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BARCELONA – SSR2 Face to Face Meeting – Day 2 (2 of 2)

Wednesday, October 24, 2018 – 13:30 to 18:30 CEST

ICANN63 | Barcelona, Spain

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Everybody, welcome back to the Day 2 SSR2 Face-to-Face meeting in Barcelona. This is the afternoon session. I'm just going to hand it over to the CCT Review Team members. I guess we'll do a quick run through.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Sounds good. [inaudible].

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Sorry. Jean-Baptiste, [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Russ Housley.

ALAIN AINA: Alain Aina.

DENISE MICHEL: Denise Michel.

NORM RITCHIE: Norm Ritchie.

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**Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.**

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DREW BAGLEY: Drew Bagley.

DAVID TAYLOR: David Taylor.

CALVIN BROWN: Calvin Brown.

JONATHAN ZUCK: I don't know if I can out-mumble you guys, but Jonathan Zuck from Innovator's Network.

ZARKO KECIC: Zarko Kecic.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Okay. Over to you guys.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks for having us. We're going to have Drew, who focused on the areas of most interest to you, [inaudible] parts of the report and we're just here for [core] commentary. So, Drew.

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DREW BAGLEY: And moral support.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Exactly.

DREW BAGLEY: Thank you, guys, so much for inviting us. There were several areas in the process of us going through when our mandate was and then all of the research that came out of that, that we believe would be relative to you. Next slide, please.

So, we have several recommendations. It's a very long report, if you've seen it. However, there are a few targeted areas that I highly recommend that you guys, that we look at the recommendations for. And in particular, with the DNS abuse section of our report, I think it would be worthwhile for you to look at the data and analysis that came out of our work there as you're looking at the equities for security and stability with the newer mandate.

Some of the other recommendations – and I'll get into them in a few slides – in addition to the DNS abuse that may be relevant for your work are general recommendations to the ICANN board requiring or recommending to them that they actually require data to be collected and released to the community for data-driven policy outcomes, some of that being directly related to security. Next slide, please.

And for last slide please, I'm going to try to note update it. Oh, I think the bullet point didn't show up.

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So, of these, you see there are several recommendations. There's only one directed directly to SSR2 and that's recommendation 16. However, there are about four that are still highly relevant and then in this PowerPoint, there are several others that are potentially relevant. So, instead of doing death by PowerPoint, I'm only going to go over the DNS abuse slide. But then I think this PDF should be shared with the whole group afterwards, so that way you can kind of skim through and see if there's anything that you think might be relevant to something that you guys are discovering or even mulling over for your own recommendations. Next slide, please.

Oh, this is the wrong ... It could be the wrong PowerPoint. Is this the one I sent back to you?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: I think so.

DREW BAGLEY: Because mine went back in ... Okay. Sorry about that. Let me send it again because I think this is the unabridged version that just has every single recommendation. I cut out ... This is death by PowerPoint. Let me save you from death by PowerPoint. I'm going to send [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Okay. So ...

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DREW BAGLEY: It looks like I did send the ...

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: The right one. [inaudible] so that's my bad.

DREW BAGLEY: Oh, got it. So, the general findings that we found with regards to DNS abuse were that, in fact, with the new gTLD program, despite the introduction of new safeguards that were intended to prevent many types of DNS abuse as well as just broader security and stability issues, there still were nonetheless higher occurrences of DNS abuse in certain concentrated TLDs as well as with certain operators, registrars, registry operators as well as registrars both in the new gTLD program as well as a continuation in the legacy TLDs.

So, with that, what we did with our analysis was we looked at each of the safeguards, the degree to which they were implemented or not and then what we saw as the shortcomings.

So, these issues for what we focus on also affected something bigger which was with regard to consumer trust. So, through survey data that we had conducted at the very beginning of our review through Nielson, we saw a strong correlation between Internet users expectations and what they believed was necessary for them to have trust and what was perhaps intended by some of the safeguards but not quite met. So, that's how [inaudible].

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Oh, sorry, so here's the slide I was going to go over. There's 35 total recommendations. It's important to note that our group did reach full consensus. There were no minority statements on anything, so what you see with these recommendations is [inaudible]. The breakdown the same is the PowerPoint we were just looking at as far as what's data driven and which ones are safeguard focused, but if you look, there's 15 safeguard focused ones. Next slide, please.

This is pretty much a summary of what I was saying as far as some of the things we've looked at. A lot of what we looked at, too, that might be relevant to you, since our mandate was of course focused on new gTLD programs but because our research did a comparative analysis of legacy gTLDs, the research study itself that we commissioned would likely be a relevant resource for you. It's abbreviated [SADAG] but it's the Statistical Abuse ... We call it the DNS Abuse Study. I don't remember what the acronym stands for but it's a very academic acronym, so Eric will like it.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

I like it.

DREW BAGLEY:

Some of the other areas where we saw some overlap, if there's naturally an overlap, trademark infringement and DNS abuse, because the use of trademarks to do phishing, we saw that with this data was something that was common when we were looking at potential issues that still persisted and potential ways to solve them. Next slide, please.

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This is just the summary of the safeguards that we implemented as part of the program that were related more broadly to security and then some of it directly to DNS abuse. So, these are all the safeguards that we looked at. So, if you look at the DNS abuse chapter, you can see that analysis that might be helpful for you guys. Next slide, please.

This is the – oh, here it is – the Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in gTLDs study. So, that’s the report that was issued and we put it out for public comment on its own a year ago and that’s something that, amongst our recommendations, we think that this should just be the beginning of data collection like this and if we go to the next slide, please.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

That was pre-GDPR.

DREW BAGLEY:

Pre-GDPR, exactly. WHOIS. But we think that’s something that should be an ongoing effort by ICANN whether it’s put out for RFP or whether it’s through the use of DAR or some other way as far as ICANN creating a data scientist position or something. We think it’s very important to regularly have this data, see how policies are, see what the trends are and see where there needs to be course correction.

These are the overall findings from both our own analysis as well as the reliance upon the data in the report. So, you can see the general operating definition we use, because obviously, abuse on its own is a very broad concept that can include so many areas where there are not consensus. So, we focused on the security-related areas where there

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are consensus and the definition we came up with is also based off of cited work in our chapter in case that might be of use for you as you're trying to use some of the nomenclature that has consensus and some areas that might not.

With this breakdown, you can see that the expansion of the DNS as a whole was certainly not any sort of Armageddon for the DNS overall but there's certainly, despite the safeguards, where TLDs for which abuse is completely rampant, operators for which the way of registering domain names even really tends to lend towards being very friendly to abuse by allowing people to register 2000 domain names at once that are randomly generated and other sorts of things. So, that's in this research, too, that might be helpful for you.

The big takeaway was that abuse is certainly not universal, but it's also not random and we really did see that there are solvable problems and strong correlations. Yeah, Eric?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Drew, sorry. I don't mean to interrupt, but did you want to take questions in the middle?

DREW BAGLEY: Either way is fine. I'm fine with either.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: If I could just ask real quick, a couple comments. So, abuse is neither universal and random. Abuse rates strongly correlate with registration



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restriction posed by [inaudible] registration prices. Did you have any price data that you ...

DREW BAGLEY:

So, we only had anecdotal evidence of that because there is no body of discounts and price data collected over time reflecting all the different promotions, unfortunately. So, that's another thing that we hope for the future as this research is repeated and we'll get to the [inaudible] on that is that price would be looked at.

We still, nonetheless, came up with suggestions to mitigate the concept that a free and open Internet invariably is going to have TLDs with open registration policies and perhaps low prices but that's not to say you couldn't have other proactive anti-abuse measures in place to make it that. Next slide, please.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Cool. Thank you.

DREW BAGLEY:

Great question. So, this is the recommendation directed specifically to SSR2. It's basically what I've been talking about with regards to making data collection ongoing but that it should be not only ongoing but more granular, especially with what you suggested, Eric, as well as getting really granular all of the overlap holistically, not just focused on the new gTLD program but even more broadly to measure the new gTLD safeguards before we have another round, figure out in a more nuanced

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way exactly how this relationship really works when you include all variables with the operators because we included as many variables as we had data for, but price with discounts would be another one where I think you could draw even more granular distinctions like to what's working and what's not.

Then, the second part of this recommendation that's directed to you is that upon identifying this abuse phenomena, in a more specific way, ICANN should actually put in place some sort of action plan to respond to what's found and actually remedy the problems instead of it merely being data that's out there and is interesting but no action taken. So, that's part of our overall approach to even things unrelated to SSR2 but with competition in other areas where we're really calling on ICANN to be much more data driven in policy making.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Does the review team have any insight into why there's been such a huge delay in putting the DAR report into the public domain and maintaining a much more robust and reliable and useful abuse reporting system?

DREW BAGLEY: I don't think we have any more insight than you guys would as far as that. We only suggested DAR because it came to exist during the time in which we were working on this. We saw this as a potential future data repository that could be used for that public reporting, but then, like what I'm sure you've been told, we were told that due to the contract

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with the vendor and other ways in which the data was collected, they're [inaudible] shared publicly. So, I don't know the degree to which that's been worked out. But we certainly, whether it's DAR or whether it's ICANN, getting the data from elsewhere through RFPs like we did, we think it's very important that data like this is regularly generated and released.

And going forward with our report, it was a much more comprehensive that the [inaudible] much more comprehensive longer one to do because it needed to be historical. But if we're only measuring the [delta] going forward and doing these things regularly, then it wouldn't have to be an expensive or cumbersome thing because that was even part of the feedback from ICANN Org when we put out our draft recommendations whether this could potentially be expensive. But our intention would be for this to be regular and shorter snapshots, so it wouldn't have to be a complete repeat of the study we did.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Right.

DREW BAGLEY: Next slide, please.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Can I ask another quick question?

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DREW BAGLEY: Sure.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: ICANN has said that their OCTO SSR staff does not need to access the non-public WHOIS records to do any aspects of their job. Did you have an opportunity to address what ICANN Org’s responsibilities are in terms of understanding, collecting, analyzing the abuse-related data in the space they’re responsible for coordinating?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. Funny you ask that. That’s a [inaudible] question. The recommendations that weren’t directed to you but that we [inaudible] that we think are relevant that are in the subsequent slides actually go directly into that because what we found was that you had a multitude of issues where the safeguard [inaudible] obviously were not enough to prevent abuse and the abuse that the community itself identified as one of the fears with having an expansion to the DNS.

Then, on top of that, ICANN’s current enforcement ability where [inaudible] essentially what you can have enforcement for in the contract as well as the means by which complaints are one domain at a time – I mean, you could have a group, but nonetheless, you’re not looking at things systematically – we’ve found that both of those were issues that needed to be addressed in order to prevent abuse.

So, in the subsequent recommendations, I’ll point out, we did make a recommendation to the board to further empower ICANN compliance to be able to be more proactive in going after operators engaged in

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systemic abuse as well as the ways in which – and we suggest in a more open way potential other mechanisms that could exist for [inaudible].

JONATHAN ZUCK:

I guess I'll also address your question about data gathering. We got periodic feedback from a board caucus committee that was established specifically to interact with CCT. One piece of that feedback was to be very cautious about the specificity of recommendations, because under the new bylaws, it's an up or down vote on them, whether they can't modify them in their acceptance. So, they were concerned because we were initially being overly prescriptive in how data would be gathered or from whom. There were instances in which we said – we, in our recommendations explicitly said make amendments to the contracts to be able to collect data X, Y, and Z and we got a lot of pushback on that. So, we reformed a lot of our recommendations to get this data by any means necessary and sort of leaving it up to ICANN Org to figure out what the best way to get that is.

So, it doesn't speak specifically to this issue about whether or not they need confidential [abuse] data. It may mean that they're going to have to go through an outside source. I think they were just concerned that they didn't know what world they'd be living in and they pushed back on us being too specific in how the recommendations were implemented.

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UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Which makes it challenging, I imagine, in some ways potentially to hold them accountable for the implementation.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Super challenging. Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Okay.

DREW BAGLEY: Next slide, please. So, you can see here the other groups that we directed this recommendation to in addition to SSR2. [inaudible]. Next slide, please.

So, these are the recommendations that are more broadly related to DNS abuse but are still highly relevant I think to informing [inaudible]. These touch upon both questions that have been asked so far.

So, this one is for the board to consider directing ICANN Org and its discussions with registries to negotiate amendments to the existing registry agreement and basically adopt provisions that would provide some sort of [inaudible] to adopt proactive anti-abuse practices. And as we point out, we think financial incentives should be included. We're not being prescribed to say it should be financial incentives, but as far as what should actually be considered, I think potential carrot and stick approach to this, we think that perhaps some sort of financial incentives in what we had discussed internally was maybe fee discounts for those who adopt a certain threshold of best practices or

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even if there are certain ... The way it's done is somehow by setting certain abuse [inaudible] some sort of metrics. We're not being overly prescriptive on that, but we do think it's very important to incentivize this, particularly with what I was saying earlier with regard to low price.

If we're going to live in a world where we're going to have low prices and open TLDs, then we thought that this might be a proper way to counter-balance the issues that naturally come with that by nevertheless getting operators to use proactive abuse.

We also cite in our report some examples of some methods currently used. So, one of the examples we cited – and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think we cited [EurID] and what they've adopted as far as proactive anti-abuse measures with dot-EU as well as citing guidance from M3AAWG about best practices and there's other stuff in the report that we cited for that, so that we're hoping that that could also kind of inform some of those discussions. Next slide, please.

As you guys will have fun with your recommendations, you can see the recommendations themselves get really long when you do the rationalizing all this stuff. Next slide, please.

So, this slide ... The first part was the carrot and then this slide is certainly much more to the stick. We think that it's very important for the actual means for enforcement to be improved as well as a consideration, if necessary, of another mechanism to do that.

So, what we suggested was that the contracts for both the registrars with ICANN as well as the registries should be renegotiated to bring into

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effect thresholds of abuse that are not permitted. That way, if a ... And as that's defined – and we included also, and I'll get to that in a moment in a subsequent slide, but we included recommendations on what those thresholds should be. We didn't put it in the recommendation itself. We put it in the details. [inaudible] community something different, then they can look to what we stated for guidance but we're not being overly prescriptive with that.

But if you have thresholds in place whereby an operator is not allowed to be associated with abuse levels that are higher than a certain amount, then that is going to also incentivize proactive anti-abuse measures and a model by which operators are going to have more ownership over the abuse in their realm.

So, then, if that number was exceeded, that threshold, then that's where ICANN compliance could launch an enforcement action, an investigation or enforcement action.

Alternatively, we also identified that there may be areas, particularly because of how complex DNS security abuse is now, whereby ICANN compliance may not be the best suited means of addressing some sort of abuse. For that, we suggested that the ICANN board consider creating a DNS abuse dispute resolution policy. This would work like other dispute policy mechanisms whereby we think that if this path is chosen and for what it was chosen for – because we had many discussions and the consensus in our group on this was really depending upon it not being used merely for [inaudible] shopping. But we think where it would be appropriate that it would be something that



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would also incentivize good behavior by merely existing even if it was never used. Then, if it was used, it would provide an avenue whereby there could be the proper expertise and independent authority for decision-making with regard to this sort of systemic abuse that we saw from the DNS abuse report. Next slide, please.

You can see here in the rationale we put forth, we called out some of the actual abuse levels that were seen in the DNS abuse study itself. Granted, what you would need to of course account for are different spikes. There might be anomalies during the year and whatnot as you would create thresholds, but that's part of what the study did in its own methodology.

So, what we suggested was that nonetheless looking at these examples was a good way to see how many operators had more than 10% abuse and how acceptable that really should be for the community because even if it's hard to deal with legitimate compromised domain names, ICANN can certainly deal with this issue of systemic abuse.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: On the levels of abuse, did you have any discussion or views on what would be acceptable?

DREW BAGLEY: Yes. We have it in our footnotes. I don't want to mis-cite the levels we came up with. We did come up with two thresholds.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Read the document.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. Sadly. I want to save you guys from having to do that much reading because you guys have to do so much reading already on your own, but yes, in there we did and we came to consensus on that. That's why I don't want to misstate it. But, we did suggest that.

DAVID TAYLOR: And one of the things we stressed, which is in there, is the anti-abuse safeguards put in place as part of the new gTLD program did not address the problem. That is something we did feel quite strongly on. We started the CCT Review Team, certain levels of abuse, and we finished the CCT Review Team two-and-a-half years later and abuse is still there.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah. I recognize some of those [inaudible].

DREW BAGLEY: Next slide, please. Oh, here we go. We do have the threshold here. So, our threshold that we suggested was 3% or 30 total registrations, so if you're dealing with a very small TLD, whichever is higher.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's acceptable, [inaudible] these, phishing, spam.

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JONATHAN ZUCK: So, was that part of the methodology as well? Because the magic number thing might evolve over time, but if the way you derived it was part of a methodology, then we could apply it with new data, operationalize it. Is that part of the write-up anywhere?

DREW BAGLEY: No. We unfortunately base that off of what we were seeing in the DNS abuse study as some of the real-world levels and then understanding that there needed to be some sort of allowance for where an operator themselves was a victim or their end users were the victims. So, they were legitimately registered and it wasn't something where they were part of the systemic abuse. So, that's how we came up with that.

Certainly, looking at the data, but not to say that we could distinguish between in a way other than our own thinking with regards to policy in a quantifiable way between a 3% or 4% threshold, for example.

DAVID TAYLOR: I certainly wouldn't look at 3% as necessarily being acceptable. It was more the 3% is where we get an automatic generation. So, obviously, if it's at 1 or 2, there are still issues. You're looking at it. You're seeing what it is. But, at 3%, it's automatic and then at 10% it was presumed breach of agreement. So, the ones we've got there which you saw on the previous slide that got fines, etc., were 50%. They shouldn't ever get to that.

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DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. So, 3% is only triggering an investigation.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Then, it's 10% that then ... The presumption is against ....

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We downloaded the abuse report while we were talking and I was looking at the slides, so I was wondering [inaudible].

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. But either way, what we think is important is to have a two-tier threshold to some, whereby one is merely triggering investigation, so that alone gets us beyond the current world of a reactive approach, you wait until the abuse has happened. Someone files a complaint about that specific domain name. Maybe it's dealt with, maybe it's not. To one where, for the systemic abuse, you're having automatic triggers in place, which again, by creating these requirements alone is already going to, we believe, incentivize better behavior and then of course having it in place provides more safeguards to stop the furtherance of abuse and stop some of the operators we call out in the report from getting away with abuse for so long and that's precisely why we came up with and we set examples in the body of the text as far as operators who, for the better course of a year, had such absurdly high levels of abuse where most of the registrations were abusive and yet nothing was happening.

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[ERIC OSTERWEIL]: This seems to have really worked so far. Did you guys talk about [inaudible]? So, basically, once you cross a threshold, you have a much higher threshold you have to drop through in order to get back on the good side of things?

DREW BAGLEY: It's a great idea. It sounds really cool. It's probably something to pick up—

[ERIC OSTERWEIL]: Maybe you guys can do [sequel] recommendations. So, wherever we left off and you have better ideas ...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] the original.

JONATHAN ZUCK: [inaudible].

[ERIC OSTERWEIL]: [inaudible] recommendations, [inaudible] when you did that.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I echo that. That's really good stuff. Thank you for that. We [could] look at, perhaps, doing metrics based on number of registrants as opposed to number of domains.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's a great suggestion.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, [inaudible] 15,000 domains in one shot for spam run versus you have a whole bunch of bad actors.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's a great recommendation to the [prequel, sequel] and—

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, to go into the recommendation 16 directed to you about the type of data that needs to be ongoing. That's a great point for that, getting more granular in number of registrants would be a great [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] do that, right?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. That's right. Yeah. I think the more granular you could get with what the variables actually are, the better for pretty much all the policies we've discussed so far. I think that's a great idea. Next slide, please. This is just more details about the [financing] we've already discussed probably.

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DAVID TAYLOR:

Yeah. It's also the factors. So, registry, you can take into account certain things that we've got proactive anti-abuse measures, whether there's been [inaudible] itself. So, it's a quid pro quo [inaudible] so we can look at that. And I suppose [inaudible] [DADRP] you've got it there that the [DADRP] could serve as a significant deterrent to the whole idea of that thing to help minimize the abuse. It's very similar to the trademark [PDDRP] we put in place that's back in the IRC 2009 for trademark abuse. And it's been one of those things which – and we talk about and we said [PDDRP] exists. No one has used it. So, you could argue it's pointless, but you could also argue that it's been very useful and there's no TLD with over 10% of its zone file abusing trademarks. It just doesn't even get there. So, again, I'll look at this [inaudible] 50% of the domain names being malicious. It's quite staggering.

So, that's the [inaudible] in place of [PDDRP] [inaudible] suggest that with the community. It would empower the community to address it. It might be something which could be used as a deterrent and hopefully never used.

DREW BAGLEY:

Yeah. And that's in our general approach with a lot of these as we see a lot of what we're putting in place as incentivizing better behavior and then of course having ultimately some sort of safeguard in the event that that does not work to conduct enforcement. That would correct the problems.

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DAVID TAYLOR: I think that, just [inaudible] the last point there. We've actually directed [inaudible] points made there with referred case to the [DADRP]. Because again, one of the things we'd hear in the discussions which compliance couldn't do anything about it because the contract [inaudible] aimed at this. It wasn't right.

So, yes, we're fixing the contract. That's the goal. But it still may not be in a position. So, let's give compliance the right, if they wish, they could use the DADRP as well. So, [inaudible] open it up and put it out there for community discussion.

DREW BAGLEY: And part of that, to David's point, was to take away excuses. So, that's the way we framed it, too, is that if there's no reason for DADRP and ICANN compliance as the proper body, then we believe that these recommendations will help fix that issue. But, if the only issue comes about that there's consensus on the approach and everything else that ICANN compliance is unable or ill-suited for it, then that's why we suggested another mechanism that could serve in that place.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] this organization.

DREW BAGLEY: Next slide, please. You'll see with all of our recommendations, when you have a chance on your flight home to look at the report, put yourself to sleep, that each of the—



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JONATHAN ZUCK: [inaudible] flight over.

DREW BAGLEY: Each of them has success measures attached, too. I think already with the idea that I've heard, that's where I think that might be highly relevant for you guys to consider that and consider how to even improve upon that with what success would really look like with regard to your broader mandate with regard to security and stability. Next slide, please.

This was our final, I believe, DNS abuse specific recommendation. This is something that may already be in the works, but with the current processes, we wanted to make sure it certainly got done and that was to include [reseller] information in whether it's called a WHOIS record or whatever we end up having at the end of this year, but to make sure that information is there so that it's possible for both, even ICANN with this information collecting initiatives, as well as the community, as well as complainants and everyone to see the full chain of how a registration was actually made, so that you know who the reseller is, who the registrar is, and then the registry as well, because right now, it's too easy to have a bunch of abuse that's potentially associated with the registrar, when at the end of the day, it could just be one reseller who is engaging in this sort of systemic abuse and not the registrar.

So, especially as we are making these recommendations, the call for increase enforcement against registrars, we want to make sure there's

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more transparency and clarity with the chain of parties because we think that's going to also lead to better decision making and a better way of identifying in a more granular way where the problems are actually going to ...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Are you saying that ICANN should also [inaudible] contact up to the seller or make the registrar to disclose [inaudible]? Because right now there's no contractor relationship between ICANN and Verisign.

DREW BAGLEY: Right. So, we have not made any recommendations to call to change that one way or another and did not look into that, because we thought that rather than up-ending the current model, just that the lack of transparency are to registrars and their resellers was the issue we saw with the DNS abuse study itself and how it could only go so far and you couldn't really distinguish if a registrar itself was really fully engaged in some sort of methodology that was leading to these spikes in abuse or if it was merely one of their resellers.

So, I don't know the degree to which that's warranted or not. We certainly didn't look into that, but we have no reason to call for there to be a direct contractual relationship between ICANN and resellers.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You've had some feedback [inaudible] recommendations from registrars and registries so far. How are the registrars reacting?

DREW BAGLEY:

So, we've had both formal feedback through the public comments that came out with different parts of our report. We released our report in two different segments as drafts. We got feedback as well as official engagement sessions and then even just one-off comments that I think all of us have heard.

So, the reaction has actually been, I'd say, overall positive. I wouldn't say there's universal agreement with our recommendations, but overall positive towards it because the people who show up at the ICANN meetings tend to be the good actors that are more responsible with their policies and their enforcement with regard to things. So, some have actually seen this as a good way to distinguish good operators from bad operators in a way in which you actually do impose some sort of cost for being a bad operator that is not being responsible and not caring about the security and stability of the DNS.

So, I'd say, in that sense, there's certainly overall positive and widespread support for our general ideas, whether then with the specific calls for renegotiating contracts and whatnot, there naturally ... There always would be ambivalence towards that.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

[inaudible] also maybe disclosing the resellers, disclose their name as part of your ... It's something you don't want to do. It's your customer, right? So, you don't want to tell people who it is.

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DAVID TAYLOR: Some resellers wouldn't .... So, [inaudible] as well [inaudible] other ways of [inaudible] from one registrar to another.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm a huge fan of these recommendations.

JONATHAN ZUCK: I think there will be some pushback, just to be blunt. A lot of those folks are just looking to minimize complexity and thoughts, and as we [inaudible] GDPR negotiations, liability. So, anything that touches on that I think is a hot stove for them. But, at the same time, I think there's, as Drew mentioned, the good actors are interested in differentiating themselves from the bad actors and not being painted with a broad brush.

DENISE MICHEL: They should be. I mean, they should care. This is dragging down, in my opinion, [inaudible] and you have a relatively ... Based on the good work that you guys have done and the data that you've surfaced, it's a relatively small number of [inaudible] care of those [inaudible] go a long way towards cleaning up this arena.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. Next slide, please.

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DAVID TAYLOR:

You do see quite a marked difference in talking to different registry operators as to what they think about the DNS abuse and even some surprising registry operators really don't seem to care too much about it. It's really not their problem. And allowing it to go. And then other registry operators really say, "No, we don't want anything." I don't want to get into citing, but what [inaudible] any abuse, any trademark issues, anything, because they say we want the cleanest TLD. Okay, [inaudible] registrations. But still. It's principle. And you know when you meet the people, you talk to them, they don't want to have any abuse. They find it fundamentally wrong. Whereas other registries, I suppose as you get bigger and bigger, say we just don't want to look in the pot. You get that sort of thing. It seems to be acceptable in many circles that it's okay to have it [inaudible].

DREW BAGLEY:

Yeah. This is the second part of that recommendation. Next slide, please.

The rest of the recommendations are ones that are potentially relevant to your work and they're through different areas related to safeguards, as well as consumer trust. There may even be a few related to consumer choice that I put in the deck that are potentially related. But I think at least the data generated in those sections might be relevant. So, a good way for you to ... In addition to [inaudible] the report, memorizing it, [inaudible] maybe look at the excerpt of recommendations we put in this PowerPoint and see what might be related to some of the areas you're looking at and then you can go over to our chapter on it and then

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the resources we used. So, that way, [inaudible] some of the data that was created for our report can be data that can also be used for [inaudible], too. But we did look at, within our mandate, all sorts of things related to WHOIS accuracy as well as trademark issues. We looked at all sorts of data driven areas and areas [inaudible] for us to do our work, we saw gaps in the data that existed and other areas in which we just thought that better data could exist. So, I would encourage you to look through all of those.

But I promised I wouldn't do death by PowerPoint [inaudible] the rest of the CCT Review Team to chime in with anything else and scroll through this at your leisure.

DAVID TAYLOR:

I think you killed it. The only thing I'd add to that, which may well be my bad – I was just looking at this and I've just [inaudible]. Originally it was recommendation 17 and before that it was recommendation D. When it was recommendation D, it was addressed to the SSR2 and when it was recommendation 17, it was addressed to the [inaudible]. Then, it got [inaudible] which wasn't addressed. So, I think it was my bad because John-Baptiste just pointed out the degree [inaudible], but this was supposed to be directed to the SSR2. I don't know whether that makes any difference to you whether we need to fix that or [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL:

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DAVID TAYLOR: 15 is supposed to be addressed to you, as well as 16. So, it might be something we need to try and—

DREW BAGLEY: We'll just put your name first on this one.

DAVID TAYLOR: This one ... Well, no, they weren't first either on this one. They're always at the end. The final review.

JONATHAN ZUCK: A culmination of the recommendations.

DAVID TAYLOR: Because this is the one with the thresholds of abuse and already there you made a comment. I think your input is very good on this.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is currently in the comment space. In fact, [inaudible].

JONATHAN ZUCK: The board's comments [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] just had a comment and [inaudible] SSR2.

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DAVID TAYLOR: Yeah. And we can comment back and say yes.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, that's the [inaudible], if they want to reopen the report.

DENISE MICHEL: [inaudible] address it.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Usually, we would address it [inaudible] recommendations anyway.

DENISE MICHEL: Yes.

DAVID TAYLOR: Just to make sure you know that that one is supposed to be ... My bad, I think.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Was that David Taylor for the record?

DAVID TAYLOR: It was.

JONATHAN ZUCK: I thought it was [inaudible].



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DAVID TAYLOR: [inaudible] going back into one of our standard jokes, was it?

JONATHAN ZUCK: No, I was [inaudible] controversial recommendation. We just don't want to do anything to drag you guys down by referring [inaudible]. I think there will be pushback on [DADRP].

DENISE MICHEL: Pardon?

JONATHAN ZUCK: I think there will be pushback on [DADRP] from the [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL: I think there will be pushback on everything in here that is targeting a mitigation of abuse and in any way trying to surface information on abuse can [inaudible] provide any degree of responses for the responsibility for ICANN [inaudible]. I think this is a seminal report and extremely important. I hope it gets the attention I imagine it would have.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Any other questions? Anything else we need to address?

DENISE MICHEL: Are there any learnings on the data gathering and analysis of [inaudible]?

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JONATHAN ZUCK: What do you mean by learnings?

DENISE MICHEL: So, things you missed, things you wished you had done differently [inaudible], a type of data gathering and analysis.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yeah. We have this recommendation one which is one of the ones that got kind of watered down in this process of don't tell us how to do our job kind of feedback that we got, but the idea being that we actually think that data collection and data science ought to be a more central function of ICANN generally.

So, I think we had ... Our initial version of this recommendation had suggested a data scientist position for ICANN that was specific to not only helping review teams, but work groups and others because all the work here is so anecdotal all the time and the data—

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Anecdotally speaking.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Anecdotally speaking, yeah. Actually, I ran a work group on data. So, in fact, specifically speaking it's pretty anecdotal. I can share that with you.

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So, that was our recommendation one. So, the biggest issue we have ... For example, the data that was collected by the Analysis Group on pricing was done by screen scraping a very small subset of data because it was [inaudible] data out of the contracted parties because they regarded it as a commercial issue even though it was public in some level for screen scraping purposes.

So, I think the greatest deficiency ... The two greatest deficiencies of this report analytically I think had to do with not enough time passing to see the [inaudible] in data and the unavailability of data.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

In terms of [inaudible] as well. So, you want to start with that infection yesterday [inaudible].

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Which we tried to do. I mean, Analysis Group did two studies. Nielson did two surveys, etc. But again, it was a fairly short period of time and that period of time was during the ramp-up of the new gTLD program. So, just even the [inaudible] program was different in terms of what TLDs had been delegated, etc., between the two and it became difficult to have a [inaudible] from that. But the difficulty of getting data was a persistent problem and one that we ... So, we have this recommendation one that isn't even really specific to our work which is more about trying to address this problem, to use it as a more systemic problem at ICANN.

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DENISE MICHEL: Sure. And data collection is certainly an issue for the SSR area as well. Can you give us a little more insight on why it was watered down?

JONATHAN ZUCK: Oh. Only watered down insomuch as we removed the specificity of the recommendation. In other words, we said it needs to become ... if you look at the language how it needs to become the central function of ICANN, etc., and we were actually ... When this began, we were actually trying to identify a personnel recommendation within ICANN and we became concerned, based on their feedback, that that was too specific. Hopefully, something that's something that can be acted on, but it felt watered down by the end because of that pushback that if we feel like we can't implement it the way you're suggesting it, we have to deny it or turn it down or reject it.

So, we were trying to make sure that these things were acceptable by the [inaudible] board, by [inaudible] specificity.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You'll note, though, in the details, that's where we still put whatever we had specifically discussed nonetheless.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Right. A [poor] example, but [inaudible], etc.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] idea.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It seems like ... I think I'm hearing two different aspects of the data issue. One is [inaudible] collect it and understand [inaudible] some level, but there was also a couple of days, as we talked about, that seemed like they weren't actually collectable and accessible, the price of data. So, I mean, was it your sense that there needed to be a couple of different asks or maybe [inaudible] recommendations to make this data collectable as well as go out and [inaudible]?

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yes. And our first set of recommendations were fairly explicit in that context of modify contracts to make data more collectable and there was substantial pushback on addressing the recommendation that way. So, those words still exist inside the recommendation, but the recommendations themselves are worded in such a way that if they come up with some other way to get the data, that's okay, too. And I guess I have to concede that that is in fact okay if they come up with another way to get the data. We just don't know what it is, right? But if there's some miracle that happens inside ICANN Org that they've found another way to get the data that doesn't involve [inaudible] contracts, then more power to them.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: A crystal ball.

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JONATHAN ZUCK: Or they engage in a more sophisticated, automated screen scraping or whatever it is that they want to do. That is, in fact, what the Analysis Group ended up doing and I guess there's no reason that couldn't be done in a more systematic way.

[DREW BAGLEY]: And part of our problem is we were the first for the CCT, so we didn't have a previous CCT to rely upon for outdated data to begin with. So, I think that by the time there's a CCT2, hopefully and especially if some of our recommendations are actually implemented, there would be an easier way to go about getting some of this data and even just identifying which methodologies to use, because that's something, too. With some of the data we inherited, particularly – and we did this with another recommendation. The Neilson survey data. We actually wished the questions were asked in slightly different ways or that there were additional questions asked with some of the things we were trying to figure out around consumers.

So, even with the data that was ready for us in the beginning, since we didn't get the full say in how it looked or—

JONATHAN ZUCK: [inaudible] responsible for making the mistake in the first survey, too. I [inaudible] some things we didn't think of. One of the issues that was a topic [inaudible] trust was just this issue of trust, generally. How do you measure consumer trust?

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So, when we were doing the ... There was a work group whose job it was to try and get data going for the CCT Review a year out and that's what lead to the Analysis Group and Nielson surveys to get fielded a year in advance of the CCTRT. So, it seemed like the only way to really judge trust was to ask. As we really developed a rigor around trying to measure it in the CCRT, I think we saw two things. One is that we couldn't ask it that way. Instead, needed to ask more about behavior. Would you use a credit card on this site? Or something like that as opposed to, "Do you trust this site?" So, there's some nuance to the way the questions were asked.

I think there's also, we went down a path of looking at trustworthiness as a sort of proxy for trust and that's where issues of DNS abuse and things like that really come into play under our trust moniker is that we don't know whether or not these things have yet affected consumer trust or not, but they certainly affected trustworthiness I guess and that's where we ended up taking it to [inaudible] of the CCTRT.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

And there's where I think some of those areas are relevant to your work because whenever there were questions related to financial or health data, that's where trust in the DNS is very important based on the survey data, and so that's something that we certainly incorporated into our discussion of some of the safeguards, but I think that's relevant holistically looking at the security and stability of the DNS and some of those other equities with regards to the users of [inaudible]. I would recommendation looking at [inaudible].

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JONATHAN ZUCK: One part of the [inaudible] survey that's interesting generally but not maybe specifically to your efforts is that there appear to be a consumer expectation that this huge expansion of the name space would lead to a more [inaudible], that each of these names would have meaning associated with them that they could use to find sites. There's a lot of pushback programmatically against that notion, so in some senses, that's a wait and see. An expectation has been set and obviously not met and what affect will that have on end user community of I don't know whether to go to this domain or that domain, etc.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: How did you get to the [inaudible]? Did you set some ...

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yeah. I borrowed some multi-sided dice from Dungeons and Dragons. No. It's a complicated issue. The bylaws called on us specifically to suggest whether or not something was a prerequisite. So, that was really our only specific mandate was prerequisite or not. So, there are some that we had called prerequisites that meant that if the board accepted them they needed in fact to implement it prior to any subsequent procedures.

But we looked also at some of the others to try and figure out where they might fit in the timeline which was part of the board's recommendation to us as well is that we need to be somewhat cognizant of budgeting and things like that, the finances of ICANN, and



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how things might fall on a timeline. So, we came up with a time [inaudible] being a time-based [inaudible].

So, in some respects, the high-priority items are due to be handled more quickly perhaps than the prerequisites. But the prerequisites were meant to be sort of a hard line in the sand [inaudible] these have to happen before you continue with the program. So, they were very hard to do.

And our last exercise, our very last exercise before releasing this, was taking a very hard look at these and making sure that we weren't making too many things high priority, etc., and trying to be as careful as possible about that. Any other questions?

DENISE MICHEL: Any general advice, having wrapped up a year or so, on review exercises?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Would you do it again?

DENISE MICHEL: We are, in some sense, starting anew at this point having been paused.

JONATHAN ZUCK: And unpaused. That was the joke I was going to make earlier and I thought it was too soon, maybe. Exactly. I'm sorry that happened. We are I think very concerned as a group about how these reviews act as

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critical paths in the context of the business as usual of the organization. The Subsequent Procedures Working Group is very much on the business as usual path line and timeline and making sure that the reviews find their way into that path as opposed to just being a parallel academic exercise is something of great concern to us for sure. We spent a couple of years on this.

I think the reason that it was a couple of years instead of one was, in large part, because we were noticing things about DNS abuse as we were going through and then realized we really needed to study it, then commissioned that study, and that's what really pushed things out, but it's also some of the most important findings of the group. So, I mean, it was well worth taking the extra time to do that and I think most of the team would do it again.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: What's the [inaudible] stuff that just doesn't [inaudible]. I think some of the stuff we say there is to set up and make the process easier for those who are [inaudible]. There was a lot of time and effort spent on that.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, [inaudible].

JONATHAN ZUCK: Well, we were really trying to do something [inaudible] and I think we were ... It was not easy to do that with the data problems and things like that for sure, but that was part of what we were trying to do is get

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down to measurable metrics and success measures and we succeeded in some areas and failed in others in that regard. But I think one of the persistent issues associated with the reviews generally ... I mean, ATRT-3, for example, may focus entirely on the implementation of ATRT-2 because that's been ... The implementation has been such a difficult issue across these reviews, which is why the other thing that I think we're helping to launch is the idea of staying intact, to some extent, to participate as advisors in the implementation phase as well. So, [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] great job. Good luck to you guys.

JONATHAN ZUCK: I feel like we could jump over and the subsequent procedures team [inaudible] part of the implementation side of it. Great. Thank you so much for your time and good work. Feel free to ask questions at any point, too.

DENISE MICHEL: Thank you. We really appreciate it. It's been helpful.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah. Thank you so much. We really appreciate this opportunity. We had you guys in mind a lot when we were looking at these issues. [inaudible].

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DAVID TAYLOR: Even when you weren't there, we were thinking of you.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You were never [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Now you're going to make me blush. Why don't we take—  
[crosstalk]

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Okay. The recording is unplugged. So, we're now recording. Welcome back to the afternoon session of the SSR2 face-to-face meeting in Barcelona.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Alright. I have been staring at this list that work stream three now calls outward facing. It struck me that what Eric said, the meetings in LA helped organize the thoughts and create the items that were there, what activity do we need to do to get the same level of specificity here that we have there? So, people who went to LA, can you help?

ZARKO KECIC: I can try to explain how we got that. [inaudible] couple meetings face-to-face [inaudible] but it doesn't seem that we have to sit together. We can do that online, but [inaudible] break down past [inaudible].

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UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Can we remember to state our names before speaking?

ZARKO KECIC: Sorry. That was Zarko.

BOBAN KRSIC: Hi, this is Boban. It's [inaudible] meeting because we have the right people [inaudible]. So, we sent them the topics and they [inaudible] identifying the [inaudible]. So, we [inaudible] session when the [inaudible] ICANN and [inaudible] when you ask me how we can [inaudible] support item three. We need people who [inaudible]. But how to identify them, that's the question. Then, we need resources, documents, experts, [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, are these people ... Can you characterize them? Are they ICANN staff? Are they community members? Are they a mix? Are they ... I'm trying to figure it out. Yes, Zarko?

ZARKO KECIC: Yes. That's both talking about the [inaudible] question is what we want to accomplish [inaudible] sometime. So, defining task and objective of the task and then it's much easier [inaudible] and working in the team how to find [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The question was about people in general, what they [inaudible].

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ZARKO KECIC: How we identify the [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes. That was my question.

ZARKO KECIC: Because we started from [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No because that's where they went and [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] in our way we have objectives one, two, [inaudible] and for each task we have a clear objective.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Before the meeting.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Before the meeting.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, in this case, you have ... If we were to dictate, [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Exactly.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I can see how that made LA [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: But for the people who you [inaudible] LA are only staff or some [inaudible]?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I also think it was the environment that we had there. It was a vast difference when you have everything recorded and everything you're doing are being public when you're talking about [your own job], for the most part. It went off record and productivity fell because then we had dialogue. It wasn't a formal choose your words very carefully, making sure that you can phrase things the right way that's suitable for public [inaudible] issues.

ZARCO KECIC: That was a little bit tough meeting because just before the meeting ICANN board and ICANN Org raised question what we are going to do in LA because of wording used in some topics, in our comprehensive analysis. So, there are [inaudible] have intentions to [inaudible].

We needed those closed sessions without recording to explain what is our intention and that we are not going to do comprehensive analysis but to find ways how [inaudible].

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] to be an open one, because you explained what you would be doing, but why [inaudible]?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: When we talk about closed sessions, it was closed part of the session, then public part of the session where we discussed as part of findings [inaudible]. At the end, everything was public, but ...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Okay. So, how do you think we're going to ... Who do you think we need to talk to once we get approved? I realize I'm crystal balling. But once we've said what is it we're trying to learn? Do we have another trip that we have to make in order to go gather that information or do you think it's scattered and we're all going to have to go figure out, divide the team up and go gather 11 different places?

BOBAN KRSIC: [inaudible] remember [inaudible] team, I think [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: With Kim Davies.

BOBAN KRSIC: With Kim and [inaudible].



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ERIC OSTERWEIL: I wasn't there for Kim Davies conversation. He just told us he had them. I'm not 100% sure what [inaudible] talk to Kim about, so I don't have a lot of context. I don't remember getting [inaudible]. I mean, I know that Kim and Kathy [inaudible] PTI stuff and with [Elise] when she was in that position. I was there for a lot of those, but that was in regards to the PTI, IANA transition, so that was a completely different [inaudible] Kim. I wasn't sure what it was about.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible]. Okay. This must be on the list, right? That's why you pulled it up. [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible] Wiki?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: It's no the Wiki, yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Shall we read it out or should we just tell people to find it?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: You can [inaudible].

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

Alright. I'll read it out since no one in the room knows how to read it, except for me. So, TLD label management, [inaudible] labels go in the root, so I guess you'll [inaudible] what guidelines and constraints, [inaudible] labels that are placed into the zone to DNS. For example, are single-character domains either in ASCII or in Unicode equivalent permitted?

Are two-letter codes other than those defining [inaudible] ISO that are doing [inaudible]? Another question, how is constraints managed by ICANN? How are the constraints? Another question, how is change control exercised over the constraints? And there are some sub-questions that I'll let people read on their own.

If a proposed TLD contains non-ASCII Unicode characters, like IDNs, what procedures are followed to ensure that the label meets these criteria [inaudible]?

Coordination with ISO 3166 or both introduction and retirement of ccTLDs, coordination with IETF over special-use names registries. Coordination with IETF and Unicode Consortium over IDNA standards and practice.

Then, I guess separate category, NS and DS record management in the root zone. When a name is delegated in the root zone, the delegation is reflected by the presence of NS records in the root zone and the DNSSEC security binding is reflected by the presence of DS records in the root zone. Are appropriate security practices used to ensure that changes are duly authorized by the correct party prior to the inclusion onto the root zone? Are the NS and DS records validated by ICANN or

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PTI prior to inclusion in the root zone with steps taken if validation fails?  
Are these records and the associated [inaudible] records regularly audited to ensure their accuracy? Are there any checks to ensure that the published root zone content is exactly aligned to the records of the delegation of TLDs?

And under DNS root zone KSK, are there procedures in place to manage the emergency KSK roll? Are there procedures in place in the unlikely event, then, that the two KSK repositories are inaccessible? Are there any procedures to access the KSK outside of the scheduled access windows?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, that was [Jeff's] pass?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That was Kim.

DENISE MICHEL: He had the interview and I'll see if I can find. I'll just post into the chat that link.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Is there a report or a recording?

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I think Jennifer says [inaudible] probably there's notes or something like that.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I was not on the Kim interview.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I thought you were.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So some of those are kind of staff issues.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah. They're PTI staff, so way back at the very beginning, there was a big set of discussions on the team about is PTI in bounds or out of bounds for us? Is it a separate thing for us? Is it the same thing as ICANN Org? How much of a line should we draw around this? So, I think Jeff felt very strongly that PTI was a separate organization from ICANN in a lot of important ways and there were a bunch of sub-arguments about various aspects of that, but I think it was reflected in his handling there where, yes, there was an ICANN SSR team that was going to go talk to ICANN, but I think he felt this was a PTI thing, so he wanted to handle it separately. Other people may disagree with that. That was just how I remember it.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: But it's a wholly owned subsidiary.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah. We had those discussions.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm not sure how you get there.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You kind of just had to be there. I'm not sure how we got there, either, and I'm pretty sure I was there the whole time.

DENISE MICHEL: I find the SSR [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, we need to filter those questions into here in some way to make sure they're ... Is there anything from the CCT briefing we just had [inaudible] added here?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, I'm going to [inaudible] management because [inaudible]. But as you noted or as you noted before we changed rooms, that list is at a lower level of maturity than the first list that we [inaudible].

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: At some level, it might make sense to open up the discussion about what we think we should be doing with the outward-facing, the newly renamed outward-facing substream. There were a bunch of topics on there that were the result of brainstorming and Jeff selected some overlapping set of topics to focus on. So, it might be worth trying to get the team's current perspective on this and maybe those are starting points or just inputs to the starting point. I hate to say it, but it might be worth considering from [inaudible] just because there are a lot of issues and I think the CCT Team I think what they just briefed us on was informative in ways I don't think we necessarily all thought of anyway. So, it's probably a good time for me to leave the room and let you guys [inaudible]. No. It's probably a [inaudible]. Okay, cool. So, you drop a bomb, too. We'll both drop bombs. So, you guys have a lot of work to do. I'll be back when you're done. Good luck. You're supposed to say, "Good luck. We're all counting on you." I will be back.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: So, drop your other one off. Go ahead.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Are you waiting for me to leave because you're worried about how I'll react?

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It doesn't really make sense [inaudible] here because [inaudible] in this group [inaudible], so we have to tell them that all the people [inaudible] are not anymore [inaudible] all the points that we have here and then we can come back to this topic and discuss if it is okay or not. For me, there is a lot to of stuff that [inaudible] for me. What about you, Zarko?

ZARKO KECIC: I was in that group, but unfortunately, [inaudible] that this group was during my vacation time, so I missed all of that.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Okay. We put together some tasks, high-level tasks, in Madrid, but never drilled down and got to the point to have some tasks and achievements that we want to reach at the end of work. Okay. Questions that [inaudible] had for Kim. Some of them are well-known and I believe everybody can answer them. Kim could [inaudible] key point, PTI is following directions given earlier. There are a lot of other questions that I would personally have for PTI operations and how they fulfill that directly related to SSR issues. For example, SLA [inaudible] and there are SLAs, but if something happened, for example, if something happened to my DNSSEC signature, how long it will take IANA to put new DS records into the root zone?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It depends.

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ZARKO KECIC: That's right, because my experience is that it takes three days or a little more.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It could take more, yeah.

ZARKO KECIC: I never did anything [inaudible] less than three days. That's too long. Also, who is responsible for root zone operations? We are talking about [inaudible] because it is operating by ICANN. But we need to know and to establish mechanisms to have good measurements and [inaudible] mechanism if something is wrong to any root zone survey and we don't know how ICANN is doing that or is ICANN at all doing that?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Exactly right.

ZARKO KECIC: DNS OARC is doing, but what ICANN is doing, [inaudible] measurements or they have their own or whatever. It is okay if they say, "Okay, we are [inaudible]." But we have to clarify.

There are lots of talks about abuse and the ways how domain names can be abused. Okay, that's part of our contract with TLD operators, but also, ICANN should do some and put some effort into fighting that. There is DAAR measurements and database, but how to use that, what to do. We heard this group did really great job. And we heard how to do



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that. Also, recently, there are lots of measurements of [common name] abuse [inaudible] there are a lot of abuse cases, and ICANN may put some effort in measuring and producing tools to find [common name] abuse. So there are lots of questions, there are just some that I had in mind right now to put into this subtask.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. I think abuse should be a big one for us, and I would rather them be that specific. Sure, [inaudible] get into that, but I like the point of [inaudible] assess the DNS threat landscape, domain abuse, litigation relevant to ICANN's role. I think that's a great [statement].

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. Works for me.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think you just said start typing, right?

NORM RITCHIE: No, it's already there. Just highlight it. There, boom. I'm blue. But there are some other things in here, I think, that maybe I would strike, like alternate root. I don't know. I was involved in this brainstorming session, I created these, so I hate to just delete things. [I'm just trying to look at the list] now [inaudible] would be my contribution to the

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brainstorming. I don't know what the thinking was on that, so [inaudible] it's outside of our scope.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I assume, given that it's under the can identifiers [inaudible] addressing the fact that you're getting an answer from the alternate root.

NORM RITCHIE: If you use a different system, yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right. So, given the question, it's the obvious – well, not if you do that.

NORM RITCHIE: If you use our system, you won't have that problem.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, I think it was suggested as an area to look into, and of the potential serious threat that ICANN may have an appropriate inflection point into. I would suggest just given this lower number of members here to highlight and comment on things that we did, people are suggesting we remove to give others time to weigh in or ask for more information on it. Because I wasn't the one who added this to the brainstorming list, but there may be others who have more background and can clarify.

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NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. And name collisions, I know the IETF is looking at that topic. It really becomes pertinent when you have a new gTLD round, so I don't know if that's even pertinent at this point.

DENISE MICHEL: Oh, yeah.

ZARKO KECIC: It is?

DENISE MICHEL: Here's an example. There's a whole series of Autodiscover domains that creates a vulnerability and access to personal identifiable information and passwords. We've just cleaned up a bunch of Autodiscover domains in Autodiscover in the UK, but it's a vulnerability throughout all TLDs and we've asked SSA to address it. That's just one example. There's a number of name collision issues that remain live and unaddressed. So that's what I thought it was worth [inaudible] address specific name collision issues but to perhaps take a fresh look at the process and approach that has been taken on new gTLDs and whether we can offer some fine tuning at a high level perhaps on [inaudible].

NORM RITCHIE: Okay. Got you. So that's more – you're talking about it'd be look contacting [Belkin] and say, “Hey, do you want to fix this thing?” Or [inaudible].

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DENISE MICHEL: Or for example SSAC issuing an advisory asking all top-level registries to take action on a certain vulnerability. [inaudible].

NORM RITCHIE: No, I think I understand. Yeah. Universal resolvability, internet of things. That's a big issue.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Are you done, Norm?

NORM RITCHIE: No.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

NORM RITCHIE: I don't understand that. I don't understand why the Internet of Things is connected with the [inaudible].

ALAIN AINA: Can I help you? Because if you're going through this brainstorming document, you may not find your way out.

NORM RITCHIE: Okay. Thank you.

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ALAIN AINA: And then from that brainstorming that remains, there is another document Jeff put in place. Then we discussed this, I think it was Madrid. There is another document you can [inaudible] get it from the Wiki, another document where [inaudible] Wiki, there is a—

JENNIFER BRYCE: I'll post the link in the chat.

ALAIN AINA: Yeah, so then basically, what was discussed [inaudible] that we agree on it, but what was proposed by Jeff in discussion was to look at this around three main points. One was root zone management practices, which includes collision [inaudible] and then all of this, TLD label management, NS and DS record, respective role of SSAC and ICANN, etc., and then at some point, and then he also include role of ICANN, PTI, VeriSign over the root zone content.

Point two, change management, so [inaudible] new TLDs coordination with the RSO CC [inaudible] special use name registry, [inaudible] of the root services.

Then number three, role and responsibility for abuse and threat, and then has something about DNSSEC. So I would suggest that we go back to this document and see what we have to [inaudible]. For me, I see this to cover for me what we should be looking at under DNS, DNS SSR and

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trying to look at the connection, because this DNS SSR probably has some connection between the ICANN SSR, so to avoid duplication of the effort, I think this is [inaudible]. So Norm, you saw the document?

NORM RITCHIE: No, but I can listen.

ALAIN AINA: You put the link on – okay. So I think if we take this document, for me, I agree – okay, the issue at that time [inaudible] we had some strong discussion of do we include PTI or not, do we etc. But I think the agreement is ... Okay, I will not say that [inaudible] go up to making decision on it, but I think [inaudible] we agree that PTI was part of ICANN [inaudible] not treat PTI as separate. So, if this team can agree on that, then for me, I will see this as one major step, one major accomplishment on this thing. Okay? And maybe we should try to see who we appoint next for the rapporteur, because this one is missing a rapporteur, and then probably [take this] from here. I think so. So, Russ? –

RUSS HOUSLEY: [I think I found the document].

ALAIN AINA: You saw the document, Russ? The document I was reading?

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, I found it.

ALAIN AINA: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That is another [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL: I'm not sure what document we're referring to.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Are you in the Adobe Connect?

DENISE MICHEL: No, I need to get in the Adobe Connect to see it.

JENNIFER BRYCE: I posted the link in there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You just emailed it, you said?

JENNIFER BRYCE: I just put it in Adobe Connect.

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ALAIN AINA: Yes, and the question to [inaudible] on this document [inaudible].

JENNIFER BRYCE: Are you in the Adobe Connect room?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm only here on the Wiki. Is it in the Wiki?

ALAIN AINA: In the Wiki, under subgroup three, if you go under subgroup three, subgroup documents, the first one from the bottom. The first one is what we are reading, then the second document is the 25th June, security, stability of DNS topics. Then before [inaudible] question to Kim Davies.

JENNIFER BRYCE: I'm just going to update the link.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Okay.

ALAIN AINA: So, for me, if I have to add something, I think I would like to add to the document that we look at DNS, the KSK, the KSK, because okay, DNSSEC, root key management was not formally, but there is a section on there on DNSSEC. But I think we definitely need to add something on the root KSK management stuff, WHOIS address, Zarko concern of



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[inaudible] or if the key gets compromised, will it survive? Etc. So [we have added] KSK management to it.

DENISE MICHEL: So, this is an old document, this isn't a document that's being added to today.

ZARKO KECIC: Madrid, I believe.

ALAIN AINA: Madrid, yes.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Is it really from Madrid? Yeah.

ZARKO KECIC: Madrid, [inaudible] but do you remember when we break down into subgroups in Madrid?

ALAIN AINA: [inaudible] Can you go to the Wiki?

DENISE MICHEL: Oh, on the Wiki? She said she dropped the link—

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JENNIFER BRYCE: [inaudible]

ALAIN AINA: No, but what I want you to send is different from what I was reading. I think [inaudible] working document, but this is another document.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Let me [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL: I've got the work stream topics, and I've got security, stability of the DNS topics.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, that's the document [inaudible].

ALAIN AINA: No, but he's reading in a document [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL: And it's being heavily edited today.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: And Jeff is editing it?

ALAIN AINA: [inaudible]

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DENISE MICHEL: Okay. Yes, Jeff's editing it.

JENNIFER BRYCE: This is it, yes. This is him.

ALAIN AINA: Is this him?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It's Jeff!

RUSS HOUSLEY: Wait a minute. We need a new Google doc.

ALAIN AINA: Maybe I'm not connected. Okay. As long as it's the same document, I'll be fine. But mine didn't show the [inaudible] and the changing of [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Jeff edited it at 9:03 today.

JENNIFER BRYCE: I know because I reloaded it into the SSR2 Google file [inaudible].

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ALAIN AINA: [inaudible]. He's still on the team. Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: See all these edits?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah.

ALAIN AINA: Okay, so mine was not showing me change log [inaudible] same document. So mine was not showing the change log.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I just wonder why Jeff's doing this. I have no answer.

KC CLAFFY: There seems to be two documents. There's a .doc file that I think Jennifer or somebody put into the Adobe Connect chat room that's not being edited that I think was only Jeff. In fact, the file name says draft-gh. And then there's a Google doc, which is that file popped into Google Docs that's currently being edited. And I don't know why the ghost of Jeff is visiting us, but I can say as an SSAC person that Jeff is certainly revisiting all of these topics in an SSAC context. But I don't know, I can't explain what he means to do with this particular Google doc.

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JENNIFER BRYCE: I think I can explain, KC, because I just changed the location of this doc, so it would have said – like all these comments up until then, and it’s saying that he made that edit today, but it’s not.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But it’s not. Okay.

KC CLAFFY: Ohhh....

JENNIFER BRYCE: Sorry.

KC CLAFFY: Wait, how did that work?

JENNIFER BRYCE: I’m assuming that because I moved this, the Google document, uploaded it into this new SSR2 external file that we have for security reasons, so whenever I uploaded it – I see that Matogoro made some of these comments as well, but those for some reason aren’t [saved] today.

DENISE MICHEL: So if the comment says “from important document,” then Jennifer has done that and it’s not a live comment someone added recently.

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KC CLAFFY: Got it. Yeah. Weird. You mean those were Microsoft Word comments?  
Okay, maybe it just ...

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, there's no way someone could have typed all of those at 9:03 today.

JENNIFER BRYCE: No, I don't think anyone touched this document.

ALAIN AINA: Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: So let me figure out where we are. Is this supposed to be, whatever, a discussion piece for Work Stream 3, sub-stream 3?

ALAIN AINA: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We're trying to understand Work Stream 3 will be doing in its examining its outward-facing pieces of the SSR and trying to figure out what resources we need in terms of who we need to talk to or whatever to accomplish our work.

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KC CLAFFY: Okay. Got it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: This doesn't really map exactly to the other list we were looking at.

ALAIN AINA: Yeah. And I think the explanation is that from the brainstorming list when the subgroup met, we had long discussions, plus the fact that Jeff has his own view on certain things, so [the list] brought us to this one. But I think we all agree that some of the points in the brainstorming may not fall under [where we are] right now, so they need to be worked out.

RUSS HOUSLEY: They need to go somewhere is what you're saying, right? But they need to go in the other list? Is that what you're saying?

ALAIN AINA: No, I'm saying that there are some points in the brainstorming list we may just drop because afterwards when we look at them, like what Norm was saying for example, the IoT, all of these things are not really – so just drop them because they're not [inaudible].

ZARKO KECIC: There are a lot of discussions about IoT using DNS services, all the devices connected to [inaudible].

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KC CLAFFY: I'm not sure that we can drop that, but I think all of these issues have to be processed in some way. We have to decide do they belong here, do we have time for them? We have to say something or at least think about them, which is daunting because there's a lot of them.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes.

ALAIN AINA: Yes, that is the point, and we have time for them. Where do we put them? For example, the IoT, this can fall under what do you call?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Threat assessment.

ALAIN AINA: Exactly, threat assessment and this kind of things.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah, DDoS attacks.

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible]

ALAIN AINA: I think sometimes, we can address, for example if we [inaudible] under threat, then we can cover IoT and all of them, not specifically



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addressing IoT [inaudible] etc., but when you go there, you have to cover IoT and [all the] vectors of attack and all that.

KC CLAFFY:

Well, okay, I'm sorry, I missed the conversation about the recommendations this morning. I'll go back and listen to the audio, but certainly, this is reminding me of the recommendation I was assigned with 23, which is about resources allocated to SSR topics because I think we keep running into this issue that SSR topics keep getting bigger, and even with the infinite budget that seems to be available, there's not enough time to cover everything, or there has to be some circumscription of what stays within the boundaries of ICANN to be worrying about.

I will say that SSAC has taken on IoT as a topic this year because there are so many DNS issues that are used as vectors for IoT-based attacks. So it's not trivial for me to just rule that out and say, "Okay, we can drop that, it's out of scope." But I take the point that it's a very big umbrella that's been painted in this document. I wouldn't say it's fantasy, it's all real, but I don't know how to scope it.

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, but I see there's a section that's empty but it says abuse and threats, so I think that's where the IoT stuff would go.

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ALAIN AINA: Yeah. Abuse and threats waiting for tests so we can – waiting for tests and [it's usually] focused on what falls under ICANN remit and the SSR things, so we can put them abuse and threats.

NORM RITCHIE: So my take on this is kind of the work – I didn't know about this, so the work that we were just going to do now has already been done, and it's here.

KC CLAFFY: You mean Norm scoping out the [states]?

NORM RITCHIE: Yes.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, I agree.

NORM RITCHIE: I'm not seeing anything further that I would add. I think the buckets are broad enough that – there's just a lot more work to be done on it. Unless Jeff decides to rejoin us.

KC CLAFFY: I'm a little perplexed about abuse and threats being stuck at the end with no text, because I feel like abuse and threats should be the primary issue, and all of the other things should be what are the implications of

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these things for abuse and threats, like change management in the rootzone. Do we care about change management in the rootzone unless it touches an abuse or threat? We're SSR people so we care about threats. So I just don't understand why we stuck that at the end rather than that being the main motivating thread through the whole thing.

NORM RITCHIE: I agree, it should have more prominence. But as long as it's addressed.

KC CLAFFY: I guess what I'm trying to say is it seems like that should structure everything else, not just be a section.

NORM RITCHIE: I see.

ALAIN AINA: I think that's a good point[inaudible]. And we said this document is an old document, so [the questions we asked now] [inaudible] based on public comment and update document [inaudible] change the order and put this where is needed.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, this document and tasks should be reviewed, and I believe we should proceed to see who is going to do that.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE:            Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                I'm sorry, I didn't hear the last part.

ALAIN AINA:                    Who is going to do that.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                Who is going to do that?

ALAIN AINA:                    Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                Exactly.

ALAIN AINA:                    Who is going to do that? That's why we need to appoint a rapporteur, because I think this group no longer has a rapporteur. Then from there, we can see [inaudible] rapporteur.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:            So yeah, I would say Eric or –

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:            Yeah, I think so.

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ALAIN AINA: By default, it should be Eric, but –

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: When he logs back in.

ZARKO KECIC: He's not here, so Eric.

NORM RITCHIE: Well, he has run a root server, right? Two.

ALAIN AINA: [inaudible] and maybe this is an opportunity to discuss, do we [inaudible] only one rapporteur, or we have one – at least two, because if one drop any time, so –

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible]

ALAIN AINA: [inaudible] So Russ, I think we have a rapporteur, that is good, and we agree that we should put text on abuse, threat and abuse and maybe change the order, I think, so [inaudible] maybe what else?

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RUSS HOUSLEY: So, do we like this organization better than the one that's in the other Google doc?

ALAIN AINA: Or we can use this to fix the one in the Google doc, make sure that we are doing the same format. So use this to then –

ZARKO KECIC: Use this, review –

ALAIN AINA: Review it and then [update] the one in the Google doc so that we have [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: So who's going to take –

KC CLAFFY: I didn't see a big difference? What is the different Russ is seeing between the two?

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's radically different. So you're not looking at the same thing we are.

KC CLAFFY: No, I'm not. Okay. [Maybe] somebody can put these two links in the –

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JENNIFER BRYCE: Yeah, it's hard to follow even when you're in this room. Sorry about that, KC.

KC CLAFFY: The title is Security and Stability of the DNS Topics, right?

RUSS HOUSLEY: That is one of them, one of the topics.

KC CLAFFY: I see. Then I do not have the other one.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Here's the other one. I just put it in the – the one I just pasted there has these streams and has a bunch of topics.

KC CLAFFY: Oh, sorry. Yeah, got that doc – I didn't know that's [what you meant.] So you mean the box that's Work Stream 3 and all the questions inside that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes.

KC CLAFFY: [Right.]

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RUSS HOUSLEY: They're very different. There's some overlap, but they're very different.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. You could manage the structure of one, change management – so I think the box actually is more aligned with my thought about everything should have abuse or threat or security in it, whereas the Google doc sort of talks about management and stewardship of the root zone writ large.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, KC, are you willing to pull things out of the “Jeff edited today but not really” document [inaudible] the boxes document?

KC CLAFFY: Sure. I think that's an interesting exercise.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you.

KC CLAFFY: What could go wrong?

RUSS HOUSLEY: [Oh, Bart called.]



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KC CLAFFY: So somebody said we had a rapporteur for this topic. Who is that?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It was Jeff but now we are proposing Eric.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Now we don't.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, I think Eric is taking this over.

NORM RITCHIE: He just doesn't know it yet.

DENISE MICHEL: No, I think he volunteered, actually.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think he did volunteer. We'll just make sure he remembers he volunteered.

NORM RITCHIE: Voluntold.

KC CLAFFY: Alright. Great, I'll work with Eric on this.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: So, is there anything else we can do today on –

ZARKO KECIC: What we are going to do with other challenges –

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, I meant Work Stream 3. If not, we're going to move to Work Stream 4. You're right where I want you to be. Is there anything else we need to do about Work Stream 3 that we didn't just assign to KC?

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible] Thank you. Maybe you want a water? I'll throw it at you. You want one? [inaudible] throw it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. We look at [Work Stream 4.] There's a few topics for consideration, and –

ALAIN AINA: Challenges.

RUSS HOUSLEY: A whole lot of definitions. IoT appears there. Interesting. And Kerry Ann was the rapporteur on this. She said she's willing to continue, I believe. But there's no steps part yet. Is that right?

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NORM RITCHIE: I've always struggled to understand the purpose of this one. This is a crystal ball that's going to sit around trying to figure out what could possibly go wrong?

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, if we go back to – the bylaws say something about this.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

ALAIN AINA: Yeah, 4.6(c)(iii).

NORM RITCHIE: Governments take over the Internet?

RUSS HOUSLEY: No.

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible].

NORM RITCHIE: Kim Jong-Un gets elected [inaudible] Protocol flaws.

ALAIN AINA: But [inaudible]

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Basically, what it says is that we get to say something about whether the security and stability of the DNS and the extent to which security efforts are sufficiently robust to meet future challenges and threats to the security, stability and resiliency of DNS consistent with ICANN's mission. That's the piece of the bylaws that's supposed to [inaudible]

NORM RITCHIE: So that's not dissimilar from disaster preparedness [inaudible] we don't know what the event's going to be.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. But I think [inaudible] I think there were suggestions, and I'd say suggestions that the team should talk through, not decisions at all, but we should tackle this. My understanding of it. Kerry Ann and Eric are in a better position to opine about this. My understanding is that this is still a little bit in the brainstorming stage. The intention here was to try and zero in on some critical, evolving potential threats beyond simply [inaudible]

NORM RITCHIE: Things go bump in the night that you kind of –

DENISE MICHEL: Not only technical threats and hacks but also nation state firewalls or blockchain, whatever it is we think ICANN should be keeping an eye on

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and thinking about how they want to be prepared for I think was the idea of this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Blockchain have to do with this?

NORM RITCHIE: Well, you have to say blockchain.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, [a TLD just here just launched digitally secure domain names using blockchain.]

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible] quantum DNS?

NORM RITCHIE: Actually, yes.

KC CLAFFY: I'm going to make a radical suggestion to drop this Work Stream, because I think first of all, there's nothing in here that is listed in the current text that is not a current threat, a current challenge. And I think it's going to look too fantasy land and there's just so much to focus on with what ICANN needs to be doing right now to deal with threats and abuse that I actually feel this will dilute our focus and I just think we

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don't have time to think ten years out right now. We've got to worry about two years out and now.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. [inaudible]

KC CLAFFY: That would be my suggestion.

DENISE MICHEL: Do you think some of the items in future challenges should be woven into the –

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, the outward-facing DNS. Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: [Thanks.]

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I think there is a group in OCTO already that looks at evolving technical gotchas. And that's their job, to report to the board on it.

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JENNIFER BRYCE: Russ, Laurin has his hand up in the Adobe Connect.

RUSS HOUSLEY: KC, I think what you suggested you're going to do is go through this list and pull them into the other box] that you're pulling the Jeff list into, right?

KC CLAFFY: This is the last time I'm doing a meeting in the middle of the night. Yeah, I can try to do that, but again, I will take liberty to just delete things that I think are covered or redundant with [this other stuff] or too mushy to really have us say. I'm really worried that our report is not going to be concrete enough, so I want to avoid things that drag us out of concrete territory.

DENISE MICHEL: We can also discuss at some point taking a step back and looking at ICANN's staffing and resources and ability to stay in touch with the broader ecosystem and have the resources to be forward-looking and planning ahead. I think a much higher level, broader recommendation potentially to make sure that [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Jennifer.

JENNIFER BRYCE: I just wanted to note that Laurin has his hand raised.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Laurin.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Hi, again. Thank you very much. So while I think your point [inaudible] on a lot of this stuff being a bit like in the air too much, at the same time I think there is a lot of stuff in there that is relevant and that we should look at. I'm wondering, what we could do is not necessarily kill it off but maybe give it a bit of a different profile. I'm also happy with moving everything around and putting it elsewhere, unless we do address the ones that are relevant, just to put in like another option, because I wouldn't want to see some of this stuff go because I think it is relevant.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Wait, let me see if I understand you. Do you want the Work Stream to remain as an independent thing?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I was saying my idea is either we take out the relevant elements or we kind of rebrand the work stream if you want. So if we say, okay, let's see what the issues are that are relevant there and why this thing was created, and if we can then kind of refocus this to make it shorter and clearer but give it a good and clear structure, that we can deal with and that is not too much in the future. But as I said, I'm happy with both, I'm just saying there might be another option that we could go for.



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KC CLAFFY: Okay. I'll think about it.

ZARKO KECIC: Can I see something? I believe that we are losing a lot of time talking about subtopics and stuff like that. They're there to just organize the work in smaller pieces, right? And when it gets to the report and writing a report, we can group tasks whatever and findings whatever we want and we find is appropriate.

So I wouldn't be worried where something is, and KC is right that we have to [duplicate stuff to have] overlapping tasks in different groups because maybe few people are not going to work in both subgroups. But I wouldn't be worried what subtasks are there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I agree with your thought there that the way we've organized the Work Streams and the way we organize the report are very different, okay? I'm sure that will end up being the case, except for maybe we have to say something about every SSR1 recommendation.

I do worry a little bit about too much overlap in the Work Stream and don't have the time to have duplicate [inaudible]. That's my only reflection.

KC CLAFFY: Again, can somebody think of a future challenge in this box that isn't a present challenge? Maybe my imagination is too weak, because I think we don't know about the future challenges that we haven't thought

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about [inaudible]. All the current things that are in there are present challenges.

NORM RITCHIE: Crypto computing for real breaks DNSSEC.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You mean quantum?

NORM RITCHIE: Quantum, sorry. Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, that one's probably a future challenge.

KC CLAFFY: [I really don't care -]

RUSS HOUSLEY: I mean it already talks about new crypto systems in DNSSEC, and the reason cited that there might be one, it was [post-quantum.]

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Go ahead.

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JENNIFER BRYCE: Laurin, go ahead.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Maybe as an idea, why can't we do the following? We look at certain issues, and where pertinent, we do a kind of brainstorm, how could this issue evolve in the near future? So we don't really put it in a Work Stream, this future stuff, but it's more like if there is a relevant topic, we have a brainstorm, we think about what could happen based on our expertise, what are the things that ICANN should watch out for, and then we can essentially just integrate this future challenges thing into the work we do and we don't have to do this specific thing and we don't have to do it for every topic that's coming around, but only where we see it is useful, if that makes sense.

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible] getting diminishing returns.

DENISE MICHEL: Can you say that again, Laurin?

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible] future.

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LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes, no problem. So essentially, what I'm saying is if we integrate the idea of the future challenges or the emerging challenges into what we're doing, so Russ said we actually have points already where we're looking at stuff that is not quite there yet. So instead of having a future challenges Work Stream, we include thinking about how things could develop into challenges into where they already are, if that makes sense.

For example, if we think about a certain type of threat, we can say, "Oh, okay, we have seen [that that] is possible. It's not being used much yet, but it could be used. And how could that be mitigated in the near future?"

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: And we don't do this as one thing but we do this when the issue actually arises in one or the other [inaudible] and not as one big, "Oh, let's have a big brainstom about the future" but for everything we do, we think, "Will this change? Is this still relevant? Will this potentially get worse? And what can be done about it?" Bit like we did with the recommendations [too.]

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

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LAURIN WEISSINGER:                    Sorry, it might be that I've been awake since like 2:45 AM.

KC CLAFFY:                                I'm going to back off a little on getting rid of the Work Stream. I think Laurin's point – and I also see down – I didn't read far enough, but there are a couple of things in here I would say are not current threats but are worth considering. The name coin, the alternate naming system stuff. You could argue it's a current threat, but I think we can envision something much broader as a future threat. [Censoring, loss of confidence] in standards bodies, I actually think that's worth saying something about.

All these kind of fall into the similar scenario, sort of alternate root stuff. So maybe there's something to do there. But I think a lot of the stuff that's the current text in this box should be folded into – or already is or will be covered by that Work Stream 3. But I take Laurin's point that in that context, it behooves us to think about a future version of those threats. By the time we get this report published, they will be current.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                        Okay. So I still think some of these do belong in the previous Work Stream.

KC CLAFFY:                                Agree.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: But as you say, some of them deserve some forecasting.

KC CLAFFY: I'm trying to digest the red text at the bottom that talks about performance security SSR2 scope. Does anybody know who wrote that or [has a] position on this stuff? Resource utilization – I'm looking at red text at the bottom of this Work Stream description. [inaudible] it just goes on and on.

The subtitle is Performance Security (SSR2 scope) and then Technology Selection Security, how to select vendors. This looks – vendor accountability for security problems. I don't know what the person who wrote this was envisioning. Am I on the right page?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, you're on the right document.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Right, go ahead.

JENNIFER BRYCE: If I remember correctly, it was Ameen who was interested in this topic who hasn't attended any meetings in recent history. So I think he would be the person to be able to provide more information.

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NORM RITCHIE: Well, let's ask Ameen if he cares if we delete it. No. No response? Okay. One of these I recognize, the technology selection. That's the supply chain's considered one of the biggest security threats currently, so I'm guessing that's what that's about. But that's not a future thing, it's now.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's not a now thing?

NORM RITCHIE: It's a now thing.

DENISE MICHEL: [It is. He's saying it is.]

NORM RITCHIE: I'd delete it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Somebody was thinking about typing something.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Laurin, you have your hand up.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. I think two of these things, I can read out that might be interesting. I wanted to type in another. I'll just tell you. I think one that is interesting is the kind of architecture design going forward, and that

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could be an interesting thing we can do after we're done with the rest kind of saying, "Okay, this is what we take away, what could and could not be useful."

And the same goes for the whole second thing which I would just shut down, so essentially, where to get them from, is there any recommendations we can make about that? I think this would more or less cover most of it.

NORM RITCHIE: I'm still voting to delete the red text.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: On DNSSEC?

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible] performance security and technology selection security.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Alright. We've been going at this for [inaudible] hour. I think maybe a five-minute break, bio break would probably help, and then come back.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And we end at 5:00 today, is that right?



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NEGAR FARZINNIA:                   Actually, I think the schedule says 6:30.

JENNIFER BRYCE:                   [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL:                   I'm not going until 6:30.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                   Okay. [inaudible]

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:           I actually do think that would [inaudible] long.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                   Am I the only one who's getting tired?

NORM RITCHIE:                   [I know, I had to bring a beer.]

DENISE MICHEL:                   Yeah, it's a little bit too long of a day to –

NORM RITCHIE:                   Okay, that's good.

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RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Alright, so let's take a break at this [inaudible] figure out how this affects the Work Stream. I certainly want Zarko here for that.

JENNIFER BRYCE:                Okay, I'm going to unpause the recording. And then can everyone please remember to state your name before you speak? Okay. We're unpaused.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                Okay, what I'd like to look at briefly is the work plan and how that discussion we just had fits into it. I expect we [inaudible] totally finish this up, but I do think that there's a couple assumptions in the work plan that [could] be rebutted in the last session, for example that – I read the part where it says prepared draft report section to mean that the report is going to follow the sections exactly as we had. So Work Stream 1 would have a section, and maybe it'll end up that way and maybe it won't. I think we need to see how this work plan is to be restructured for the discussion we just had.

DENISE MICHEL:                Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                And I think we'll start with Work Stream 1 [inaudible] a note [inaudible] each of the recommendations. I do think this will be a section in the

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report [inaudible] has not yet begun to be drafted. So I don't know what percent each of these things is, but does that part still make sense? Obviously, the dates are – not hearing anything.

DENISE MICHEL: I'm sorry, which – where are you? Oh, the green part, Work Stream 1?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

DENISE MICHEL: You're asking if the dates are still valid? No, I think we need to push this out.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You're not going to be done in six days?

DENISE MICHEL: Well, I think we need to check.

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: Do you want to make it a draft in two weeks?

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, I think that's probably reasonable. But at the same time, I think we are – if it's three weeks, it's no longer the critical [path], right?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. Okay. Jennifer, can I send you this work plan and just have you edit it as we talked?

JENNIFER BRYCE: It's in the Google, [inaudible] link in the Google document.

DENISE MICHEL: Oh, great. So people can just edit it in the Google.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Yes.

DENISE MICHEL: Awesome. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sorry, isn't that what you gave us?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

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DENISE MICHEL: Okay, and –

RUSS HOUSLEY: So how long do you think we need for Work Stream 2 to – Boban’s got a lot of information there that’s organized in that tool that I’ve never seen before today.

BOBAN KRSIC: Oh, it’s a first time?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. And we need to self-select, do assignments sand then start gathering the data for each of those subtasks, and then we need to get – Work Stream 3 in the same state [which is going to be hard until] KC edits it. So, what else needs to happen here to make this something we need to share with the board? Because right now, we’re going to be done with this the end of next month. I just don’t see that happening.

BOBAN KRSIC: No.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No.

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BOBAN KRSIC: No. [inaudible] December over holidays and Christmas and so on, I would say we will be somewhere in the middle of January. On the [inaudible] January. That's my opinion on this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So my personal projection is that we won't have a draft report for Kobe if we don't get together again face-to-face before then. We're thinking – I was informed that ICANN needs 90 to 100 days to set you pa meeting like that, so we're talking about what you've just said.

DENISE MICHEL: Well, if you want to come to a Facebook office, and the only thing that ICANN would need to do is give you guys hotels and air flights, or trains. That's another option.

BOBAN KRSIC: That sounds great. That's perfect [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: [inaudible]

LAURIN WEISSINGER: [inaudible] come to Germany and then we'll –

DENISE MICHEL: Sure.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: People are going to have to [go] across oceans. But I recall some people complaining about the visa process for Washington, so I was kind of thinking Canada, maybe Vancouver so it'll be winter time, people [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: [inaudible]

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible]

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible] Russ, you're skiing?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I am not a skier.

NORM RITCHIE: I also golf, to say.

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: [inaudible]

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: I'm sorry, KC?

KC CLAFFY: Are we talking about January?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, I think Russ is talking about January.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Did you suggest Cancun, KC?

KC CLAFFY: No, I'm [inaudible] San Diego in January. Are you crazy?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, but that has the U.S. problem too, just like Washington did.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Right. No, I get that.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, but I don't know why [inaudible] Canada is better than the U.S.



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RUSS HOUSLEY: That's what I've been told by—

DENISE MICHEL: Who couldn't get a visa?

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible] come to the IETF.

JENNIFER BRYCE: I think the problems are—

DENISE MICHEL: Matogoro can only go out of the country very few times. It's not necessarily linked to where the meeting is. Is there someone else who couldn't get into the U.S.?

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Naveed has no problem getting visa.

RUSS HOUSLEY: [Naveed] had trouble.

DENISE MICHEL: Oh, Kaveh?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, and Kaveh had trouble. I think [inaudible]

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DENISE MICHEL: He was there. Kaveh was there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible] the issue, I don't remember what—

DENISE MICHEL: Naveed was who was not there.

ALAIN AINA: Naveed?

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Yeah, he was there.

DENISE MICHEL: Naveed was there. Noorul was not there.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Noorul was not there.

DENISE MICHEL: Noorul was not there.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: If the issue –

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DENISE MICHEL: [Didn't have a] problem, [inaudible] government passports.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: We have asked the Meetings team to provide us with codes for cost for meetings in D.C., Brussels, Vancouver per your request. And if there are any other locations anyone's interested in, again, obviously add that to the list. We have enough time –

RUSS HOUSLEY: Weather-wise, L.A. is fine.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: We can do that in L.A. too. We certainly have enough time for the visa process, so if the length of the process is a concern for everybody, there is plenty of time to get that now if you make a decision soon and select dates.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, if we have – right.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: So the length of the visa process shouldn't be a concern. If there are issues with actually getting the visa because of the current government status, that may be a different story.

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RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Yeah. I don't know.

NEGAR FARZINNIA:                But I don't know the details pertaining to that for anyone in particular.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    I just remember complaints.

DENISE MICHEL:                    Well, let's put a couple options out to the list, give people a couple days to respond and [inaudible]

ZARKO KECIC:                      That's not going to be changed [either] being in Brussels or Vancouver or –

DENISE MICHEL:                    In terms of visas, you think?

ZARKO KECIC:                      Yeah.

DENISE MICHEL:                    Okay. Well, we can let people speak for themselves and then [inaudible].

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RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Alright. Go ahead.

JENNIFER BRYCE:                Laurin, can you go ahead, please?

LAURIN WEISSINGER:            Yeah, just want a clarification. My audio was spotty and no one replied in chat. Are we talking about not going to Kobe and somewhere else, or are we talking about going to Kobe plus somewhere else? Just out of interest. I'll fly anywhere that's necessary.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Plus.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:            Okay. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    In order to have the report for Kobe, I think we need to get together again.

DENISE MICHEL:                  Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Was the audio good that time?

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LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. It was just spotty in the beginning, now it kind of recovered. So [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible] Okay. So looking at Work Stream 2, Boban, you were guessing it's going to be mid-January until the facts are gathered anyway. Right?

BOBAN KRSIC: Yes, to draft summary notes and [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Okay. Right, so we [inaudible]

BOBAN KRSIC: [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

BOBAN KRSIC: That's the idea. Approve the finding and [inaudible] version and finalize it [inaudible]

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible] do some additional –

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BOBAN KRSIC: If it's needed.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah.

BOBAN KRSIC: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So my hope is that we can do Work Stream 3 and [the rest] the same chunk of time by dividing it up among team members so that we have three [facts found] by the time we gather again, wherever it is. Right?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. With the goal to have actual draft text.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Do a little chunk [inaudible] exactly, so that we can start organizing how we will present these concepts.

DENISE MICHEL: And editing and actually have something akin to a draft report. Yeah, I agree.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Does that make sense?

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DENISE MICHEL:                    Yeah, I think so.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    So that's g an require a lot of work from all of us in the –

DENISE MICHEL:                    Interim, yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Yeah. Okay. And I think we don't know enough about Work Stream 4 yet other than we're going to do some brainstorming [inaudible] and I think if we convince ourselves that there's something in the future challenges to highlight, then there will be a section about it, and we'll ask Kerry Ann to dig into that a bit. Make sense?

ZARKO KECIC:                    Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Anybody got a better idea? And then the way this is laid out, draft report, final report stuff just gets tacked on at the end. So I see that draft report stuff at the bottom of the spreadsheet happening after our interim meeting and [inaudible] Kobe so that coming out of Kobe is when we have a draft report. We need all the ideas to share with people at Kobe. The high-level bullets, if you will.



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And then we do the public comment period and then we update the report based on whatever comments we get.

NORM RITCHIE: Are you envisioning that we would have our off-site – sorry, face-to-face, and then we’ll have Kobe meeting? Are we going to tack on additional days ourselves at that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, I was not thinking we would have to do that. But I guess it depends how the engagements go [inaudible] when we share the highlights of this is where we’re going and they go, “What?” [inaudible] one thing and they go, “Yeah, we expected that.” It’s a different [inaudible] You know what I’m saying?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And do you think we – it would be great if we could have a day together at the end, but I don’t think – we could ask for the Thursday or something. Yeah, let’s all get together after the gala.

NORM RITCHIE: The face-to-face is far more productive.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: We are far more productive.

NORM RITCHIE: That's why [inaudible] one block there and then we have another block before the ICANN meeting. I know it's a lot, but...

RUSS HOUSLEY: So you think one before and one after, bookend the meeting?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I'd actually like [that,] because then you get the benefit of having some time together, have our feedback we get during the meeting and then [you come back.]

RUSS HOUSLEY: The before will help us finalize the engagements [inaudible]. Okay. Can you request bookend dates?

NEGAR FARZINNIA: I will just have to make a comment, [which I know is] not very popular, but there is absolutely no – the last day of the ICANN meeting is the last day of any meetings. So having a meeting the day after is not possible, unfortunately. And I know that is essentially non-negotiable from the perspective of [Meetings.] It's part of the policy that the community came up with.

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Before the meeting, there is a possibility. We can certainly have many days as you need before the ICANN meeting, but unfortunately, the day after is not because they're dismantling the [inaudible] and everything, so they're not [inaudible] anyway.

RUSS HOUSLEY: What if we could do it in the hotel? Because we're just trying to get the work done.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: No, I understand.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Ask, is my – we need to be able to pull together, as Norm said, what happens at [inaudible] at those engagement sessions [inaudible]. Even though it'll be mostly [inaudible] Yes, Denise? Are you just thinking, or – I don't know what [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: [inaudible] Okay. So we're still aiming to have an initial draft to discuss with the community. I'm a little hazy now on the timeframe. Are you suggesting that we're posting something in advance of Kobe? Comment, or we're posting for public comment?

RUSS HOUSLEY: We're saying we're going to – the way I read the milestones is we're posting right at the end of Kobe for public comment.

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DENISE MICHEL: Okay. Then it's a 40-day public comment.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Correct. We can [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: [Okay.] So then we should meet somewhere else besides Kobe after the public comment period closes, had a chance to look at them, and then come together and make some decisions. [Is that what you're thinking?]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

ZARKO KECIC: We are going to have engagement sessions in Kobe?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. To highlight what we're recommending. I'm not sure we're going to walk through every recommendation the way CCT has been going around doing, but we'll have to see where we are. Yes, Norm.

NORM RITCHIE: How big do we think the reports going to be? Is it going to be a 300-page report like the [CCT?]

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh my god, I have no idea.

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible] actually read?

DENISE MICHEL: Well, CCT was really heavy on setting the stage for a lot of data gathering and analysis, and I think it made it much bigger and sort of setting out the parameters for future reports. I guess I'm not expecting ours to be as big, because their first step was to engage and write the researchers and do some voluminous research reports that were then incorporated into their report and made it substantially longer. So that's a really long way of saying I don't expect it to be that long.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. Good, okay.

DENISE MICHEL: But who knows.

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, the SSR1 was what, 60 pages?

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DENISE MICHEL:                    Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Let's aim for half.

DENISE MICHEL:                    Alright.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    It is what it is, but we have to say what we need to say.

NEGAR FARZINNIA:                    [I don't think it's that].

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    So the glossary is also substantive in that document.

DENISE MICHEL:                    So we're looking at a January meeting and then a Kobe and then a May meeting?

RUSS HOUSLEY:                    Yeah, looks that way.

DENISE MICHEL:                    Okay.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

ZARKO KECIC: [January end is too early].

NORM RITCHIE: It's I think also [inaudible] or beginning of February.

DENISE MICHEL: Late January.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: You're looking at options between late January and end of February just to see what's available.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Could we do a Doodle for that?

NEGAR FARZINNIA: As soon as we get options back from the meetings team so we know what the limitations are, we'll send out a Doodle poll to the review team.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Great, see which one—

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Please expect a few days of delay because they're packing up the meeting soon and they will be gone for a few days.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sure. No, that's fine. I just want to get a feel for—

NEGAR FARZINNIA: For sure.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Pick the one that lets most people attend.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And it's when and where.

ZARKO KECIC: My concern is not [who will not] come. We will not be ready to draft report.



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RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. I'm worried about that too, but if I don't do the logistics, then if we are done and—

ZARKO KECIC: I know, but what I'd like to say [move that] in February.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Make it February?

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

ZARKO KECIC: That's the reason why I asked how long.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

ZARKO KECIC: [inaudible].

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Fair enough. Alright, are there any other business? This resolves what I wanted to get done today. Is there Any Other Business you guys want to bring up?

DENISE MICHEL: [inaudible] just to check on the [inaudible] of the work plan, what's the status about standing – [inaudible] standing and when are we anticipating answers?

JENNIFER BRYCE: I have to take a minute to count how many. I think there were 17 outstanding questions, three of which was asked for clarification to the review team, and I'm happy to resend those to the list.

DENISE MICHEL: That'd be great.

JENNIFER BRYCE: And then the rest of this, 15 or 14 questions, [inaudible] given obviously this meeting and people traveling as the 2nd of November as a new deadline with the caveat that we will try our best to get answers to you as quickly as possible.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Anything else?

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ZARKO KECIC: What we are going to do with timeline [inaudible] workplan?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think we have the rough idea, and what I would propose is that a few people get together and throw some things together and then send it to the list for us all to kind of [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL: So I've made notes of what we discussed here, the dates we're going to push, and if we could have staff based on those notes update the spreadsheet, and then I'll take a quick look at it and make sure it's consistent with what we agreed to, and then Russ should shoot it to the board and SOs and ACs, and we should post it on our wiki, I think, in terms of the steps to have this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So those rough notes – and you can easily paste them in the Adobe?

DENISE MICHEL: I put them in the Wiki. I mean on the Google docs. And Jennifer –

RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh, you've put them in the Google docs.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, Jennifer put the workplan draft in Google docs, so I just made notes right there. And she's got a link in the Adobe Connect.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: I think I'm looking at a different view – oh, I see them. Okay. I wasn't looking to the right –

DENISE MICHEL: So if anyone else has any additional notes, drop them in.

ZARKO KECIC: I've already [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: What?

ZARKO KECIC: I've already updated the [inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: Oh, great. Okay, thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Great.

JENNIFER BRYCE: I have one AOB minor item on behalf of Brenda, really. So I think with the time zones, the time change, clocks going forward, do we want to move the call back one hour to where it stays the same time, or keep it

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at the same time UTC? Which I think would make it not for everybody but would make it one hour earlier for [some] people.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The time change will make it one hour earlier, but not all at the same time because the U.S. and Europe are not changing at the same time.

JENNIFER BRYCE: It's slightly different.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: To make matters worse.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That would be too easy. So, shifting it one hour early is okay for me. It's the west coast people I suspect making it an hour earlier is a problem. Right?

DENISE MICHEL: I do 6:00 AM conference calls.

KC CLAFFY: KC doesn't. I'm an academic, so no. I have 6:00 PM conferences.

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DENISE MICHEL: Okay. Yeah, point taken.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So we want to shift –

KC CLAFFY: I can do it. It wouldn't be my preference, but I can do it.

DENISE MICHEL: It's not my preference either. I should have caveated it [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: So you'd rather shift an hour later?

DENISE MICHEL: But does that cause it to be past 11:00 PM for anyone?

JENNIFER BRYCE: Well, I think for most people, the clock change, but I can look for a little timetable. So I'll drop a note to the e-mail list to make sure everyone's okay with it, and I'll say something like if we don't hear any objections, then [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's right.

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DENISE MICHEL:                      Sounds good. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY:                      Yeah, it's the west coast people, I'm sure, that it affects the most here.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:                [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY:                      Oh, that's true. [inaudible].

KC CLAFFY:                            [He's always at the beach.]

RUSS HOUSLEY:                      [inaudible]

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:              That's right. Hence the lighter laptop, it's easier to carry around.  
[inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY:                      You need a waterproof one so you can surf.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:              Exactly.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

ZARKO KECIC: I [won't be at our] next conference call.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You won't make it?

ZARKO KECIC: No.

DENISE MICHEL: The next one is a week from tomorrow, right?

ZARKO KECIC: Next week.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Actually, we should probably discuss the leadership call next week, Monday, and the plenary call next week, Thursday as a lot of you might be traveling, either on holidays or business. And especially the Monday leadership call, because it's right after the trip.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Well, I'm going tomorrow, so [inaudible] And Eric's on the same plane as me. Laurin, are you still on the phone?



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LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes, absolutely. And no problem for me.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So let's keep it.

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Okay.

KC CLAFFY: If we're wrapping up now, I'm just wondering – and I hate to ask because I should have been on the earlier call, but is there a one-minute summary of reviewing the old recommendations and where we stand on that? And secondary question, [is there some kind of going to be] public report about what transpired at this meeting? Like a blog entry or something?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I hadn't thought about it because basically, we just did engagement stuff that was outward-looking, and [inaudible] recommendations. And there's a little blurb in that Google doc, the one you've put yellow text in.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Just since we had a miscommunication about what Google doc earlier. And all the three of them have text there. Two of them falls to Scott because it's something [about to happen, we'll still be able to fill it in as soon as it does.] And Laurin has one [inaudible] because he was not able to join us [inaudible] call.

KC CLAFFY: Is the plan to publish that document as is or to use it to create [inaudible]?

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, that's the part where we have now gotten to the point where we've reached – we have a summary of the findings for each of those. Now we're going to prepare the report part.

KC CLAFFY: Great.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay?

KC CLAFFY: Okay. [Thanks.]

NEGAR FARZINNIA: If I may add something, regarding what KC commented [inaudible] about what you guys accomplished here, since you will be finishing

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[inaudible] workplan that will be submitted to the SO/AC chairs, leadership and the board, I'm imagining that there would be a communication that goes out with that workplan to announce it to the community as a whole, [which you could discuss accomplishments] at the face-to-face meeting in Barcelona with the engagement [inaudible] work that the review team did just to highlight a few things, and then of course, [inaudible] SO/ACs and the board.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. We can structure [inaudible].

NEGAR FARZINNIA: Only if that is your preference. There's no requirement.

DENISE MICHEL: That's what we used to do.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: I agree it'd be a good idea. And also put it on a [subpage of the Wiki.]

RUSS HOUSLEY: We'll have a draft then for the next call of that cover letter. Would you please? You know what we did.

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NEGAR FARZINNIA: Yeah. You know what we did.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Anything else, KC?

KC CLAFFY: Well, I just want to thank the ICANN folks for this remote meeting support. It's really almost too good, because I don't see why I'd have to go to these meetings in person. Sorry. But [inaudible] just really appreciate. And I'm sorry that some of the stuff I couldn't find on the Wiki. I totally accept that once you know how the wiki's structured and you remember to scroll down to day two of the meeting, everything is there. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Bye.

KC CLAFFY: Alright. Bye, guys. [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. You can stop the recording.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Thank you.

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**[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]**