Draft Agenda

1.  Welcome, SoI, Roll Call

2.  Discussion of refined accountability mechanism

3.  Responding to NTIA letter

4.  Concluding remarks

Transcript

• Transcript CCWG ACCT Working Session 3 - 25 June Buenos Aires.doc
• Transcript CCWG ACCT Working Session 3 - 25 June Buenos Aires.pdf

Recordings

The Adobe Connect recording is available here:  https://icann.adobeconnect.com/p237a6ylvzs/

The audio recording is available here:  http://audio.icann.org/meetings/buenosaires2015/ccwg-accountability-25jun15-en.mp3

Documents presented

20150625_CCWG_Visuals.pdf

Notes

CCWG-Accountability Working Session 3 -- 25 June 2015

1.  Welcome, SoI, Roll Call

2.  Discussion of refined accountability mechanism

3.  Responding to NTIA letter

4.  Concluding remarks

Intense discussion yesterday, trying to recap this and the proposals on

the table for us to consider.

XPLANE have a visualization of yesterday's and last Friday's discussion.

Discussion around requirements:  the CWG, the budgets issues, the Board,

about openness and the ability to adjust as the community evolves.  And

the notion of leverage if needs be.

Concerns - esp to involve the courts as little as possible.  While

retaining our community powers.  But we had problems.

Stemming from there statutory rights of members and derivative actions.

Legal complexities and formalities.  And concern of capture by a SO/AC

that obtained legal  personhood first that might then capture ICANN.

Community powers should go in the bylaws.  We seem to have agreement on

this. But how to actualize them.  But there are even more rights that are

available through statutory rights, that come with the members model.  See

the issues under the member model are complex, and some we wanted and some

we didn't have on our radar and need some to way to limit those powers.

Status quo.  Work on the assumption we will keep the status quo, and that

the community can exercise their powers based on the status quo.  But,

how, if a need for it, do we get from the status quo, to a different model

with more powers.

So where do we go in the hybrid model.

Some consider that the dismissal of the board would be a sufficient

remedy.  Interventions yesterday, about budget issues for the IANA

function being enshrined in the bylaws removes one of the weaknesses of

the designator model.  So we may have an empowered designator model.

The model doesn't have all the nuances of the earlier designs. The

graphics show a Community "power bar".  Giving the designators the

possibility to remove their director, and the collective ability to recall

the board.  Add the proposal to enshrine the IANA budget.

If we need to go to court to have the board honor an IRP, then the

relationship would have soured so much to reach that point they would have

left.

With the power bar approach, we don't have problems with derivative

actions, no risk of capture.  As we move from the voluntary model to the

designator, the power can only be invoked by more than one SO and AC.

Email from the RIR community hadn't expressed preference for any model,

they believe we need to reach resolution as soon as possible and simply.

Hear concern about enforceability.  Taking a matter before a court is an

extreme situation.  Is this small possibility worth delaying the

transition, and creating complexity and misunderstanding?

Makes us recommend and push for the designator model.  And consistent with

the model just presented.  At a phase in our WG where we must move

forward, so ask what can be added to or removed.  Enhance the proposal.

First question for the meeting: does this describe what was presented

yesterday - the table describes the community powers developed by WP1, but

WP2 an important part of our work and WP2 needs legal remedies for its

recommendations, for example, what could be done if IRP not implemented,

this should be part of the analysis.

Having heard that removal of the board, the nuclear option, as the only

power, is unwise.

Comments:

Clarity.  If the member model is off the table then say so.  What is meant

by hybrid?  May need to re-think the thresholds, give clarity about

participation of SO/AC that do not appoint a director

The status quo, which is the working model, with transformation for

designator model when some event triggers the need for greater authority.

Statutory legal rights are needed.  For example access to documents.

Derivative actions: the right of members to sue ICANN to remedy a rogue

board.  Some have concerns with other statutory rights,  some are

supportive.

The presentation gives a stark view of the member model and rosey view of

designator.  And the ultimate backstop of the designator model is still

the courts.

Hybrid.  Staring point is what we have now and how to improve on this, and

we are along the road to do that with IRP and reconsideration.  There are

already proposals before the board for document transparency from the ATRT

process.  Removal of the board is not so nuclear.  And concern about

capture is worse with member than designator.

Statement from Counsel, June 16, says they are unsure if the designator

needs to be legal persons, and need clarity on this.

The good thing about the model is that the SO/AC are exercising the

powers, until some eventually that necessitates legal measures.

The second proposal should have the consensus of the group.  NTIA

requirement that must represent consensus of the community.  All the

models are good.  But learning from the CWG approach won't work, they had

more discussion of the issues first.

Pragmatic.  Take into account dependencies of CWG and make every effort

before Paris to address them.  e.g the budget of PTI.  What else is

absolutely necessary.  Move the rest to WS2.

And this approach is what we are trying to do.  We are focusing on

requirements and towards a consensus proposal.

The member model is incomplete as a multi-stakeholder model if GAC cannot

participate.  We mention a rogue board, what about other rogue community

members?  Need to work toward a balanced model.

Both models would work.  And satisfy our requirements.  But when I listen

to the community I don't think the member model will be accepted.  I think

the designator model has a high chance of getting accepted.  Now it's time

to drop our personal ideas and listen to each-other. Agree with Avri that

dismissing the board is not the end of the world. May never need to use

the power of removing the board.

Not acceptable to interrupt the speakers.  Not acceptable to extend

meetings on short notice.  Not acceptable to tell members they are off

topic. 

There was a basic consensus around the community powers.  So now concerned

that statutory legal rights as something we want, when they have not been

discussed internally or with the community.

As someone who has sought legal enforceability, recognize that there are

degrees of accountability, and wish to move towards consensus.

3-4 weeks to revise our next proposal.  Our powers and core values and AoC

are well developed and the same for whichever model we choose.  The other

challenge is to reach agreement on authority/empowerment perhaps as a

sub-group.

Need to compromise, and not loose the window of opportunity. Use the

opportunity between now and Paris to compromise.   We would like to use

this comparison, further refine it.  Looking for external counsel for

support on this.

SWAT analysis - define the model, looks at strengths and weaknesses and

also creates opportunities and threats.

The models need to be fleshed out to have a fully informed discussion in

Paris.  And we all need to all work on grasping the subtleties between the

models.  And we will ask legal counsel to better flesh this out.

We have drafting to do.  We have substantial discussion to have about

topics raised in public comment.  Discussions needed of WS1 and WS2. And

begin organizing this on our call next Tuesday.

We have sufficient progress so we can go for legal advice. We have made

good progress since arriving in BA.

Responding to NTIA letter

Letter from Larry Strickling asking about the timeline of CCWG work,

noting unlikely to complete work before the end date of the NTIA/ICANN

IANA functions contract.  Also asked the ICG chairs.  There are extension

options available.

Our timeline is a second draft for 2nd public comment of 40 days.  A

review of comments and if no major changes then will ask the Chartering

organizations to review at the Dublin meeting. That is the goal.

How much time do we need to finalize our proposals, and have them ready

for implementation.  We hear the other groups are aiming for

June/September next year.

We have been asked to factor in community accountability.  Jan our Advisor

has warned us on this.  So work actively on this going forward.

At least need to say how it will be addressed in WS2.  Perhaps need to

create a WP3 to begin thinking about this.

In the reply - 2 assumptions, there's no magic to the date as NTIA and

ICANN can mutually cancel.  And that US Congress has kept away from

arbitrary dates and requirements.  A relatively short period of time after

completed or work for the transition to go forward.

Discretion, but within limits, L Strickling told us he needs 4 months, and

don't slip by more than a year.  Need to move the bar on stakeholder

accountability, and also recall the recommendation about human rights in

the bylaws.

ICG is debating, and some request that they don't send until coordinated

with the CCWG.

We have to finalize our proposal to get it to SO/AC charter organization

for Dublin. 

We will be crucified if we are not ready in Dublin.

So let's not add new issues like community accountability.

The CRISP team responsible for the numbers part of the ICG proposal is

targeting  Implementation is September of this year, not next year.

Develop the models so we can have meaningful discussion in Paris.  New

topics to discuss, inc community accountability, they are critical, and we

need to consider. We need volunteers to step up on this. WP1 and WP2 will

have a great deal of work in the coming weeks.

Co-chairs will coordinate response to NTIA

Acknowledge Bruce's comments on the bylaws drafting.  And will look at

blocks that are ready, and the AoC incorporation will be first of these we

think.

Reconvene as early as Tuesday 30 June for CCWG call at 06:00 UTC

We are making progress in surfacing underlying concerns.

AoB

Fiona - About the AoC reviews public comment.  Need to move forward in

synchronize with other work. In this review process they are looking at

the future of reviews, the schedule and structure of them, both the

organizational reviews of the bylaws and also the AoC reviews.  Bring them

in to our discussions about review mechanisms. Synchronize their

contribution with the CCWG.

Staff are cognizant of overlap of work and we are coordinating and the are

following the CCWG work. A comment from from the CCWG to the review

process would be helpful.

Thank you all. 

Chat transcript

  Kimberly Carlson: (6/25/2015 06:51) Hello, Welcome to the CCWG-ACCT Working Session #3 - ICANN 53 Buenos Aires

  Kimberly Carlson: (06:52) Hello, my name is Kim and I will be monitoring this chat room. In this role, I am the voice for the remote participants, ensuring that they are heard equally with those who are “in-room” participants. When submitting a question that you want me to read out loud on the mic, please provide your name and affiliation if you have one, start your sentence with <QUESTION> and end it with <QUESTION>. When submitting a comment that you want me to read out loud of the mic, once again provide your name and affiliation if you have one then start your sentence with a <COMMENT> and end it with <COMMENT>.  Text outside these quotes will be considered as part of “chat” and will not be read out loud on the mic.

  Kimberly Carlson: (06:57) Any questions or comments provided outside of the session time will not be read aloud.

  wolfgang: (07:11) When do you start?

  Kimberly Carlson: (07:11) 10:15 ART

  wolfgang: (07:11) Thx.

  Kimberly Carlson: (07:12) you're welcome

  Josh Hofheimer (Sidley): (07:17) Has the meeting started yet?  I am not getting any audio

  Kimberly Carlson: (07:18) Hi Josh, not yet

  James Gannon: (07:18) The room is coming together now I;d think we will start in a moment

  Jordan Carter: (07:20) hey!

  Bruce Tonkin 2: (07:22) The meeting has now started.

  Gigi Johnson: (07:23) Is the visualization going up into the Adobe  Connect?

  Alice Jansen: (07:23) Yes

  Alice Jansen: (07:23) we are setting up the AC room right now

  Gigi Johnson: (07:23) thanks

  Amr Elsadr: (07:24) Looks like there are no problems. :)

  Amr Elsadr: (07:25) Ah..., here they come. :)

  James Gannon: (07:29) =)

  Matthew Shears: (07:31) will someone be providing a fuller description of the SO/AC model?

  Matthew Shears: (07:31) sorry empowered SO/AC model

  Malcolm Hutty: (07:32) Actually Thomas what I said was "some legal remedy"

  Farzaneh Badii: (07:33) to get remedy we need enforceability ! I don't see the uncorrectness in enforceability !

  James Gannon: (07:34) We have da powah!

  Becky Burr: (07:34) In a nutshell, starting with the membership model:  Step 1:  ICANN amends bylaws as recommended by CCWG and permits members and bylaws give SOs and ACs powers of members under the statute.

  Becky Burr: (07:36) Step 2:  SOs and ACs continue as usual.  Step 3:  Any SO or AC may elect, at some point in the future to declare its intention to work together to exercise those rights, giving it the legal personality to to enforce membership rights.

  David McAuley (RySG): (07:36) Kimb erly, I am back in rfoom but had problems with user limits

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:36) Capture may be small letter x ;-)

  Becky Burr: (07:37) Critical point:  safeguards must be in place to prevent unequal rights etc.  Note:  it appears that using designator approach rather than membership may be simpler.  Question to consider:  adequacy of rights with respect to budget under designator model

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (07:37) This proposal makes perfect sense to me

  Diego Canabarro: (07:37) Hello all, is there any document which actually describes what the DESIGNATOR means?

  Amr Elsadr: (07:38) I think I lost audio.

  Nathalie Coupet: (07:38) No audio

  McTim: (07:38) which one athina? designator?

  Kimberly Carlson: (07:38) Working on getting Audio back

  Matthew Shears: (07:38) is the dictinction between moels w/r/t the "problems" that stark?

  Anne Aikman-Scalese: (07:39) Does everyone else have audio?

  Becky Burr: (07:39) well, based on very preliminary input, it seems that we can bootstrap the membership rights we want in the much simpler designator model

  Jonathan Zuck (IPC): (07:39) they're not, @Matthew. that's what I wanted to bring up

  Gordon Chillcott: (07:39) No audio at the moment

  Becky Burr: (07:40) or may be able to do that

  Gigi Johnson: (07:40) Not even any nice Argentinian hold music.

  Chris Disspain: (07:40) who is speaking please?

  Kimberly Carlson: (07:40) Sorry everyone, technical team is working on getting Audio back

  Leon Sanchez (Co-chair ALAC): (07:40) @Chris the speaker is Athina

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:40) This is Athina (ASO)

  Chris Disspain: (07:40) thanks you

  David McAuley (RySG): (07:40) The chart shows an "X" by statutory rights in designator model but I thought board removal was a statutory right in the model

  Mike Brennan 2: (07:41) Hello please standby we are fixing audio issue

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:41) @Athina you may look at this document(ref: page 7): https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ARIN-Memo-re-NRO-Status-as-an-Unincorporated-Association.pdf

  Becky Burr: (07:41) but the "bringing the matter before courts" argument has been thoroughly debunked

  Farzaneh Badii: (07:41) can someone respond to Diego's question: "is there any document which actually describes what the DESIGNATOR means?"

  Matthew Shears: (07:41) it might be useful to actually explain the designator model as we have spent so much time on the membership model

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:42) @Farzaneh i just posted a useful link, although its not official CCWG document

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:42) https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ARIN-Memo-re-NRO-Status-as-an-Unincorporated-Association.pdf

  George Sadowsky: (07:42) Can we assume that the details of board member removal are consistent with those in the last paper that was circulated (April?)  The devil is in the details here.

  Mike Brennan 2: (07:42) Audio should be back now, apologies for the issue

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:43) @David: right, the chart should say "other statutory rights" than the ones above

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:43) I agree there is some value in explaining the "designator" legal concept a little further.   I thin most of us are famkliar with the current ICANn structure, and the membership structure.   WOudl be helpful to perhaps have some examples of other orgnaixations that take advantgae of this legal concept under California law.

  Nathalie Coupet: (07:43) @Mike Brennan Thank you

  David McAuley (RySG): (07:43) If I recall correctly, John Curran put an email in the list back in April with a memo offering a description of the designator model

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:44) @David correct and the url to that document is what was just referenced

  Chris Disspain: (07:44) Malcolm...if the WP2 stuff is enshrined in a fundamental by-law then the answer is yes...

  Chris Disspain: (07:44) and I bleieve that that is what we had already agreed anyway

  Farzaneh Badii: (07:45) Adam your notes disappear

  David McAuley (RySG): (07:45) Thanks @Seun

  Becky Burr: (07:46) @Chris and Malcolm, i think the Bylaws would have to provide some remedy for failure to implement

  Hillary Jett: (07:46) @Farzaneh - Its a problem with Adobe Connect that causes the notes to scroll. All notes should be there if you scroll up a bit :)

  Anne Aikman-Scalese: (07:46) Would it be possible to post in the chat a link to the document which lists the statutory powers which are under discussion?  Thank you.

  Farzaneh Badii: (07:47) Thanks Hillary. 

  Matthew Shears: (07:50) I hope that this brief discussion at a very high level without the full understanding of the models does not result in taking things off the table

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:50) https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52890082/Response%20to%20Samantha%20Eisner%20Member%20Rights%20Chart.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1433828616000&api=v2

  Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (07:50) Hybrid refers to allowing advisory community powers UNLESS/UNTIL we have to activate enforceability.   The enforceability might be Member or Designator model

  Mathieu Weill, ccNSO, co-chair: (07:50) Member rights chart

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:51) removing the whole board has been on the table since the start of our work

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:51) Here is a link to the NRO advice on their role as a designator. 

  Bruce Tonkin: (07:51) https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ARIN-Memo-re-NRO-Status-as-an-Unincorporated-Association.pdf

  tylercompton: (07:52) that's hybird?    aren't community powers what we put in the bylaws,?  huh?

  Malcolm Hutty: (07:52) @Becky, so what? That's recursive. We need the Bylaws to be enforceable at the suit of an affected party - or if not, at the very least, at the suit of a party in which an affected party is represented. Leaving it to the consent of bodies in who have themselves no interest in the bylaws failure in question is not acceptable

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:52) it seems unlikely we would defy the community feedback we have in support of it, but I guess that's for further discussion

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:53) Perhaps removing the hybrid word and just calling this what it really is as "Designator model" would be helpful.

  Matthew Shears: (07:53) the public comment supported all the community powers - lets not forget that

  Anne Aikman-Scalese: (07:53) @Mathieu - Merci mille fois!

  Farzaneh Badii: (07:54) "Matthew Shears: I hope that this brief discussion at a very high level without the full understanding of the models does not result in taking things off the table " I fully agree.

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:54) People see the Statutory rights that members come with as a positive and a negative, there are views both ways

  Seun Ojedeji: (07:55) I think enough analysis may have already been done on the membership model....don't know what further detailed analysis is required. Having specific focus on a model would be helpful

  Becky Burr: (07:55) @ Malcolm, I hadn't really been thinking about the failure to implement - but that is clearly a very important issue.  The IRP can be binding immediately, but there is a recursive issue as you suggest

  tylercompton: (07:55) are mem statutory rights the same everywhere?  or are they just in US CA?

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:56) different legal schemes give different sets of rights

  tylercompton: (07:56) ah, ok -thx

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:56) there's a memo from counsel somewhere (the Sam Eisner one?) that sets them out

  Keith Drazek: (07:56) I am willing to consider the Empowered SO/AC Designator model instead of membership, but not at the expense of losing the designator power to spill the Board.

  Becky Burr: (07:56) probably some commonality at a very basic level

  Holly Gregory: (07:56) Seun, there are a number of open legal issues with the recently proposed empowered SO/AC membership model that we will need to consider

  James Gannon: (07:57) Keith: My understanding is that there is a possibility to do that.

  tylercompton: (07:57) i'll look on the mm.mail arcive

  Chris Disspain: (07:57) Keith - that makes sense to me

  Chris Disspain: (07:57) and yes, it is possible

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:58) people could maybe take their hands down?

  Becky Burr: (07:58) i don't think that we have to sacrifice board spill under designator model - am I wrong Holly and Rosemary?

  Keith Drazek: (07:58) I would also want to see the "Director Resignation Letter" concept included in the Empowered SO/AC Designator model...there may be items related to budget and other behavior we want to include, but not necessarily rely on membership to secure them. My mind is open on this.

  David McAuley (RySG): (07:58) I believe yiou are right Becky - interestd in legal reply

  Chris Disspain: (07:59) Becky...you are right - some folks said they wanted not to have it not that we couldn't have it

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (07:59) one of the questions that needs exploring is the question of bylaws enforceability

  Avri Doria (atrt): (07:59) i thnk the director resignation letter is a good idea.

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:00) @Keith actually if the "Director resignation letter" upon request can be enforeced without need for designator or membership model i will be glad with that.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:00) yes, jordan, enforceability of the bylaws will be a key

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:00) not just for our six powers, but more broadly

  Becky Burr: (08:00) I was worried about the advance resignation letter re impact on finding qualified directors.  I'm told that these are actually very standard in corporate boards these days

  Keith Drazek: (08:00) @Sean, yes, I'm saying it would be needed to augment the Designator model.

  James Gannon: (08:01) I agree with Becky, I had concerns over the pre-signed letters but seemingly its common enough that it lessens my conerns

  Chris Disspain: (08:01) Correct James

  Bruce Tonkin: (08:02) From the NRO paper:  Designators are simply those partiesprovided in a corporation’s articles or bylaws as having the power to appoint some or all ofthe corporation’s directors

  Keith Drazek: (08:02) Also, we will need to be very careful about protecting/securing the Designators. The bylaws could have provisions to protect the status of designators that might require supermajority approval of the designators themselves. I would expect the reasonable protections that satisfied a consensus could be baked into the bylaws.

  Chris Disspain: (08:02) Agree Keith

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:03) +1 Keith

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:03) @Bruce exactly (re:designators) so it may be good to get clarification from ccwg legal team on the "legal personhood referred"

  tylercompton: (08:03) are there writeups of the various models being discussed?  other than charts?

  Keith Drazek: (08:04) Not yet. This is the next step @Tyler

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:04) though they have already indicated that we can safely assume we already have personhood in relaation to the memebrship model.  so if we need, it we have it.

  Malcolm Hutty: (08:04) But designators are only a model for replacing the directors - either indivdually or the entire Board. They only protect anything through the route of replacing the Board. I think this is completely unsatisfactory as a means of delivering our proposed accountablity reforms, esp WP2 reforms

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (08:04) agree with Kavous and indeed this is in line with co-chairs efforts

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:05) and in a democratic model removing the leaders is the best power to have.

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:05) This model basically says "the only enforceable power is the removal of directors: the rest is bylaws-based."

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (08:05) I think we may need to recap the differences between Membership and Designator models with respect to their legal complexities. The fact that an SO or AC may choose or not to have legal personhood (now or later) does not answer the question about the complexities involved in acquiring a legal personhood (if that direction is chosen).

  Keith Drazek: (08:05) bylaws-based and contract-based

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:05) (where enforceable = court enforceable)

  Matthew Shears: (08:05) agree Jordan

  SivasubramanianM: (08:05) A membership model is incomplete as a multi-stakeholder model. From what I hear and assume, GAC wouldn't become a member, so it reduces the ms model to effectively a dual stake holder model. We have talked about a "rogue"  Board or "rogue" Executive, but what if there is a rogue registry? This model tends to create a dangerous imbalance. We could move beyond both the membership model and designator model to an Intercommunity or a unified house model.

  Holly Gregory: (08:05) @Becky no need to sacrifice board recall under designator model; cwould describe in bylaws and ould use director resignation letter or could use contract among designators

  Malcolm Hutty: (08:06) agree Jordan, and that's not acceptable in my view

  David McAuley (RySG): (08:06) Thank you Holly - that makes good sense

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:07) if wee have signed letters from al directors saung they will comply with being removed, what moe enforcement do we really need.

  Becky Burr: (08:07) @Siva - the pure membership model reflected in the "reference model" is no longer on the table

  FIONA ASONGA (ASO): (08:07) Malcolm is it that you think the bylaws as being insignificant?

  tylercompton: (08:08) so if the community pwoers are in the bylaws, the board has to follow.    Without membership, enforcement  would be use of the board remove power bar?

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (08:08) +1 Roelof very good point

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:08) agreed

  Chris Disspain: (08:08) Roelof + 1

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:08) and the pwoer to remove the IANA was remote.  most of the time it was years away and a lot harder to do than removing a director.

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:08) @Becky is "Empowered SO/AC membership model" not going to require some form of membership anyhow?

  Keith Drazek: (08:08) For the record, I still  prefer membership over designator,  but I'm doing exactly what Roelof suggested in remaining open to the Empowered SO/AC Designator + Contract Model

  Becky Burr: (08:08) I personally think the spill to board option is the weakest of our tools.  It's nuclear, begs mutual assured destruction responses.  So I would be extremely uncomfortable hanging our enforcement hat on that approach

  Chris Disspain: (08:08) Avri + 1

  Farzaneh Badii: (08:09) Seun, that is my question too. Here the counsel recommends to establish UA for desingator. https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53778692

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (08:09) @Siva: "GAC wouldn't become a member" - this is not decided yet and GAC does not have a common position on this.

  Leon Sanchez (Co-chair ALAC): (08:09) @Seun this is not an "empowered membership" model. it is an empowered designator model

  Matthew Shears: (08:09) + 1 Keith - agree - but would like more information on both before decisions are made

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:09) I believe we will never use the spill the board option.  The fact that we have the power is the leverage however.

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:10) Becky, I disagree.    there is nothing nuclear about it.  epsecially if they have already agreed to be spilled if necessary. 

  Malcolm Hutty: (08:10) @Fiona, it is that I think that accountability without enforceability is not accountability at all. If we make all our accountability reforms rely upon a power to sack the Board, a power that will never be used (and is almost impossible to use) then those reforms are not enforceable and become nugatory

  Keith Drazek: (08:10) @Matthew, totally agree we need far more detail to evaluate both, risks and benefits.

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:10) and especially if we have a well formed method of creating a temp board.

  Becky Burr: (08:11) again, i don't think it is real leverage.  I know this perspective is not widely shared, so I'm not pushing it.  But I don't think it is a sufficient tool

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:11) @Leon sure i was just responding to Becky as i sense she seem to be making a point for the "Empowered SO/AC membership model" to live on

  tylercompton: (08:11) wouldnt the board fix something before we used the "power bar"

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:11) the better tool is individual board recall.

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:11) i fear statuatory legal rights, derivative actions and the complexities they bring.

  Becky Burr: (08:12) no - I am open on these approaches.

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:12) i think having both individual removal and group removal re good tools.

  Leon Sanchez (Co-chair ALAC): (08:12) @Seun understood. My bad :-)

  Athina Fragkouli (ASO): (08:12) indeed a big thank-you to the co-chairs for their efforts

  Matthew Shears: (08:12) agree Avri

  Chris Disspain: (08:12) @ Robin...probably both tools would be the way to go but there ARE issues with with individual spill...not insurmaountable but need to be dealt with

  tylercompton: (08:12) I guess, I dont get why waving powerbar  isn't goin get them going.the right way, but maybe icann baord is really stubborn

  Keith Drazek: (08:13) Agree Avri, both powers are important for different reasons.

  Matthew Shears: (08:13) + 1 Jordan

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:13) yes, I think we need both tools, but spilling is unlikely.  individual removal is less unlikely

  Chris Disspain: (08:13) agree

  Becky Burr: (08:13) My point about removal applies in all models, on its own, i do not think it delivers meaningful, useable accountability.  But I don't think that it is the only tool in the designator model

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:14) right, Becky.

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:14) It is important we keep an open mind at this point.

  Keith Drazek: (08:14) +1 Steve....I think your comments also reflect the remarks of Larry Strickling on Sunday where he asked for documented evidence of our deliberations around pros and cons and options considered.

  David McAuley (RySG): (08:14) +1 @Steve. As to some final enforceability power, Malcolm put it well yesterday – better to have and not need than to need and not have

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:15) the "spill the board" thing comes at the end of the process, it's just that it would be the only bit you could enforce in the court in the designator approach

  SivasubramanianM: (08:15) @Pedro Thanks. GAC does not have a common position, but it is likely that GAC may not. In case the GAC decides not to, or becomes a part of this model with a certain degree of detachment, then it would become a model prone to severe imbalances

  Matthew Shears: (08:15) + 1 David

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:15) i share Becky's view it'd never be used

  Becky Burr: (08:15) That decision is up to GAC, Siva

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:15) I think the model to use for enforcability is the only bottleneck of the CCWG right now and the document won't be complete for submission without that. So the earlier that is concluded upon the better.

  Keith Drazek: (08:15) +1 Thomas.....DIDP is something that requires attention if we move away from full membership powers.

  Pedro Ivo Silva [GAC Brasil]: (08:15) +1 Becky

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:16) I like exploring the option of putting DIDP reform in WS1 to address the transparency goals

  David McAuley (RySG): (08:16) I likke idea of putting DIDP in WS1

  tylercompton: (08:16) can we start writeing bylaw changes for the comnmunity powers  - is tht what Steve said?']

  FIONA ASONGA (ASO): (08:17) I agree with Thomas and add we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water

  Matthew Shears: (08:17) agree on DIDP as well

  Samantha Eisner: (08:17) I thought that the other part of the work we really needed to focus on right now was doing the impact assessment that Asst. Sec. Strickling was discussing and doing the work to getting the report fleshed out

  SivasubramanianM: (08:18) A unified house model would resemble some sort of a Joint General Body of all ACs /SOs + RSSAC etc, a house with about 300 + memhere (just thinking aloud)

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:18) Well the way i read the room, i don't think a SWOT would help people decide especially as it doesn't seem people want to shift base. Nevertheless lets try it out but again be concious of time.

  Avri Doria (atrt): (08:18) we would not need to had the board actually acted on previous recommendations on transparency, but yes, i agree that is a good idea to fix that in the bylaws as part of WS1.  And it is in keeping with previous ATRT intentions and recommendations.

  Keith Drazek: (08:18) Absolutely agree Avri

  Holly Gregory: (08:18) Legal counsel could provide a description and assessment of each model for CCWG's further consideration

  Keith Drazek: (08:19) @Sean, I sense a willingness to shift but more detail is needed for informed shifting.

  David McAuley (RySG): (08:19) @Sam, a compromise appears to be coming from the mist - don't we need that before doing an impact analysis?

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:19) it would be helpful if the lawyers could examine how far we can get with different tools (rather than us trying to tell them a solution and ask if it works).

  Holly Gregory: (08:20) Agree Robin

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:20) Avri: why haven't they moved on that stuff?

  Matthew Shears: (08:20) I don't think we are that far apart BUT we do need far more detailed analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of both models before we decide

  Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (08:21) completely agree, Matt

  Becky Burr: (08:21) +1 David.  we need to understand pros and cons of models before any impact analysis could be undertaken

  tylercompton: (08:21) wait, does member model mean you go to court to get teh budget changed, in addition to taking away a board guy?

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:22) @Keith i hope i am wrong about that then. The CCWG is the ONLY work that could delay the transition so all those effort must not be in vain. At least the probable vanity should not be as a result of the community not completing their task

  SivasubramanianM: (08:22) (thinking aloud) An inter-community or unified house would resemble a sort of General Body meeting of all ACs/SOs + RSSAC etc, seated together 300+ in distributed strength to make decisions of significance

  tylercompton: (08:22) enforcibilitt is more than board removal w/member, the court somehow enforces the community powers?  for real?

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:22) tyler: in a member model, members can go to court to enforce anything that is in the bylaws

  tylercompton: (08:23) is it even legal for court to force a budget on icann?

  tylercompton: (08:23) wow

  tylercompton: (08:23) why is that better than just shooting board like a lame horse?

  Greg Shatan (IPC/CSG/GNSO): (08:24) That's not an accurate characterization of what would happen if powers relating to budget were enforced in court.

  Greg Shatan (IPC/CSG/GNSO): (08:25) That is why you are shocking yourself.

  tylercompton: (08:25) uh ok

  Keith Drazek: (08:25) @Tyler, if members have the ultimate authority and the "tool in the toolbox" you'll never actually need to use it.

  tylercompton: (08:25) isn't that the same if the communtiy has the utlim to remove board, and thats in the toolbox?

  Keith Drazek: (08:26) they're parts of the same process

  tylercompton: (08:27) ok, but the board shooting doesn't need members - u get one tool - its in the toolbox- and you never have to use it because its ready

  tylercompton: (08:28) i guess going to court for something else might be useful, but don't really know how it is better than the"pwoer bar"

  tylercompton: (08:29) lawyers would know

  Amr Elsadr: (08:31) Is audio gone in the AC room?

  Anne Aikman-Scalese: (08:31)       Audio?

  Kimberly Carlson: (08:31) Techs are aware and working on restoring Audio - Sorry

  James Gannon: (08:31) I lost the whole AC room at one stage

  DeeDee Halleck: (08:32) I have no audio.

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:32) I think there's no challenge in getting any of our models through in terms of community decision (rpesumably we will end up at a consensus model) by the Dublin or at worst the Marrakech meeting

  David McAuley (RySG): (08:32) To get to the next proposal we face need to: reach agreement; answer NTIA questions, Board questions (somewhere north of 88 questions) ; perhaps other questions; do an impact analysis; and write and agree bylaws

  James Gannon: (08:32) I share Jordans opinion

  Amr Elsadr: (08:32) Audio back.

  DeeDee Halleck: (08:32) it's back

  Mike Brennan 2: (08:33) Apologies for the audio issues, we are working on it in the room.

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:34) Well that would be valid if both models are developed in details concurrently

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:35) So details of both will need to be ready in July to decide on one route

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (08:35) Just for clarity, the CRISP team have submitted timelines expressing we expect to be ready by Sep 2016

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (08:36) Ofcourse there are unexected elements but at least from the part we can be ready, we expect to be ready by Sept 2015

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:38) oh I was gonna say, 16?

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (08:38) https://www.nro.net/pipermail/ianaxfer/2015-June/000580.html

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (08:38) Sep 2015

  Seun Ojedeji: (08:38) @Izumi you just wrote 2016 in your first statement, perhaps you meant 2015?

  Izumi Okutani (ASO): (08:39) @Seun yes I meant Sep 2015, this year

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:39) Larry isn't going to extend the contract only for Names, so the issue is getting everyone over the line ASAP

  tylercompton: (08:40) this isnt name, this is ccwg,

  tylercompton: (08:40) stupid bylaws have to be done even before gummit says ok to plan

  Matthew Shears: (08:41) agree Jordan

  tylercompton: (08:42) fadi video said bylaw changes happen first, even b4 congress looks at the plan

  Jordan Carter (.nz ccTLD): (08:42) tyler, I was referring to the notion some have had that the contract might be allowed to expire for numbers nad protocols on 30 Sep 2015

  tylercompton: (08:43) oh, dunno  - video says one plan,

  tylercompton: (08:44) i guess if some of this work is bylaws and some is other junk, the extra stuff can happen whenever

  tylercompton: (08:45) implementation of the plan might be in pieces, mayb?

  tylercompton: (08:46) no decisionon which?

  Kimberly Carlson: (08:46) Thank you for your participation.  If you are participating remotely at the Public Forum, please note that the engagement@icann.org email will be used to receive questions that you would like to ask the Board and selected members of staff.  If you have any questions ready before Thursday, simple send ahead of time with “Subject Matter” in Header.