| Comment Close Date | Statement Name | Status | Assignee(s) and | Call for Comments | Call for Comments Close | Vote Announcement | Vote Open | Vote Reminder | Vote Close | Date of Submission | Staff Contact and Email | Statement Number |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21.02.2014 | Second Accountability and Transparency Review Team (ATRT 2) Final Report & Recommendations | TBC | TBC | TBC | TBC | TBC | TBC | TBC | TBC | TBC | Larisa Gurnick larisa.gurnick@icann.org | TBC |
(*) Comments submitted after the posted Close Date/Time are not guaranteed to be considered in any final summary, analysis, reporting, or decision-making that takes place once this period lapses.
FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED
The final version to be submitted, if the draft is ratified, will be placed here by upon completion of the vote.
FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC
The final draft version to be voted upon by the ALAC will be placed here before the vote is to begin.
FIRST DRAFT SUBMITTED
Introduction
The At Large Community recognizes the role and significance that the DNS plays in ensuring interoperability. We recognize the importance of DNSSEC in the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet in the root zone and the subsequent deployment in DNS Infrastructure. Noting that to date there are 427 TLDs in the root zone of which 235 are signed and that 229 have trust anchors published in the DS records in the root zone whilst 4 TLDs have trust anchors published in the ISC DLV Repository, we hope that in time more TLDs will move towards having trust anchors published.
The Root Zone Key Signing Ceremony points to one of ICANN’s most sacred functions of preserving accountability and transparency in the manner in which it conducts its DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies. We would like to congratulate all the stakeholders involved in the KSK management process on the services since the first KSK signing ceremony till to date. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the Review of Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Ceremonies.
We believe that the current Trusted Community Representative (TCR) model has been effectively performing its functions of ensuring trust in the KSK management process. We would like to suggest a few additional processes that could complement the existing process. The original TCR proposal is silent on the term. Where there is an assumption of indefinite service as a TCR, there should be a constant requirement to disclose any and all potential conflicts of interest to disable the risk of “capture” by any stakeholder or interest.
We note that there is a financial burden placed on the TCR although they are volunteers and a system should be set in place that guarantees independence yet allows for ease in carrying out their duty. A fund should be managed externally that is independent that can cater for the expenses of the TCRs.There should be limitations on those who can contribute. Any funds or gifts being awarded to the TCR should be promptly and formally disclosed through appropriate avenues.
The At Large community is curious as to whether the TCR who resigned did so because of an inability to continue in his or her role due to arising conflict, lack of finances etc. The current size of the TCR pool needs to be expanded to ensure that there is sufficient participation in ceremonies as ICANN should account for the remote possibility of mass unavailability due to random unforeseen circumstances. There might be some merit in expanding the pool and retaining the TCRs whilst rotating them from within the pool.
