| Comment Close Date | Statement Name | Status | Assignee(s) | Call for Comments Open | Call for Comments Close | Vote Open | Vote Close | Date of Submission | Staff Contact and Email | Statement Number |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.05.2015 | 15Y, 0N, 0 Abstain | Alan Greenberg | 18.05.2015 | 21.05.2015 16:59 UTC | 21.05.2015 17:00 UTC | 26.05.2015 23:59 UTC | 26.05.2015 | Grace Abuhamad | AL-ALAC-ST-0515-02-00-EN |
FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED
Please click here to download the PDF doc below.
FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC
PDF Version as submitted to the Public Comment - 20 May 2015
PDF Version - Redline from previous draft
FIRST DRAFT SUBMITTED
Submitted 18 May 2015, 17:51 UTC
Since there is VERY little time before the comment must be submitted, please be as concise as possible. Comments on the Wiki are preferable to document edits, because they are easier for all to view.
66 Comments
Alan Greenberg
PLEASE IDENTIFY ISSUES THAT YOU BELIEVE ARE PROBLEMATIC.
EXPLAIN WHY IF NOT OBVIOUS.
IS THE ISSUE SOMETHING THAT SHOULD CAUSE US TO REJECT PROPOSAL?
Ariel Liang
FYI - kindly see the comment from Vanda Scartezini on the 2nd draft proposal. She submitted to the public comment individually: http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00001.html
Seun Ojedeji
Thought i should drop the few comments below for a start:
Page21:
"The existing IANA naming functions department, administrative staff and related resources, processes, data and know-how would be legally transferred to PTI"
There may be need to further clarify the following:
- Who appoints and fires PTI staffs (is it ICANN board or PTI board?)
- Is there an IANA "naming" function department and specific staff/resources already existing that would make movement easier (as i presume IANA staff does multiple roles across the 3 operational communities). My understanding is that there is currently IANA department and not "IANA naming department"
- As it concerns data, does it mean PTI would assume ownership of the data?
- Does Any of the transfer includes IANA trademarks?
- The CWG may need to consider extra cost that would emerge on recruiting more staff (since there may be less multi-tasking of staff going forward)
"ICANN would provide funding and administrative resources to PTI through an agreed upon budget"
It may be good to determine what will happen should incase ICANN refuses to provide adequate budget to PTI, also it needs to be clear who approved PTI's budget i.e is it the PTI board, ICANN board or ICANN community (as represented by SO/AC leaders)
"The contract would provide for automatic renewal, but subject to potential non-renewal by ICANN if recommended by the IANA Function Review "
I think it needs to be clear that automatic renewal is subject to the outcome of the IFR, so i would really suggest removing "automatic" from the statement since there will be an action that will occur before any contract renewal happen.
Page 22
"The outcomes of reports submitted to the CSC, reviews and comments received on these reports during the relevant time period will be included as input to the IFR"
It is my hope that the reports referred to is those from IANA (which will be available to the public including CSC). That said, its not clear who initiates this process, is it the IFR or PTI?
"The members of the IANA Function Review Team (IFRT) would be selected by the Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees"
It will be very useful to specify that selection will be done in a balanced manner across the SO/AC. That said, a few clarification is required to be explicitly stated:
- Is PTI going to be managing all IANA operations (including those of the other 2 operational communities?)
- Is IFRT going to be looking at review relating to names alone or for the overall IANA
- If IFRT is going to be all about names, then its composition may include some of the SO/AC and not all.
- If IFRT is for entire IANA then the issue of need for Liaisons may need to be clarify, except for ICANN board being a liaison in the group.
- The use of the phrase "several liaisons" may need to be clarified, are we looking to include communities outside of ICANN (like ISOC et all) and its also good to make that phrase consistent with the fact that "IFRT is intended to be a small group"
"In the event of a Special Review being proposed,the ccNSO and GNSO should consult with both members and non-member TLDs, in the light of the consultations, the Councils can decide by a supermajority to call for a special review"
Isn't there supposed to be an MS input beyond (GNSO/ccNSO) before such special review can be called. I mean where does ALAC view gets represented as part of the call process. Does ALAC really need to wait until IFR before they can make their views known?
Alan Greenberg
All good questions that should be explicitly addressed. What we are putting into IANA is the entire IANA, not just the naming functions. The relations with the other communities is covered by footnote.5 on page 21. Regarding data ownership, my understanding is that IANA, ICANN and NTIA have always maintained that all data that compises the root zone is in the public domain. However, there should be expicit mention of the internal files of IANA all being transferred.
Given the amount of time the other groups spent on this, I think that we wisely ignored it (it was a DT that we deferred, but will have to revisit). It is less of a problem for us than the other groups, because ICANN will stay the Steward of the names function regardless of what the other groups do.
Yes, that is part of the budgeting process.
That is handled by the ICANN Accountability processes.
"but subject" covers part of that, and an IFR recommendation to terminate covers the rest I would think.
The IFR is the process. It is initiated with automatically on a periodic basis, or based on a problem.
The answer is that this is the Post-transition IANA and it does whatever IANA does. But you are correct that this should be made clear at the start.
I am not sure we need that, but perhaps that falls under the re-instated MRT as I mentioned.
Alan Greenberg
Overall, I am pleased with the proposal. Although my specifica comments address a number of issues, the main focus is ensuring equitable MS involvement.
Page 22, Section III.A.i.b
It is presumed that the PRI Board would need to be minimal, yet that begs the question of where real decisions will be made. A larger Board with the requisite skills and interests need not be accompanied by separate accountability measures. This Board would be chosen by ICANN and its constituent parts and could be withdrawn by them as well. The accountability measures within ICANN will suffice.
Page 22, Section III.A.i.d
The IFR should also be allowed to review the CSC and its effectiveness as well as recommend changes to its composition and charter.
Page 24, Section III.A.ii.a & Page 68, Annex J
I cannot speak to the ccNSO, but I do not believe that the GNSO is an appropriate body to which IANA issues should be escalated. It is explicitly a policy body and does not readily have the processes nor the staff to deal with such escalations.
Annex J implies that the GNSO/ccNSO could use the community empowerment mechanisms designed by the CCWG – but this implies that the COMMUNITY must be involved, not just the GNSO or ccNSO.
This is a place where the MRT from the ill-fated Contract Co. solution still does fit.
Page 25, Section III.A.ii.d
It is unclear what will be “separated”. Discussions in the CWG after publication implied that ICANN would remain the Steward of the IANA function but the actual IANA operation could be removed from PTI. I find that completely acceptable.
Page 60, Annex G
Although I am not sure that it hurts, the concept of a unaffiliated registry being allowed to be a Liaison does not seem to make sense as Liaisons are from groups that are explicitly not registries.
The proposal says that Members and Liaisons “will be appointed by their respective communities in accordance with internal processes”, but also that “the full membership of the CSC must be approved by the ccNSO and the GNSO”. Those two specifications conflict with each other. Similarly, it is unclear how the ccNSO and GNSO will address geographic diversity or skill sets while honoring the first premise.
Do the term limitation and staggered appointment rules apply just to Members (which makes sense) or also Liaisons (which doesn’t).
Page 61, Annex G
CSC Charter changes should be appoved by the Community and not just the ccNSO and GNSO. The proposal puts the nonRy parts of the GNSO in an inappropriately privileged position.
Page 62, Annex G
Ditto to the review of the CSC.
Ariel Liang
In response to this message <http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/pipermail/alac-announce/2015-May/002483.html>, Jean-Jacques Subrenat submitted his individual input on the CWG IANA 2nd Draft Proposal to At-Large Staff, using the template provided by the CWG IANA.
He responded to Question no.11 in the template: "Do you have any specific comments or input you would like to provide with regards to section III.A.i.b. - Post-Transition IANA Board. This section describes the proposed Board for the post-transition IANA." His response is as follows:
"In addressing this subject, one should remember that over the years, there has been a steady call for a more "global" Internet, as well as a more representative and inclusive form of Internet governance. So far, those most vocal at the Working Group level have considered that existing and future entities (ICANN, IANA, post-IANA) should remain in the sole jurisdiction of the USA. When invited to defend this conservative view, its proponents have generally invoked "being realistic", or "it's working, so why change?", or again "there's no way the USG, or the US Congress, will ever accept anything like this". As a result, a form of self-censorship has limited, or even impaired, the ability to have a longer-term view with sufficient emphasis on the interests of the global Internet user. With these considerations in mind, I suggested the Working Group ask its legal adviser to study the hypothesis of forming the future PTI Board in a jurisdiction different from the current US jurisdiction. This would not affect the operational responsibilities of ICANN or PTI, which would remain in the US and under California law. But it would provide a first proof of the willingness of the USG to implement what so many of its partners have called for over the years, a truly global Internet, a gradual globalization of ICANN and similar Internet bodies or processes."
Alan Greenberg
Jean-Jacques,
Can you elaborate further. I do not understand the concept of PTI being under US/California jurisdiction, but its Board under another. According to my understanding, a board typically does not have a legal presence other than as the embodiment of the its parent corporation.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
I generally agree with Alan’s comments. I do accept the proposed model with clear conditions that are conditioning our acceptance of the proposal as a whole:
The proposed model might be extended to be used for the global unique proposal the ICG is tasked to pass to the NTIA, with 1 single PTI, 3 CSCs (they may be different, but they are all monitoring the operational aspect of the IANA functions), and one single IFR. I propose that ALAC include this as an advantage of the CSC proposal.
I also propose that ALAC rejects the whole proposal if:
Alan Greenberg
Tijani, I strongly agree with almost everything you say and I thank you for enumerating them so clearly. But with a two exceptions.
I certainly agree that the PTI board needs to be functional and able to run the small but critical business that is IANA. Moreover, they need to have the skills and ability to address problems should they occur.
I am far less sure that it needs to be multi-stakeholder. For several reasons:
Now, several times, I have heard people say that if it is not MS, then it will be dominated by Registries. And that must NOT happen.
That is why I liked the Sidley suggestion that it largely (but not completely) be populated with operational people from ICANN. Specifically, I would think it could be populated by EXACTLY those people who would have been overseeing the IANA operation if it was kept completely internal (as the ALAC was originally advocating). And those with the management perspective to address real operational problems, ie professionals.
Note that there would still be MS CONTROL over PTI through the ICANN accountability measures.
The other thing I disagree with is that the CSC only escalates to the PTI Board. Certainly, the PTI Board should be given an opportunity to address problems, but if they fail, I think that it needs to go to a MS oversight body in ICANN, which can begin to use its powers to fix whatever the major problem is.
Seun Ojedeji
I am also in agreement with Tijani and Alan with few exceptions:
- While PTI board may be "partly" populated by staff, I hope we are talking about just 1 or 2 staff members.
- I would expect PTI board be as small as possible with Max of 5 - It's not yet clear who appoints other non-staff board members
- While I agree as well that CSC may escalate beyond PTI board, I think the level of severity to warrant such needs to be clearly defined as we don't want an IFRT team that will become standing.
- I am not sure I get how ccwg accountability mechanism will apply to PTI board members especially if the affiliate route is taken
- This last one is a postulation: If PTI would indeed become IANA operator for the 3 communities. Would it then not make sense to populate the board with representative from each of the 3 communities (including 1/2 IANA staff member)
Alan Greenberg
Seun, PLEASE say whether your reference to "staff" above is PTI staff, or ICANN staff. It makes a VERY big difference.
I agree that five is probably about as big as you would want it to get.
The other communities I believe have either shown no interest or negative interest in participating at this point.
Seun Ojedeji
Alan Greenberg
The only PTI staff member that I would expect to be on the PTI board would be the senior manager (CEO, Executive Director or whatever the posiiton is called - Elise Gerich in today's staffing). It is very common that such a person is on the Board, perhaps in a non-voting role, perhaps voting. Just as Fadi is on the ICANN board. I would not expect any other PTI staff on the PTI board - in fact, for a California Public Interest Corp, there are specific legal limits on staff being on the Board.
ICANN staff on the Board are essentially representing the owners or members of PTI (depending on which form of company we select). This generally how many Boards are formed. Large stockholders of for-profit companies often have seats on the Board, and for privately held companies, the owners are often the majority of or the entire Board. For wholly owned subsidiaries, it is quite common for the parent Board to appint one or more of its members to the subsidiary Board.
In this particular case, it would make some sense for the people who would managed the entity if it was a department of ICANN to be on its Board (ie the senior decision makers) if it segregated into a new company.
Seun Ojedeji
Alan Greenberg
My recollection is that the legal opinion was for an "insider" board made up largely of ICANN senior managers. The "outsider" board option would require accountability measures to ensure that it was in line with ICANN and the ICANN community. See the last attachment of http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-client/2015-May/000168.html which was discussed at the last meeting I believe. It looked at a number of stress tests with both board scenarios. The discussion did not really differentiate between the corporate model chosen.
The preference to an insider board was because it would not require separate accountability measures.
The accountability measures work because the majority of the PTI board would be ICANN employees carrying out their duties as ICANN employees and thus subject to all of the accountability measures we are designing in the CCWG.
I had never thought of such an insider board before this presentation, but the main attractiveness of it is that it puts on the board the exact people we would have wanted to oversee the IANA function operator if we had succeeded in getting a completely internal model. Those people should have the skills to deal with operational problems, and it is far less likely that a board composed of representatives of various stakeholders would have those skills and qualities. And THAT is what I consider the most important part of the PTI board - the ability to respond to problems and fix them before they need to be escalated to accountability measures outside of PTI.
Seun Ojedeji
Alan Greenberg
As I have said before, in a perfect world, we would not be creating a PTI, so effectively I am agreeing with you. But it is clear to me that such a model cannot be sold, just as the Contract Co model could not be sold. MSism is in essence, an exercise in finding compromises that meet the end goal. PTI is, in my opinion,, one such compromise.
If an ICANN employee who is, as part of their job, a PTI board member ceases to be employed by ICANN, they are no longer a board member. As the sole member or the owner of PTI (depending on model chosen), ICANN (and implicitly the ICANN Board) have the right to name the PTI board (if we set it up like that).
Implicitly as the member or owner, ICANN can control PTI, but PTI is also bound by whatever contracts it signs.
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
"once there is separation" - it is my understanding that if there is separation, it means that PTI is no longer the operator - in which case, PTI disappears altogether, except if it is chose again to be the operator.
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
Seun says:
- This last one is a postulation: If PTI would indeed become IANA operator for the 3 communities. Would it then not make sense to populate the board with representative from each of the 3 communities (including 1/2 IANA staff member)
OCL:
It would BUT having the other 2 communities accept PTI is still a long way away. Reading the discussion on their respective lists, there appears to be a lot of pushback about this - they prefer to contract with ICANN directly. So it is a big "if".
Eduardo Diaz
I agree with Alan in that the PTI could be the same people that is actually managing the IANA Operations. I will say that a max of 3 people will be a perfect number. After all, the way I understand it the functions to be done are not that intensive or complicated to perform.
Alan Greenberg
3-5 is probably a reasonable target, presuming one of them is the PTI CEO (or whatever the title), in either a voting or non-voting role.
If things are going well, this board will have very little to do. Routine things such as appoint auditors and set excecutive compensation. Hiring a new CEO if that ever becomes necessary.
However, if things start going poorly, this is the place that the fixes should come from. And that is why you need people who are not just figureheads but capable of taking real business decisions regarding PTI.
Vanda Scartezini
Tijani. knowledge will the must relevant point for this board.
Seun Ojedeji
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
Before accepting a PTI Board that is primarily made up of ICANN Staff and is not multistakeholder, I'd like to understand where the multistakeholder elements of the whole function will be.
As I understand it, the CSC will not be multistakeholder but will have observers that are not Registries.
The IRF - is this going to be multistakeholder?
It was always my understanding that the stewardship of the IANA function needed to be multistakeholder. I just have problems now understanding where this multistakeholder element is, if all of the committees are controlled primarily by Registries and by ICANN Staff. The track record of Registries and ICANN Staff working together leaves much to be desired when it comes to the public interest, simply because ICANN Staff appear to be unable/unwilling to stand up to Registries that they consider both their clients and a legal threat.
Alan Greenberg
In my opinion, it is not there at the moment, but putting in the PTI Board, is probably not the optimal place either.
As I said before, I believe that replacing the GNSO and ccNSO with a MS body/group is essential, and in my mind, the lack of such a structure/process may well constitute a reason to not supporting the proposal.
Making the PTI Board MS would be a token effort, giving very little real power to the MSs and reducing the chances that the PTI Board can act effectively to address problems in crisis mode.
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
Thanks for following up Alan. I don't think we are at the stage yet of saying we're not going to support the proposal.
On the contrary, we're on the commenting period so let's insist that the escalation point should NOT go through GNSO & CCNSO (you have provided very valid reasons on the recent calls) but through an MS body. We need to be very strong on this. I have now asked several parties on several occasions, to point to me where the multistakeholder element comes in and to show me that this multistakeholder element has the last word/control of the whole stewardship process.... and have gotten nothing in return.
In the meantime, having discussed the Stewarship Transition both formally & informally outside of ICANN, the point that comes back is that under no circumstance should the proposal replace the US Government with purely Industry. Indeed, some people in Europe, if faced by a Corporate Lobby control, would then prefer an Inter-Governmental Stewardship - something which the US Government has explicitly excluded.
Alan Greenberg
To be clear, my reference to "not supporting" was that it was a possibility IF it is not fixed in the next go-around. But we need to be upfront in our comment to make sure it is not just tossed off as being easily rejected.
And yes, of course it must be backed up with the rationale which I hope will be compelling.
Will work on a draft later tonight.
Alan Greenberg
The draft ALAC comment is not yet complete. I have incorporated my comments, but not yet those of others. It will be done early Monday (East coast Canada time).
The current version can be seen at ALAC-CWG_Comment_May2015-v04.pdf.
Seun Ojedeji
Hi Alan,
Thanks for the share, if you provide an editable version i could make further personal edits and provide the redline version.
Regards
Alan Greenberg
I will once I finish it, but since we have VERY little time to complete this, comments instead of edits may be more efficient.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
Alan and all,
Olivier concern is mine. the MS aspect of the proposal.
A PTI of 3 to 5 people with the PTI CEO and 2 other staff member.... Is it a board? of course it is not. it is exactly what was proposed at the beginning and that we rejected collectively: an insignifiant Board, with no power almost no existance.
A board made of those who managed IANA... it is an operational group... is it what is needed to govern the PTI.
If I follow your reasonning Alan, I would also ask if the ICANN Board is populated with experts so that they can manage the crises?
A board is not an operational body. and the PTI board shouldn't be either.
I remain strongly convinced that the PTI board should be multi-stakeholder, and acceopt that one staff member be included as liaison without voting right.
The escalation would be to a MS body if the PTI board is MS. and in my views, the escalation should be to the PTI Board who must take the right action (special review by IFR, reinforcing the operational staff, upgrading the infrastructure, etc.).
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
Hello Tijani,
what about a PTI Board that has no specific power of governance (ie. small at most 5 people for example) and a multistakeholder group within ICANN that will be in the escalation path (instead of GNSO & ccNSO) ?
Alan Greenberg
Olivier, I think I support this, but I don't know what you mean by "no specific power of governance". A Board by definition (and law) DOES have a power of governance. If we choose an LLC, perhaps less so.
Alan Greenberg
Tijani, we can have differing opinions.
I believe that the ICANN Board has a VERY different function to the PTI Board. ICANN is made up of a lot of different groups and the Board needs to span those. IANA has a very limited and well defined function and the Board must ensure that it meets these specific needs.
If you believe that the PTI Board must be multistakeholder in its composition, I ask that you suggest a specific composition that will satisfy your requirements AND ensure that if there are severe operational problems with IANA, that this Board will be able to take effective action to remedy the problems to avoid a more catastrophic alternative. Please be specific as to the size of the Board, which MS will be represented and if not obvious, how they would be chosen.
Ariel Liang
Please note that AFRALO commented on the Draft Proposal and published the comment on Afri-discuss mailing list: http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/pipermail/afri-discuss/2015-May/003408.html
AFRALO Statement on CWG Proposal (Draft)
12 May 2015
-----------------------------
We Members of AFRALO community have been following closely the activities of the Cross community working group on IANA stewardship transition (CWG-Stewardship). In view of this we would like to present the following view about the second draft proposal of the CWG that is currently up for public comment:
- We observe the significant change in the overall model presented in the current draft as opposed to the first draft of the CWG proposal released for public comment in December 2014 and we welcome this change in approach.
- We understand that the proposal intends to create a new entity called the post transition IANA (PTI) that will be awarded contract by ICANN to operate the IANA function for names. However, we have the following observation about PTI:
- We understand from the proposal that a customer standing committee (CSC) will be tasked with monitoring operational performance of IANA function related to names and we have the following views:
- We also understand from the proposal that an IANA function review team (IFRT) would be created to review activities of PTI as it concern IANA function operation as defined in the contract and recommend renewal of PTI contract (or otherwise) to the ICANN board :
Finally, we will like to reiterate our support on the request from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to ICANN to “convene a multi-stakeholder process to develop a plan to transition the U.S. government stewardship role” with regard to the IANA Functions and related root zone management. We appreciate the direction of the CWG proposal formation and we hope our concerns will be addressed within the group. We look forward to an improved proposal that ensures participation of all relevant communities within ICANN including AFRALO (as a regional organization of At-Large)
Alan Greenberg
Two comments:
The recommendation that the CSC have a Liaison from the IFRT is problematic, since the IFRT will only be constituted when a review is required, and will not be a standing body the rest of the time.
The document says that the composition of the IFRT is not yet determined, but Annex F of the proposal does specify a specific composition.
Seun Ojedeji
Yeah I think I agree with that as well, maybe recommending that a Liaison from atlarge would be more appropriate. As to IFRT composition will have to check that again. Currently mobile.
Alan Greenberg
The CSC proposal already allows for an At-Large liaison.already.
What I forgot to include was that we need more clarity on exactly what a Liaison can and cannot do. Will add in next version.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
Alan,
Yes, I believe in a MS PTI board with full power. My understanding is that we will end up with one single proposal for the 3 functions as required by the NTIA, and I see the PTI in this perspective. A PTI for the 3 functions with a CSC for each (of course, I don't stick to the names or details of the proposal assuming that the 2 other function would ask for modifications,
The PTI board should be MS, and include at least the GNSO, ccNSO, ASO, IETF, ALACthe CEO and a staff liaison. 6 voting members and a liaison. It is as light as you propose, but have full prerogatives and selected by the community. This will avoid capture and permit diversity.
In case of severe failure, the board will not go and change a figure in a line of the code or replace a server by a new one. The board action is at a higher level. Do not forget that the CSCs will be monitoring the day to day operation and follow fixing problems as they happen. It is only in case the problem is not solved that the board will take the necessary action (not operational action).
If you accept the proposal of Olivier for a MS group at ICANN for the escalation, this means that you believe that the MS group will solve problems in case of severe problems. So why not a MS PTI board?????
Alan Greenberg
I see two problems with this:
I don't see the MS group as an escalation body within ICANN as a problem solving group. I see them with the clout to try to get the PTI Board to fix a problem with the threat of having the ICANN Board (or themselves depending on the control mechanisms over PTI) change the PTI Board or ultimately start an IFR.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
Olivier,
I find it a new complication of the system. If we accept that solving the severe problems is possible through a MS group in ICANN, why we refuse that it is done by the MS PTI board?
Seun Ojedeji
Seun Ojedeji
Alan Greenberg
Well, I would accept that, but at this point Tijani is strongly opposed to an insider board and feels that a MS board is mandatory. So I do not feel comfortable putting in such a statement until more people give their opinions and we can decide what the majority prefer.
Since the draft proposal is silent on the Board structure and composition, we can get away with that at the moment.It would be better if we could definitively say what we prefer, since it will then be formally recorded as the ALAC choice going forward.
We will, however, need to come to closure on this very soon, as the CWG will have to make a recommendation on this very soon.
Alan Greenberg
Thanks Seun, but I am not following your logic.
26 is an overall statement and I think it is accurate. We do not support the ENTIRE proposal but most parts.
28-30 says what many in At-Large have said from time to time. We would prefer to avoid the new legal entity, but having it is not sufficient for us to reject the proposal.
What am I missing?
Seun Ojedeji
Alan Greenberg
Got it. So it is not really 28-30, but that 26 gives a false impression of whether we will accept the final report or not.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
Alan,
I said at least. I see the SSAC should also be on the board, and perhaps others.
What is the problem with a board of 10 members or even more? What is the constraint you see for the PTI board sieze.
A board acting at the operations level?
the MS group in the ICANN as an additionel mail box? what's the need?
Frankly speaking, I don't understand the real problem.
On the other hand, I find the last draft of the template with line numbers quit good. I have a concern about line 133-134 only (about the sieze of the PTI Board).
Alan Greenberg
Tijani, as I said, we may choose to disagree on this, and others need to give their thoughts.
Legal opinion is that if we have an "outsider" Board (and that is what you are describing), we will need accountability mechanisms associated with that, and Jan Scholte has once again said we need to address the accountability of the community as well as ICANN itself and its board.
I personally think that a board of 10 overseeing a company with 9 employees is overkill, but that may be just me. I have sat on several Boards with three people on them, so although I think that may be too low in this case, it indeed is still a real and functional Board.
On lines 133-134 on the draft, I only put in that section things that I thought we had agreement on, and limiting the size of the PTI Board was something I did think was in that list. If it is not the case, unless there is strong demand from others to keep it, I will remove that paragraph.
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
A multistakeholder PTI Board would be fine if it actually had a say in the possibility of separation. BUT the way I understand it, if the IRFT & the ICANN Community decides to proceed with separation, the PTI will simply disappear as the bids in response to the RFP might have another candidate win. That's why you'll see me push for a multistakeholder IRFT on the CWG IANA mailing list.
Alan Greenberg
The IFRT is already reasonably MS in the proposal, but there does seem to be a push to increase the Ry component and I agree with Olivier that this is not good.
We need MS in the escalation process! See the answer to question 14 starting at line 190 of the draft comment.
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
Agreed that we need MS in the escalation process - we absolutely need it. I have repeatedly asked for a diagram of the escalation process to be produced, in vain. Perhaps is this unclear yet, but we need to have that multistakeholder component. The question is whether a (a) committee of mostly Registries "listening to the community" is enough or whether (b) the committee itself needs to be multistakeholder, or whether (c) there needs a vote of all SOs & ACs.
I do not like option (a) above since Committees can stop listening & ignore advice.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
Alan,
My problem is not that I desagree with a board of 5 people, it is that I don't find it an obligation that will determine the seize of the board.
Olivier, the IFR is not a standing body. It only exists when there is a review (perhaps once every 5 years). Is it sufficient to give the MS nature of the entity?
Alan Greenberg
I cannot answer on behalf of Olivier, but I agree that the IFRT alone is not sufficient with regard to supporting MS involvement. That is why I have suggested that the CSC escalation path must be to a MS group.
Seun Ojedeji
Alan Greenberg
Perhaps a judgement call. One of the things the MS body can do is to present their case to the PTI oard, or to the ICANN Board for relaying (depending on whether it is an insider or outsider board).
Olivier Crepin-Leblond
IRF plus multistakeholder committee in the escalation process. I initially thought it could be IRFT performing both functions. Do you not thing that's enough?
Eduardo Diaz
I have read the draft proposal and agree with its content.
Holly Raiche
I have read the document, and all of the comments made leading up to its finalisation. I am not as strong on the issue of an insider board that Tijani raised as long as the accountability issues are addressed and the MS community has a voice. I'm happy to proceed on the basis of the statement
And a huge thank you to you Alan particularly and others who have contributed so much time and effort to what is a terribly important set of issues for us all.
Tijani Ben Jemaa
I support the last version of the statement.
Seun Ojedeji
Hi Alan Greenberg,
Looks good generally but may I suggest further rewording of the section below:
"The ALAC is generally supportive of the Draft Proposal. That being said, the ALAC does have a number of critical concerns."
Be updated to the one below (or similar):
"The ALAC is generally supportive of the CWG progress as presented in Draft Proposal. That being said, the ALAC does have a number of critical concerns that would need to be addressed in order to determine our full support for this proposal."
Thanks for the effort.
Alan Greenberg
Done.
Sebastien Bachollet
Thanks Alan,
Just one small point line 147
... properly serve Internet users as the IAN Functions Operator
must be
... properly serve Internet users as the IANA Functions Operator
Alan Greenberg
Good catch! Fixed.
Cheryl Langdon-Orr
this is looking good
Vanda Scartezini
just finish to read everything before vote and looks very good work.