are correct. I was trying to show that we ALREADY use different rules for different slections, so doing the same for recalls is not going in a new direction.

  fadi Chehadé: (07:53) standing panel is a good approach

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (07:53) What does lower cost translate into for IRP?

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:53) @Rinalia : it means cost of admin & panel be taken on Icann funds, not billed to parties

  Ray Plzak: (07:53) I think that standing panels have been considered before

  Kimberly Carlson: (07:54) as a reminder, please mute your lines if you are not speaking.  Thanks!

  wolfgang: (07:56) I like the proposed enhanced IRP :-)

  Carlos Raul Gutierrez: (07:57) too many slides.....

  Asha Hemrajani: (07:59) I like the IRP proposal.  Some questions a) What would be the threshold or trigger for the dispute to go to the IRP? b) How would case workload be managed? c) how would members of the IRP be selected and neutrality ensured? Many thanks.

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:59) @Asha : c) is described on slide 16 selection by Board, confirmed by community

  Greg Shatan: (08:00) Please mute if not speaking (especially if you are beeping or blooping).

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (08:00) a) it is the notion of "materially affected party". Needs further definition, input welcome !

  James Bladel - GNSO: (08:00) Yes, the person with the Skype noises. :)

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (08:01) b) so far not defined, input welcome !

  Carlos Raul Gutierrez: (08:01) i was wondering about those bips...

  David McAuley: (08:01) IRP is moving well but many details remain to be filled in

  Kuo Wu: (08:01) Can you hear me

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (08:02) How do you enforce less legal engagement?

  Kuo Wu: (08:02) I try to input my question here

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (08:02) @Rinalia : less legal engagement ?

  Becky Burr: (08:02) not sure I understand the question Rinalia

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (08:03) Sorry, it was under composition  on reconsideration.

  Asha Hemrajani: (08:03) @Mathieu yes a) and b) are very much related and affect each other, as well as affect the effectiveness of the IRP. If the IRP is overloaded with high number of cases.  Trigger/threshold definition is key

  Asha Hemrajani: (08:03) Same point as Bruce just made!

  David McAuley: (08:04) Material harm as a standing issue may be filled in by panel as one option

  Becky Burr: (08:05) no - action or inaction of ICANN decision maker

  Asha Hemrajani: (08:06) @Becky I support the idea of using a mediator.

  Asha Hemrajani: (08:06) @Mathieu if we have time later, could we go back to point c)

  Asha Hemrajani: (08:08) @mathieu oui merci!

  Leon Sanchez: (08:08) :-)

  Rinalia Abdul Rahim: (08:09) Good that AoC Reviews are brought into Bylaws.

  Adam Peake: (08:10) The slides being used are available from the CCWG webinar page https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53773485  See Webinar 11 May 2015

  Ray Plzak: (08:11) Should be brought into an  Accountability Review Framework. Accountability Review Framework should be in the bylaws

  wolfgang: (08:11) 1+ to  Rinalia. AoC review is a good idecentralized multistakeholder oversight mechanism which has to be strengthened

  Jordan Carter 2: (08:11) Ray: That's part of the proposal for sure.

  Ray Plzak: (08:13) AoC becomes moot when one of the parties departs, ie, the USG

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (08:13) Well, not really the AoC has nothing to do with the IANA functions contract

  steve DelBianco   [GNSO - CSG]: (08:13) More important, the AoC becomes a targetfor elimination since it's a unique role for USG

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (08:14) now THAT'S true

  Jordan Carter 2: (08:14) That's why the review and the relevant parts of the AOC are being incorporated in the bylaws

  Adam Peake: (08:14) the second public comment should show 40 days

  Jordan Carter 2: (08:14) (i.e. those parts relating to ICANN's commitments)

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (08:15) @Adam: good point ;-)

  Keith Drazek: (08:20) I would also like to thank Bruce and Chris for their involvement and contributions to the CCWG. Very constructive and welcome.

  David McAuley: (08:20) +1 keith

  James Bladel - GNSO: (08:20) +1

  Jordan Carter: (08:20) Thanks indeed all

  Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair: (08:20) +1

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (08:21) Agreed

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (08:21) bye for now then...

  Rudi Daniel: (08:21) +1

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (08:21) Thanks all.

  Suzanne Radell (GAC): (08:21) Thanks to all

  Markus Kummer: (08:21) Bye and thanks!

  Asha Hemrajani: (08:21) +1 Steve.  Thank you everyone. 

  Greg Shatan: (08:21) Goodbye, all.

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (08:21) thank you

  wolfgang: (08:21) Thanka to everbody. Good spirit

  Olivier Crepin-Leblond: (08:21) Thanks all

  Manal Ismail: (08:21) Thanks .. Bye ..

  Steve Crocker: (08:21) Thank you, everyone

  Vrikson Acosta: (08:21) Bye :) Happy weekend

  fadi Chehadé: (08:21) superb work. thanks

  Ram Mohan: (08:21) bye

  Leon Sanchez: (08:22) thanks everyone!