During my service on the ICANN Board, and on its President's Strategy Committee, I had an active role in drafting the "Improving Institutional Confidence" document, some recommendations of which later found their way into the Affirmation of Commitments, but are also reflected in the CEO's recent statement about ICANN's need to further "internationalize" (F. Chéhadé announced a new ICANN legal entity to be set up in Geneva). Also on the Board, I helped set up the Public Participation Committee, of which I was the first Chair (significant improvements in remote participation, in the Public Forum, and in linguistic services). And for more than 2 years, I constantly pleaded for Board oversight on the international and institutional dimensions of ICANN, which at the time were taken care of by the CEO and a handful of senior Staff: my suggestion was finally accepted, resulting in the creation of the Global Relationships Committee. I was also active in a number of Review Working Groups: chair of the ccNSO Review; member of the ALAC Review which recommended 2 voting members to be nominated by At-Large (this resulted in the creation of "Seat 15"). On the Board, I often made the point that it was time to consider the ALAC not as some "junior partner", but as an essential element of ICANN's very legitimacy. I also strongly supported funding for the first At-Large Summit.

During my service on the ALAC, I introduced the notion that, in parallel with the usual work of this Advisory Committee (responding to calls for comments, drafting statements, consulting with other ACs and SOs), it would be in the interest of the user community for the ALAC to take a more autonomous and longer-term view of challenges to the Internet and to ICANN. Acting upon my suggestion, the ALAC created the "Future challenges working group" (FCWG), of which Evan Leibovitch and I were appointed co-Chairs. The FCWG produced a document, "Making ICANN Relevant, Responsive and Respected" (R3), unanimously accepted by the ALAC as its first White Paper, and which has enjoyed quite a wide distribution.

During ICANN-49 in Singapore, the FCWG will be hosting a public session on its new work, "The Internet as a space of freedom: the user perspective". It is hoped and expected that the result of this work may contribute, in a significant way, to the current debate on the need to place the user at the centre of Internet preoccupations and processes. Without this user dimension, the multi-equal-stakeholder model would be unrepresentative of the evolving Internet.

Although this is a very small contribution, I am also pleased that the over-arching theme chosen by my colleagues for the Atlas-2 Summit (London, June 2014) is the one I suggested, "The global Internet: the user perspective".

If chosen for Seat 15, I would want to make sure that the Board holds itself to the same high standards that are required of the community, its ACs and SOs (for instance, how are Board Committee Chairs appointed?). With an open mind, I would demand full information about a number of items crucial to the future of the Internet and of ICANN: the IANA function and contract; objectives, methods and calendar for the further internationalization of ICANN; the upcoming consultations between i-organizations (Sao Paolo and beyond); the need to promote "default settings" that respect privacy and fundamental rights of Internet users; encouraging efforts currently under way at IETF for technical solutions to user rights (encryption); taking stock of the New gTLD programme; helping ICANN migrate from the silo mentality to a more fluid community involvement.

As some members of the Board have pointed out over the years, the notion of a "skills set" for the Board must be treated with caution, if only because terms served by Directors partly overlap, in what amounts to "a permanently unstable equation". With respect, rather than answering the question "without you the Board will lack what skills", I offer the view that, whatever the composition of the Board at any given moment, I could contribute in the following ways:

• heightened awareness of, and attention to the global public interest, by emphasising the Internet users' perspective (fundamental rights, basic principles of good governance, "default settings" in software and applications so as to protect privacy, fair representation) ;
• the ability to place Internet and ICANN challenges in the wider context of social, geopolitical and economic transformation;
• a high-level experience in international affairs, both in conceptual and in practical terms;
• familiarity with high-level cooperation in diverse professional contexts, with colleagues from various cultures and walks of life;
• an operational balance between careful listening, independent thinking, clear analysis of challenges, and problem-solving;
• gravitas and humor in equal measure, where required.

ICANN takes great pains not to use the term “regulator”, even though it clearly serves many regulatory functions. In my opinion, this is because being thought of as a Regulator, either in American law or elsewhere, implies for ICANN a heightened and explicit level of public accountability that the organization does not wish to shoulder.

In response to my perception of this attitude, I wrote and circulated an article titled “A Call for ICANN to Embrace its Inner Regulator”. This article attracted broad support, as well as contributions from a number of people (including some of my fellow candidates), and evolved into a submission to the ATRT2. That submission contains my answer to this question more completely, but the title of the article also summarizes the vision that would guide me as a Board member.

Eric Brunner-Williams (NARALO)

For Mssrs. Bachollet and Subrenat:

I have the impression, having interacted with each of you over a number of years, that each of you are reflective, and aware of the "Anglo-Saxon" limitations assumed by the Corporation.

If re-selected to join the Corporation Board, which basic principle will most inform you, one in which the "market", in which Verisign holds "market power", determines public policy or one in which "market power" does not determine public policy?

1) The first part of your question is a statement to the effect that the DNA of ICANN, incorporated under California law, is largely "Anglo-Saxon". I cannot dispute this. I also share your view that this feature imposes "limitations" on the Corporation. In fact, as a member of the President's Strategy Committee (PSC) and a drafter of its "Improving Institutional Confidence" document, I strongly advocated the creation of a "separate legal entity" of ICANN outisde of California and the USA. Our findings led us to suggest Geneva as the best location for this, and I note that the CEO of ICANN recently mentioned Geneva in this context. 

For the At-Large community, the interesting question should be "why would ICANN need a separate legal entity outside of the US?". In the PSC paper, we identified, among other advantages for ICANN, fiscal predictability and flexibility, a status favourable to non-government international entitites, and the ability to recruit on a truly worldwide basis (without the visa constraints of recruiting non-US citizens in California).

2) The second part of your question echoes one of the major debates of the early 21st century, about government vs. enterprise. At the heart of the debate is the notion of self-regulation, long expounded as the ultimate mechanism to ensure economic growth and free competition. It is now clear that the financial crisis of 2008 was one of the unwanted results of permissive self-regulation in the financial sector (Nouriel Roubini & Stephen Mihm, "Crisis Economics, A Crash Course in the Future of Finance", Penguin USA 2010). What does this have to do with the Internet? Whether ICANN likes it or not, it does partly play the role of a regulator of the Domain Names Business. But because it shies away from the suggestion of any regulatory role, it has allowed itself to become unbalanced, to the detriment of the global public interest, as evidenced in the way the New gTLD programme was launched.

3) You allude to Verisign. For future progress in ICANN, an open approach will be required, among other things about the IANA function. Along with the European Commission, I am in favour of a thorough debate, in order to make the Internet, and ICANN, globally accountable. Governments alone cannot achieve this, nor corporations alone: if the Multi-Stakeholder Model is to succeed, now is the time to improve it.

For all the candidates except the incumbent, are the interests of "At-Large", a By-Laws body charged with providing advice to the Corporation Board, advanced by limiting the tenure of the appointee to Seat allocated to At-Large to a single term? If not, what defect of the incumbent, or advantage unique to you, do you offer as sufficient to end the incumbent's tenure and begin your own? Please note that several individuals have been on the Board in one capacity or another for several terms.

I have answered the reasons for my running clearly and completely, in my statement of candidacy (and subsequently in a summary of that statement provided at EURALO’s request and sent to all RALOs). While there are some advantages to serving multiple terms, these benefits do not override the public-interest need for Directors to be accountable to the community at appropriate intervals. To argue otherwise is to invite complacency and stagnation.

A Board member's tenure provides no entitlement: I found it completely natural to have failed re-election after my term of duty on the Board, 2007-10. My candidacy for Seat 15 is not motivated by any "defect of the incumbent", nor do I claim to possess any "advantage unique to (me)". In the life of an organization, different times require different profiles. Candidates should be judged not on whether they are incumbents or new applicants, but on the expected value of their contribution.

According to my analysis, the challenges ahead include: clearer and more effective roles to be played by the various i-organizations including ICANN; more substantial globalization of ICANN, in the face of the rapid evolution of the Internet worldwide; placing the Internet user at the heart of ICANN's processes. I am confident I can contribute a global view, gained from my high-level experience in an international context.

For all the candidates, the Corporation provides "technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers", acting on three baskets -- a zone file published in coordination with the US DoC NTIA, Verisign GRS and the operators of several nameservers, a set of sets of protocol parameters published in coordination with the IETF, autonomous system numbers, and IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes allocated in coordination with the Regional Internet Registries. Can you think of any reason why protocol parameters, ASNs, and IP allocations should remain the concerns of the Corporation?

Please note, this was the subject of significant discussion when the IANA Functions Contract was last let for competitive bid, and the NTIA archives contain comments reflecting several points of view. The IANA Functions Contract will be up for competitive bid during the term of the individual selected by this process.

Alberto Soto

You think that the criteria for this selection, are correct and sufficient?

Requires modifications?

You put this question yesterday 6 March, during the conference call which provided an opportunity for the candidates to present themselves, and to respond to questions from the At-Large community. I'm glad to repeat in writing what I expressed yesterday: yes, I think the criteria are sufficient.

In fact, having too many parameters or criteria would carry the risk of losing the wider picture: what are a candidate's stature, credibility, ability to listen, ability to convince, familiarity with Internet matters, and experience in working on a high-level Board?