Section 8 - Enhance Constituencies

A case was put to us that the existing division of constituencies does not well serve “brands” that are, increasingly, acquiring their own TLDs in which they can be registries, registrars and business users, and within which policy rules may be different from open TLDs.

Suggest clarification:

A case was put to us that the existing GNSO Structure fails completely to serve “brands” that are, increasingly, acquiring their own brand registries. The business objective and internal policies of brand registries are radically different to the open registries around which the current GNSO was created. The charter of the Registry Stakeholder Groups does not allow for constituencies but a looser concept of Interest Groups.

Moreover, the arrival of brand registries challenges the very basis of the current GNSO structure with its division between users (the CSG and NCSG) and contract parties (RSG and RySG). A brand may well be simultaneously: a registry, a business user or a non-commercial user, and have intellectual property interests.

The changing environment drives a requirement for flexibility in policy-making and representative structures. An example of this is the interest of brands in new gTLDs – brand owners potentially become registries, registrars and users of domains, as well as maintaining their obvious interests in intellectual property.

In theory the current GNSO structure provides for the creation of new constituencies so that a wider range of views can be represented. 

Suggest clarification to paragraph2:

The current GNSO structure, which predates new types of TLDs, and the underlying charters of the stakeholder groups provides for the creation of new constituencies only in two of the four Stakeholder Groups (Commercial SG and the Non-Commercial SG). The charters of the Registry Stakeholder Group and the Registrar Stakeholder group do not allow for new constituencies.

I don’t think it is helpful to describe the cases described in testimony/allegations as “venal”.  The fact is, at least among civil society participants, that they are pitted against one another for funding in every field of activity, across the spectrum of development, human rights, free speech and political freedom, women’s education…you name it.  This has been well documented in my own field (privacy) by Colin Bennett, in his 2009 book The Privacy Advocates.  If ICANN is truly to become a leader in Internet governance through the multi-stakeholder model, it should recognize this fact, and take steps to remedy the situation through more funding, fair funding models, etc.  It is not helpful to pit one group against the other, and when this appears to be happening, significant, transparent efforts should be made to remedy the disagreements, including the scrupulous avoidance of manipulation (or the appearance of manipulation) by other stakeholders who could benefit from discord among the opposition ranks.  So far, I don’t think the approach that Westlake has taken to obtaining interviews (appears to be the squeaky wheel methodology) or citing allegations in this draft are helpful in this regard.

It would do much to establish trust if the SOI requirements were beefed up.  Who pays for volunteers to participate at ICANN?  I certainly would have no objection to greater transparency about funding issues regarding participation at ICANN, and I think it will be necessary if there is to be broader outreach to new countries and new groups.  I note that some speakers at the ICANN public forum are scrupulous about stating when they are representing the views of a client or stakeholder group, or views they are representing as advice to a client.  I regard this as a best practice, but it does not appear to be universal.

With respect to creating new groups and constituencies….it seems more sensible to get the existing groups working together better than to go out looking for more at this time.  Returning to funding for civil society….we do have a fair and transparent system for the limited funds available at the moment, so I am mystified as to where these comments are coming from. 

I agree that incumbency is a problem, but the idea of cutting off the “lifers” strikes me as shooting ourselves in the foot.  Furthermore, some of the folks who have been around for a long time are the best chairs.  As examples, I might select Chuck Gomes, Don Blumenthal and Steve Metalitz, who chair/co-chair PDPs I am on, and who in my view do an absolutely first-rate job of chairing.  Lets not move to get rid of veterans until we can be sure that we have well-trained, knowledgeable folks coming up in the ranks.  I would note in that context that Graeme Bunton, who co-chairs the PPSAI with Steve Metalitz, is a relative newcomer and is also doing a great job, doubtless assisted by working side by side with his colleagues.  This kind of mentoring is essential in my view.  The democratic process of selecting chairs appears to be working….and if it is not, lets have a look at improving it and providing for mentoring and “apprenticeship” rather than imposing arbitrary limits.  I for one would not be able to manage as many PDPs as a volunteer if the difficult task of chairing were not well managed.

In the recommendation that says constituency travel should be decided by ICANN, to whom individuals would have to prove their contributions would be valuable….how on earth would that be decided?  Constituencies should manage their own representation.  Don’t get ICANN staff involved in this.