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5. Voting Process
Currently all ALAC votes for leadership and Liaison positions use a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. When an elector casts their ballot, they rank all candidates in order of preference. The automated voting system computes the votes received considering only the first preference of all electors. If one candidate receives a majority of the votes, that candidate is declared the winner (a threshold other than 50% can also be used). If a winner is not declared, the candidate that received the least number of votes is dropped. All ballots are re-evaluated dropping that candidate and moving the others up to fill the gap. The process is repeated (evaluate the ballots and drop additional bottom candidates if necessary) until a winner is declared.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_transferable_vote
for further details.
The most-discussed alternative is to use a Plurality system, with the requirement that a winner must receive greater than 50% of the votes. In a Plurality system, each elector casts a ballot indicating their single preference. If no candidate achieves the required percentage, the bottom candidate is dropped and a new set of ballots are cast.
If there are many candidates with no clear winner, for N initial candidates, this could take as many as N-1 rounds. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting_system for further details.
The threshold in most elections is 50%. In some (including at least one ICANN Board seat election), a higher threshold is required. The benefit is that the person has a higher approval level. The downside is that in a highly contested election, no single candidate is able to reach the higher level of approval – resulting in a stalemate.
Alternatives:
The prime benefit of STV voting is that only one ballot needs to be cast. The rest of the process is automatic. If ballots are cast in one place with all electors present this is not a major benefit over Plurality voting (with its potential for multiple rounds). However, if votes are cast remotely, with each round taking several days, Plurality voting can be problematic in that the overall time taken to declare a winner can be long. If, in the case of directed votes, constituents must be consulted, this process can take long indeed.
On the side of Plurality voting, there are a number of perceived benefits:
·When a winner is declared, it is clear to the candidate, the other candidates, the electors and the other Board members, that the declared victor actually received the conscious vote of the majority of electors.
·The wording used in the Bylaws for the GNSO and ccNSO selection of their Board members implies an explicit final vote – “The ccNSO Council shall make selections to fill Seats 11 and 12 on the Board by written ballot or by action at a meeting; any such selection must have affirmative votes of a majority of all the members of the ccNSO Council then in office.”
·For people who live in locations where STV (or similar) voting is common, there is a level of comfort with the process. For others, the process is not well understood, and some people tend to be overwhelmed by the need to prioritize all candidates with the result that they pick their preference and then don’t think clearly about the order of the others.
·The ability to re-think their decision once a candidate is eliminated (potentially their favourite) is viewed as important to some people.
During the December 9, 2009 community teleconference, a number of speakers expressed interest in a hybrid scenario in which one round could be done by STV to narrow the slate to a small number of candidates and later round(s) could be carried out using conventional Plurality voting.
Discussion:
Plurality voting with a single candidate selected provides clarity, but if multiple rounds are required, with a requirement for electronic long-period voting, the overall timing can be untenable. In person (or telephone) balloting can reduce the time for multiple rounds so as to be not problematic. Absent voters can potentially be addressed by using proxies. If some electors need to consult constituencies (such as ALS and ultimately ALS membership) between rounds, this can be problematic.
A hybrid model discussed during the December teleconference received significant support during and following the call. Specifically, if the first slate has too many candidates, then an STV vote is used to reduce the number of candidates to a small number (perhaps 3). Once there is a final slate, individual ballots are held to determine the final winner. In the hybrid model, it is possible that the two phases use different groups of electors.
If multiple ballots are used, the issue of directed votes must be addressed. There are a number of alternatives: the respective communities can be re-consulted (potentially time-consuming), some automated way of doing this must be found, the community can provide an ordered list without the ability to reconsider between rounds, or the elector can be given the discretion to vote independently.
The issue of “fairness” is often raised in discussions such as this. However, the concept of “fair” is very subjective, and most parties agree that all of the mechanisms being described are reasonably fair. Some are more or less transparent.
One suggestion that has been made is to use Plurality voting (as previously defined) with a maximum of two rounds. If the first round does not yield a winner (with greater than 50% of the vote), then the top two candidates will participate in a second round using the same electors. This method has the benefit of a maximum of two rounds and the winner has the clear affirmative vote of the majority. This is the method used in French presidential elections, and not surprisingly, there are those who feel that it is far from the best method. It does serve to narrow a very large field of candidates quickly, however. A variant of this is to use an STV ballot in the first round to identify either the winner (if more than 50% of first-choice votes go to a single candidate) or to identify the top two candidates for the runoff. This addresses most criticisms against the French-type system while preserving the maximum of two rounds and the clear affirmative vote of the winner. A further variant is to have the first STV round select three candidates, with up to two run-off rounds.
Recommendation: 5 (two alternative recommendations provided)
5.1 The first round is a vote conducted with STV ballots. If more than 50% of first-choice votes select the same candidate, that person is declared winner. If there is no winner, the standard STV mechanism identifies the top two candidates. A Plurality vote is then held to select the winner.
5.2 The first round is a vote conducted with STV ballots. If more than 50% of first-choice votes select the same candidate, that person is declared winner. If there is no winner, the standard STV mechanism identifies the top three candidates. A Plurality vote is then held to select the winner, or to narrow the field to the top two candidates. If no winner was declared, the candidate with the fewest votes is dropped and a third and final round is held to select the winner.
Method 5.1 will take less time. Method 5.2 provides more direct elector control but takes up to one additional round.
RALO Chairs will be given sufficient time to consult with ALSes and constituents to determine regional preferences. It is to be expected that the voting period for subsequent rounds will be compressed such that an equal amount of preparation may not be possible – RALOs will be advised to prepare sufficiently for all rounds in advance.
Notes and Appendices:
Members of the White Paper drafting team
- Sébastien Bachollet
- Alan Greenberg
- Dave Kissoondoyal
- Cheryl Langdon-Orr
- Evan Leibovitch
- Carlton Samuels
Related web pages and links:
ABS%20White%20Paper_FINAL_11012011_EN.pdf
Call%20for%20community%20Comment%20on%20ABS%20White%20Paper_FR_final.pdf
ABS%20White%20Paper_ES_final_08012010-RevisedContent_FINAL-ES.pdf
Appendix 1 - Documentation of Prior Actions
Appendix 2 - Announcement and Minutes of ICANN Board Resolution 27th August 2009
Glossary
Comments:
Comments will be accepted in any of the six UN languages.
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In the first para.
If a winner is not declared, the candidate that received the
least number of votes is dropped. excluded. (is the usual terminology)
For a concise descption of the STV process you are welcome to place a link to http://www.bigpulse.com/preferentialvoting
In the discussion section you could clarify the advantage of STV with:
1. STV reduces the chance of eliminating in round ONE those candidates who would win in any paired contested.
2. STV discourages strategic voting – that is, it encourages people to vote on merit. A first preference vote for a candidate unlikely to make the short list for a runoff vote is not a wasted vote because preference votes are transferred.
Submitted by Ralph McKay; BigPulse on 14 January 2010
contributed by heidi.ullrich@icann.org on 2010-01-17 03:38:47 GMT
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LACRALO was unanimously with the 5.2 reccomendation.
Also, there was a question: What happens if there is a tie at the votation?. And we come with 4 possible options (we consider that would be premature to come with an only solution just at that teleconference):
- Some people say that it should be the ALAC chair with an extra vote.
- Other people say that a new round of election should be made. But from what we have heard, a new election would have basically consequences on the time table.
- Another proposal is to have the five chairs to decide.
The final proposal is that "the president of that ad-hoc committee" is the one who should decide and break the tie (not the ALAC chair).
contributed by investigaciones@densi.com.ar on 2010-01-27 12:37:54 GMT
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Andres, by "ad-hoc committee" do you mean the ABSC or the ABSdt (or another)?
This was discussed briefly among some people and the thought at that time was a random draw could be used. Not really sure myself what the best answer is.
contributed by alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca on 2010-01-27 13:54:05 GMT