Versión EspañolVersión Inglés


Está a consulta por parte de ICANN el documento de Lineamientos para las Revisiones (Reviews) de las actividades de ICANN https://www.icann.org/public-comments/reviews-standards-2017-10-17-en "Operating Standards for ICANN Specific Reviews".


MOCIÓN: LACRALO debe solicitar al Board y los líderes de las SOs y ACs una revisión de los procedimientos para integrar los "Review Teams". El resultado de dicha revisión debe ser la inclusión de personas en los RT de pleno derecho sin exigir la aprobación del conjunto de líderes de SO/AC.

FUNDAMENTO: el sistema actual conforma un sistema cerrado en el que no es posible incluir opiniones independientes. El proceso describe la contratación de "expertos independientes" pero ésta se refiere exclusivamente a consultores que serán seleccionados por una vía similar. El resultado de este ciclo cerrado no se ha hecho esperar: la revisión "SSRT2" o 2a. revisión de estabilidad, seguridad y robustez del DNS ha sido puesta en suspenso por no lograr avance, lo cual en mi análisis se debe al menos en parte a la constitución cerrada del equipo de trabajo.


DECLARACIÓN DE INTERÉS: conozco el proceso en detalle por haber presidido el SSRT inicial (2010) y presentado solicitud de participación en el segundo y discusiones al respecto con los presidentes del Board, SSAC y ALAC, así como otros miembros de esos organismos. Mucho agradeceré al Secretariado la copia de la presente moción a los documentos que se revisarán esta tarde, ya que el asunto afecta estructuralmente a las decisiones tomadas por el CCWG que dirigió la transición de IANA.


ICANN has initiated a public comment on the Guidelines for Reviews on ICANN activities https://www.icann.org/public-comments/reviews-standards-2017-10-17-en "Operating Standards for ICANN Specific Reviews".


MOTION: LACRALO must request the Board and the SO/AC leadership to review the procedures to integrate the "Review Teams". The result of said review should be the inclusion of RT members as a matter of law without requiring the approval of the SO/AC leadership as a whole.

RATIONALE: the current system forms a closed system in which it is not possible to include independent opinions. The process describes how to hire "independent experts" but this refers exclusively to consultants who will be selected in a similar way. The result of this closed cycle were immediate: the "SSRT2" revision or the second DNS security, stability and resiliency review has been put on hold for not achieving progress, which in my opinion is at least partly due to the closed constitution of the working team.


STATEMENT OF INTEREST: I have a detailed knowledge of the process as I was Chair of the Initial SSRT (2010) and had submitted a request to participate in the second team as well, and I also have had discussions with the Board, SSAC and ALAC Chairs, as with other members who are part of those bodies.
I would be grateful to the Secretariat for attaching a copy of this motion to the documents that will be reviewed this afternoon, as the matter structurally affects the decisions made by the CCWG which led the IANA transition.


  • No labels

12 Comments

  1. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:

    "De: Alberto Soto

    Enviado: lunes, 29 de enero de 2018 06:20 a. m.

    (...)

    Estimados, apoyo la moción de Alejandro Pisanty.

    Saludos cordiales

     Alberto Soto"

  2. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:


    "De: Vanda Scartezini

    (...)

    Enviado: lunes, 29 de enero de 2018 12:21 p. m.
    Dear Maritza, colleagues


    As I understand, some volunteer’s groups are under the scrutiny of AC/SO to select their own representative. However I haven’t see much CCWG where the participation of an independent member is not allowed, even they may be not consider a member, but observer, they can act as a member as well, may be without some obligation to attend majority of meeting, contribute , answer questions etc., but can express freely their own opinion e suggestion for the work.


    If this is the case of SSRT2, falling under this category of been not inclusive as demanded by transparency rules of ICANN, then I do agree that ALAC shall consider making this suggestion to review such procedure as a rule for all.


    To allow ALC to move further, then it is important to pass this motion.


    If the case, I appreciate the suggestion made by Alex and thank him to alert the group for an open and inclusive ICANN.


    Best regards,


    Vanda Scartezini"


  3. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:

    "De: Carlton Samuels <carlton.samuels@gmail.com>

    Enviado: lunes, 29 de enero de 2018 07:43 p. m.
    (...)
    I think inclusiveness is always laudable and should be a consistently-applied principle in promoting multi-stakeholder solutions, especially in the governance matters related to the domain name system. 
       
    Team member selection is the specific issue referenced by Alejandro's motion.  And the consultations now underway for "Operating Standards for ICANN-specific Reviews" does have something to say about that.  It suggests 'community selection' as the preferred model.  So maybe what we need is a re-definition of 'community' within the ICANN context.

    A couple of questions. Would that presentation of the proposed Operating Standards for Review Teams address the issue raised by Alejandro?

    And if we think it is inadequate to task, would it not be more helpful if responses here give global visibility to the matter?   Have a look: 

    https://www.icann.org/public-comments/reviews-standards-2017-10-17-en

    -Carlton"

  4. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:


    "De: Dr. Alejandro Pisanty Baruch 

    Enviado: lunes, 29 de enero de 2018 08:19 p.m.
    (...)
     Hi,

    the motion addresses what I perceive as a shortcoming of the Operating Standards. Community selection, as implemented, is creating a process that is too closed and can preclude an open enough composition of review teams. This can be at the root of the ongoing difficulties the SSR2 review has encountered and thus it can be that the problem presented is not hypothetical but something that has already had consequences for ICANN.

    I do intend to present a comment in the link indicated, individually, but find the matter of enough importance for LACRALO to raise it collectively.

    Alejandro Pisanty"

  5. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:

    "De: bartlettmorgan

    (...)

    Enviado el: martes, 30 de enero de 2018 06:52

    Hi Alejandro,

    Just for clarity, what aspects of the current system characterise it as 'too closed?"

    1. The following answer has been made through the mailing list:


      "De: Alejandro Pisanty Baruch 

      Enviado: martes, 30 de enero de 2018 09:06 a. m.

      (...)

      Bart,

      when decisions are made by the SO/AC leadership, incentives and negotiations structurally favor the known (people, organizations) that will not question the incumbent. Before the IANA transition the Board was able to introduce a degree of independence that for now has not been recovered. This is a paradoxal effect of the design that has as its main thrust the positive, desired goal of making ICANN robust against capture by specific inerests, notably governments.

      Yours,

      Alejandro Pisanty".

  6. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:

    "De: Carlton Samuels

    Enviado: martes, 30 de enero de 2018 07:32 p. m.

    (...)


    Thanks for the clarification Alejandro.  Your resolution seems to suggest disqualifying SO/ACs from selecting RT members. If this is removed from SO/ACs, it goes to ICANN the organisation, no?  So I extracted the obligations of ICANN org in what is proposed:

        • Timely publication of call for volunteers;


        • Determining the need to extend the call, in case of insufficiently diverse or skilled pool of applicants;


        • Assure that each applicant indicates which SO/AC from which they seek nomination and encourage applicants to familiarize themselves with the work and leadership of the SO/AC from which they seek nomination
        • Provide a non-binding assessment of the skillset of each of the applicants relative to the skills and experiences identified in the call for volunteers;
        • Provide each SO/AC with a list of those applicants who have sought their respective nomination, including all application materials, and the non-binding skillset assessment;
        • Coordinate the meeting of SO/AC Chairs for the final selection of the review team.


    The call for volunteers must:

        • Include a mandatory field for candidate to indicate which of the seven SO/ACs from which they seek nomination.
        • Include a Statement of Interest (SOI) to be filled in by every candidate.
        • Solicit information from applicants regarding their skillset and experience, relevant to the review.

    Set an expectation that a review team member may be asked to execute a nondisclosure agreement.

    I highlighted the duties of ICANN org that is being proposed because even as I am for diversity and how that is achieved, I'm concerned about a concentration of power.  Would your proposal not concentrate power unconditionally in ICANN org?


    Best,
    -Carlton".

    1. The following answer has been made through the mailing list:

      "De: Alejandro Pisanty Baruch 

      Enviado: martes, 30 de enero de 2018 09:09 p. m.

      (...)

      thanks for the careful read and underlining the relevant documentation.

      The pendulum swing in which the CCWG's for the IANA transition was careful to avoid a concentration of power in the ICANN professional organization has led to a paradoxal effect in which the SO/AC leadership has incentives to "circle the wagons" and to perform a bit too much of internal "horse-trading." We lived through a similar analysis in the 2003 Evolution and Reform Process, when we created the Nominating Committee and had to take care that some politics of the GNSO (previously DNSO) and other ICANN components was not transferred to the NomCom. 

      The motion I put forward would not undo the SO/AC part but would add the opportunity for a correction to the undesirable, pardoxal effect I have described. 

      This is also important because the rules for the accountability, transparency, and liability for the circle of SO/AC leadership have not yet been fully developed to the level of the Board's requirements and risks. This adds to the incentives to avoid a review that could scrutinize the organization in ways that this circle would not desire, yet would be important for the health of the organization as a whole and in consequence would also stave off the criticism that it is too self-contained. These are already around since before the IANA transition and may get worse (whether founded or unfounded, it is always better to have objective grounds to dismiss them.)

      Alejandro Pisanty"  


  7. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:


    "De: Dev Anand Teelucksingh 

    Enviado: miércoles, 31 de enero de 2018 08:58 p. m.

    (...) 

    The motion to submit a comment on "Operating Standards for ICANN Specific Reviews" to have "independent" Review Team members not endorsed by any SO/AC is problematic for several reasons :

    - Who would assess and decide to select such members if not the AC/SOs? If ICANN, it would likely (as Carlton suggests) concentrate
    power to ICANN to review ICANN. 
    - "Independent" members applying will likely be from the ICANN stakeholder community (from a AC or SO). For them to be somehow not
    accountable, or coordinating with their AC/SO throughout the Review is unusual - independent members could also seek their personal
    interest/agendas and disrupt the review team's work.
    - What happens when independent members resign? Who would replace them?

    Furthermore the proposal is quite detailed:
    - having a scope drafting team setting the scope before the review starts with appropriate review, public comment and approval.
    - call for volunteers to be on the review team, noting criteria needed.
    - after the call, each SO/AC, following its own internal processes, nominates up to seven candidates for each review team selecting from
    the pool of applicants that responded to the open call for volunteers.
    - ICANN organization Non-Binding Diversity and Skill Analysis of the presumed review team done and shared with the SO/ACs chairs - the purpose of this additional step is to alert the Chairs of any shortcomings in diversity and skillset across the full anticipated
    composition, and to allow them to confer with their respective SO/ACs in order to make changes to nominations or otherwise receive modified direction on completing the selection process.
    - how the review team does it work, how the review team can adjust the scope if it deems necessary , solicit independent experts, etc.
    - dealing with resignation of review team members - removal of review team members - having observers on review teams

    etc, which appears sufficient to fulfill the mission of the reviews.

    I therefore cannot support Alejandro's motion as I don't see how such a change will help achieve the goals of the ICANN reviews.

    I do thank Alejandro for the suggestion, it forced me (and hopefully others in LACRALO) to scrutinize and reflect on the proposed policy
    more intently.

    Kind Regards,

    Dev Anand Teelucksingh".

    1. The following answer has been made through the mailing list:


      "De: Alejandro Pisanty

      Enviado: miércoles, 31 de enero de 2018 09:07 p. m.

      (...)

       Dev,

      en el diseño actual, la primera revisión que se ha iniciado con las nuevas reglas no ha podido alcanzar los objetivos. 

      La modificación propuesta permitiría inroducir perspectivas más amplias, con una visión crítica de la organización y sin representar los conflictos que detienen el avance. 

      De hecho es la característica más importante que existía en las revisiones antes de la transición y que fue abandonada en las reglas post-transición. 

      Alejandro Pisanty".

      1. The following answer has been made through the mailing list:

        "De: Carlton Samuels 

        Enviado: miércoles, 31 de enero de 2018 09:23 p. m.

        (...)
         
        +1.

        Because of my concerns about inclusiveness and diversity, I too have given this motion some serious thought.  However, we believe the logical remedy is hardly fit for purpose and could likely inflame the situation.

        Specific to the immediate trigger for this motion, I've seen where the collective SO/AC leadership has responded to concerns about the SSR Review with a roadmap for progressing that agenda.   It is entirely reasonable that their collective views may not find favour with all of us  at this time. We can imagine that turnover in SO/AC leadership may enable a new perspective to emerge. 

        Add these to the reasons outlined by Dev. I cannot support this motion. 

        -Carlton Samuels
        The University of the West Indies".

  8. The following comment has been made through the mailing list:


    "De: Niran Beharry

    Enviado: miércoles, 31 de enero de 2018 09:03 p. m.

     +1  Dev

    Niran Beharry".