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Most Recent Blog Update 

Author:  John Poole Jordan Carter

Date:  01 9 October 2015

Original Link:  http://www.domainmondo.com/2015/10/iana-transition-icann-accountability.html

This post shares a referenced chronology of recent accountability-related milestones in the ICANN environment, and offers some thoughts about the stakes at ICANN's Dublin meeting next week.

You’ve probably had an experience in your life of being part of a difficult or complicated project – sometimes things go into a blur, or after months or years you find it hard to remember the order of significant events.

Well, the debate regarding ICANN’s accountability is nothing if not complicated (not to say difficult!). I’ve been a participant in it as a member of the Working Group representing country-code domains since December 2014, and even over not quite a year, things get a bit blurry.

To help me, and possibly you, I decided to pull together a short chronology of some of the key milestones. Dates of proposals, significant moments in the project, and so on.

You can review (and critique) the chronology here:

.pdf
.docx

I didn’t expect that seeing this story in one short place would trigger some new insights, or remind me of some old ones, but it did. Here are some of them:

  • Astonishing progress: since the end of last year, and the demise of ICANN’s resistance to a community-led accountability process, the Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) has made huge progress. It assessed previous suggested accountability mechanisms; built requirements for a new settlement; devised models that could deliver; took feedback in good faith and worked together to overcome problems exposed in public debate. The Second Draft Proposal of the group is workable, though it does not enjoy consensus in the ICANN community yet.
  • Consistent resistance and delay: the powers-that-be at ICANN have resisted community-driven accountability reforms throughout this process. The multi-month delay to establishing the CCWG speaks volumes. The group’s work would have concluded next week in Dublin if we’d had the few more months back in 2014. I say that not to lament it, but to make it clear where responsibility lies for the current time pressure. Hint: the CCWG isn’t responsible.
  • The rightness of multistakeholderism: the community has followed a true multistakeholder process. Compromise, diligence, thoroughness and a willingness to compromise and think outside the box – all these have been central to the work of the group. That work process is hard to maintain and has been seriously challenged by the ICANN Board alleging a right to insert “red lines” into part of the debate – on the critical matters of enforcement. Those interventions place the credibility of the multistakeholder process at risk. In doing so, the ICANN Board isn’t only putting the accountability reform process under pressure it doesn’t need, it is delaying the group’s ability to complete its task (others have more forceful views - see the note by William Currie, an Advisor to the CCWG appointed by the Public Experts Group last year, here). The follow on consequence: the IANA Stewardship transition itself is delayed, a consequence only a very few people would celebrate (and I am not one of them). 
  • Proof of need: looking over the short history of the current debate gives ample evidence of why the reforms demanded by the community are required.  Without the spur provided by the IANA Stewardship transition, this opportunity would never have opened up. We should be grateful to the Obama administration for the chance provided to build a long term, responsible framework for ICANN accountability.
  • Some welcome flexibility: a year ago, if you’d thought you would hear ICANN saying it would welcome binding arbitration, the ability to remove Board directors, a community right of veto in bylaws changes – many would have stared at you and laughed. If you’d suggested a community group working in open multistakeholder ways could deliver a work output the quality the CCWG has matched, the same stares and laughs. But both have happened. Things have moved.

Everyone involved with or watching this process will have different insights, or may agree happily or disagree sharply with mine. I offer them up in public as part of my own commitment to accountability: it is reasonable for people involved in the conversation to share their thinking. In any case, my own thought processes work best with dialogue – not with solitude.

ICANN is on the verge of historic, meaningful and positive reform. The Numbers and Protocols communities, watching this process through gritted teeth and very keen for the transition to go ahead, can hopefully celebrate what is happening. With ICANN having a curious dual role for the Names community (policy forum and IANA functions operator), there has been no alternative to making accountability improvements now.

(To my technical community friends - if there’s any doubt in your mind about why we need change – review the chronology, remember the pushback, remember what you guys faced early this year.)

We’re all close to the end of the debate. You can sense it – proposals are crystallising, timeframes are compressing, volunteers are at the end of reasonable commitments of time and energy.

The imperatives now are to see things through: to stick with the multistakeholder process that listens to all perspectives but gives nobody a right of veto; the accountability framework the community requires to accept the transition going ahead; and the changes to ICANN’s culture that will flow from a new accountability settlement. 

Dublin is a week away. The elephant in the room (the CCWG’s proposal and the ICANN Board’s counterproposal for the way to crystallise accountability powers) will need to be resolved, or eaten, or thrown in the ocean.

My preference is of course for the product of the multistakeholder process, the model the CCWG has developed in public and with the involvement of all stakeholders. But unlike some others, I am not proclaiming bottom lines on any of the “how” – it is the “what,” the requirements and ability to meet them, that matter. 

The “what” is ensuring the Internet community, able to organise through ICANN’s open groupings, can hold a corporation with hundreds of staff, hundreds of millions of dollars, tight links with the American government, a monopoly ability to extract rents from the domain name industry, and a natural institutional desire to be as free of restraint as it can – can hold all that to account, given the huge imbalance of power, knowledge, resources that tilt the playing field of accountability entirely in ICANN’s favour.

Beyond the "elephant," there are lots of other details that need to be sorted out.  It all matters – NTIA have been clear the proposal has to be bullet proof.

In the end though, if there isn’t an accountability settlement that achieves consensus, then there isn’t going to be a proposal bullet proof or not.

No accountability proposal – no IANA Stewardship Transition proposal. No transition proposal – no transition.

No transition? All those risks the transition is designed to head off come back to life. And the multistakeholder approach discredited to boot.

Those are the stakes on the table as we head to Dublin.

Two final thoughts: where there’s a will there’s a way. And as an old high-school teacher used to say to me, “not easy, not optional.”

 


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IANA Transition, ICANN Accountability, "Has Always Been About POWER"

"... At least the USG (US government) offers some accountability. ICANN's primary active stakeholders are businesses making money off the DNS; most users are too busy elsewhere to pay much attention..."--Esther Dyson, ICANN's founding Chairman, Sept 22, 2015
"Sole Member given reserved power under Bylaws to override Board decision directly, regardless of Board fiduciary duties." - Legal counsel for CCWG-Accountability (pdf) opinion on 2nd draft
"WS1 has always been about power"--Jonathan Zuck, CCWG-Accountability participant, infra The biggest problem that the global multistakeholder community (a/k/a the global internet community which is a lot larger and broader than just ICANN's relatively small "stakeholder community"), has right now is that so many members and participants comprising the CCWG-Accountability are engrossed in their own groupthink that they apparently have not taken the time to actually read and analyze all the public comments to their own "fundamentally flawed2nd Draft Report which is supported overall by only 19 out of 90+ comments. If you read the CCWG mail list regularly, you will discover that many, if not most, CCWG members are actually operating under the delusion that the global multistakeholder community supports their proposed "power grab." 
Indicative of this state of "denial" or what might be called ignorant arrogance among CCWG-accountability members and participants are the remarks made on the CCWG public mail list byPhilip Corwin, who represents a group known as the "Internet Commerce Association," of which major supporters include new gTLDs registry operator Donuts, and other domain name industry "players." Here's an excerpt from Corwin's response to Domain Mondo's post China (CAICT) Objects to ICANN CCWG Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal:
"If the CCWG Proposal is a "power grab" then it's the sorriest excuse for one I've ever seen. It is almost exclusively a proposal for greater defensive rights in reaction to ICANN Board/corporate actions, and would hardly put "vested self-interested special interests ("ICANN stakeholders" or "lobbyists")" in charge of the enterprise." -- Phil Corwin, September 25, 2015 
I suggest Mr. Corwin, (and all other CCWG members and participants), take the time to read carefully all the comments to the 2nd draft report and then take note of the following post on the CCWG mail list by the President of the Association for Competitive Technology (ACT), after which, hopefully, they might actually be more "informed and enlightened" and less consumed by their own "ignorant arrogance"--
"WS1 has always been about power and WS2 about implementation. WS1 was never going to be complete and, for that matter, WS2 won’t ever be complete either. That said, if we have the power to spill the board with relative ease, we can easily reconvene, flesh out the member model, submit it to the board and spill them if they aren’t constructive. We don’t need to worry about deadlines, the Congress, NTIA, etc. the whole point of WS1 is to ensure the capability to do just this." Jonathan Zuck, President of ACT and CCWG participant, September 29, 2015 (emphasis added)
Clearly and succinctly said Mr. Zuck! Sounds like a neat way to hijack or supplant ICANN Board authority and bypass any encumbering "fiduciary duties." The use of the word "constructive" above is clearly a euphemism for "submissive." It's all about the "power." The problem, as noted, is that the mostly profit-seeking, self-interested ICANN stakeholders, or "lobbyists," do not have the ICANN Board of Directors' fiduciary duties to the global internet communitynor the fiduciary duty to operate in the "global public interest." By their own self-admission, most ICANN stakeholders are self-seeking, self-interested, profit-making individuals and enterprises, who are primarily interested in their own "agendas" not what is in the "global public interest." That job is usually left to either governments, trustees, or a carefully selected Board of Directors held tofiduciary standards. While ICANN stakeholders should have input into ICANN policy-making, (and I know this may come as a "shock" to some of those stakeholders), they are hardly"infallible." Of course, directors, even though held to fiduciary standards, can still, from time to time, "fail," which is why "enhanced ICANN accountability," in the absence of US government oversight, needs to have "means or methods" whereby any member of the global internet community can seek redress of a Board decision, action, or adopted ICANN policy, which violates ICANN's articles, bylaws, or the Board's fiduciary duties to the global multistakeholder community and the global public interest. The ICANN Board says they agree and have offered suggested "means or methods" by which such redress can be provided. Other accountability "enhancements" or requirements, including, for example, transparency (e.g., record requests etc.), can easily be provided to any member of the global internet community by having appropriate provisions in ICANN's bylaws, none of which requires implementation of the proposed Single Member Model (SMM or CMSM) which, understandably, the ICANN Board does not support.
-- John Poole, Editor, Domain Mondo