Members:  Alan Greenberg, Alice Munyua, Athina Fragkouli, Becky Burr, Cheryl Langdon-Orr, Eberhard Lisse, Fiona Asonga, Jordan Carter, Jorge Villa, Julia Wolman, Leon Sanchez, Mathieu Weill, Olga Cavalli, Par Brumark, Robin Gross, Roelof Meijer, Samantha Eisner, Sebastien Bachollet, Steve DelBianco, Suzanne Radell, Thomas Rickert, Tijani Ben Jemaa  (22)

Participants:  Alain Bidron, Barrack Otieno, Bob Takacs, Carlos Rau Gutierrrez, David McAuley, Edward Morris, Finn Petersen, Jonathan Zuck, Jorge Cancio, Kavouss Arasteh, Keith Drazek, Martin Boyle, Matthew Shears, Mike Chartier, Olivier Muron, Pedro Ivo Silva, Peter Van Roste, Philip Corwin, Rafael Perez Galindo, Rudi Daniel, Vrikson Ivan Acosta, Yasuichi Kitamura  (22)

Staff:  Adam Peake, Alice Jansen, Bart Boswinkel, Berry Cobb, Brenda Brewer, Grace Abuhamad, Marika Konings, Theresa Swinehart

Apologies:  David Maher, Avri Doria

**Please let Brenda know if your name has been left off the list (attendees or apologies).**


Transcript CCWG ACCT #15 03March.doc

Transcript CCWG ACCT #15 03March.pdf


The Adobe Connect recording is available here:

The audio recording is available here:

Proposed Agenda

1. Welcome, roll-call & SoI 

2. Activity reports 

  • WP 1 
  • WP 2 
  • ST-WP 
  • Legal Subteam 

3. Timeline

4. A.O.B 

5. Next steps & Closing Remarks 


CCWG - Call # 15 - 3 March 2015

This call is being recorded. 

Chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: 

1. Welcome, roll-call & SOI

Becky Burr and Barrack Otieno call only

2. Activity reports 


  • followed the triggered and un-triggered format, and this demarkation broadly work  On  2 calls and coordination with Jordan WP1, moved work on ICANN limited scope to WP2.  
  • Tasks between there 2 groups compared and allocated. 
  • Document transparency, all are part of WP1
  • WP2 includes modifications, enhancements, review of exist triggered mechanisms.  
  • These include Ombudsman, reconsideration independent review and suggestions from the community related to these.
  • Plus covers the compact with the community and statement of ICANN's mission  and standards to carrot mission, as discussed in Singapore. 
  • Holding weekly meetings, planning sub-group calls, and possibly a meeting on Sunday afternoon in Istanbul to prepare for the week..
  • WP2 will enhance existing mechanisms, ensure that the Board can be held to its bylaws, prevent mission creep etc.
  • Question: When do we ask for reconsideration, what do we mean by redress, and need to agree on a definition of "community".
  • Definitions will be in the final report, build on initial discussions in Frankfurt
  • There are attempts to define "community" in the scoping document: communities are being discussed in respect at standing, and other with decisions making power.
  • WP2 proposing 5 new sub-groups.  Work of the groups will be on the WIKI, and referred to in transcripts and notes of WP2 calls
  • Light-weight structures might be preferred.  


  • Weekly meetings.  Discussions about, removal of directors and defining GAC consensus.  Draft templates available for most, where not they are topics transferred to WP2 or in progress. 
  • Looking at mechanisms that make these powers work:  issue of statutory members, members, supervisory board etc are the right way to make the powers work being discussed.
  • Example: removal of directors (note yet discussed by the working group)
  • Any number or all Directors might be removed.
  • Assumption controlling is whatever is recommended in terms of  CCWG
  • A new mechanism
  • The effect of a director being removed.  
  • Standard of the decision, objective standards are often not specified.  Suggestion should follow same standards as the ICANN Board currently has to remove a Director.  
  • Do not expect resolution before F2F
  • Contributes to all accountability dimensions, makes the Director more aware of all accountability mechanisms and contingencies. 
  • A director appointed by a particular community, should that electing entity be the only one able to remove the director?  Or removal by others with the support or no objection by that SO/AC 
  • NomCom appointed directors, may require a modifies process 

Action (co-chair): Can the advisors provide advice on international law and also corporate governance related to removal

  • What infringement might trigger the process? That this is a measure of last resort
  • With each power there will be different triggers. Suggest powers should be attached to existing mechanisms, or one shared new group. 
  • Initial proposal was to spill the entire board.  Extreme and very difficult to trigger.  Threat of use, presence enough  Now making a simple concept complex, picking off single directors, objective standards of the
    community rather than super-majority. 
  • WP1 will distinguish between pilling the board and powers if the individual SO/AC.  Need to have graduated scale, or risk the only option is to escalate to the higher standard.
  • Notion of the "big stick" for WS1 topics.  Recall of whole board is that big stick. removal of individual directors left as WS2.   
  • GAC advice and how the bylaws require the Board to consider this advice.  
  • GAC set out its own operating principles., is able to lower or raise the threshold for advice. 
  • Suggestion of the current wording of GAC principles about consensus advice, that it is that consensus advice that triggers this reconciliation by the Board.  If the GAC then changes its standard of advice, 
    how that advice is considered by the board is a matter for the community. Codifies the status quo in the ICANN bylaws. 

Stress Test WP 

  • Stress test 1 and 2, combined.
  • Note: intention to apply a test against a package of proposed accountability measures, so premature to apply, but is proving useful to apply to these drafts. 
  • 1 and 2:  IANA root zone change authority/delegation authority fails to function.  Need to engage with the CWG. 

Action: to discuss on regular calls with the CWG co-chairs.

  • Test 24. Mission creep, CEO expands or extends ICANN's mission, lacking community consensus  
  • Loss of confidence is ICANN and ability to perform technical functions. 
  • Loss of confidence is ICANN and ability to perform technical functions.  If in strategic plan or budget then community non-binding comment, and CA AG has authority if an organization acts outside its mission.  What powers doe the CA AG have? 
  • \Under a majority or supermajority, the community might block the budget.  Mid-year, if the the community power to veto a Board decision.  Or triggering an independent review, but to what standard.  Collectively the proposed mechanisms seem adequate.  
  • Is the golden bylaw is addressed by WP2 in mission and standards
  • Test 15.   ICANN terminates its legal presence in a nation in response to litigation. 
  • community standing to veto a board decision could prevent the board on moving.  AoC in the bylaws would mean ICANN is subject to legal action by another party. Seems adequate protection against the contingency 

Legal Subteam

  • Legal scoping document, working through a number of drafts.  Expect to narrow the issues and questions down by the end of the week.
  • Particularly aware of issues of interest to the  ccTLD community
  • External law firm, prep calls with a short list of firms, two more interviews this week 
  • Anti-trust issues will be considered in the scoping document. 
  • Jurisdiction: expect further discussion with Advisors 


  • Working towards f2f in Istanbul and readiness of the draft for public comment on April 6.
  • What is the structure of the F2F Istanbul, so we can play the work of the subgroups.  

Action: Co-chairs to prepare the next meeting, agenda to include the structure of the report and of the F2F meeting. 

Action: Staff to provide a skeleton for the report..

Action Items

Action (co-chair) Can the advisors provide advice on international law and also corporate governance related to removal

Action to discuss on regular calls with the CWG co-chairs.

Action: Co-chairs to prepare the next meeting, agenda to include the structure of the report and of the F2F meeting. 

Action: Staff to provide a skeleton for the report.

Documents Presented

WP1 Drafts -

WP2 Drafts -

ST-WP Drafts -

Legal Subt Drafts -

Timeline -  

Chat Transcript

Alice Jansen 3: (3/3/2015 02:43) Welcome to CCWG call #15! Please note that chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior:

  Alice Jansen 6: (05:55) Please mute your lines

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair, ALAC): (05:57) Hello everyone

  jorge villa (ASO): (05:58) Hi Leon, good morning

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair, ALAC): (05:58) is there a rooster in the backiground?

  Suzanne Radell: (05:58) Hello everyone

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair, ALAC): (05:58) Hi Jorge!

  Pär Brumark (GAC, Niue): (05:58) Hi everyone!

  Yasuichi Kitamura (At-Large): (05:59) h

  Yasuichi Kitamura (At-Large): (05:59) hi, all

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (05:59) Hi Everyone

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (05:59) Hi everyone

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (06:00) hello everyone

  Carlos Rau Gutierrez: (06:00) Good morning

  Edward Morris: (06:00) Good aftenoon all

  jorge cancio: (06:00) hello everyone

  Julia Wolman GAC Denmark: (06:01) Hello everyone

  Thomas Rickert: (06:01) Hello all!

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (06:02) Hi all. sorry I'm late

  Fiona Asonga (ASO): (06:02) Hallo All

  Finn Petersen, GAC: (06:02) Hello everyone

  Alice Munyua GAC: (06:02) Hello everyone

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:02) Hi, waiting for the operator ...

  Adam Peake: (06:03) WP2:

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:03) am in

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:05) Can I also register my apology for having to leave the call after on hour, I'll be following the Adobe Connect, but  have to consult.

  arasteh: (06:06) Alice

  arasteh: (06:06) pls also register me to leave after one hour

  Alice Jansen: (06:08) Noted - thanks

  Edward Morris: (06:08) DIDP is a triggered transparency mechanism. Think consideration should be given to transferring it to 2.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:10) Apols for lateness

  Keith Drazek: (06:11) Hi all

  Olga Cavalli - GAC: (06:12) Hello everyone

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:13) hi Keith, Olga. :)

  Matthew Shears: (06:13) when is the next WP1 call?

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (06:15) We have definition of review vs redress in our definitionn document. I suggest to refer to this as much as possible

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:15) Matthew: same day/time this week

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (06:15) Thank you for that, Mattheu, I was about to ask

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (06:20) @Kavouss : apologies I did not capture the difference review / reconsideration. Understoof now

  Adam Peake: (06:20) WP1 wiki:

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (06:22) Another item in WP1 is bringing the Affirmation Reviews into ICANN Bylaws.    That is already drafted.   But it does not fit into the Template so well.

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:24) Grace, can y ou make it so that each person can move the page without interfereing with the preseneter's control?

  Alice Jansen: (06:24) hi Erberhard, you should have scroll control

  Grace Abuhamad: (06:25) @Jordan -- no your won't be moving everyone's screen

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:25) Yes, I have but whenever I scroll it scrolls back (as if someone was doing that) :-)-O

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:26) ok, better now

  Grace Abuhamad: (06:26) @Eberhard -- that's a bug with AC that I haven't quite figured out yet. Happens with me too occasionally

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:26) should I log out and back in?

  Grace Abuhamad: (06:27) you can try that. but if it's better, you might be ok

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:27) I am lostening via the bridge anyway

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:27) listening

  Grace Abuhamad: (06:27) sometimes, if you use the arrows instead of scroll, then you are better off

  Alice Jansen: (06:27) You can also find this document here

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (06:32) Indeed @Alan  VERY good point re 'replacement"  be appointing bodies esp NomCom

  Matthew Shears: (06:32) I agree with Alan re standards and even those pointed to such as a the global public interest are undefined and very hards to measure

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:32) So essentially we are saying that there are no standards in palce currently?

  Matthew Shears: (06:33) good question

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:34) If we have a different process for 'replacement' than for 'appintment' we might be creating new accountability problems, so let's think about that - Tijani's suggestion on the audio just now that appointing bodies appoint a member as well as a replacement prospect is one.

  Samantha Eisner: (06:34) There is not a defined standard in the Bylaws for when a Board member could be removed; however we have codes of conduct and conflict of interest policies that help define situations when removal of director may be an appropriate considerations

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:35) +1 Mathieu - yes, I think that's a great idea.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:35) Good feedback to incorporate (the idea that the standards WP2 is working on could be the basis)

  Samantha Eisner: (06:35) The Bylaws solely require a 3/4 majority vote of the Board for removal of any individual director

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (06:35) @Sam -- but only the Board itself can remove a director based on those standards.  The COmmuity has no standing to trigger removal of directors.  Do I have that right?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:36) has the board ever removed another board member?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:36) That's the Status Quo, Steve. Yep.

  Matthew Shears: (06:36) @ Samantha - are there performance measurements against which Board members are apprised?

  Samantha Eisner: (06:36) Robin, I'm not aware of any removal that's ever happened

  Samantha Eisner: (06:36) Steve, it's correct that the power only lies with teh board right now

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (06:38) @Sam, correct. But the Board is not limited to those Standards. If the majority of the Board chooses to remove a Director due to lack of good oral hygiene (to use a unlikely real reason), and it follows the due process correctly, that is sufficient..

  Keith Drazek: (06:39) +1 Jordan, simplicity is highly desirable.

  Samantha Eisner: (06:39) Matthew, there are not currently any sort of performance metrics that hte Board members are required to meet.  However, there are situations such as the code of conduct lay out teh statndards to which Board members are expected to meet

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (06:39) I am pretty sure the removal process has never been used.

  Matthew Shears: (06:39) thanks!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:40) Yep Thomas, that makes sense.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:41) Steve: do you think we should do three different templates - an SO/AC removing one director, collective removal of a number of directors, removing all directors?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:42) I think we need ability to recall single board members, but think groups should have their own standard for recall

  Edward Morris: (06:42) Folks, as long as the Membership option is open understand that under CA law recall of individual Board members is statutorily required, not just recall of the entire Board.

  Matthew Shears: (06:43) there needs to be the "spill the board" option and also the opportunity to recall an individual board member but not sure about "a number of directors"

  Eberhard Lisse [.NA ccTLD Manager]: (06:43) Alan,  one doe, however., wonder about the high turnover, especially of the female Board Members...

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (06:43) Agree with @Alan  on this matter

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (06:43) I like that idea, Alan.  Separate Spill from individual recall

  Edward Morris: (06:43) @ Matthew. Agree.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:43) that works for me

  Matthew Shears: (06:43) + 1

  Keith Drazek: (06:43) Agree with (1) Spill the board, (2) SO/AC recall for their directoes, and (3) a mechanism for NomCom appointee recall/removal.

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (06:44) I fully agree with Steve. Let's keep it as simple as possible as a process, but very difficuly to achieve: supermajority treshold to remove the entire board, no recall of individual members. Individual members that were performing well (there will always be) can be reappointed

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (06:44) I was going to ask how difficult it would be for noncom given changes in membership, etc.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:44) Agree with Keith on the 3 options we need on this issue.

  Matthew Shears: (06:44) + 1 Keith of issue of NomCom Board appointees

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (06:44) I disagree with your last oart @Roelof  I am one who thinks there needs to be (seperatly) some empowerment of 'appointing bodies'

  Keith Drazek: (06:45) It might not be NomCom recall of NomCom appointees. It might be a community mechanism.

  Matthew Shears: (06:45) yes

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:45) yes community recall of nomcom appointees

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (06:45) I don't agree with Keith, no seperate process for nomcom appointees

  jorge cancio: (06:45) A general thought: I wonder whether the different accountability mechanism descriptions/proposals will be presented with an assessment of their impact on the power structures within ICANN and the apropriate balance between parts of the community

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:46) I don't think it makes sense to move individual recall to WS2

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (06:46) That splitting into WS's #1 and 2 works for me @Thomas

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:46) I don't mind which WS the individual spilling goes into

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:46) but it is a good idea to split the two

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:46) WP sorry, not WS

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:46) I think these are all WS1

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:47) thanks for the clarification, Jordan.  WP2 is ok. 

  Matthew Shears: (06:47) agree - all WS1

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:47) just not WS2

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:48) The idea to test (and to ak the community?) is whether the community wants the power to remove (basically nonpeforming) invid directors. The fact the Board can do so isn't really relevant to asking people. After all the "impact" threshold is much higher for all the board than for one.

  David McAuley: (06:48) I like Thomas’s idea for putting individual revocations to WP2 – I think we will unearth some complexities that need to be ironed out – not least, how to track individual member votes/actions

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr: (06:48) Indeed @David  much more to be discussed on this/

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:48) board having a power and community have a power are not the same thing at all.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:49) Happy to suspend this discussion here

  Edward Morris: (06:49) +1 Robin

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:49) good points here, I hope the staff notes capture :)

  Keith Drazek: (06:49) Or WS1 commitment with details to be ironed out after. Agree the timing of SO/AC and NomCom recall will take time to implement.

  Alice Jansen: (06:50) GAC consensus template can be found here

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (06:50) Agree, Keith.   "Spill the Board" is all that needs to be in Work Stream 1

  jorge cancio: (06:51) On the issue of GAC advice decisions: are we planning to review decision-making procedures of other SOs/ACs and their impact on public interest?

  Suzanne Radell (GAC): (06:53) My understanding of this proposal is thatit  has less to do wth how the GAC develops advice but what the Board would be required to do with less than consensus advice; would that be an accurate assessment?

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (06:53) @Steve. Recall that our def'n of what is in WS1 are all the necessary powers to effect WS2 processes. I am not at all sure that removal of individual members would fall into that category.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:53) Suzanne: that's exactly right

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:53) i has nothing to do with what GAC thinks

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:53) or decides

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:54) is only to do with how the ICANN Board has to respond

  Alice Munyua GAC: (06:54) Thats how I understand it. More to do with how the boad addresses no consensus GAC advice

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:55) This is basically about codifying the status quo, to deal with the risk or prospect of 'governmental takeover'

  jorge cancio: (06:55) Well the effect of GAC advice is clearly affected, I feel.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:55) I don't mind ICANN having to give this special consideration, but I think the current threshold for that is sensible, and this would protect that current situation.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (06:55) this isn't that complicated.  it is just about how the board treats advice to which no one has objected to.  this is a very good proposal in my view.

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (06:56) agree

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:56) If you are using Chrome, Rafael, don't forget to let the browser let your comments through.

  Alice Munyua GAC: (06:57) I suppose what the ICANN board would do when there is no GAC advice and instead chair conveys the full range of views

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:57) Alice - in that situation they would do whatever they do today :-)

  Grace Abuhamad: (06:57) @Rafa would you like a dial out?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (06:57) Everyone is on tenterhooks

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (06:58) We need this to address Stress Test #18 and the condition that NTIA would not accept a plan that allowed government capture of ICANN

  Suzanne Radell (GAC): (06:58) There is an explicit requirement (agreed via ATRT1) for a consultation process when the Board determines it cannot accept or act on GAC advice

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (06:59) For the record, I strongly support the concept described here . I just think we need to be very careful in how we approach it.

  Rafael Pérez Galindo (GAC): (06:59) Sorry for the mike issue.

  Rafael Pérez Galindo (GAC): (06:59) My point was: While understanding the need to avoid capture, no proposal should preempt the way in which a Committee makes decisions, which is what this idea would mean in practice by compelling the GAC to stick to the consensus rule if it wants the Board to duly take into account its advice. This proposal goes beyond the scope of this CCWG unless we engage in discussion of procedures in all relevant SOs/ACs, as well.At any rate, such a proposal would strongly affect the GAC role and should request explicit consent from the GAC prior to its inclusion in the report.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:00) It would affect the GAC's ability to change its effective level of influence, but it would have no impact at all on its current role at all, in any way.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:00) actually this proposal has nothing to do with how the GAC makes decisions.  it just says that defernce goes to advice that hasn't been objected to.

  jorge cancio: (07:01) @Robin: the effect on GAC decisions is evident in my view

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:01) what is the effect?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:01) I would add that other SOs and ACs can't change their rules in this way that changes their influence - but this is a very valuable discussion.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:01) Thank you Rafael for sharing his perspective.

  jorge cancio: (07:02) almost all SOs have special arrangements in relation to their influence on Board decisions on policy issues...

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:02) and it only has to do with "special deference"

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:02) jorge - the question is can they change this themselves

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:02) different SO's have different roles - some are "advisory" and others make policy.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:02) SOs make policy, ACs advise, isn't it?

  jorge cancio: (07:02) take the numbering or the protocol policy areas...

  Alan Greenberg (ALAC): (07:03) @Thomas, problem is that currently there is no ICANN-wide uniform definition of consensus.

  Olga Cavalli - GAC: (07:04) audio from Matthew is lo

  Olga Cavalli - GAC: (07:04) low

  Adam Peake: (07:05) WIKI for stress test working party:

  Thomas Rickert: (07:05) @Alan, the ICANN understanding of consensus would be the definition in the bylaws :-)

  Rafael Pérez Galindo (GAC): (07:07) Thank you Jordan, and many thanks to Rickert for reading out loud my message

  Rafael Pérez Galindo (GAC): (07:08) This has to be thoroughly adn deeply thought before any decision is made.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC- AP Region Member): (07:08) Indeed PLEAS  remember what @Steve is saying now,  this is a run thrugh exercis and  leads us to a 'gap analysis'  as the proposed Accountability Mechanisms  are developed... we need to of course 'run' these ST's  against all Mechanisms  once further and fully developed...

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:11) Rafael: Yep, it does. What it basically does, when you boil it all down, is say: "GAC can't change its level of influence in ICANN - up or down - without community consent allowing a bylaws change."

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:12) We do need to think about that deeply, because it is part of adjusting to the post-NTIA-contract world.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:13) It might be the right or the wrong idea as part of this adjustment, but at least we are having the right conversation :-)

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:14) Martin is muted.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:14) [I am told that restarting the Adobe room sometimes helps.]

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (07:14) I think I must have

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (07:15) I'm a slow typist, but I'll work on it

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (07:15) Carry on and I'll catch up!

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (07:15) I have a concern about the nature of the stress test

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (07:16) We still have not agreed about the need for authorisation.  Against that, the existing and proposed accountability measures are ok

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:17) @Martin, I think there is room to improve definition of stress test to avoid confusion

  Martin Boyle, Nominet: (07:18) I would like to see the stress test re-defined into something more general about service level or performance or failure to follow agreed policy (or inventing new policy)

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC- AP Region Member): (07:18) @Mathieu,  perhaps we can ake a little time in our F2F meeting to do exactly that with the full CCWG

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:19) This is a question in our legal scoping document, Steve.  I believe the answer we get back will be the Cal Attny General can do little (and practically will do little, since our Cal Attny Gen is also running for Senate).

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:20) From draft legal scoping doc:          8.  How could the California Attorney General (or other public official) intervene in ICANN’s operation on behalf of community members?  How typical is such an intervention by the California Attorney General in the operation of a nonprofit corporation, what are the grounds for such intervention, and what is a reasonable expectation for a successful remedy in this situation?

  Finn Petersen, GAC: (07:20) Ja - det er meget klart - men Rafael vil øjensynlig have, at GAC for endnu større indflydelse på ICANN beslutninger, end hvad de eksisterende concensusregler indebærer

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:21) Yes, Becky, I support that proposal that even community could not engage in scope creep.

  Suzanne Radell (GAC): (07:21) Finn, could you re-type your comment in English please?

  Rudi Daniel: (07:23) Thank you leaving the meet.

  Finn Petersen, GAC: (07:23) Suz - it should only have been send to Julia - sorry

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:24) The perils of chat on the Internet, Finn. :)

  Edward Morris: (07:25) Steve, Cheryl: Thank you so much for the hard wrk you guys are doing on this. In the future, could you try to get these out to use at least 24 hours before the general meeting?  It would have been useful to have time to go over them and povide feedback before it went out to the group as a whole. Thank you.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:26) It's not WP1

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (07:26) Will try, Edward.   Sorry about that

  Samantha Eisner: (07:29) It's very hard to escape established jurisdictional reach of courts by simply leaving that jurisdiction by closing an office

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:30) Agree with Samantha.  ICANN is going to be subject to legal jurisdiction pretty much everywhere.

  Leon Sanchez (Co-Chair, ALAC): (07:30) National Courts can always reach to Courts in other countries to ask for cooperation

  Matthew Shears: (07:31) in listen only - but are looking at the other AoC articles to see if they can be brought into the bylaws beyond the reviews

  Matthew Shears: (07:32) as Steve outlined

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:32) speaking of legal jurisdiction, I imagine that ICANN is subject to antitrust enforcementaroud the world, no?

  David McAuley: (07:33) Jurisdictional concepts are changing in the digital age, I think it is fair to say it is an unsettled area as to what “presence” is needed to maintain jurisdiction but is moving toward including digital impact

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:34) thanks for the clarification, Phil, about which type of jurisdiction we are talking about here.

  Keith Drazek: (07:35) Has someone captured the anti-trust question/issue? Is that now in a WP for attention, or with the legal question work group?

  Vrikson: (07:35) I agree with Samantha and Robin. It only takes political-juridical will from a mail court of a country for courts in other countries try to emulate what was decided and make ICANN accountable

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:35) Is Fadi on our email list? :)

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:36) Keith, current draft of anti-trust question to legal council:    10.  What antitrust legal issues are possible to arise in this context and how can those issues be most effectively addressed given the CCWG’s stated goals and concerns?

  Keith Drazek: (07:36) Excellent, thanks Robin.

  David McAuley: (07:36) I'm not sure anti-trust issues are squarely captured

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (07:36) at this point we've applied half of the 25 stress tests.   Shold be able to finish them by the time we meet inIstanbul

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:36) Here's the link for the draft doc:

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:37) for legal scoping

  David McAuley: (07:37) Thanks Robin, my error

  Adam Peake: (07:37) And legal sub-group wiki:

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:37) well, improvements to the wording are welcome

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC- AP Region Member): (07:38) Thank you @ Mathieu

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:38) That's my point David, China is using antitrust enforcement very creatively these days with protectionist ends. Why not use antitrust as a form of capture?

  David McAuley: (07:39) Fair question Jonathan

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:40) @Jonathan : good idea, would also apply to FTC trying to capture I guess

  Keith Drazek: (07:41) I have to drop in 5 minutes. Apologies.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:41) The list of questions is long - it is going to be hard to answer

  David McAuley: (07:41) Thanks Leon and Robin

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:41) Jordan, suggestions for what to pare out would be welcome.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:42) Thanks, David.

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (07:42) are these questions used to SELECT a law firm, or are these questions that we will want answered AFTER we selct the firm?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:42) after the selection in my view, Steve

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:42) but before also, I guess. 

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (07:42) Does the subteam agree with you on that, Robin?

  David McAuley: (07:43) Fair point Thomas

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:43) we haven't discussed it, Steve.  but the more I think about it, I don't know why it couldn't be before.  It is on a public wiki now

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:44) The three goals are what we want to achieve.  1.  Recalling board members.  2.  community empowerment.  3.  Limit scope of activity.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:46) Aren't we using the same firm as the CWG?

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (07:46) In the "proposals under construction" paragraph, three mechanisms that we identified seem to be missing: existing SO/AC structure, permananet CCWG, supervisory board/two tier board construction

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:46) aren't we piggybacking on their work?

  Matthew Shears: (07:47) I thought so

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:47) I hate to raise this too: is there any possibility of a conflict for the law firm in advising both the CCWG and the CWG? I don't think there is but the question must be asked?

  David McAuley: (07:49) Greg Shatan has been active in the selection process, too bad he is not here. But I think his questions to qualify firms have only generally used these questions pretty much as Leon described

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:49) Great to know this question has been being asked. Thanks Samantha.

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (07:50) I'm glad to see  question 8 on California Attorney General, too.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:54) If you were able to make this doc downloadable for poeple as a PDF that might be helpful since it's so small it is hard to read on a small screen

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:55) This a helpful chart I think, Berry, better than what I started by far in pulling everything together in one place.

  Alice Jansen: (07:56) The document can be found here

  Matthew Shears: (07:59) Jordan - should we anticipate a F2F of WP1 on Sunday of the week in Istanbul?

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:59) Matthew - I've suggested as such in an email today

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (07:59) I don't think this timeline is realistic.  We won't even get our legal advice back for several weeks.  We need to make decisions based on that advice.

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (07:59) I've asked ICANN staff if they can find us a room.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC- AP Region Member): (08:01) Good plan @Jordan

  Steve DelBianco  [GNSO - CSG]: (08:01) @Jordan -- if you plan a WP meeting on Suday, please let us know ASAP so we can make travel plans

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC- AP Region Member): (08:02) I am nt arrivning until late Sunday  so yes need to know ASAP  to shift travel if needs be

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:02) has anyone heard from the travel dept about making flight arrangements?  I haven't received anything yet.

  Grace Abuhamad: (08:02) @robin -- I'll check in today. I know others have been contacted

  Roelof Meijer (ccNSO): (08:03) I won't be able to join a F2F WP1 on Sunday, will arrive in Istanbul late iSunday night

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:03) I think we need a more realistic timeline.

  Cheryl Langdon-Orr (ALAC- AP Region Member): (08:03) @ Berry  see  for the current list of WPST Members/ volunteers

  Edward Morris: (08:04) +1 Robin.

  Pär Brumark (GAC, Niue): (08:04) Thx!

  Jordan Carter (.nz, member): (08:04) bye all

  Thomas Rickert: (08:04) Thanks all and bye!

  Alice Munyua GAC: (08:04) Thank you

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:04) Thanks, bye!

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