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4. Electorate
A major and contentious issue is who does the voting. As will be noted in the next section, depending on the voting mechanism selected there may be more than one round of voting. If so, it is possible that the electorate could be different in each round.
Alternatives:
Unlike some aspects of the overall selection process, the issue of who votes has been the subject of MUCH discussion, perhaps not surprisingly. Options that have been suggested include the following. In all cases, the ballot could be either secret or open (the ALAC convention in recent years has been that all ballots involving individuals are secret).
a) ALAC elects a Board member from the final candidate list. Each of the ALAC members has one vote (15 vote’s total). As per other ALAC votes, if the RALO’s Rules of Procedure (RoP) allow, a RALO could direct the votes of the RALO-appointed ALAC members.
b) The RALOs elect a Board member from the final candidate list. Each RALO would have one vote (five vote’s total). The selection process within each RALO would be in keeping with its own RoP and need not be identical.
c) ALAC members and RALO Chairs elect a Board member from the final candidate list (20 vote’s total). RALO-appointed ALAC members may be bound by their RALO as per their respective RoP, and Chairs may be similarly bound. If there are multiple rounds without the potential for full consultation of the RALO, bound votes may be controlled by a prioritypreset by the RALO, or at the discretion of the RALO Chair.
d) As a variation of the RALO Chairs voting, an automated process could be set up which would allow ALSes to vote and the result of this tally would automatically be fed into the overall vote. If a RALO requires that ALS votes be weighted, the automated process would need to account for this.
e) All participating ALSes and individual members cast votes. The process must factor in the need for weighting ALS votes within a region and for overall weighting to ensure that each region has an equal overall vote. For the one RALO that currently has individual members (NARALO), the RoP calls for all such individuals to be collectively considered as a single virtual ALS. A variant of this is to give each individual member a full vote equivalent to an ALS.
f) All individuals who express interest as individual Internet users cast votes. This is equivalent to the 2000 vote for At-Large Directors.
Discussion:
To some extent, this discussion is a philosophical one - almost a matter of faith. That is, no amount of logical argument is likely to persuade a person to change their opinion on some of the options. Specifically, there are those who feel that the 2000 election by individual electors was a model to strive for, and others who believe that is “has been tried before and unequivocally was shown to lead to disaster.” There are some who feel that the ALAC members have been appointed to make decisions and that they should do just that, others who envision a more substantial role for ALSes and RALOs within the At-Large decision-making process, and yet others who feel that decisions should be taken at a grass-roots individual Internet user level.
Following the NARALO discussions, the question of "who votes" (offering the choices listed above) was put to meeting of every RALO (individually). At that time, the unanimous preference was option c) – with ALAC members and RALO Chairs casting votes (with the Chairs being directed by their RALO). Some felt that since a RALO could also direct their own appointed ALAC members, that this was a form of double counting. Since that time, one RALO has indicated it is reconsidering and is currently undecided on what method to use (EURALO). It should also be noted that a small but vocal minority within NARALO – notably some of those who participated in the 2000 vote – supported option f).
In the variants that require nested voting (that is, one secret ballot feeds into another), there is the potential for the lack of clarity bringing into question the validity of the vote.
Any direct vote of ALSes will without doubt bring into question to what extent that actual members of the ALS are being involved in the process and the decision, or whether the vote is being decided on and cast by a single representative of that ALS.
The issue of “voting with one’s heart” vs. “voting with one's head” has also been raised. Given the importance of this process, it is vital that whatever electorate is selected,that there can be a high degree of confidence that they will vote based on the evidence and not based primarily on the origins of the candidates or the languages that they speak.
At the other extreme, a vote purely carried out by ALAC members (option a) raised the question of whether the entire process is a sham with ALAC members acting as a clique.
One of the arguments raised is that the Board has designated the new seat as an “At-Large seat” and not an “ALAC seat”. However, the Bylaws are consistent in identifying the SO seats as the GNSO seats, the ccNSO seats and the ASO seats, while in all cases, that actual appointment is made by the appropriate Council and not the entire Supporting Organization (terminology: At-Large is comparable to a SO with the ALAC being comparable to the SO Council). The Board motion adopted the principle of an At-Large director did make reference to the position being filled by the "At-Large Community" and that is taken to mean the term as defined in the ICANN Bylaws - the ALAC, RALOs and ALSes with individual Internet users largely predominating in the operation of each ALS, andindividual RALO members where applicable.
Comments by various members of the ALAC Review Committee do show sharp disagreement on how the various members envisioned the Board seat being filled.
The issue of secret ballot has not generated much discussion. The argument for a secret ballot is that it avoids personal conflict, and that one is more likely to vote how he/she truly believes is good for the organization if they don’t have to be audited by friends and colleagues. The counter argument is how an ALS or RALO will know if their direction was honoured if they cannot see how the vote was cast. It may be technically possible to reveal how votes were cast to an independent auditor to verify that directed votes were cast as directed. This does raise the question of why a group would select their leader if the person cannot be trusted.
Since any recommendation on this matter will need to be approved by the SIC and the Board, it would be useful to have the thoughts of members of those two bodies. It is clear from private discussions that there are some strong feelings in those groups. It is less clear if those thoughts will be shared prior to a recommendation being submitted. This is rather unfortunate. The process of creating the Non-Commercial Stakeholders Group Charter has demonstrated that common ground might have been reached if all parties had actually talked prior to a confrontation instead of just after it occurred.
In the absence of such dialogue, the recommendation contained in the ALAC Review Report (section 3.2.2.3, page 16) will be followed:
Designing a mechanism to place At Large members on the Board is a complicated task and the WG recommends that ALAC working with the RALOs and the ALSes (and with staff support) develop that mechanism. As an initial proposal, the WG suggests that Board members be elected through a process that involves ALAC, RALOs and ALSes, rather than just ALAC or the RALOs. This will provide the best representation of the voice and concerns of the individual Internet user.
Recommendation: 4
The Board seat should be selected by the ALAC plus the RALO Chairs. The RALO-appointed ALAC members and the RALO Chairs may be directed by their ALSes if the RALO desires (and in accordance with their RoP). This methodology gives ALSes large control over who is selected, without the complexity of two-level vote weighting and centralized ALS elector verification. The vote should be by secret ballot.
Notes and Appendices:
Members of the White Paper drafting team
- Sébastien Bachollet
- Alan Greenberg
- Dave Kissoondoyal
- Cheryl Langdon-Orr
- Evan Leibovitch
- Carlton Samuels
Related web pages and links:
ABS%20White%20Paper_FINAL_11012011_EN.pdf
Call%20for%20community%20Comment%20on%20ABS%20White%20Paper_FR_final.pdf
ABS%20White%20Paper_ES_final_08012010-RevisedContent_FINAL-ES.pdf
Appendix 1 - Documentation of Prior Actions
Appendix 2 - Announcement and Minutes of ICANN Board Resolution 27th August 2009
Glossary
Comments:
Comments will be accepted in any of the six UN languages.
This recommendation does not follow from the discussion, but instead takes a very far removed "representation" in place of a true At-Large. Why not include individuals or ALSs?
My counter-recommendation: Option 6. All individuals who express interest as individual Internet users cast votes. This is equivalent to the 2000 vote for At-Large Directors.
--Wendy
contributed by guest@socialtext.net on 2010-01-11 19:17:01 GMT
Are there any graphics that that can be incorporated into this presentation to make the organizations, their relationships, and memberships clearer?
contributed by toml@communisphere.com on 2010-01-12 06:27:43 GMT
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I agree totally with this recommendation. It considers the discussions in LACRALO and my personal opinion
Acuerdo totalmente con esta recomendación.Refleja lo discutido en LACRALO y particularmente mi opinión personal.
contributed by investigaciones@densi.com.ar on 2010-01-18 21:59:10 GMT
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LACRALO also agreed.
contributed by investigaciones@densi.com.ar on 2010-01-27 12:30:51 GMT
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I still do not understand how a vote which is both directed but anonymous can be audited by the ALSes. How can the ALSes be sure that their representatives have indeed voted according to the directions given ?
Which is why I suggest to take the human part out of the loop, and that the RALO vote be transferred into the main vote as X_RALO=3 votes. This should also apply to NomCom-elected ALAC members who have decided to follow the region's vote.
contributed by guest@socialtext.net on 2010-02-09 10:03:43 GMT
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The guest user above was me.
Additionally, because knowing the votes of the regions early might influence the votes of those ALAC members which are not directed by a RALO, the votes of the regions would need to be kept secret (by the staff, I guess) until the main election is through.
contributed by patrick@vande-walle.eu on 2010-02-09 10:08:11 GMT
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Although "taking the human out of the loop" is fine with me, I do have some trouble with the concept of appointing someone to represent a RALO on the ALAC, but not trusting them enough to honour a directed vote. If you can't trust them, perhaps they should not have been selected.
For the record, the intent of "anonymous but audited" was that a vote would not be made public, but that a trusted individual (staff or the voting authority) could verify to the RALO that the votes was or was not cast as instructed.
Lastly, although this is surely the subject of a good discussion, I am not whether the knowledge of some votes influencing others is a bad thing.
contributed by alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca on 2010-02-26 03:42:37 GMT
