Sub-Group Members: Alan Greenberg, Avri Doria, Finn Petersen, Fiona Asonga, Greg Shatan, Izumi Okutani, Jordan Carter, Keith Drazek, Matthew Shears, Maura Gambassi, Par Brumark, Philip Corwin, Robin Gross, Steve DelBianco, Gary Hunt (15)
Staff: Adam Peake, Bernard Turcotte, Berry Cobb, Brenda Brewer, Kim Carlson
Apologies: Roelof Meijer
**Please let Brenda know if your name has been left off the list (attendees or apologies).**
1. Review of Agenda.
2. Content - Community Powers - Standard Bylaws (Izumi O)
3. Content - Community Powers - Removal of Individual ICANN Directors (Alan G)
4. Content - Community Mechanism - FOLLOW UP (Alan G et al)
5. Content - Community Powers - Recall of ICANN Board FOLLOW UP (Keith D)
6. Content - Community Powers - Fundamental Bylaws (Jordan C)
7. Actions to complete in time for the Freeze
8. Any Other Business.
Issues for today, with the standard bylaws, removal of individual directors. Overall 4 pieces for work. The work to be completed for the document freeze which is UTC 23:59 July 14.
Izumi: Standard bylaws paper. Aren't many changes in the document. Change on the period of time for making the change, selecting from the options. Also, instead of 3Ž4 ratio, various comments suggested a lower ratio, suggesting 2/3, which is the same as the board's threshold for changing the bylaws.
Added a limited to the number of times the community can change the bylaws, to two times.
Steve: last change, what public comment support was there for this two-times? Just one suggestion, and no contradictions. But the rest were in favor.
We need consistency throughout the document as to "reaching" the fraction or "greater than" - just consistency check during overall final editing of the proposal.
Where does the number two come from? Prefer the original paragraph without limit.
Izumi: Point taken: and revert to the original text.
Change to the two-week text: suggest keeping this text as we discuss in Paris. Note the standard bylaw change will go through at least a 40-day public comment, and the following 2 weeks is not disruptive. But something to discuss and to make the overall process of the timing clear.
No mandate for the 2 times limit.
Izumi: revert to the original text as supported by most in the group.
Greg: A little uneasy about the move from 3/4 to 2/3, but not enough to change it back.
Suggestion, to be more specific: 2 weeks following the announcement of Board approval.
Editing suggestion. Use calendar days, not weeks. Suggest 15 calendar days / 30 calendar days following board approval. And decide in Paris.
Greg: indicative in the drafting of the formal bylaws. Look to the bylaws and how they count units of time. But follow the lead of the bylaws.
Kavouss: agree with the change from 3/4 to 2/3 - it is consistent.
(Note Izumi's email as forwarded by Jordan)
Options for the Board's approval. 30 days. 60 days. Not later than 30 days after the end of the next ICANN meeting?
CCWG with continue to explore and explain the membership structure. How can membership be maintained without due cost, complexity and liability?
CCWG will consider mechanisms for considering impasse and possible delays. Especially if there is no limit on the number of times the community can limit the bylaws.
Increase the participation on the SO/AC other than ccNSO and GAC? Kavouss. Hard to agree ccNSO is influenced and controlled by govt.
Time frame, 15/30 Calendar days as Kavouss suggested. Some aspects will be dictated by the model.
3rd bullet, on considering procedural impasse: instead of considering as already solved, it will be considered later? It will be addresses as part of the time frame discussion in Paris.
* Removal of individual directors
Little basis on which to revise text. Mix of comments:
Be removed by those who appointed, and equally strong comments that it should be a community mechanism.
In whatever the model, recall that the designators had to support removal.
If a single member issues, treat differently. The removal of director by one constituency seems unconstitutional. Once designated, they serve the whole community. Should not be removed because one community is not happy.
ALAC is divided. The argument against the single SO/AC removing is to prevent capricious actions by the SO/AC, and concern expressed by ALAC and others it will encourage the Director to be overly representative. And don't want a situation where the rest of the SO/AC remove "my" director. Should only be removed with the approval of the appointing SO/AC.
Public comments - 25 comments 23 agreements, 6 concerns and 2 divergent. Concern of the NomCom. What happens to a removed Director? Jordan, suggest that keep the status quo. Alan: fair number said community removal but may have been an unclear use of the term community
The proposal was removal of the NomCom appointees should be a community process. Then the Lawyers suggested the NomCom as the appointers must be removers. But there are problems with the NomCom in terms of timing, in terms of process (being inherently closed, when transparency is necessary) Let the community council be designated as the NomCom sub-committee for removal.
Agree with Alan's suggestion to have the community create a sub-committee which deals with the removal of the noncom designated directors.
CA law suggests it must be the NomCom, but can be creative in saying it comes from the NomCom as sub-committee.
A third option: Current NomCom, a new sub-committee of the NomCom, or the community council.
Brand new committee: could be comprised of a rump group of prior NomCom.
Original proposal was to use the NomCom through some process, but only through a petition step. Need to avoid creating a capture point. The community council as the removal agent.
Avri: problem with the community council is that the designator approach is important.
a. recall noncom with community petition
b. community council as the recall noncom
c. current noncom
a = 4
b = 7
c = 0 (remove as an option)
* Community mechanism.
Difficult part is the number of votes. We defined two things are the reference mechanism. Difficulty over RSAC and SSAC. Go with the original and leave the other, which is equal votes for all.
So long as we have fractional voting, it does offer an alternative between the more vote and less vote groups. Note, the AC only 2 votes. Withdraw comment.
Comments on this new text, para 194 and 195, and discuss in email.
Fractional voting. The granularity of each vote should be left to each group,
Under the new proposal, abstentions raise the threshold.
The intent was that there would be a threshold of 2/3, then anyone opting out would disappear from the count.
Alan: will re-word this section.
Wait for GAC comments. And GAC's public policy advice to the board.
* Recall of ICANN Board:
Strong support for this power.
Clarify about the 2/3 or the SO/AC, unclear if it was the sum of or the individual. Agreed it was the sum of. The comments identify our action items. The first is working with legal counsel on implementation, Selected 30 calendar days as bracketed language for discussion,
Action item 2 for WP1, our work syncs with the reference model
Removed 245, which was the 80% threshold, and 75% is what we move forward with.
246 - removes members, and stated it is the community process. Engage with legal advisors on caretaker board. And WP1 will work on a caretaker board process, minimizing instability etc.
CWG dependency noted.
The community mechanism is the voting model Alan just described, not the enforcement model
Implementation discussed in 246, says we must come up with a process that minimizes risk. Suggested language for 243 or 246. Mechanism for SO and AC to exorcise the community power.
Community power, suggested drafting approach: as referred to in para... and cross reference to the para.
The caretaker board has the same powers a traditional board? This is a topic open for discussion.
5.5 on removing directors. A petition on at least 2 SO or AC, or the SG from the GNSO. An alternative to a SO or and AC? Just highlight and fix later.
SG having the same weight is that NSCG represents all of CS and CSG which represents all of business, and they are reduced to a sliver in this model.
* Fundamental Bylaws
Read through WP2 and WP1 work on fundamental bylaws. Support for this power. Need to provide an explanation as to why it would strengthen accountability. And note that CWG dependencies need to be fundamental.
Minor changes. Added the IANA functions review to the list of bylaws that would be fundamental. A comment about location as fundamental, rejecting this noting that it would be addressed in WS2.
Won't be an emergency to change, negation of concerns about operational impact .
The potential controversial issue is whether the HQ bylaws should be fundamental.
Note, not all of the AoC reviews are fundamental, only the IANA functions review at the request of the CWG fundamental. So no consistency requirement for 8b to be fundamental if Article 18 is not.
(Agree about the SG issue above).
Seemed a pretty even split between those who wanted article 18 fundamental or not.
END
Action item 2 for WP1, our work syncs with the reference model
Kimberly Carlson: (7/13/2015 11:25) Welcome to WP2 Meeting #19 on 13 July! Please note that chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards
Pär Brumark (GAC Niue): (13:56) Hi Kavouss!
arasteh 2: (13:58) Dear All,
arasteh 2: (13:58) Hi to evertybody
Kimberly Carlson: (13:58) Hello Everyone
arasteh 2: (13:59) If you are in a good health mappreciate that god given gift
Jordan C: (14:00) hello everyone, we will start in two minutes
Greg Shatan: (14:01) Hello All.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:01) did everyone hear me say that on the audi?
Greg Shatan: (14:01) Yes
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:01) gr8, thank you
FIONA ASONGA (ASO): (14:01) HI Everyone
Matthew Shears: (14:01) Hello!
Avri Doria: (14:02) getting inthese calls is like a enunciation test each and every time.
Keith Drazek: (14:02) Hi Jordan. I unfortunately wan't able to get to the update on 5.6 Recall the Entire Board following Friday's call, so we'll need to push Agenda #5. Apologies for the ugly surprise....
Keith Drazek: (14:04) Hopefully it's give us more time on the rest of the items on today's agenda. (Glass half-full perspective)
Matthew Shears: (14:08) What happens after the bylaw change has been rejected twice?
Matthew Shears: (14:10) agree Steve
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:11) Let's please resolve this "two times" limitation BEFORE sending this doc to the full CCWG
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:11) Staff - can we note Alan's pint to make all our thresholds consistent?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:11) *point
Matthew Shears: (14:11) I would like us to return to the original text if that is overwhemlingly supported thanks
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:11) +1 Matthew
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:12) +1 Kavouss
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:16) Izumi -- we can just explain to that commenter why their 2x limitaiton would not work
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:16) There might have been one comment there, but it fundamentally changes the nature of what is proposed and isn't widely supported, so I think it is reasonable to keep our initial proposal
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:16) sure undertood, and I agree Jordan
Greg Shatan: (14:17) Yeah, I'm pretty boring.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:17) heh, good point Alan
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:18) @Izumi -- all of the commenters who said they supported our bylaws blocking proposal should be counted AGAINST the one person who wanted to limit to 2x
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:19) (fifteen / thirty calendar days) following announcement of Board approval.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:20) and track those changes
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:20) and discusss in Paris
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:20) ?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:20) it's just a description Izumi - fifteen days is close enough to two weeks
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:21) calendar days is definitely unambiguous.
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:22) Yes, I see your point Steve
Matthew Shears: (14:22) how easy will it be to marshall the forces to actually ring about the rejection - is two weeks enough?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:22) Staff - do you have the ability to show Izumi's covering email?
Matthew Shears: (14:22) bring
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:22) Matthew: it won't be from a cold start, surely?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:23) people will have known about the change for months
Greg Shatan: (14:24) Just checked the Bylaws. The Bylaws do not use weeks, ever.
Matthew Shears: (14:24) true - guess it depends on how the "community council" comes together to decide. also if it is known well in advance then the board will also have known that it was lilkely to get rejected but will have gone ahead anyway...
Greg Shatan: (14:25) They variously use calendar days, business days, or just days.
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:25) Jordan - perhaps you could paste into the chat?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:26) * CCWG will consider extending the community review period from 2 weeks to a longer timeframe TBD - CCWG needs to agree on the alternative - Alternative options expressed from the public comment: a) 30 days b) 60 days c) The end of the next ICANN meeting that begins no sooner than one month after the Board posts notice of adoption d) Prior to such changes becoming effective
Matthew Shears: (14:26) is thee a process for engaging with the community on bylaws change prior to Board approval?
Greg Shatan: (14:26) So, we think that each of the SOs and ACs can each decide their course of action and bring a Community Council together to come up with a coordinated response in 15 days. Good luck.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:26) Matthew: the 40 day public comment period. Does anyone know if that's mandatory?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:26) Greg - hmm, fair point
Matthew Shears: (14:27) 2 weeks is to short
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:28) Greg, won'
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:28) t they have begun deliberations on that during the public comment period tho?
Greg Shatan: (14:28) I believe Kavouss suggested calendar days. Business Days is dependent on location. The Bylaws use the following: (as calculated by local time at the location of ICANN's principal office),
Greg Shatan: (14:29) Would they deliberate before its clear that the vote will go against the community's sentiments? As opposed to waiting and seeing how the Board acts? I don't want to treat the Board's decisions as foregone conclusions.
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:30) great thanks Jordan
Matthew Shears: (14:31) What if the public consultation is inconclusive - or that te community is not fully aligned but should be? I think we have to provide the community adeqiate time regardless of the public consultation
Greg Shatan: (14:31) I think it's one thing to put in separate comments on a Bylaw amendment. Quite another thing to muster the Grand Assembly and exercise extraordinary and rarely powers.
Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:31) @Alan - NO
Greg Shatan: (14:31) *rarely used*
Greg Shatan: (14:31) *rarely used*
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:32) I agree Alan with your observation - it needs to be discussed
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:32) I may have numbered them
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:32) Indeed, some of the numbers were different
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:32) Yes it's one from Siva
Bernard Turcotte Staff Support: (14:33) Mu comment was about the ccNSO
Alan Greenberg: (14:33) Ahh Sorry!
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:35) @Alan -- agree, especially when the majority of those 60 commenters said they supported the porposed community power
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:37) there's also the fair point that we won't know how the Board has responded to the public comment unti l the decision is announced
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:39) Agree, Jordan.
Greg Shatan: (14:39) I suggest 21 calendar days to give more time to react and come to a decision.
Matthew Shears: (14:40) is there a precedent we can look to?
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:41) Yes, I agree with this summary
Greg Shatan: (14:41) Other alternatives on impasse can be (1) meaningful consultation, (2) moving to 3/4 threshold after the first 1-2 votes....
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:41) Thanks all for the input
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:43) I thought the lawyers said that was the case, regardless of choice of member or designator
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:43) (that only the appointing body could remove individuals)
Greg Shatan: (14:45) Jordan I believe you are correct.
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (14:45) Many commenters said they supported the proposal, in their answers to specific questions.
Matthew Shears: (14:45) SO/AC can recall their own Board member; the community the entire board - seems a reasonable way of looking at it
Greg Shatan: (14:46) I disagree. And I play a lawyer on TV.
Adam Peake: (14:46) Sounds like something to get clarity on from the lawyers. My memory slightly different from Alan and Jordan. But these there counsel's comments on calls not in a memo
Avri Doria: (14:47) not only wrong, but seriously broken and dangerous.
Matthew Shears: (14:48) individual director is SO/AC responsbility; entire board recall is a collective SO/AC responsibility through the commuity council
Avri Doria: (14:48) still does not answer what to do about nomcom. and having the rest of us vote out a nomc pick is also dangerous. especially wqhen they bring in an outsider.
Matthew Shears: (14:49) true Avri - we should come up with a proposal for that to go into Paris with
Avri Doria: (14:49) how often do we all sit back and applaud the brilliant picks of the nomcom.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:49) Matthew: now is the time ;)
Matthew Shears: (14:49) yep
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:49) So, you have two minutes...
Matthew Shears: (14:50) I like option c.
Matthew Shears: (14:50) so removal at hte community council level
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (14:52) I aggree Alan that removal of a director should be done with approval of the SO/AC which appointed that Board
Greg Shatan: (14:52) I think it should be solely up to the appointing AC/SO to recall the Board member they appointed.
Matthew Shears: (14:53) + 1 Greg
Avri Doria: (14:54) agree with Greg on this
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:55) NomCom - I propose we actually make that a WS2 issue...... (gulp)
Matthew Shears: (14:55) that would be treating the ditrectors differenetly
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:56) yes, it would
Avri Doria: (14:57) tricky solution.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (14:59) I actually like throwing Alan's suggestion to the Paris meeting for discussion
Alan Greenberg: (15:00) @Matthew, the nomcom directors are appointed by a VERY differnet mechanism from the SO/AC directors. One is an open usually transparent process, the other cloaked in secrecy.
arasteh 2: (15:00) Alan +1
Avri Doria: (15:00) i am so uncomfortable with this bot of sleight of hand.
Alan Greenberg: (15:00) Avri bot?
Avri Doria: (15:00) bit
Avri Doria: (15:00) my bad typoing, apologies.
Greg Shatan: (15:01) I don't think it is sleight of hand. It is a practical solution to resolving a tension between a legal requirement and the way our community works. This is all in a day's work for the lawyering types.
Matthew Shears: (15:01) reasonable approach Jordan
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (15:01) I think it's reasonable
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:01) im just trying to help us get to a Paris
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:01) to a Paris discussion
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:02) a) the current NomCom
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:02) b) a brand new subcommittee of the NomCom
Avri Doria: (15:02) making the council the nomcm for a day so that they can become like as it they really were the designators seems tricky to me.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:02) c) the Community Council being deemed as a sub-committee of the NomCom for this purpose
Greg Shatan: (15:02) THey would not be the nomcom for a day. They would be delegated the power to make the decision, which would then be communicated by the NomCom.
Avri Doria: (15:03) i like this thrid possiblity. a rump committee of the previous nomcom
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:04) Does it vest too much power in that group?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:04) they have potential control over ahlf the ICANN Board
Greg Shatan: (15:04) Possibly. SInce they can act of their own initative.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:04) at least with SO/AC removal, there is a direct connection to an identifiable part of the community
Matthew Shears: (15:04) so commnuity council and rump group of previous nomcom working together?
Avri Doria: (15:04) sometimes adding a new option makes it possible to resolve the others by moving beyond them.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:04) we had suggested a petitioning step
Greg Shatan: (15:05) Using the community council to inform the NomCom of the decision to be carried forward by the NomCom seems fairly straightforward.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:07) can we at least fine down to two options
Matthew Shears: (15:07) not sure why the nomcom should be involved in the recall of nomcom apointted directors - they are likely the most biased
Greg Shatan: (15:07) Shall we take a sense of the room with checks and crosses.?
arasteh 2: (15:09) Drenda
Greg Shatan: (15:09) We would need resounding non-assurance to even start attacking a NomCom member.
Greg Shatan: (15:09) i.e., Board appointee.
arasteh 2: (15:09) pls deletew reference to ArASTEH 2 as tghere is only one araSTEH
Greg Shatan: (15:09) The alternatives.
arasteh 2: (15:10) Sorry for typo
Avri Doria: (15:10) i still vfavor a recall nomcom
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:10) a) Original Proposal - recall nomcom with community petition
arasteh 2: (15:10) Dear ICANN STAFF
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:10) b) community council as a recall nomcom
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:11) c) the current nomcom
arasteh 2: (15:11) pls delete reference to ARASTEH 2 as thgere is only one arasteh
Matthew Shears: (15:11) I could live with a or b
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (15:12) I would prefer to not vote now, until it is clear on the pros/cons for each option (Good about people voting)
Matthew Shears: (15:12) good point Izumi
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:13) De-Green Yourself! jordan said
Greg Shatan: (15:13) That doesn't sound eco-sensitive.
arasteh 2: (15:14) Alan
Greg Shatan: (15:14) No voting here. We could try humming.
arasteh 2: (15:14) Pls indicate my proposal for deletion of OIption c
Keith Drazek: (15:14) Jordan, I sent an update document to you and Staff via email, so I can address 5.6 if you like.
Greg Shatan: (15:14) But who's counting?
Keith Drazek: (15:15) I sensed Jordan's disappoinment and couldn't live with myself.
Greg Shatan: (15:16) Very sensitive, Keith.
Keith Drazek: (15:17) I can cover mine in 5 minutes since most of our substantive discussion took place on Friday.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:17) Keith, awesome
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:17) Reference MOdel versus Reference Mechanism :(
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:20) I support the reference mechanism
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:20) I do too, Steve
Avri Doria: (15:21) i support Alt B
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:21) I believe the SSAC and RSSAC decided against voting (for now), becuase of their narrow focus. They were not objecting to # of votes or to Member structure
Greg Shatan: (15:22) Brain = jelly
Adam Peake: (15:24) Greg, empathy
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:28) Agree, Alan. We need a "Quorum" threshhold
Matthew Shears: (15:29) the document from the GAC on input for the Paris meeting is pretty split on the role of the GAC in the "community council" - some asking for equal role (it seems) others for remaining in an advisory role, others seeking a liaison role
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:30) In other words, minimum conditions include a quorum of voting AC/SOs
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:32) the placeholder para is fine thanks
Adam Peake: (15:32) Tom Dale Was the sender of the GAC comments
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:36) 30 calendar days might be a nice period of time to settle on these
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:36) for all the powers
Alan Greenberg: (15:36) Jordan, I need one more minute to raise the turquise hilite on page 2 of board member removal doc.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:37) oh thanks
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:37) Note: reference model is the voting allocations. It is NOT the notion of enforcement (Member, Designator, etc.)
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:38) we used the term reference twice, oops
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:43) no we used Reference Model and Reference Mechanism for sure
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:43) Yep, let's stop using that term "Reference Mechanism" Thomas "buried" the reference in Buenos Aires, right?
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:44) Fine, Kavous
Matthew Shears: (15:44) in the para on caretaker board do we need some words to reflect that we will be looking to legal counsel or other expert advice? just so we don't appear to be dreaming up a new caretaker board model...
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:45) oh wow. it got corrected in the proofing reading
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:45) the phrase got changed
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:45) lol
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:48) Right, Alan. We'll alwas have Paris
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:50) not just Higher Thresholds, Jordan. Fundamental bylaws MUST be approved. Regular blaws MAY be blocked
arasteh 2: (15:50) Jordan
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:52) I think the ICANN HQ bylaw had split decision as to whether it should be Fundamental
arasteh 2: (15:52) Now we have realized tgat my proposal to create small group worked well and ewfficiently contributed to the successful completion of reviewing the entire sujject assigned to us
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:53) lead authors v important indeed, Kavouss :)
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (15:53) I agree with this approach about HQ location - to be discussed in WS2, not to incorporate as Fundamental, given there is no clear agreement about it
arasteh 2: (15:54) I do not agree to put ICANN Seat in fundamental Bylaws
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:54) Thanks for that Greg - worth raising that point in the Paris debate.
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (15:54) Greg is right about that.
Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:54) Agree with Greg too.
Matthew Shears: (15:54) also agree with Greg
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:55) I also note for the record that I mis-labelled the file, sorry about that (it refers to 3-4 when it should say 3-2)
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:55) Greg, can you write that list?
Greg Shatan: (15:56) Seems like Steve can do a better job of writing the list...
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:56) so to be consistent should we add "Consistent with the treatment of other AOC commitments,"?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:56) Steve can you propose some tracked hchanges improvements?
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (15:58) we have no lawyers in this call ;)
Greg Shatan: (15:58) Plaintiff picks the court. ICANN can be sued everywhere it has a permanent establishment.
Greg Shatan: (15:58) And then some.
Keith Drazek: (15:59) Apologies, I need to drop
Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (15:59) right - where it has minimun contacts and has an impact in the jurisdiction, which is just about anywhere.
arasteh 2: (15:59) I NEWVERE EVER REFERRED TO ANY SPECIFIC COUNTRY ,in particular, namning a coutry pls kindly consider tghat
Steve DelBianco [GNSO - CSG]: (16:00) Apologies, Kavouss. I only mentioned Iran as an example.
Avri Doria: (16:00) But perhaps we do need to repsond to Kavouss'point about the jurisdiction for complaints and make a a sttement of the fact and of our acceptance of that fact.
Avri Doria: (16:01) yes, that reference would be somewhere else, but it might be worth producing some lanaguage on that issue.
Avri Doria: (16:01) this jurisdiction issue is important to many.
Greg Shatan: (16:01) Which jurisdiction issue?
Matthew Shears: (16:02) great call all!
Greg Shatan: (16:02) There are so many.
Greg Shatan: (16:02) Bye all.
Jordan Carter (.nz, rapporteur): (16:02) see you all later
Avri Doria: (16:02) the larger one that is not related to where the copr sits.
Izumi Okutani (ASO): (16:02) Thanks all that was fruitful meeting!
Gary Hunt - UK Government: (16:02) Bye
Robin Gross [GNSO - NCSG]: (16:02) thanks Jordan and all. bye!
Kimberly Carlson: (16:02) Thank you everyone, bye
Adam Peake: (16:02) thank you all