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Blogs 

 

 

Most Recent Blog Update 


Authors:  Thomas Rickert, León Sanchez, Matheiu Weill Jari Arkko and Andrew Sullivan

Date:  14 21 October 2015

Original Link: httpshttp://www.icannietf.org/blog/news2015/blog10/ccwgstrange-accountabilitybut-co-chairs-statement-leading-into-icann54-familiar-in-dublin

CCWG-Accountability co-Chairs Statement Leading into ICANN54

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Strange but familiar in Dublin

Members and participants of the CCWG-Accountability are on their way to Dublin for a full week of intense work and engagement with other ICANN54 attendees. A list of the Enhancing ICANNAccountability-related meetings is available here.

As co-Chairs, we are grateful to the volunteers, support staff, advisors and independent counsel who put up a tremendous effort to prepare for these meetings. They deserve and have earned the community's greatest respect and the deepest recognition.

We are very pleased that the analysis of the 93 comments received in the 2nd Public Comment period is now complete. Work Parties (WPs) have produced summaries, analyzed the content of submissions and identified options for the group's consideration. You can find these essential inputs here.

In anticipation of the various meetings, we are providing a rough assessment of our progress through a Scorecard, which can be found below:

Report SectionSubtopicWP OwnerStatusRelationship with CWG-Stewardship Requirements
3.1. Revised mission, commitments & core valuesRefine wording of mission & core values based on public comment feedbackWP2To be refinedRepresents the standard of review for the IRP, which is a requirement from the CWG-Stewardship
3.1. Revised mission, commitments & core valuesHuman rights bylaw articleWP4To be considered 
4. "Fundamental Bylaws"ScopeWP2SupportedFundamental Bylaws are a requirement of the CWG-Stewardship
5.1. Independent Review Panel enhancements WP2To be refinedIRP is a requirement from the CWG-Stewardship
5.2. Reconsideration process Enhancements WP2To be refined 
6. Mechanism to represent the community (community council or other)Implementation model discussionWP1Some disagreementThe mechanism is necessary to provide for the powers required by CWG-Stewardship
6. Mechanism to represent the community (community council or other)Community ForumWP1To be refinedThe mechanism is necessary to provide for the powers required by CWG-Stewardship
6. Mechanism to represent the community (community council or other)Decision making mechanismsWP1Some disagreementThe mechanism is necessary to provide for the powers required by CWG-Stewardship
7.1. Reject Budget/strategyPC2 received some proposals to adjust. Also pending on community mechanism discussionsWP1To be consideredThe CWG-Stewardship requires community rights, regarding elaboration and approval of the budget, especially with relation to IANA
7.2. Reject Bylaw changeDetails are pending community mechanism discussionsWP1To be refined 
4.5. Approve "Fundamental Bylaw" changeDetails are pending community mechanism discussionsWP1To be refinedCWG-Stewadship requires fundamental Bylaws mechanisms to protect against future changes of accountability mechanisms
7.3. Individual Board Director removalPC2 received some proposals to adjust. Also pending on community mechanism discussionsWP1To be consideredCommunity rights, specifically to appoint/remove members, recall entire Board
7.4. Recall of theICANN BoardPC2 received some proposals to adjust. Also pending on community mechanism discussionsWP1To be consideredCommunity rights, specifically to appoint/remove members, recall entire Board
9. AoC reviews transcription into the BylawsRefine detailsWP1SupportedCWG-Stewardship requires an IANAFunction Review as a "Fundamental Bylaw"
10. Bylaw changes recommended after stress testsDiscuss ST 18 and refineST-WPSome disagreement 
10. Stress Tests (Based on WA 4 and ST-WP work)Some comments received on ST 29 & 30ST-WPTo be refined 
11. Items for consideration in Work stream 2Scope to be defined versus continuous improvement itemsCo-chairsTo be considered 
8.3. SO/ACAccountabilityConsider SO/ACAccountabilityWP3To be refined 
12. Implementation Plan including Timing Co-chairsTo be refinedReviewed draft started

Download a PDF of this Scorecard here.

A significant number of items have a status of "To be refined," but we are confident that these refinements can be provided shortly to meet stakeholder expectations. Our hope is that many of these will turn into a "Supported" status by the end of the Dublin meeting.

Areas where more work is needed to reach consensus are in orange and red. Several of these items are related to community powers and have received broad support in principle. However, the implementation model for these powers remains a fundamental discussion. Until a solution is found that does not raise any significant level of objection, these issues cannot be finalized.

There have been significant discussions in the last few weeks, on the mailing list as well as during theface-to-face meeting in Los Angeles. These discussions were useful to better understand the various perspectives and the areas where views were diverging.

As co-Chairs, we would describe these discussions as follows:

  • Views in the community differ on the level of enforceability that is Strictly required for the community powers, in light of the CWG-Stewardship conditions (beginning at paragraph 106).
  • The CCWG-Accountability has requested legal input to provide more details on the practical differences in terms of complexity, delay or cost associated to the various levels of enforceability.
  • Significant concerns were raised regarding the weight of the various SOs and ACs in the community mechanism, as well as the ability to opt-in or opt-out of this system. Alternative decision making mechanisms, such as consensus or rough consensus, are being investigated.
  • The requirement of SO and AC accountability to the global Internet community as a whole has been a key theme of the comments received, although few concrete suggestions are offered (see WP3 documents)
  • A 2-phase scenario to implement community empowerment is being investigated, which could help accommodate some of the concerns related to the significance of the changes proposed by the CCWG-Accountability 2nd Draft Report.

The CCWG-Accountability is fully mobilized and committed to make great strides during the Dublin meeting. We are aware that the finalization of our recommendations is the last missing piece in the IANAStewardship Transition puzzle and we take this responsibility very seriously. We will welcome in Dublin all contributions to this bottom-up, multistakeholder, consensus driven process.

All hands on deck! Looking forward to a productive week in Dublin!

We’re both at ICANN 54 in Dublin, and of course a big topic is the IANA transition. At this meeting most of the focus is on ICANN accountability changes. Those are important for us because the IANA stewardship transition plan for the names community depends on those accountability changes. People want to make sure that ICANN (the organization) complies with the community’s will. Since we think that’s what it means to be a bottom-up organization, it seems like a natural reform to us and one the ICANN community deserves.

There are disagreements about the specific ways to do this, and people also recognize the risk of accidentally creating new issues when making a change. The amount of progress we’ve seen during the meeting is impressive, however. The feelings here are at once familiar and strange — the exact ways people hammer out consensus in ICANN are not the way we do things in the IETF, but seeing hard positions start to converge is for sure something we understand. One thing we’re noticing is people embracing practical power that rests with the community rather than mere legal enforcement by courts. We think that’s positive for three reasons. First, it hands the power directly to the people who need it instead of giving them indirect means to achieve it. Second, it seems to represent lower risk to IANA: lengthy legal proceedings would be bad operationally. Finally, this mode of operation has always worked for the IETF.

We care about the overall stability of Internet systems and organizations, but a current big interest in this is due to the IANA transition. If the different operational communities can’t together make this transition happen, we’ll have to face bad options. We will lose some of the confidence people have in the Internet community. The transition was part of the promise at the foundation of ICANN, and the promise has come due.

We really appreciate the hard work people are doing on these accountability changes. We are very happy with the progress that has already been made this week. The key to completing this process is to focus on the practical ways to put the appropriate and sufficient power in the community hands.

Jari Arkko, IETF Chair and Andrew Sullivan, IAB Chair (representing our personal opinions in this post)

This entry was posted in IETF on 2015/10/21 by Jari Arkko.

CCWG-Accountability co-Chairs
Thomas Rickert
León Sanchez
Matheiu Weill