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1. Mechanisms giving the ICANN community ultimate authority over the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS1, since community Members need the leverage of IANA transition to obtain these Bylaws changes. | |||
Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts | Supported by | WS | ATRT [2] |
Community Members as ultimate authority[1]. Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize permanent cross-community Members (ALAC, ccNSO, GAC, SSAC, NRO, RSSAC, IETF, ASO, and each Constituency) with authority in these specific areas: | GNSO Joint Statement, BC, ITIC, B.Carpenter, CNNIC, Siva, TPI, Verizon, NCSG, Just Net, E.Morris, Izumi | WS1 | - |
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams | BC, Spain, Avri Doria | WS1 | |
Review any board decision. Non-approval would send decision back to bottom-up policy development process. | BC, ITIC, Heritage, SIIA, EC, C. Gutiérrez | WS1 | - |
[Alt:] Refer any board decision to an independent review panel. The CWG believes this should be binding for IANA functions. | BC, ITIC, Heritage, SIIA, EC, Mueller, CWG | WS1 | (ATRT2 9.2) |
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 majority | BC, ITIC, SIIA, Hutty | WS1 | - |
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget [vote threshold?] | BC, ITIC, USCIB | WS1 | - |
Recall one or all ICANN Board members [vote threshold?] | BC, Avri Doria, NCSG | WS1 | - |
Bring the Affirmation of Commitments (incl the Reviews) into the ICANN bylaws, with these amendments: | BC, USCIB, SIIA, Verizon, Morris | WS1 | - |
Affirmation Review Teams get access to all internal documents | Doria, MPAA, CIS, Morris | WS2 | |
Affirmation Accountability & Transparency Review Team could recommend sunset of original reviews and create new reviews | BC, USCIB | WS2 | |
Change Affirmation reviews from “in the public interest” to “for protection and advance of human rights and internet freedoms” | NCSG, Robin Gross [Opposition noted] | WS2 | - |
Change bylaws for Reconsideration Process: trigger when board acts arbitrarily or capriciously; make decisions subject to Independent Review | WS1 | - | |
Create a contract between ICANN and Registries & Registrars, with Registrants as 3rd party beneficiaries. Contract lets ICANN impose rules on others only when supported by consensus of affected parties. Disputes go to independent arbitration panel that could issue binding decisions. | David Johnson | WS1 | - |
Replace Affirmation with accountability contract between ICANN and ‘Contract Co.’ | Guru Acharya | WS1
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Independent certification for delegation & re-delegation requests | CWG | WS1 | - |
Independent Appeals Panel for contested root zone changes & WHOIS | CWG | WS1 | - |
2. Mechanisms to restrict actions of the board and management of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above). | |||
Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts | Supported by | WS | ATRT Ref. |
Require supermajority for Board to approve action despite advice to the contrary from ACs or significant subsets of SOs. Izumi believes this will take timeand Athina believe that this should be considered properly with all stakeholders and not done in a rush, so should be in WS2. | ISPCP, ITIC, Izumi | WS1 | - |
Ensure that the ICANN Board can be held to its Bylaws, with effective remedy if breach found by independent adjudicator [Alt: found by the community]. | Malcolm Hutty, Seun Ojedeji | WS1 | |
Prevent ICANN Board redefining mission/scope in Bylaws without community consensus | Malcolm Hutty | WS1 | - |
Ensure ICANN Board does not act "ultra vires", and stays within assigned mission and scope. e.g., prevent scope creep in policies imposed via RAA. | Malcolm Hutty, BC, TPI | WS1 | |
Prohibit ICANN from entering agreements that impose obligations unrelated to DNS management | Heritage | WS2 | - |
Require supermajority board vote and 2/3 community vote to change ICANN not-for-profit status or change ICANN’s state of incorporation | USCIB, Verizon, SIIA [opposition noted] | WS2 | - |
Before leaving California, ICANN must show benefits exceed costs | SIIA, USCIB | WS2 | - |
Broadly expand grounds on which ICANN decisions and operations can be challenged; lower threshold to succeed in a challenge | Spain, Heritage | WS2 | |
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3. Mechanisms to prescribe actions of the ICANN corporation. Most of these are initially designated as WS2, since the Members could reverse board or management decisions if Members are empowered in WS1 (above). For example, a bottom-up consensus process to change ICANN bylaws might be rejected by ICANN board, but the Members could then reverse that decision and force the change. | |||
Accountability Suggestions from public comments and posts | Supported by | WS | |
Require a defined notion of consensus for any GAC advice that would need to be given deference by the ICANN board. Izumi believes this will take timeand Athina believe that this should be considered properly with all stakeholders and not done in a rush, so should be in WS2. | Heritage, Izumi, BC Stress Test #6 | WS1 | |
Let local courts hear complaints on free expression, security, and privacy | NCSG [opposition noted] | WS2 | - |
Establish an independent inspector general for ICANN | SIIA | WS2 | - |
Commit the ICANN organization to maintain freedom of expression | Heritage, NCSG | WS2 | - |
Require registry and registrar agreements be equitable and non-discriminatory | ITIC, Heritage | WS1 | - |
Require supermajority of board to [increase] change registry or registrar fees [Members could reverse] | Heritage | WS1 | - |
Create channels for inquiry/complaint/suggestions | Internet Society of China | WS2 | (ATRT2 9.3) |
Recall mechanism for any board member selected by an AC/SO | Avri Doria | WS2 | - |
Recall mechanism for SO Council and ALAC member selected by NomCom | Avri Doria | WS2 | - |
ICANN to engage with all governments as equal community stakeholders | Fiona Asonga | WS2 | - |
Allow GAC to select 2-4 voting ICANN board members | Spain [opposition noted] | WS2 | - |
Give Ombudsman ability to refer a matter to external body | NCSG [opposition noted] | WS2 | |
Change bylaws to establish term limits for ICANN senior officers | Heritage | WS2 | - |
Change bylaws to require that ICANN remain subject to US Law. Izumi notes [Izumi and Athina suggest not to restrict this to US Law but to make any changes subject to community's decision. They also believe that this should be in WS2] | Heritage [opposition noted] | WS1 | - |
Explore incorporation as international org under international law | NRO [opposition noted] | WS2 | - |
Limit ICANN executive function to implementation of policies | ITIC, Siva | WS1 | - |
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