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Comment Close
Date		Statement
Name 

Status

Assignee(s) and
RALO(s)

Call for
Comments		Call for
Comments
Close 		Vote
Announcement 		Vote OpenVote
Reminder		Vote CloseDate of SubmissionStaff Contact and EmailStatement Number
11.02.2014Review of Trusted Community Representation in Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing CeremoniesVoting
ステータス
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titleadopted
12Y, 0N, 0A		Salanieta Tamanikaiwaimaro (APRALO)31.01.201407.02.2013201411.02.201411.02.201416.02.201417.02.201418.02.2014Kim Davies
kim.davies@icann.org 		TBC

 

AL-ALAC-ST-0214-02-00-EN

For more information about this PC, please click here
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Comment / Reply Periods (*)
Comment Open Date: 21 January 2014
Comment Close Date: 11 February 2014 - 23:59 UTC
Reply Open Date: 12 February 2014
Reply Close Date: 4 March 2014 - 23:59 UTC
Important Information Links
Public Comment Announcement
To Submit Your Comments (Forum)
View Comments Submitted
Brief Overview
Originating Organization: 
ICANN Staff
Categories/Tags: 
  • Security/Stability
Purpose (Brief): 

Based on feedback from the current TCRs and our experience from the first 14 ceremonies, we are reviewing what changes, if any, should be made to the current model of Trusted Community Representative participation.

Current Status: 

Initial public consultation

Next Steps: 

Review consultation input

Staff Contact: 
Kim Davies
Email Staff Contact
Detailed Information
Section I: Description, Explanation, and Purpose: 

Based on feedback from the current TCRs and our experience from the first 14 ceremonies, we are reviewing[PDF, 321 KB] what changes, if any, should be made to the current model of Trusted Community Representative participation.

Section II: Background: 

Since July 2010, the DNS Root Zone has been secured using DNSSEC. The model of using DNSSEC in theDNS Root Zone revolves around a "key signing key" (KSK) that is managed by ICANN in two secure facilities. Four times a year, a ceremony is conducted at these facilities to perform operations involving the KSK. As a key part of this process, a minimum of three from a pool of 21 trusted community representatives (TCRs) attend each ceremony to enable access to the secure materials, to witness the procedure, and to attest that the ceremony was conducted properly.

Section III: Document and Resource Links: 
Section IV: Additional Information: 

N/A

(*) Comments submitted after the posted Close Date/Time are not guaranteed to be considered in any final summary, analysis, reporting, or decision-making that takes place once this period lapses.

FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED

The final version to be submitted, if the draft is ratified, will be placed here by upon completion of the vote. Please click here to download a copy of the PDF below.

PDF
nameAL-ALAC-ST-0214-02-00-EN.pdf

...

FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC

...

Background

The Affirmation of Commitment describes the Internet as a transformative technology that empowers people around the globe, spurs innovation, facilitates trade and commerce, and enables the free and unfettered flow of information[1]. One of the elements of the Internet's success is a highly decentralized network that enables and encourages decision-making at a local level. Notwithstanding this decentralization, global technical coordination of the Internet's underlying infrastructure - the Domain Name System[2] (DNS) - is required to ensure interoperability[3].

...

The other view is that there is a need for term limits as the original TCR mechanism is silent on the term. Given the Internet reaches an estimated 2.6 billion users all over the world, there should be enough candidates able to meet the criteria of being a TCR. The number of candidate or backup TCRs can also be increased. Regardless, where there is an assumption of indefinite service as a TCR, there should be a constant requirement to disclose any and all potential conflicts of interest to disable the risk of “capture” by any stakeholder or interest.  

...