

Note about methodology: For this survey, each contributor was asked to rank the four mechanisms in order of preference and also indicate if any of the mechanisms should be eliminated from further consideration in the Initial Report. For each response, the following number of points were allocated to each mechanism: first choice = 4 points, second choice = 3 points, third choice = 2 points, fourth choice = 1 point. If a respondent stated that a mechanism should be eliminated from further consideration, it received zero points for that response. Cells with a value of zero are highlighted in yellow on the spreadsheet summarizing results.

Response	Name	Type	Mech 1	Mech 2	Mech 3	Mech 4	Elimination	Criteria
1	John Levine	Member	4	3	3	0	Please eliminate 3 and 4. External entity has no support. I know from experience that setting up a captive foundation would take another year, be very expensive, and leave ICANN with an expensive useless appendage after we give the one-time auction money away.	experience with grant making, and desire not to spend even more time and money on this one-time accident than we already have
2	Alberto Soto	Participant	1	4	3	2	no	do not want more bureaucracy in ICANN, not the increase in personnel. If there is a need for more personnel, that is as small as possible or assigning double function.
3	Maureen Hilyard	Member	0	3	4	3	1) I would exclude total control by ICANN (Mechanism 1) as the mechanism for the control, access and distribution of the funds gained from the auction of domains. I believe that ICANN Org's current financial situation does not put it in the best position to be making decisions about how best to use the funds for what I believe was initially to provide new growth and development opportunities for global Internet users. While we as a committee have spent months on this, we are all witness to the ICANN's increasing demands for volunteer support yet decreasing opportunities to explore how they can more effectively carry out the mission of ICANN within their communities, to ensure that its decisions are better understood, and its mission outputs employed more meaningfully and more effectively by global users of the Internet. Only by having an impartial but appropriate outside mechanism at least sharing the organizational and administrative roles, and that the guidelines are clearly specified about an appropriate cap on what ICANN Org could possible use for themselves, can I feel that there would be a more egalitarian approach to the distribution of the funding.	My choice focuses on the best interests of communities who would benefit most from the funds in order to achieve the mission of ICANN more effectively for end users globally. While this does not mean some heavy allocations to ICANN Org to improve its technical reach to some of our underserved regions, there must be provision within the regulations of this committee, that constrain access by ICANN to a capped amount so that communities get more direct benefit from the funds that have been gained by the auction of domain names.
4	Elliott Noss	Member	4	3	0	0	yes, three and four as they are most likely to lead to high expenses, institutionalize a "foundation" and to lead to outcomes detached from the community.	the community has great expertise and a great spirit to help, we have been responsible for this gift (excess funds) being generated and we wish to see it put to the best use possible to help people and the Open Internet in the context of the ICANN mission.
5	Daniel Dardailier	Participant	4	3	0	0	Yes, 3, which would take too much time and create a liability when the funding stops? and 4, which would considerably complicate the compliance to mission relevance, transparency, accountability, community participation, etc.	Mechanism 1 offers all the guarantees that the funding agency will be compliant to all the criteria laid out by the CCWG: expertise in mission/Internet goodness compliance, global community involvement, transparency, accountability, quick to put in place, etc.
6	Jon Newett	Member	0	4	0	0	eliminate mechanisms 1 & 3 - ICANN shouldn't reinvent the wheel here.	Cost, efficiency, & effectiveness
7	Gnanajayaraman Rajaram	Participant	4	2	3	1	NO	solicitation, implementation and evaluation
8	Kavoush Arasteh	Member	3	4	2	0	yes, 4 too costly, too dependent	ICANN internal get experience and work toward to transit to mech. 1 in future
9	Yeo Ameen Ameenou Sosou	Participant	4	0	0	0	I wish mechanism 1 to be promoted	the existence of an internal body inside the teams to implementing and issuing solution to the problems related to Internet governance and also documentation. This could necessitate less efforts to raise funds to conduct specific take or missions.
10	Carolina Caero	Member	3	4	2	0	I am OK with removing mechanism 4. However, I believe mechanism 3 should be kept in the report for Barcelona to show the depth of our debate. My feeling is that many would think, given the task at hand, that a foundation is mechanism that would make sense, so showing the challenges that option would pose is a means to help the community understand our final recommendation (which will likely be mechanism 1 or 2).	I would like to answer this question in light of my preferred choice. Mechanism 2 is my top choice because of the expertise and reach that would come from ICANN's partnership with one or multiple external organizations. I think this is a viable add-on, and one that would best equip ICANN to deploy effective and efficient grant-making in the short-run. Distilling these points into specific criteria, I would say: Mechanism's ability to pool needed expertise on grant-making Mechanism's ability to support quick and widespread deployment of grant opportunities
11	Sébastien Bachellet	Member	4	3	0	0	Yes 4 and 3	Cost of the mechanism Multistakeholder implication Fiduciary responsibility
12	Nadira Al-Araj	Participant	4	3	0	2	Yes, eliminate mechanism (3) because it takes a long time to make up an functioning.	Possibility to close the mechanism when the money is totally distributed If we chose (it is not my first choice) need to work with external organization(s), how we will select them? The time to start managing the Auction Proceeds.
13	Seun Ojedeh	Member	4	3	0	0	I support eliminating 4, because of its setup complexity including cost and more so because this will create yet another recurring overhead which can become unsustainable, especially when the funds run out. There is also the administrative back and forth overhead involved since it's expected that ICANN leadership must exercise an oversight over the funds.	I considered the following: 1. Simplicity of setup and shutdown when funds run out 2. Sufficiency of ICANN's oversight responsibility. 3. Flexibility for instance, ability to achieve mechanism 2 exist in mechanism 1 4. Less overall overhead cost 5. Continuity, viability and sustainability of ICANN as an organization.
14	Judith Hellerstein	Participant	2	4	3	0	I support eliminating Mechanism 4. I think this mechanism would be too expensive to administer and take too much time to get it started.	The key criteria I had set forward were: 1) Transparency & accountability 2) How costly would it be to administer 3) Independence from ICANN allows another agency such as a DAFs to implement the process which would help ICANN meet its commitments to the board and to the community. 4) allows for stakeholders to be involved in advising on the grants and setting the criteria. I chose mechanism 2 because: 1) Start up costs are minimal 2) Provides some measure of independence without an over extensive cost involved in the start up and in the implementation. 3) Minimize cost and complexity and maximize flexibility.
15	Alan Greenberg	Member	4	3	0	0	Eliminate 3 and 4. 3 will be expensive (5 and other resources) and may not allow ICANN to be a funding applicant. 4 gives up too much control.	Cost, and alignment with mission and fiduciary requirements.
16	Hada Elmizawi	Participant	4	3	0	0	I support eliminating 3 and 4. Set up time and cost are minimum if we are talking about mechanisms 1 and 2. Don't see any additional benefits from mechanisms 3 and 4, they are more costly and add more restrictions (in case of mechanism 3, ICANN will not be able to apply for any of the funds) and in case of 4, ICANN must still be involved to ensure that the fiduciary responsibilities are met.	
17	Sylvia Cadena	Member	3	4	0	0	I will support the elimination of the mechanisms 3 and 4 proposed. These 2 mechanisms will require at least another 12 to 18 months of work to get established (if not longer) and the costs are quite unknown. It will be better to focus on the selection between mechanism #1 and #2.	I think it is important for ICANN to recognize its strengths and weaknesses and to choose mechanism #1 will give ICANN the opportunity to learn about grant management, due diligence and compliance through a partnership with a DAF (For example the Tides Foundation) as many other medium size donor funds do.
18	Adetola Sobesan	Participant	0	2	4	3	Yes, Mechanism 1. Its against the purpose and core mandate of ICANN.	ICANN focus on core mandate. Possibility of different semi-independent Auction Proceeds management. Possibility of Fund raising without conflict with ICANN mandate. Possibility of Transparency and Accountability
19	Mel Lin Fung	Participant	3	4	0	0	Yes, I would eliminate 3 and 4	Setting up an entirely new foundation and the overhead of working with a separate organization would take away from the learning that ICANN should be getting from embarking on this new use of auction proceeds.
20	Juff Heitingus	Participant	1	4	2	3	No	Concern about creating new, complicated organizational structures that will take on a life of their own, as well as concern about finding and retaining sufficient expertise.
21	Clara McKnight	Participant	2	3	4	0	No	A arms length organization is important
22	Stephan Deenhaake	Member	4	3	2	1	No	At the end of the day these funds are ICANN's funds, and the Organization's number one priority is to insure its survival. Thus they need to have maximal control over the funds.
23	Marilyn Gade	Member	2	4	3	0	Yes, eliminate #4. This is long overdue to eliminate wasting time of both CCWG-AP members, ICANN staff and the external consultant retained and funded by ICANN org. Rationale: Existing mechanisms have missions/purposes, and an existing Board - it is not at all simple to ask such an entity to modify their bylaws/processes to take on new processes that are defined and prescribed by ICANN's mission/new criteria to their core functions/mission established by CCWG-AP/other ICANN community/Board agreed criteria. The amount of oversight needed will be similar to Mechanism 1 and 2 and Showever, it is even more complex, as commissioning an existing foundation on "Trust" to assume such functions could require extensive time for such an entity to seek to modify its bylaws and processes. It is quite unclear how oversight of an existing foundation on "Trust" could be undertaken. This has been referenced earlier within the internal comment processes, and also by the external paid consultant. It is time to eliminate it and focus on what might be feasible and practical within ICANN's larger challenges.	Concerns about some of the analysis provided: The ICANN org retained external consultant has suggested that options 2 and 3 are more time intensive than option 1. It not clear if this seems to indicate a preference. But, this seems to indicate a complete misunderstanding of ICANN processes, which is understandable as ICANN is indeed a unique organization, with a strict need to adhere closely to its core mission and to respect its unique not for profit status. There are also concerns about Option 1. While questions about ICANN's need to adhere closely in its core mission have been raised, the responses from the external consultant are not satisfactory to us. The consultant, staff and some CCWG - AP members also seem to equate creating the GDD and the PTI with how a grant making process will work within ICANN. In earlier comments, there were questions about such assumptions, and at least some also strongly questioned the ability of Option 1 to achieve needed independence from ICANN and to protect ICANN from external concerns of those who are not fully supportive of ICANN. Repeating statements that ICANN knows how to segregate funds is not a fulsome response to how to establish an independent grant making and management process. It has been acknowledged that for Option One, new staff with required skills/expertise would be required, and that they would then be dismissed once the fund management/allocation concludes. The usual salaries for grant management is much less than what ICANN staff are paid, so bringing this internal to ICANN would result in significant additional costs and lead to creating an internal mechanism that would then need to be dissolved when the funds are fully awarded and grants are completed, thus will lead to the need to either create term limited approaches to hiring new expertise, or creating an exit strategy with external costs to pay for such staff to depart ICANN, often with termination costs, as is typical within ICANN. Co-mingling of purpose - to use existing staff part time - but compensate their time - also has to be carefully considered given that the community was advised during the Budget Review process that existing staff are fully engaged in ICANN's existing work responsibilities in fulfillment of ICANN's core mission. While this is necessary for option 2 and 3, it is much more limited than what would occur for option 1. During the Budget comment process, some in the community, including the IC strongly objected to further increases of ICANN staff, and to continued pay increases for existing staff. A proposal that seems to have staff engagement to create yet another unit inside ICANN has many concerns; and especially one that is acknowledged as a special "unit" where no expertise to actually manage a grant allocation/oversight/management/review process exists within ICANN org. Priorities: 1) ICANN must be extremely careful to adhere closely to its core mission and must avoid any situation/actions that could cast doubt/jopardize its not for profit status 2) A high priority must be placed on avoiding situations where political/geopolitical questions will naturally arise, given ICANN's unique status - creating a new temporary grant making internal mechanism will raise many concerns including about independent decision making, integrity of process; ability to intervene to improve a grant project that is struggling; preparing oversight of grant allocation and grant management; preparation of effective reviews of awarded grants. 3) Avoiding a situation where ICANN tax returns require detailed reports/inclusion of grants awarded. In our view, implications for tax reporting and ICANN's not for profit status are not yet fully documented for the options proposed. However, at least, at our insistence, it was acknowledged by the staff engaged consultant that Option 1 would require all grants to be listed on ICANN's
Total Score			64	73	32	18		

Mechanism 1 Summary: ranked as first choice = 11 responses, ranked as second choice = 4 responses, ranked as third choice = 2 responses, ranked as fourth choice = 5 responses, recommended eliminating = 3 responses  
Mechanism 2 Summary: ranked as first choice = 8 responses, ranked as second choice = 11 responses, ranked as third choice = 3 responses, ranked as fourth choice = 0 responses, recommended eliminating = 1 response  
Mechanism 3 Summary: ranked as first choice = 3 responses, ranked as second choice = 3 responses, ranked as third choice = 10 responses, ranked as fourth choice = 6 responses, recommended eliminating = 12 responses  
Mechanism 4 Summary: ranked as first choice = 0 responses, ranked as second choice = 4 responses, ranked as third choice = 7 responses, ranked as fourth choice = 11 responses, recommended eliminating = 14 responses