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Comment Close
Date		Statement
Name 

Status

Assignee(s)

Call for
Comments Open		Call for
Comments
Close 		Vote OpenVote CloseDate of SubmissionStaff Contact and EmailStatement Number
12.06.2015

Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) - Proposed Accountability Enhancements (Work Stream 1)

ADOPTED

15Y, 0N, 0A

Alan Greenberg01.06.201506.06.2015 23:58 UTC06.06.2015 23:59 UTC11.06.2015 23:59 UTC11.06.2015Accountability Staff acct-staff@icann.orgAL-ALAC-ST-0615-01-00-EN


For information about this Public Comment, please click here 

Translated Documents

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Executive Summary

Executive Summary-ar.pdf

Executive Summary-es.pdf

Executive Summary-fr.pdf

Executive Summary-pt.pdf

Executive Summary-ru.pdf

Executive Summary-zh.pdf

Draft Report Visuals

Draft Report Visuals-ar.pdf

Draft Report Visuals-es.pdf

Draft Report Visuals-fr.pdf

Draft Report Visuals-pt.pdf

Draft Report Visuals-ru.pdf

Draft Report Visuals-zh.pdf

Draft Report with Annexes

Draft Report with Annexes-ar.pdf

Draft Report with Annexes-es.pdfDraft Report with Annexes-fr.pdfDraft Report with Annexes-pt.pdfDraft Report with Annexes-ru.pdfDraft Report with Annexes-zh.pdf

Brief Overview

The CCWG-Accountability requests community feedback on the proposed enhancements to ICANN's accountability framework it has identified as essential to happen or be committed to before the IANA Stewardship Transition takes place (Work Stream 1). Your input will help the CCWG-Accountability to improve its proposal and carry on with next steps, including Chartering Organizations' endorsement of the CCWG-Accountability output before it is submitted to the ICANN Board. This comment period is an opportunity for you to make your voice heard and to shape the outcome of the CCWG-Accountability work.

In order to have time to analyze and process community feedback before ICANN53 (21-25 June), and considering the key dependencies Work Stream 1 has with the work related to the IANA Stewardship Transition, the CCWG-Accountability determined that the maximum time that could be allotted to this comment period is 30 days. The CCWG-Accountability Work Stream 1 proposals are not final: a second Public Comment period is planned for July, and will be a full 40-day period. Because this (first) Public Comment period is less than the required 40-day minimum, it has been approved by two ICANN Global Leaders.

Section I: Description, Explanation, and Purpose

The following questions provide a framework to assist with preparing and providing feedback to the CCWG-Accountability. Using this framework in helping respond to the Public Comment proceeding will facilitate the CCWG-Accountability's processing of input received.

Public Comment Input Framework

Do you believe the set of Work Stream 1 proposals in this interim report, if implemented or committed to, would provide sufficient enhancements to ICANN's accountability to proceed with the IANA Stewardship transition? If not, please clarify what amendments would be needed to the set of recommendation.

Do you have any general feedback or suggestion on the interim Work Stream 1 proposals?

Revised Mission, Commitments & Core Values

  1. Do you agree that these recommended changes to ICANN's Mission, Commitments and Core Values would enhance ICANN's accountability?
  2. Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would amend these requirements.

Fundamental Bylaws

  1. Do you agree that the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws would enhance ICANN's accountability?
  2. Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation, including the list of which Bylaws should become Fundamental Bylaws? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Independent Review Panel Enhancement

  1. Do you agree that the proposed improvements to the IRP would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Reconsideration Process Enhancement

  1. Do you agree that the proposed improvements to the reconsideration process would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements. Are the timeframes and deadlines proposed herein sufficient to meet the community's needs? Is the scope of permissible requests broad / narrow enough to meet the community's needs?

Mechanism to empower the Community

  1. What guidance, if any, would you provide to the CCWG-Accountability regarding the proposed options related to the relative influence of the various groups in the community mechanism? Please provide the underlying rationale in terms of required accountability features or protection against certain contingencies.

Power: reconsider/reject budget or strategy/operating plans

  1. Do you agree that the power for the community to reject a budget or strategic plan would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Power: reconsider/reject changes to ICANN "standard" Bylaws

  1. Do you agree that the power for the community to reject a proposed Bylaw change would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Power: approve changes to "Fundamental" Bylaws

  1. Do you agree that the power for the community to approve any fundamental Bylaw change would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Power: Recalling individual ICANN Directors

  1. Do you agree that the power for the community to remove individual Board Directors would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board

  1. Do you agree that the power for the community to recall the entire Board would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Incorporating the Affirmation of Commitments into the ICANN Bylaws

  1. Do you agree that the incorporation into ICANN's Bylaws of the Affirmation of Commitments principles would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.
  2. Do you agree that the incorporation into ICANN's Bylaws of the Affirmation of Commitments reviews would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Bylaws changes suggested by Stress Tests

  1. Do you agree that the incorporation into ICANN's Bylaws of the above changes, as suggested by stress tests, would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.

Items for Consideration in Work Stream 2

The CCWG-Accountability seeks input from the community regarding its proposed work plan for the CCWG-Accountability Accountability Work Stream 2? If need be, please clarify what amendments would be needed.

Section II: Background

On 14 March 2014 the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)announced its intent to transition its stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions and related root zone management to the global multistakeholder community.NTIA asked ICANN to convene a multistakeholder process to develop a proposal for the transition. The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) was formed in July 2014 to assemble and deliver through the ICANN Board to NTIA a transition proposal consistent with the key principles outlined in the NTIA announcement.

As initial discussions of the IANA Stewardship Transition were taking place, the ICANN community raised the broader topic of the impact of the transition on ICANN's current accountability mechanisms. From this dialogue, the Enhancing ICANN Accountability process was developed to provide assurance that ICANN remains accountable in the absence of its historical contractual relationship with the U.S. Government, which has been perceived as a backstop with regard to ICANN's organization-wide accountability since 1998. Following public comment periods and discussions on accountability, a final Revised Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps was published in October 2014. It includes considering how ICANN's broader accountability mechanisms should be strengthened in light of the transition, including a review of existing accountability mechanisms such as those within the ICANN Bylaws and the Affirmation of Commitments.

A Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability) was convened, designed and approved by five ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. The CCWG-Accountability was chartered to deliver proposals that would enhance ICANN's accountability towards all stakeholders.

As indicated in the CCWG-Accountability Charter, the CCWG-Accountability has divided its work into two Work Streams:

  • Work Stream 1: focuses on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition;
  • Work Stream 2: focuses on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.

Section III: Relevant Resources

The CCWG-Accountability Draft Report is the Document on which the CCWG-Accountability seeks your input and feedback. For ease of reading in this Public Comment period, the Draft Report is available in two document styles:

As a note for all comments submitted via the Public Comment proceeding: once a comment is submitted, please be on the lookout for a confirmation email (to confirm that the submission is posted to the proceeding). This is an automatically generated email to prevent spam. You must confirm your submission in order for it to appear in the proceeding archive.

In addition, along with the CCWG-Accountability Draft Report, the group has developed a set of visuals and graphics to accompany its work, available here: (TBD). The graphics accompanying this document support the main recommendations of the CCWG-Accountability proposal, summarizing the community mechanism, the five main community powers and the new Independent Review Process. The concepts presented in the graphics do not represent consensus of the CCWG-Accountability, but are presented to facilitate understanding of the report. Reviewing the whole report and the sections where the topics of the graphics are presented in detail is encouraged.

To view CCWG-Accountability draft documents, mailing-list exchanges, meeting archives etc., please refer to the CCWG-Accountability Work Space. See CCWG-Accountability Charter for more information on the CCWG-Accountability mandate.

Section IV: Additional Information

The CCWG-Accountability invites you to join them for a webinar to provide you with an overview of their work and answer any questions you may have. These webinars will be identical and held at different times to facilitate participation across time zones:

  • 11 May from 11:00 – 12:30 UTC (time zone converter here)
  • 11 May from 19:00 – 20:30 UTC (time zone converter here)

For further details, please see: here.

For more information on the IANA Stewardship Transition, please go to:

Section V: Reports

Staff Contact

CCWG-Accountability Staff
acct-staff@icann.org

 

FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED

Please click here to download the PDF document below. 


FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC

FINAL DRAFT - REVISED - For Approval - 05 June 22:44 UTC

Final Draft - Revised - Clean

Final Draft - Revised - Redline

Revised version for ALAC Approval - 03 June 2015 23:50 UTC

Redline from Previous Draft

FIRST DRAFT SUBMITTED

Revised version posted 03 June 2015 05:30 UTC

Revised PDF Version - 03 June 2015 - Redline

Revised PDF Version - 03 June 2015 - Clean

 

Revised version posted 02 June 2015 04:24 UTC

Revised PDF Version - 02 June 2015 - Redline

Revised PDF Version - 02 June 2015 - Clean

 

Posted 01 June 2015 05:25 UTC

PDF Version

WORD Version

Note: CCWG Proposal PDF

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34 Comments

  1. Alan Greenberg

    The first draft of the ALAC comments is posted above.

    It must be submitted on Wednesday, 03 June by 23:59 UTC.

    Although the comment covers a lot of areas, I believe that it faithfully reflects (on the whole) what has been contributed on our many teleconferences on the subject).

    Please post comments and suggestions here using line numbers to identify target text.

    Note that at the start I was inserting the explicit questions asked but found they added little value to the comments already inserted. I will remove these Blue questions in the next version.

     

    1. Eduardo Diaz

      Just browsed through the document:

       

      Line 103: UA is not defined anywhere

      Line 199: Missing "T" after the ":"

      Line 206: A&T is not defined anywhere

       

      Also, I have a concern: I looked at the CCWG proposal and in the cover page it says: "These recommendations are not presented as the consensus of the CCWG-Accountability."  Does this imply that the CCWG draft proposal was put out just by a sub-set of its members? 

       

      1. Sebastien Bachollet

        Interesting question Eduardo.

        In the document very often the proposal is not unique, but the group is asking for the inputs from the community.
        For exemple membership vs designators vs status quo are open for discussion.
        But in the same time the summary reference only to the membership solution.

        We all agree to put this report for comments but from my POV from a more open expectation.

        1. Eduardo Diaz

          Is just that I do not remember seen a caption like this in a document requesting public comments. As I understand from what you are saying is that there was consensus after all in the context of publishing the document but not in the specifics. Is the expectation then that consensus will be reach depending on the comments that you get?  

          1. Sebastien Bachollet

            Yes, if you look in the Executive Summary §03

            "This report for public comment represents the current work product of the CCWG-Accountability. It is focused on draft Work Stream 1 recommendations (Work Stream 1 is the CCWG-Accountability’s work on changes to ICANN’s accountability arrangements which must be in place, or committed to, prior to the IANA Stewardship transition), which were the focus of the first five months of work (from December 2014 until May 2015). These recommendations are not presented as the consensus of the CCWG-Accountability at this point. The CCWG-Accountability is seeking confirmation of its approach, and guidance upon several options, from the community." 

            1. Alan Greenberg

              Sorry, I have been out most of the day.

              Yes, Sebastien is correct. Actually, such a comment is not that unusual. For relatively simple issues, a draft report is effectively the full report UNTIL there is community input that might change it. For more complex issues, it is not uncommon to put out a report (thus the title INITIAL DRAFT) that is known to be incomplete and has questions for the community. I have participated in several WGs that have done this.

  2. Ariel Liang

    FYI - AFRALO comment on CCWG Accountability Draft Report: http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/pipermail/afri-discuss/2015-May/003446.html

    The AFRALO community members have received the report of Cross Community Working Group on enhancing the ICANN accountability (CCWG) put for public comment and present the following remarks on the report:

    They want first to congratulate the CCWG for the huge amount of work undertaken in a short period of time. Nevertheless, they want to make the following comments:

    • The creation of fundamental bylaws that require the consent of the community to be changed is a good approach and would enhance the accountability of ICANN board to the community. AFRALO members believe that the fundamental bylaws should include the fundamental standing issues such as the mission and the core values of the organization, excluding any functional or operational issue.
    • While giving the community the power of recalling the whole board is an appropriate accountability mechanism, it should be the very extreme step to be taken. AFRALO members wish this would never happen. The majority of 75% proposed in the report for such decision looks acceptable.
    • Recalling one or more board members without reason is an aberration in itself; Its impact would be that the Board directors will act  in the  interest of the SOs or ACs that appointed them rather than acting in the interest of the entire community ( ICANN as an organization). The AFRALO members believe that such a power shouldn’t exist in the CCWG recommendations.
    • It shouldn’t exist also because the Board directors appointed by the NomCom would have a different recalling procedure that makes the whole members of ICANN board not having an equal treatment.
    • AFRALO members appreciate the reinforcement of the Independent review Process, as well as the reconsideration mechanism proposed in the report.
    • They do not see the unincorporated associations as a good means for SOs and ACs to exercise the powers included in the report because the practical application of the UA setup seem to be problematic and complicated. One of the problems is the fact that some of the community stakeholders may be unable and/or unwilling to become a UA, which means that they will not contribute to the community decision making process while exercising the proposed community powers. Also creating the UA may expose the SO/AC to legal issue as they may be sued within the California jurisdiction, which may harm the community members.
    • Any other form of legal entity to represent the SOs and ACs wouldn’t be acceptable if it leads to suing those entities in courts.
    • All the accountability mechanisms should avoid leading to courts as much as possible. In fact, the AFRALO members do not accept that ICANN affairs be managed by courts in whatever the jurisdiction is. 
    • The community group that will act on behalf of the respective community stakeholders to exercise the powers mentioned in the report should be as inclusive as possible.  AFRALO members prefer equal footing for all SOs and ACs, but can live with the composition proposed in the report. 

    The AFRALO community members express their support to the CCWG and think that the report needs further work to find the best ways to empower the community using the right means and avoiding ICANN the risk of being weakened or losing its independence, its inclusiveness and its multi-stakeholder nature.

     

    1. Alan Greenberg

      • Recalling one or more board members without reason is an aberration in itself; Its impact would be that the Board directors will act  in the  interest of the SOs or ACs that appointed them rather than acting in the interest of the entire community ( ICANN as an organization). The AFRALO members believe that such a power shouldn’t exist in the CCWG recommendations.
      • It shouldn’t exist also because the Board directors appointed by the NomCom would have a different recalling procedure that makes the whole members of ICANN board not having an equal treatment.

       

      Please look at lines 153-198 of the draft ALAC comments and see to what extent that may address your concerns.

      Would your concerns on removing AC/SO directors be relieves if it could only be done by the entire community?

      1. Seun Ojedeji

        Hi Alan,

        I think line 162 - 164 may not be the only reason why SO/AC removing its board members should be discouraged. There is also the effect this may have on SO/AC that has more representation on the board compared to those that have less.

        ALAC has just 1 so removing that person may not affect the direction of the board as much. There are other SO/AC that has more seats and i don't think we as ALAC should take the implication of that lightly. That said, like i have earlier indicated that its a compromise i can live it but i do hope ALAC would reflect in the statement something similar to the following:

        "While we are in support of individual SO/AC removing its board members, at the same time we expect the process of doing that to be strictly defined, justifiable and transparently exercised by respective SO/AC"

        Edit: Line 177  .....SO or AC would act in that.....

        Regards

         

        1. Alan Greenberg

          Will add that caveat and tanks for catching the error.

  3. Sebastien Bachollet

    Thanks Alan for this first draft.

    I would like to provide few comments on this proposal.

     

    Line 32

    “the ALAC believes that fostering trust in the DNS” can we add the other identifiers that ICANN take are of?

     

    Line 84:

    I have significant concerns about removing one board member or the whole board.
    I know that for a lot of people it seems to be the best weapon to have the board acting as the community (not yet completely defined) would like.

     

    Lines 153 and following

    Section 5.5 Power: Removing individual ICANN Directors

    The Board members are currently elected/selected for 3 years.

    A quote from the actual bylaws:

    ARTICLE VI: BOARD OF DIRECTORS

    Section 7. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

    Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any other organizations or constituencies.

    If the “the members of the group believe that the person (appointed as Director) shares common values with the group” at the moment of the selection/election process, I am sure it can be the case for 3 years.

    Removing individual ICANN Director is in contradiction with its independency.

     

    Lines 197 and 198

    If this is the way to go to remove Nomcom appointees the members of a “sub-committee of the NomCom appointed to carry out NomCom-appointed Director removals” must not be eligible to the Board for one year after the end of there term.

     

    Lines 199 and following

    5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board[1]

    Five Board members are currently elected/selected each year for 3 years.

    Recalling the entire ICANN Board must not be supported. It will create more disruption to the whole organization than it will solve the issue(s) under discussion.
    Some participants call this possibility the “nuclear option”. The result will be the end of ICANN.

    If it could be the goal of some, it can’t be ours.

     

    As AFRALO did publish one hour ago there comments, I would like to express my support.


    [1] 5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board: he ALAC supports this mechanism…
    Must be  5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board: the ALAC supports this mechanism

  4. Alan Greenberg

    Line 32

    “the ALAC believes that fostering trust in the DNS” can we add the other identifiers that ICANN take are of?

     ICANN is only responsibly for setting policy for the TLDs. Specifically what other areas are you referring to and are they linked to AoC commitments?

     

    Line 84:

    I have significant concerns about removing one board member or the whole board.
    I know that for a lot of people it seems to be the best weapon to have the board acting as the community (not yet completely defined) would like.

     Did I not address that in lines 153-156?

     

     

    Lines 197 and 198

    If this is the way to go to remove Nomcom appointees the members of a “sub-committee of the NomCom appointed to carry out NomCom-appointed Director removals” must not be eligible to the Board for one year after the end of there term.

    I do not understand. The rule about serving after the NomCom is to ensure that "favors" are not exchanged with those who are selecting Board and other members. That does not apply to this Sub-committee and I am suggesting that the rules is not necessary for them.

     

    Lines 199 and following

    5.6 Power: Recalling the entire ICANN Board[1]

    Five Board members are currently elected/selected each year for 3 years.

    Recalling the entire ICANN Board must not be supported. It will create more disruption to the whole organization than it will solve the issue(s) under discussion.
    Some participants call this possibility the “nuclear option”. The result will be the end of ICANN.

    If it could be the goal of some, it can’t be ours.

     I could support that if we do have the ability to selectively remove any Board members. We do need one part of this ability or the other - in my mind.

     

    1. Sebastien Bachollet

      Lines 84 and 153-156 Yes but in lines 160-161 you support to remove individual Board members and I don't.

       

      Lines 197 and 198: A member of the NomCom sub-committee (with different members from the NomCom - just to be sure) can vote to remove one or more NomCom appointees to the Board, they must not be candidate to take those empty seats (and I suggest not any Board seat during one year).

      Lines 199... 

      My POV
      Removing individual ICANN Director: No
      Removing a subset of the ICANN Board: Maybe (but no more than 6 - or 7 - to allow the rest of the Board to still be effective)
      Recalling the whole Board: No 

      1. Alan Greenberg

        160-161. I will qualify.

        197-198. OK, so you  are disagreeing with what I am saying. Can you give a rationale for why those making a recommendation (presumably on the express with of their community, and I am prepared to add that) should be so disqualified?

         

         

        1. Sebastien Bachollet

          My rational: if you are able to remove a member from the ICANN Board, you can't jump on the empty seat

          1. Alan Greenberg

            Understood. I will qualify the comment.

  5. Carlton Samuels

    Re Lines 162-163.   We really should desist from this kind of doublespeak.  The [s]election of a Director is THE supreme political act!  In regard the At-Large, we had an election, for chrissakes!
    -Carlton

    1. Alan Greenberg

      Are you suggesting that I add a line saying that it is already often politicized? If so, I have no problem with that.

  6. Alan Greenberg

    I have posted a revised version of the ALAC Draft Comment incorporating the issues raised.

  7. Tijani Ben Jemaa

    Alan and all,

    Sorry for the late reaction: I was traveling and then in the Africa Internet Summit, and yesterday, I was toooo busy in this summit.

    As for thestatement, thank you Alan for the effort and the open mind. I do appreciate.

    Nevertheless, there are some point where I am not in full agreement with you:

    Line 37-40  Perhaps this is not necessary: I do prefer the independance

    Line 68-81  I think we had better stop at the line 67 and not give this option since we don't prefer it.

    Line 108-158  Any removal without reason is not accepted for me. If it is because of bad behaviour, yes, and the best is when it is the decision of the whole community with a reasonable majority (not too high, but sufficient to ensure that a single stakeholder couldn't remove one or more board members).

    Line 159-166  I may live with this proposal assuming that it will be the only mechanism that permit the removal of any board member under any circonstence. Means that the only power the community have to remove the Board Directors (1 or more) would be because of bad behaviour approved by the (reasonable) majority of the community. Also, any difference in the treatment of the board members (NomCom or not) wouldn't be acceptable.

    And thank you again for your effort Alan. 

    1. Seun Ojedeji

      I have not had time to read entire document and my previous response was just based on the specific question asked by Alan as it relates to AFRALO statement.

      In the absence of time, i will still quickly respond on Tijani's comment.

      Line 37-40  Perhaps this is not necessary: I do prefer the independence

      I am in support of his first statement

      Line 68-81  I think we had better stop at the line 67 and not give this option since we don't prefer it.

      I think i can live with leaving line 68-81 as is.

      Line 108-158  Any removal without reason is not accepted for me. If it is because of bad behaviour, yes, and the best is when it is the decision of the whole community with a reasonable majority (not too high, but sufficient to ensure that a single stakeholder couldn't remove one or more board members).

      I am in violent agreement with this as i have reflected in my previous response and on the list

      Line 159-166  I may live with this proposal assuming that it will be the only mechanism that permit the removal of any board member under any circonstence. Means that the only power the community have to remove the Board Directors (1 or more) would be because of bad behaviour approved by the (reasonable) majority of the community. Also, any difference in the treatment of the board members (NomCom or not) wouldn't be acceptable.

      I agree with this as well. With an addition; there could be the option for a SO/AC to remove its board member, however that reason should be beyond achieving goals of the particular SO/AC but that of the entire community.

      Lastly i don't think item 162 - 165 is required and i think we should remove it, because those reasons can indeed be valid.

       

    2. Alan Greenberg

      Line 37-40  Perhaps this is not necessary: I do prefer the independance

      Do not understand what change you are asking for. I am saying that the panel must be independant from ICANN and any of the parties to the dispute.

      Line 68-81  I think we had better stop at the line 67 and not give this option since we don't prefer it.

      This is a CCWG and all of our positions do not match. We may win this one, or we may not. If we do not, it is important that they implement the Membership model so as to protect us. Otherwise, we may end up with a model we don't prefer AND have it implmented in such a dangerous way that we have to refuse to ratify at the end.

      Line 108-158  Any removal without reason is not accepted for me. If it is because of bad behaviour, yes, and the best is when it is the decision of the whole community with a reasonable majority (not too high, but sufficient to ensure that a single stakeholder couldn't remove one or more board members).

      There must be a reason, but it could be that we do not believe that the director is acting in our view of the best interests of ICANN. It is important that we not structure this so that there is a right to appeal simply because the director does not agree with what we think is best. There will be no way to resolve such a difference.

      Line 159-166  I may live with this proposal assuming that it will be the only mechanism that permit the removal of any board member under any circonstence. Means that the only power the community have to remove the Board Directors (1 or more) would be because of bad behaviour approved by the (reasonable) majority of the community. Also, any difference in the treatment of the board members (NomCom or not) wouldn't be acceptable.

      My understanding is that since the directors are appointed by different mechanisms, under law they would have to be removed by similar mechanisms.

      1. Seun Ojedeji

        Oh you are right about item 1 Alan, my apologies. I think I read it too fast ;-)

  8. Rafid Fatani

    What do you mean by "bad behaviour " and how can we quantify it?

  9. Tijani Ben Jemaa

    Alan,

    Line 37-40  You are right; I read it wrong So please disregard 

    Line 68-81  This is the first report; it is not even a proposal I think we need to accept clearly what we agree with and not accept what we don't. After the public comment, we will rework the report according to the comments received and come up with the next proposal for a second public comment So I do think we had better atand at our positions to make the public comment lead to the nearst position to ours. When we arrive to the final proposal, our comment should give our position and any possible compromise.

    Line 108-158  I think the apeal is the minimum of rights the director should have. What we have to do is to insert the apeal mechanism in the removal procedure so that it will not turn to an endless process.

    Line 159-166  We are proposing new accountability mechanisms. I think we have to choose what we see appropriate. 

    1. Alan Greenberg

      Line 68-81. I know you could not make the CCWG meeting today, but you should listen to the recording. There was a very long and forceful discussion on enforceability and the associated issues. I don't think there is ANY doubt at this stage about where the ALAC stands. And we have a number of other people who are saying the same thing. I am not at all sure it is sufficient to change the CCWG direction, but the game is now different.

      It is also not quite clear if we need the "legal status" even if removing Board members is the only full right we have.

      I think it is really important to formally introduce some of these ideas into the discussion, particularly the part about requiring any formal action to have the support of multiple AC/SO. If we win, we will not need that provision, but if we don't we need to get that level of control accepted by everyone.

      Appeal: I think that this needs more discussion before we introduce it. Understanding what the grounds are for a possible appeal is very important. I personally think that if we have that, it will mean we can not ever remove someone who is acting in good faith, but counter to the needs of ICANN. So let's talk more on this.

      Entire Board Removal: I don't understand your comment. This section originally said we support it and now saiys we have strong reservations in response to your and other concerns.

      If we don't like the idea of removing individual Board members and we don't like removing the entire Board, and we don't like legal enforceability of the other mechanisms, we are right where we are now, and that is not sufficient accountability either for the IANA transfer or from my point of view, for ICANN to survive.

       

       

      1. Seun Ojedeji

        Hi Alan,

        A quick one

        Entire Board Removal: I don't understand your comment. This section originally said we support it and now saiys we have strong reservations in response to your and other concerns.

        If we don't like the idea of removing individual Board members and we don't like removing the entire Board, and we don't like legal enforceability of the other mechanisms, we are right where we are now, and that is not sufficient accountability either for the IANA transfer or from my point of view, for ICANN to survive.

        As one of the "other" i think my reservation is a little different from what you stated above. I am fine with spilling the board. However such spilling should have the quite high magnitude of community endorsement (as already defined by the suggested threshold in the report). The other aspect of my reservation is in individual SO/AC removing its elected board member, and i am saying the reason for doing that MUST be beyond committing a flaw that goes against the SO/AC (like voting for instance) but actually committing a flaw that though is against the ethics of the SO/AC or AC but also not in compliance with the organisation ethics as defined in the bylaw. Such needs to be proven and accessible to the entire community.

        For legal enforceability i am against it because as i think about its practicality, it brings me huge doubt about the stability of ICANN as an organisation and ICANN as a community if finally implemented.

         

        1. Alan Greenberg

          The current proposal calls for a very high threshold for Board removal, so there is nothing to add there.

          I have no clue how one could define "committing a flaw against ethics of the SO/AC". If there is a true ethical issue such as a violation of conflict of interest, then that is easy. But I don't know how one would define the "ethics of the ALAC" or how one would prove a violation.

          If we are trying to ensure that we never use this and that if we do, then the appeals would go on forever, then this is probably a good formula.

          In my mind, if the AC/SO decides that "if we knew then what we know now, we would not have appointed that person as our Director", that should be sufficient.

          If we really think an AC/SO will be petty and remove its Director for not voting on a specific issue in the way the AC/SO wanted, and it was already discussed thoroughly, then we really should not be trusting that AC/SO to appoint a director in the first place. It means we have a VERY poor impression of the AC/SOs that we want to be in charge of where ICANN is going.

          On enforceability, the ALAC has put its sword in the ground (so to speak) both in this statement and during yesterday's meeting. How it will turn out, I don't know.

           

  10. Alan Greenberg

    Revised version posted.

  11. Sebastien Bachollet

    Thanks Alan and Olivier for the "last" final version of the ALAC comments.

    In middle of page 3

    In summary, enshrining the powers in the Bylaws is critical. Legal enforcement of them, with the exception of Board member removal, is of far less importance.

    May I suggest that we write it without the red part?

    In summary, enshrining the powers in the Bylaws is critical. Legal enforcement of them, with the exception of Board member removal, is of far less importance.

     

    About removing or recalling Board member, I would like to reiterate my point of view:
    No removability of one Board member from any SO or any AC,
    No recalling of the full Board,
    But recalling (removing?) part of the Board (up to 7 to keep enough members to still act as a Board) by the "Community". 

    1. Alan Greenberg

      Sebastien, that sentence was written based on the opinion stated by the vast majority of people who believed that in one way or another, board member(s) removal is a mandatory requirement.

      Your position is understood and I believe is reflected in the statement.

      1. Sebastien Bachollet

        Alan, it is not the question of my point of view but the discrepancy between this sentence and the new second § of the 5.1 comments.  

        1. Alan Greenberg

          The highlighted sentence is fully consistent with the bold paragraph, and in my personal opinion (and I think Olivier who penned the new paragraph), an ultimate lawsuit against a director who, in defiance of the law, refuses to step down, is a somewhat different situation from a lawsuit brought on more specific targeted issues.

  12. Alan Greenberg

    The revised statement was slightly modified to clarify the introduction to the comment on section 5.5 (to make it clear what positions some in the community have) and to qualify the that the statements on politicizing, altered behavior and punishment apply only to the removal of Boar members by their appointing AC/SO,

    It has now been submitted and a ratification vote will begin shortly.