
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: This meeting is now being recorded.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks everyone, thanks for coming on the call. One of our last plenary calls here, we're just trying to mop up the last bit of the report and get it done. Is there anyone on the phone that is not on the Adobe Connect?

CARLOS RAUL GUTIERREZ: Yes, Carlos is on the phone only, sorry.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks Carlos. Does anyone have an update to the statement of interest? Alright, hearing none, I am just going to pass the microphone to Jordyn Buchanan.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: [inaudible] sorry, I can't see Adobe Connect.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Sorry, updates to recommendation 12.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Can we jump into the agenda, to [inaudible] I should be in a normal office in 10 minutes.

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Okay, sure. Let's jump to David, Drew then.

DREW BAGLEY:

Okay, why don't I give a high profile overview of this, then I will let David dive into the specifics of what we are now calling recommendation 17. So just to clarify with the email traffic back and forth, the overall proposal going on right now, is that no matter what we would promote what we now call recommendation 15, which calls for enhanced contractual requirements which will give ICANN compliance the tools it needs to enforce against systemic abuse and really raise the stakes where they need to be, because of the [inaudible] we identified and the safeguards we put in place as part of the new gTLD program. So, the amount of work we've already approved that one unanimously, but there is right now before us a potential to improve upon that. Jordyn's intention to improve upon that was to then, [inaudible] the need for recommendation 17, however, there's also point to be made that we could improve it with Jordyn's proposed language and I think maybe some added additional language from David, regardless of whether or not we approve recommendation 17 in the end, or regardless of whether recommendation 17's split. Either way that's one component that's certainly improving that contractual language, and then a second component, is that in addition to ICANN compliance, being able to better address systemic abuse and having those tools, we are discussing again whether or not there should also be a DADRP that would provide another mechanism to address systemic abuse. I think Carlton did a really great job at... for those of you who read that email... at addressing what actually is intended here even though maybe we didn't do a good enough job in the language.

Basically, you would have additional contractual language that would give life to the DADRP. That would be the... those would be the abuse components of the contract that the DADRP would be used to enforce against. There would be two different meanings here to enforce against this systemic abuse that is currently plugging the DNS and better data has demonstrated. So that's the big high profile overview and then I will let David dive into the specifics.

DAVID: I can dive in, how do you want to do this? Do you want to look at recommendation 15 first and then recommendation 17, or?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, actually yeah, and then I can even [inaudible] let's do that one first actually, since that would be the prerequisite anyway. I was just saying too, there really has been confusion that's because of us, because there were originally different ways we were looking at doing this. 17 would actually be something that would exist before 15, things like that but, where we actually landed is no matter what, recommendation 15 would be the prerequisite. So, here with recommendation 15 and Jean-Baptiste, maybe you might be the best one to chime in, is everything in orange and green the new language?

DAVID: Yes, well I can say that. Yeah, everything in orange and green is new language, orange is Jordyn's and the green bit is mine, David.

DREW BAGLEY:

Okay, so we already approved this one a while back, so the improvements upon this one are... you know, putting in my teeth for what the criteria would be, with regard to creating an enforceable contract which would hopefully prevent systemic abuse, and would certainly allow ICANN compliance to go after those who were associated with systemic abuse and doing nothing to abate this sort of abuse. It's along the lines of what we've seen, of course, with dot science and dot com, and other TLDs called out in the report. I will just give everybody a moment to read it, and David if you want to chime in about your edits and I know that Jordyn may want to [inaudible] on the call.

JORDYN BUCHANAN:

I am on the call, I just don't have Adobe Connect powers. [inaudible]. I guess I can't have the phone and data at the same time. I will just add, which I think is an important point. My edits here were intended as a consolidation of 17 and 15, intended to take us into the threshold that was provided in 17 that David had suggested that 7% threshold, and instead make that... introduce some triggers, both for ICANN to automatically begin compliance increase, as well as then to create a presumption that, if it gets to more than 10% abuse, they sort of presume the registry is doing something wrong, they have to rebut that presumption, instead of presuming that they are doing something right. Which is, I think, what is currently the general case, that the ICANN has to prove that the registry is doing something wrong, enough abuse in the TLD seems reasonable to say. No doubt the tables have turned now, the registry has to show that it is actually taking strong efforts to prevent abuse in the registry or that the finding of abuse is incorrect.

But that was intended as a consolidation with 17, in order to make 17 unnecessary. I actually don't think, like procedurally, since we're just supposed to be reacting to the public comments, no one suggested any changes to 15 so unless we're doing this as a consolidation with 17, I actually don't think procedurally we have a basis to make these changes, so I would just say my view is pretty strongly, doesn't make total sense with the consolidation with 17, but if we're going to try and keep 17, then we should just leave 15 as previously approved.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

I will just add to what Jordyn was just saying, I was just noticing in the document I was just showing you, there's what you was referring to as the criteria, maybe it was appearing in the footnote, but basically there would be a two tiered approach. Whereby, if a party was associated with 3% overall abuse, over a set period of time, then that would alone trigger an investigation. Then if they were found to be associated with 10% abuse, then that's where they would be in breach of their contractual obligations.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Presume to be in breach, but still have the opportunity to...

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Yeah.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Does anybody have any reaction? Because, first I guess react to this, discuss this, then as Jordyn was suggesting, move into whether or not 17 is something that is still necessary, still helpful or what not, or if we made these changes would it not be.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Let me, to just give everyone a little bit more context as David and Drew and I talked about this quite a bit before the changes came about, but at a high level I think the contracted parties and registry operators in particular, think its really really hard to deal with individual cases of abuse. Registries in particular don't have any relationship with the registrants, sometimes abuse isn't even propagated by the registrants, it's an outcome of a domain that's been hacked or something like that. It's really like, very unclear what the registry is supposed to do about abuse on an individual domain. Which is why I think the contracted parties generally push back quite a bit on the notion of like, affirmative requirement to like, react to do something about abuse on a specific domain. Once again, especially the registries. The registrants at least have a relationship with the registrant. So, you know, the registrant has heard of GoDaddy or [inaudible] or whoever their registrar is. Whereas, the registry, they've never had any relationship with this entity before, so it is very hard to imagine like a successful engagement with the registrant. However, I think we all agree when we start to see like, some of these TLDs, that there's 10% abuse or even more. That's not the case of like, falling to deal with a few individual cases of abuse, to some [inaudible] going on there and that's probably something that's in the registries control, in most of the case, or in the registrars control. Sometimes the registries and registrars are affiliated, which puts it in

both of their control. But as we saw from the DNS abuse report, the way that Drew put it, abuse is not random. There's a small number of TLDs that really have a lot of abuse and it's reasonable to believe that systemic abuse is something the registries can and should do something about. So that I do have, [inaudible] really focus on that, say let's work for, as opposed to having ICANN play whack-a-mole and try to deal with specific cases of abuse, we're just going... sorry about that... which is sort of ineffective, because it's hard to figure out exactly what a registry should be doing and ineffective because dealing with one domain name at a time is not a good way to deal with systemic abuse. Instead if we shift the focus to dealing with these systemic issues, and specifically set some quantitative thresholds, which the community sort of things, you know if we look around and see, there's basically sort of what we call normal TLDs with less than... with more than 3% abuse and certainly not more than 10% abuse, setting some thresholds where ICANN automatically starts looking into it. Then subsequently where we sort of say, hey if you're at 10% abuse, you're probably doing something wrong, either show us what proactive steps you're taking, to show us the planning [inaudible], otherwise we're going to assume someone else... that you're not living upto your [inaudible] and make it so that ICANN doesn't have to play out the stronger case, give them another tool in this presumption of breach. So, that's really it goes to sort of look how we think about dealing with abuse, which I think also should address... it's hard for me to understand why we need a third party mechanism if we give ICANN these sorts of tools in order to address the core problem we're trying to get to here.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Thanks Jordyn. Then moving onto David jumping in on the DADRP... who is that?

CARLTON SAMUELS: This is Carlton, can I jump in here?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Of course.

CARLTON SAMUELS: So, Carlton for the record. Just to extend on what Jordyn is saying. My view of it is that this is [inaudible] tool top where the RARAA agreements do not work, because right now under the rules, the registry and the registrar must have agreement to speak to DNS abuse, and malware, and all of those things. When it rises to the threshold we are talking about, it means that those agreements are not enforced and the idea, as I understand it, is that the DADRP policy is a [inaudible] to those agreements be unenforced. So, if we look at it that way, we could see that we... with my suggestion about recommendation 15, we could literally conflict, bring together 17 and 15. Because that's what I thought would be useful here. Now, I can still live with the idea that we keep the two as is, separate, then you keep 15 and 17 without any amendments to 15. That to me would work. I think [inaudible] to 15 because, 15 in this case should simply state that we expect a codification of the DADRP in the contract for registries and registrars. That's my view of things, thank you.

JORDYN BUCHANAN:

Hey Carlton, it's Jordyn. So, you're right in saying that the only obligation registries have today is to include statement in their downstream contracts, basically saying you shouldn't engage in abuse and only specific types of abuse at that. I think, to the point I made earlier, I think it's very... talking about enforcing that agreement it's actually very hard for a registry to enforce that agreement on an individual case of abuse, right like if some registrant gets hacked and malware is put on their website, now there is malware on that domain, what is the registry supposed to do about that, it has no contractual relationship with the registrant, it doesn't provide their hosting. Really all it can do is like, take down the domain, which is perhaps, in cases of really [inaudible] abuse, it's maybe the right thing to do. But maybe in like some poor website admin just didn't do, is using the wrong version of Wordpress or something like that, seems pretty extreme to just nuke their domain because that's the only tool that the registry has available to them. So, I think that's a weakness with the contractual thing work we have today, is that the only sort of expectation is that the registries like include this provision that they can't really do anything about and then we all get sort of upset on... the registries are upset, they have this obligation that everyone accepts that they are not enforcing it, but it's like, what are you going to do about it. I think we are very different from the cases, like, the problem with dot science is not that half of the registrants got hacked because they were [inaudible]. The problem with dot science is that organized abusers, like realize that they can get domain names for one cent each, they used the tool provided by the registrar in order to generate a bunch of random domain names and then they went and registered them on mass for the specific purpose of abuse. Right, so the registry can do something about that, they could

look and see, there's a huge chunk of thousands of domains that's registered by a bad few, turning those domains off is a totally reasonable thing to expect a registry to do. Working with the registrant partner to prevent them from, you know, creating this sort of like, make your spam domains tool is another reasonable thing to expect registries to do. But, and ICANN should have the ability to deal with that mass abuse and like there should be an expectation in the contract that when mass abuse happens that like, ICANN can and should be doing something about that and when it gets bad enough we just sort of presume the registry is the bad guy, so ICANN doesn't have to like lay out a case to demonstrate the ways in which they are encouraging it. I don't think we need... we don't need a DADRP as a backstop, right? Right now ICANN doesn't have... there's nothing in the contract that lets ICANN say, the systemic abuse is happening, I am going to like, find you in breach. Instead they have to play whack-a-mole and sort of say, what do you have this provision in your contract, we debate about whether they're enforcing it or not. So it's done case by case. This is just... to give ICANN the ability and the presumption that they are supposed to pay attention to these systemic abuse cases, like we've identified in the DNS abuse report. So, I just think we can clearly do that through these changes I proposed through recommendation 15, I don't think like... there's no reason to think that we need an additional enforcing mechanism. As [inaudible] pointed out, like [inaudible] pointed out it doesn't do anything differently than what ICANN... it's just crazy, it's like ICANN enforcement, go do this, and then if that doesn't work, for some reason, take it in front of a different panel and have a different outcome. It's just like adds a bunch of bureaucracy [inaudible] make a

clear mechanism that allows ICANN compliance to go after these [inaudible] they don't have today.

CARLTON SAMUELS: Yeah, everything you say there Jordyn I understand and agree. I am just... we think that maybe we can make one small... the smallest addition to 15. I am fine with it. I totally agree with the rationale, it makes sense [inaudible].

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Carlton, may I ask you to speak a little bit louder please Carlton. Thank you.

CARLTON SAMUELS: Sorry Carlos, I was saying to Jonathan... Jordyn... that everything he says I quite agree with the rationale, it makes sense to me, I will go with it and see what happens.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Thank you, I fully agree with you Carlton. The logic is flawless.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Drew and David, the fine point is obviously on that [inaudible] why that other mechanisms still useful in the context of these changes. Do you want to address that directly, since that's... the discussion is going on?

DAVID:

Sure, I will chime in on this. I was going to go back to what Carlton had said just before Jordyn come in there where you were saying about... where you thought take out the new modifications for recommendation 15 and keep in 17, which is effectively what you've said Jordyn. Those were sort of put in there as a replacement for 17 and it's all into the... enforcing the [inaudible] accreditation agreement with beefing up in the clauses, or indicating we want them beefed up. So I am okay with that, at the end of the day. If we do go down that route, I think what you've put in 15 is more helpful and puts a bit more pressure on where we want it to go, but I still think recommendation 15 has that in there, suitably on the version which we've agreed. So, recommendation 15 as we agreed previously, is okay. It's a little bit weaker, but it's still pretty clear to me on what that's doing and where that's going. I think coming back to the, effectively whether we need a DADRP or not, which is what we've discussed for 6-9 months, I suppose, and we had the sort of majority view that we did, and the minority which we didn't and so we've got your minority statement there which is what we've gone through Drew and I, and tried to amend recommendation 17 D, to sort of cover off some of those points. As well, I should just sort of, we went in circles around Panama because we were liaising with ICANN in many ways, we compared this with the PDDRP for trademarks, so we were trying to get in language where that was put in place in a fast track manner. We thought the PDDRP, so we put in language there which people haven't seen, whether we were trying to put in the DADRP happening earlier, ahead of any amendments to the contract because that's what I understood, we understood at the time, it was possible and it turns out that it isn't possible, so that wording has gone in and come back out. That's where we're left with recommendation 17 D as it

stands. I suppose, I hear exactly what Jordyn says and I think everyone on the call here doesn't look... you have to be pretty stupid to stand up on a CCT review team and say we think DNS abuse is great, bring it on. We're clearly all in line there, that we don't think DNS abuse is great and we should do something about it. From my point of view, which is where when we started looking at the DADRP, there's a clear weakness in the current agreements which are in place and as Jordyn says there, there's an obligation to say that you shouldn't engage in abuse. But that isn't enough for ICANN compliance to deal with the systematic abuse as we're seeing in dot science, dot top, and ones which we've identified. The fact that they've been alive and around since before we started the CCT review team and two and a half years after we started the CCT review team, they are still there with high levels of abuse strikes me as something I actually find as completely unacceptable in the area which we live in.

Because you're just letting that DNS abuse go on and everyone is saying, we can't do anything as ICANN compliance because the contracts don't allow us to, and registries saying we can't do anything because we don't have a contractual relationship. Everyone is sort of seems to be saying we can't really do anything, we can maybe do it on an individual basis if people complain which is what we go around doing on an individual basis complaining, and it takes a lot of cost and resources. So, that just seems to me as the situation which shouldn't be there in the next 5-10 years, when we're looking at where we're going and the internet and DNS. So the fact that there's no... there's the clear weaknesses in the current agreement, what we do agree on is that it will be good to get those amended, and that's where we think that's exactly the way it

should go, but the idea of the DADRP is an additional avenue and it's [inaudible] trademark PDDRP, it effective to empower an ability to address systemic DNS abuse. So, I think it's worth it, again, you've got to look at the DADRP, we are proposing that it should be considered by the community. So we may find a community battle going on, where the community says a lot don't want it and others do want it. We've had a lot of positive support for it, so we're proposing it and at the end of the say, the community we should do that. I think it doesn't detract from the contractual aspects, I think it actually shines a light on it and focuses on the weaknesses that are there and it provides another means, an additional means, and again I take on... yes potentially additional bureaucracy, and I understand Jordyn you're saying that we don't need a third party mechanism, but if we have that in place and we said yes, we don't need third party mechanisms, we wouldn't have the UDRP, we wouldn't have the URS, we wouldn't have the PDDRP. So, they're always listed, the PDDRP was resisted tooth and nail by registries and registrars, because it was something that was going to be abused, ect. But look at the result of it. The result is there, it's been around since new gTLD program, it's never been used but there is no TLD out there which has 10% or 50% or 30% of their zone file infringing trademarks. Maybe it hasn't worked whatsoever, maybe it's really worked incredibly and registries have thought we're going to have a real issue with this, nobody knows, but it was put in place. Yes it took a bit of time to put in place and I was on the RT drafting it and it went through various sort of redrafts. But it was there and it's been put in place and I think it serves a purpose and it's been effective in serving that purpose without even being used. So, this to me is just [inaudible] and I just fine, to be frank, that DNS abuse worse than the trademark abuse at the end of the day

because of what goes on and we seem to turn this blind eye to it. It's too easy... it's a bit like global warming, hey, something a bit similar to that.

I just feel like we should be putting something in place or suggesting that something in place and that the community looks at that and goes through and looks at the pro's and con's and that... to me that pure focus on that will be a benefit to everyone really addressing the contracts and making sure that the contracts have what's necessary. Because the contracts are supposed to have what's necessary now, because it's in there and the registry should not engage in abuse, but it happens and we struggle to do anything about it. So, that's my issue, beating the dead horse, I suppose, going on from what you've put in there earlier. Yes, it feels a bit like beating a dead horse in the other way around, because we're just not able to deal with it. So this might be a way of dealing with it, and maybe it won't, but I think it's worth a shot to be seriously considered, and I think it's something that is quite good that CCT review team puts it forward as one, even if we've got a majority, minority, it's focus, people have the focus and we say there very clearly, it needs to be specifically recommended that the ICANN board prioritize and supports community work to enhance safeguards and trust due to the negative impact of DNS security abuse on consumers. I think there's a lot of stuff in there which I do feel is very good and very useful, and again when you read through on the details, etc, it's not something which kicks in and early on before anyone else has done anything, it's a procedure which the idea is it applies when ICANN compliance and it's in the details if you want to read in that. ICANN compliance is unable to resolve a complaint related to DNS

abuse and the registry operators and registrars are identified as having excessive levels of abuse. It's when compliance can't, for whatever reason, and we have these examples where compliances has not been able to deal with abuse at the registry levels where it's new gTLDs, but we've succeeded in taking down the DNS abusive domain names across numerous ccTLDs without any issue. So why is it that the gTLDs, certain gTLDs won't take it down? That to me is the issue and if ICANN compliance can't get it taken down, then that will be the situation where this would kick in and hopefully would succeed in taking it down, if ICANN compliance doesn't have the powers to do so. I think it's a two double process, and I think it's beneficial and stronger by having both is my view, but over to anybody else.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: We have a queue, we have Jamie and Jordyn.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Thanks all, thanks David. I don't think anyone disagrees that DNS infrastructure abuse is a problem, that it is perpetrated on a systemic level by a handful of contracted parties. So the question is, how do you deal with it? My concern is that a DRP alone that is not based on new substantive obligations is like bringing in the national guard without any weapons. They can't do anything because they have no new rules to enforce. So, unless you're... the premise is the contractual compliance department is falling down on its obligations, on its responsibilities to enforce the contract, which you know, this group may find and I would be the last person to stand in the way of that. But, bringing in a new

DRP, adds some new substantive obligations on contracted parties is going to accomplish nothing except cost. It's [inaudible] with no new rules. You know, if there are new obligations that are brought in as a result of the recommendations and they are put in place, in that instance it may very well be appropriate to have a separate panel that takes on, for example, complex cases, new cases, you know, issues of definitions that contractual compliance is not in the best place to adjudicate. Similar with the rationale with went along with the [inaudible] DRP was not just a new panel, it was a new panel that was going to... that was set up to adjudicate new obligations and there are some of those obligations that everyone agreed were outside of ICANN's remit and so ICANN contractual compliance may not be in the best position to adjudicate those. So, again to be absolutely clear, I am not going to vote in favor or against a recommendation that includes a DRP, but I do think that investing in a DRP that does not have added obligations to enforce, is a waste of the community's time and money. Thanks.

DAVID:

If I could, just on that Jamie, David here just on that point. How... I mean on that... if that argument is taken, followed through about the... the additional cost to the community, etc, then we wouldn't have had a PDDRP, for trademark enforcement would we? That was created in a similar...

JAMIE HEDLUND:

It is not the cost alone, it is the cost, you know... is it offset by benefits and with the trademark stuff, it was offset by benefits, the UDRP, the URS, the [inaudible] DRP, all those, you know, have... they are not just forums that exist in a vacuum. They exist to enforce certain specific obligations, with this one, unless the contract is supplemented and amended to include new obligations on contracted parties to address DNS abuse, you have a forum with no mandate.

DAVID:

I get that, but then... but again it's being prepared. We are not sort of drafting it, we are not putting it together, so it's proposing it to tying in exactly as you say, this would be the way it would be put into place, and it would have those separate contractual terms, but it seems to me way too early for us to be delving into that here and now, and when we looked at the PDDRP proposed in 2009. That was proposed and there was no discussion then about, we can't do it because, you know... those terms didn't exist in the contract then, it had to be changed. But, it didn't stop us doing a PDDRP. Here to me, it seems we're even that step ahead of it, we're just saying, hey guys we should do something like this, because something needs to be done, so a DADRP should be considered. We are not saying it has to be done, it has to be put in place by whatever means to do this, should be considered by the community and if the community turns round and says, actually no there's no need whatsoever, because we agree everything needs to come into the ICANN clauses and they will be brought in, then everyone looks and waits, and sees, and if they're in there, they're in there. If they are not in there, people will turn round and say, we should have had a DADRP, or we should have had those clauses specifically relating to the DADRP. It

does feel like a sort of a... I don't know... I struggle with it, because the two parties of the contract are the registries and ICANN, and neither want this. So, I get it. [inaudible].

JAMIE HEDLUND:

There is a logical sequence to this, that one is, you create new substantive obligations, or requirements and then you think about how to enforce it, you don't put in an enforcement mechanism and then later say, oh well, maybe we should add something for that enforcement mechanism to enforce. So, what I am suggesting is that the emphasis, again and now speaking as... contractual compliance, it would be great to have new powers under the contracts and then we can enforce them and we would have no problems, just with the [inaudible] for some of those, either for [inaudible] discretion or our discretion to flip those over to a DRP. But only after there's a DRP... only after there's new requirements to enforce by either us or the DRP. Just to be absolutely clear, I am not saying that compliance should always have the first shot, I am not saying that at all. I am just saying that there should be new... it would make sense first to focus on beefing up the obligations, once that's in place, then looking at... if those get in place, then... for the community [inaudible] at the same time or afterwards, you know beefing up the enforcement mechanisms. Thanks.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

The line is forming, I know Jordyn had his hand up and then Jonathan raised his hand. Maybe Jordyn's hand is down. Really quickly, I just wanted to respond to you Jamie and along the lines of some other

comments. I think that... I mean from my perspective, I completely agree with all of that, so perhaps part of the issue is the way in which DADRP, the proposal has been worded, has been a little bit like a frankenstein in the drafting process, which I know we don't even actually still been [inaudible]. At one point we were looking at the prospect of this being a mechanism that could actually go into place quicker than what would be required to amend the contractual language for ICANN compliance to get the powers to the degree ICANN compliance needs. However, by looking into that we realized that was not the case, so therefore, now with the most recent version of the DADRP, the intention is to have those substantive obligations in place and then the DADRP to be another mechanisms to enforce such obligations, rather than the DADRP being an enforcement mechanism in search of a purpose or in search of language, and to David's point, since we can only propose that such a policy be considered and then the actual policy work would go onto the community, you know, I guess what we're trying to emphasize is that two parts where the DADRP would serve as an additional mechanism if ICANN compliance is unable to address the abuse. So, for example, [inaudible] so complex that ICANN compliance is ill suited for it, and then also to serve as the deterrent effect that David was noting. Which I think really, for some of the reasons that Jordyn is opposed to it, would probably serve as a deterrent effect. With that said, just so we kind of solve what we need to solve today on the call, I guess right now we should quickly discuss, regardless of whether a DADRP exists, should 15 be amended or should we keep what we already had. Then if 15 should not be amended, then that's where we could, you know, perhaps then use some of these proposals, number 15 and 17 in one way or another. So, I think that

there's absolutely consensus, because we had [inaudible] before that contractual language needs to be amended in some capacity to give ICANN compliance the power to go after systemic abuse, and so I know... Jordyn's intention was his proposed amendments and David had some language in there too, but of course, then we absolutely would not need 17. But I think we should look at 15 on its own with these amendments, do we like these? Yes or no. Then move onto the [inaudible] 17 and whether we will go forward like last time with the majority adoption, minority statement and then Jordyn would update that minority statement. Or what are our thoughts on that? Sorry, background noise. Jonathan, you can go ahead. Then Jordyn.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Oh, Jordyn had his hand up first, put it down and then back up again, so Jordyn... I don't know where we are. I was going to ask a couple of questions, and I guess I will go ahead. I am sorry. This is a cart and horse problem as Jamie has represented, does it make sense to mention a potential need for a DADRP in the details of 15, as a potential enforcement, additional enforcement mechanism if 15 is accepted. Maybe the question for, for David and I am not sure I understand it is... if we don't get 15, is there a basis for the DADRP, in other words, is there something in the contracts today that a DADRP would be attempting to, you know, provide additional enforcement for. Or, is the usefulness of a DADRP dependent on the passage of, or the acceptance of, the implementation of 15. I guess that's the question I have coming out of Jamie's discussion. I don't know whether to ask David that now, but that's what I thought I heard from Jamie, is that in a sense one is dependent on the other and if that's the case, it's just a linguistic issue

of saying, if such updates are made then potentially, its possible that the additional enforcement mechanism may also be necessary, and David's point would be let's not wait 7 or 8 years from now when we found out that we wished we had it, to put it in place but make it dependant now. I guess that's a question for David. Is there something? If there was a DADRP in place today, would he have contracted provisions that he could act upon? Are they dependent upon the implementation of recommendation 15?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

I think it's a possibility, certainly to look that way. Certainly have to think about it and think through it. I suppose it's where I wish... it does feel like the chicken and the egg. It would be nice if we could have a DADRP in place now, and that's where we did move to, almost on the argument that if the system isn't doing what it's supposed to do and compliance have got difficulties today, can we not put in place a DADRP to deal with those issues until we can amend the contracts appropriately. That's where we were a few months ago and we seem to be saying we could go down that route, and then we kind of discovered we couldn't and I'm still not quite sure why we can't, I have to say, because I get lost by it all. The kind of argument its not in the contract so we can't have it, but it almost sounded like you were saying there Jamie, that there is a way of having it in some place where compliance is helped by DADRP which is put in place now on the existing...

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Only if there is new substantive obligations as well.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yes, how could we do something, or propose something like that? Because, whichever way we look at it, the way I struggle is we're having a DADRP or contractual amendments which are 2-6 years away, so we just don't do anything for 2-6 years, and I just struggle with that.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Even if that's the case, having a DADRP isn't going to make anything better if there is nothing for them to do, that compliance can't do as well.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Could the DADRP not be a [inaudible] situation where we didn't have the four, because we didn't have registries with such concentrated levels of abuse. Instead of dealing one by one, as Jordyn says which is the difficulty for registries and for complainants, we have this situation... given the situation which exists, how do we deal with these concentrated DNS abuse TLDs, because we're just not dealing with them. They are still there.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Understood, but new enforcement mechanism which doesn't have enforcement powers isn't going to help the situation.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Because the enforcement powers will need to be built into the RAA, yeah.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Right that happens first, that makes sense.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Is there no root where the DADRP is discussed and saying, yes well actually we could put in place a small amendment which gives it the powers in a similar way to the PDPRP which has a number of powers going through from sort of blocking new registrations, blocking renewals, just blocks new registrations first I think, and then potentially can stop renewals or move off renewals and ultimately can end up with a nuclear option of a TLD having its accreditation withdrawn, but obviously it never goes that way because things happen before then. Is that something which we could ever envisage? To get something in place earlier where we have an EPDRP putting something through, and something in place there to, in the meantime whilst we look at the complete redraft of the AIRA in due course, whenever that may be.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I am not sure I completely follow but I think what you're saying is you do have some new rules, obligations in place first, before you have a broader overhaul, and again, you know... if you do that and those get put in place then you know having a DRP afterwards is a reasonable thing for the community to consider, but putting the DRP in first with

nothing that it can do more than compliance can do currently, is... it strikes me as a wasted resource.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Yeah, I don't think there was the intention of necessarily putting it in, in place before any contractual arrangements, or you know... because the RAA whatever, I am just trying to think here, that was amended for... this is where we came across the issue, that was amended so that the PDDRP could be implemented. That was when that amendment took place, but the problem is that the PDDRP had gone through from 2009 to 2012, three years of consideration. So, it evolved into a way where it could then fit in and be put into the contract. That's why I think here, again seems to be if the community is able to look at this and say yes, we can see the pro's and con's of a DADRP, similar to the PDDRP, it worked upon. Then when the contracts are amended, that's when it is plugged in. If we can amend the contract to put in place a change in the rules now before sort of the more thorough overhaul, then we've managed to do something quicker and better to lance out some of these TLDs. So I suppose it depends on how we can phrase that and put that in. That could go then in as a footnote, as you say Jonathan, to recommendation 15 and we sort of try and reword this into that, but it... I don't know how we do that.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Yeah, quick question along those lines of what's been proposed so far, would there be consensus if 15 was amended with this language and then as Jamie, maybe Jonathan, maybe Jordyn as well, I think are

alluding to, or maybe even explicitly referenced, we would then have in the footnote of this, a reference to the fact that a DADRP may be another mechanism that should be considered to enforce such new contractual provision. Then, we would still have 17, but 17 would be [inaudible] upon the part, if after consideration... if after the adoption of the pre-requisite in 15, and consideration by the community of which mechanisms are necessary to address, to tackle this systemic abuse. A DADRP was considered, this is... we recommend a DADRP should, you know, address the following things or look like this, and basically have kind of what we have for 17 in place, but in a much more [inaudible] way because, the DADRP, of course, would have to enforce something and what we're talking about is enforcing 15 and what I think we all kind of agree is that ICANN compliance should have these powers and so then this would of course, be if the community thought the DADRP would also help in enforcing those things. Would that be something we could have consensus on as a team?

JORDYN BUCHANAN:

So, this is Jordyn, I will jump in and just sort of say a couple of things that have been queueing up in my mind for a while. So, first of all, David was [inaudible] earlier that we have all these like, extra ICANN compliance abuse and Jamie mentioned about one which is [inaudible], but we have PDDRP, URS, and UDP. All those are because we decided as a community that ICANN compliance was not the right forum to adjudicate those matters. There is no part of the contract where you get a second chance to enforce it if you don't like what ICANN compliance did. I think that's fundamentally the problem with the current proposal for the DADRP. That's actually how you guys keep talking about it, which

is like, [inaudible] ICANN compliance looks at it and they don't actually do anything about it, and we want to be able to run and tell mommy that ICANN compliance is doing a bad job and have someone else do their job instead. There is no precedent for that, it's not the case that in the URS, first of all the registry takes like... registry or that ICANN compliance takes a look at it, and then ICANN compliance can't decide whether those trademark infringement or not, and they punt it to the URS. No, we decided as a community that ICANN compliance is not a trademark enforcement body and so therefore, trademark disputes should be adjudicated outside of ICANN compliance. That's a totally reasonable step to take, we wanted to say that ICANN compliance is not the right body to adjudicate topics of DNS abuse, I think that would be weird. I think DNS abuse [inaudible] I think we mostly agree that ICANN is actually responsible for with its security and stability mission. But if for some reason, Jamie decided that this is not within ICANN compliances remit, then it would be totally reasonable to say like, okay, this sort of dispute is not going to be resolved by ICANN compliance, it is going to be resolved by someone else. I think that's a reasonable decision that the community can make as part of deciding how we want to deal with systemic abuse problem. What I don't think is reasonable, and we don't think any of the contracted parties are ever going to think is reasonable, is to first of all have ICANN compliance decide something and if someone in the community doesn't like it, then they get to bring a second case in another venue [inaudible]. So, I think, it sounds like we all agree and I think we should focus on it, that like ICANN... there should be a contractual provision that does something about systemic abuse. That provision does not exist today and so when we talk about the fact that like ICANNs not doing anything about systemic abuse, well

it's because they can't, because the contract doesn't say anything about systemic abuse today. We want to deal with that, let's create contractual provisions that deal with that. We can make a footnote that says, if as part of considering how to implement that provision to allow ICANN to create a contractual obligation to registries and registrars that deal with systemic abuse, if we decide the right forum to adjudicate that is not ICANN compliance, then we can create a new DRP. I am fine putting that as a footnote, I still think that's a little weird because I do think that it seems like something ICANN compliance ought to be reasonable at resolving. But, we could flag that as something that the community can consider, but I don't think we should propose a standalone thing that's like, second fiddle to ICANN compliance that other people gets to invoke when they think ICANN compliance is doing a bad job. Every dollar in every hour this community spends trying to set up a DADRP is a dollar and hour that is not going towards ICANN compliance doing a good job. There are finite resources and I think we are very aware today that ICANN has finite resources. I don't understand why we spend a ton of money setting up this new dispute resolution procedure, instead of just giving Jamie like two more people in order to do a better job, like making sure they have time to track down these compliance cases. 15 seems to address, like everything David and Drew say they want to fix, is addressed in 15. Like 17, sure you could do it, but there's no reason to. 15 should solve the problem, if we don't think 15 is going to solve the problem, let's keep working on 15 but I don't think we need to add another process which is going to be a distraction from a problem we are actually trying to solve.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: [inaudible] there is a lot in that, which i'd comment, but I suppose how giving it, Jamie, still more people from the money saved by the community not doing a DADRP resolves anything, because I haven't seen anybody saying that Jamie can't do it because of not having enough staff. So, I don't get it.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Can I jump in? I raised my hand but I am not sure who is looking at the queue. I have been listening to this and also I've read the arguments, here is how I see it and people can jump in if I am wrong. What I hear mostly is that to echo Jamie's comments that the concern here is that you want to have authority in the contract first, to deal with this issue, new provisions that actually create an obligation to meet, therefore you can enforce it and that is the sequencing problem that Jamie is concerned about, and as I hear it, Jordyn is concerned about also, that there will not be this extra process that hasn't lived in the contract first, and in terms of how we then deal with recommendation 17, if all of that is accurate and I'm assuming that it is, then I think the proposal in 17 then really should live as part of 15, whether it's a footnote, whether it's an [inaudible], a reference to an appendix, but it does seem to me that instead of making an contingent recommendation, which I think would be a little odd and inconsistent with our current approach. We want to have all of this living in the same recommendation as something for the community to consider, if these contract amendments are in fact, embraced and then created that then this could be another amplifying alternative. That's my suggestion, because it seems like there is a lot more that we agree about than we disagree, and it's really where this

extra process should live. If I've mischaracterized anyone's position, I'll of course, be corrected.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

I can certainly speak to that. I'm not adverse to that, and I think that it does make sense in many ways to join them together because they are linked, rather than I am not some... I don't want to sit there and say we have to have a separate recommendation. Then I suppose it just depends on how much of the recommendation the ideas of it get tracked across into the footnote, relegated to a footnote, I can put that on my epitaph, just relegated to a footnote, or an [inaudible] addendum. It just depends whether you end up as a one liner, a footnote, or you sit there and say you have a one page footnote, so it gets quite complex. But, we could lose the recommendation and bring it into recommendation 15, I think we could work through that and figure it out. Starting at some good suggestions, probably is a good way forward. The other point, just picking up on... it's on the sequencing point you raised there first Laureen and exactly as you said Jamie, and picking up with Jordyn, I just saw in the chat a little bit earlier you said, you know, we could have a contractual amendment by the bilateral review of the contract. Is that a suggestion we can make as an interim process, or an interim idea that we have a bilateral review of the contract, given these high levels of DNS abuse. That is what we recommend, because that ties in... that is effective of where we're wanting to go and so we're not sitting on this for six years, or four years, or three years. We can do something quick, and if we can do something like that then can we join and push forward for that.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Hey, this is Jonathan. Thanks David. I don't know if that's treading into being too explicit in our recommendation, but maybe that's the place to do it. That might again just come down the language that we suggest that this needs to happen sooner than normal processes, and that one way to do that, be that sort of language that we're trying to scrub into the recommendations, it to do a bilateral review of the contract and look at adding these additional obligations on registries and these changes of presumptions, and then as part of that, you know, tell us there should be a discussion about whether or not additional enforcement mechanism is necessary, or that we believe that with additional mandate compliance would be capable of handling this. We could probably phrase the recommendation in that way, so that it gets some prioritization and [inaudible] of the community, and we can it a prerequisite to deal with prior to any subsequent procedures which I think will bring people to the table. Since there seems to be a few people [inaudible]. Jordyn, go ahead.

JORDYN BUCHANAN:

Yes, so... I think that's fine Jonathan. I was just saying on chat, I can take a stab at pulling 17 into 15. I actually think it would be super helpful to talk about the substance of 15 since that is the proposed change to give more contractual peace to systemic abuse. Jamie said earlier that he would love to have more powers in the contract, or more requirements in the contract. I would be particularly interested if he has feedback on the proposed changes, the thresholds in particular, is that a useful mechanism in order to allow compliance in order to engage these sorts

of problems. [inaudible] was expressing concerns about the thresholds. Like it would actually be really useful to talk about, as opposed to talking about the enforcement mechanism, which we spent doing. What do we think about these actual changes that are intended to allow ICANN to deal with systemic abuse?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Jamie, are you in a position to give feedback on that?

JAMIE HEDLUND: Not really authoritative. I mean, you know, I can tell you, as you'll know that the dollar is based on publicly available [inaudible] and we would hope that that leveraging those [inaudible] which are publically available, will address Calvin's issue. Whether it is 3% or 10%, I would... I am not in a position to say. I think it'd be great to get some operational security folks, SSAC or OCTO, get their view on what the right number is.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yes Jamie, it's not the numbers, it's more the question of is it helpful sort of compliance framework to think about having thresholds in which you sort of say, aha, you're above X percent, that means ICANN should probably be paying attention to this, and you're above Y percent and we're just going to assume you're a bad guy at this point.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yes, absolutely. I mean the way we are looking at the dollar list is seeing that a handful of registries and registrars are responsible for a large

majority of reported DNS abuse. That helps us focus resources going forward and I think that logic holds generally for determining a threshold for abuse level for a contracted party. I just... I really like the idea of using an outside, you know, outside feeds or outside sources but... that would help contractual compliance a lot, in determining who to go after and on what basis. But again, I don't have an opinion on whether or not that magic number is 3% or 10% or two [inaudibles] or 20 [inaudible] or you know, percentage of abusive domains under management, according to [inaudible] there are lots of ways of getting at it, which are probably better than others and I am just not in a position to say which, but I think the community would be.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Yeah, no, exactly. I think the idea is that we are not going to set definitive thresholds, or say which list to use or anything like that, but roughly say we should have this sort of approach, that focuses on systemic abuse and that there should be thresholds to allow sort of a clear guidance to both compliance as well as the registry operators, as sort of like, here [inaudible] operating in. I think it's pretty easy, like we should spend a little bit and once again this can probably be implementation as opposed to us. We should spend a little time looking at patterns of abuse, I think if we chose 3 and 10%, it looks to me a naivety, to like no registries... you know, you wouldn't accidentally capture anyone even at the 3% threshold, that didn't seem to be part of this systemic abuse, you don't look at any... even some of the ccTLDs, like [inaudible] has relatively high levels of abuse compared to the average new gTLD, but you wouldn't accidentally capture any of those with the thresholds that we're talking at, they're much more at the 1%

in general. I agree we don't have to sort that out [inaudible] community as part of the implementation.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Makes sense to me.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: David is that a new hand raised?

DAVID: Yes, I do. Thanks. I just wanted to pick up on that, what Jordyn says and both Jordyn and Jamie on that, I do agree. I think the threshold and it's really the first time we discussed that, wasn't it, Jordyn when we had our chat back 2-3 weeks ago and this 3 and 10% came up. I had thrown out that 10% right at the very beginning on the DADRP and I was expecting to have a discussion several times, we raised it a couple of times and there was never any discussion whether it should be 20, 5, 4, 3, etc, looking at it, as its quite a difficult thing to go into but it is effectively what we're on about, we're talking about systemic abuse so there has to be, some sort of definition of systemic. But then Jamie and I, we had a chat about you know, whether we don't put a definition in and then just, again, quite interesting to [inaudible] and say we pushed that through into implementation. But, the paragraph I have put out there in the chat about the PDDRP, that's actually quite interesting as it ties in, in the same way here because it says whilst its not possible to define a specific threshold, as to what amounts to systemic cybersquatting. The panel needs to take into account all relevant facts,

surrounding circumstances. So even back in 2009 when we were on that, we started looking at thresholds and we got stuck on them as to how you put in place the threshold and what is systemic. So, it's a thing we can go around and round in circles on and never actually get to where you're at, which is quite possibly why when I was looking at this, I was thinking, well let's have a dispute mechanism which backs up compliance and lets get compliance contract beefed up. Just commenting on that and if we can do something then that's something we can consider some sort of contractual amendments, or suggest a contractual amendment on a bilateral review, so for a full review of the contract something is put in place earlier on, then I think that would be a great success of the CCT review team in responding to something which, frankly we haven't... we as a global we, as everybody, have not been able to deal with, and that I think is the issue. The registries can't deal with it, ICANN compliance can't deal with it, and whether it's brand owner, because we've tried to deal with it and we're filing complaints and we're playing the whack-a-mole, and you look at the costs and you go, you pull back and go we can't deal with it either. So, if the CCT review team can at least suggest something which hopefully leads to the dealing of it then I think we've done a good job.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Thanks David, I guess the next action item here is that Jordyn is going to take a look at trying to combine the two to make sure that this conversation to be happening in parallel. A lot of this we're going to head over to the community to discuss, and part of that discussion will be the best [inaudible]. I think built into this is the notion that it should happen sooner rather than later and I think that would be reflected in

how we prioritize the recommendation, and it could be that we need to make a prerequisite because of the urgency of getting this fixed. But I guess the next step is for Jordyn to take a... hopefully, very soon a cut at maybe blending 17 into 15, in a way that it isn't entirely submerged but suggests that they are part and parcel of the same thing.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Does it make sense not to volunteer anyone yet doing that... does it make sense for Drew and David actually to make the first cut on that, since they are the ones proposing it and I think they have a pretty good sense of the direction this is going, and then Jordyn can look at it. It just seems to me that they as the authors who put all the time and thinking into this, primarily, if not to disregard all the good input we've got from Jordyn and Jamie, etc, would be best positioned to take a first stab at this?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I can speak for Drew and he would love to. Sorry no, that was David.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I know that Drew is not on the phone anymore.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: No, we can certainly, we have to try and do that tomorrow, because I really did want to try and go on vacation for the second week of my vacation. So I'll have to try and do that tomorrow or Friday, but then I am happy to do that and ping it to you Jordyn, because I think we know

where we're going on this. I do find Jordyn reasonable, despite anything else I might say.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Alright, so I guess the key here is that Jordyn will be working on this at the end of the day, on Friday, regardless of whether or not he receives something from David. [inaudible].

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah that gives them a window. I just would rather see them take a first stab at it, I sense that Jordyn is going to shorten whatever it is, and I don't want to start with the shortened version, I want to start with what Drew and David see as optimal and then we can move from there.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Alternatively and maybe in parallel, perhaps Lauren, because I think you're the wise one on this team, you can make an objective stamp through on it. So, if you feel like you could, I would be happy to welcome that, because we are going to go at it slightly differently, I know Drew and I will go at it one way, Jordyn will go at it another way, and then we'll hopefully find a meeting, you might actually get to that meeting point before we do and just say hey, that's exactly what I propose isn't it. Feel free, because I think it's helpful, because you are more objective on this.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: [inaudible] David.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Okay, so everyone will get their ideas to Jordyn in the next two days and he will attempt to deliver a consolidated version after that, in time for the start of next week. Does that work for everyone? End of day Monday, perfect. Alright, we have a plan. Thanks everyone. It's a good discussion and it's obviously something that may turn out to be one of the most important things that we're doing, given that a lot of our findings are so soft, this is one of the harder ones and it would be good to find a viable solution.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: We want to go back to [inaudible] do we want to just wrap up?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: What's 12 of that [inaudible] go ahead please, you are back on Adobe Connect now, I guess that you can type in it. Alright excellent, thanks Jordyn.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Sure, so this is just a revised language on the... the topic of the incentive / disincentives around other types, like non open TLDs, and so I attempted to add some language, first of all... at the very start of recommendation 12 where it says create incentives [inaudible], I think that may have been in the last version I don't remember. Then you'll see in rationale related findings, I wrote like a long thing saying like, here's why no one ever creates restricted TLDs and some of these are structural problems and [inaudible], and that's the type of thing we

need to think about addressing. Just to your point Jonathan, the last time we talked about this, we started talking about why the current fee structure works against small TLDs, etc. So this is intended to get sort of the narrative that we've been... that has developed over the last year or so talking about this topic, to get that captured in the report to help people sort of understand why we think it's important to have ICANN think about these sorts of incentives and disincentive structures, so that ideally speaking these types of TLD that consumers expect of us, actually come about. I'll just leave it at that and see if anyone has any questions or comments?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: [inaudible]. Go ahead Laureen.

LAUREEN KAPIN: This is Laureen, I thought actually this is very good. It really provided those examples about what the disincentives are here and made some much more explicit. So, I thought that this was a real improvement.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Great.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Does anybody else have comments or questions on it because I think we're going to call this approved, absent objections here on this call, because we have a decent number of review team members on the call, etc. Does anybody have an objection to the language that is written

here? It is really just an [inaudible] of conversations that we've had, so there;s nothing that's shocking here. Now we have two people typing.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I think the only comment that I would make additionally, is that the thread about the safety and security of users personal sensitive information isn't really picked up in the rationale at all. I think in the original version we did explicitly call out one of the... survey and there's also been some articles about the public concern about this and that seems to have dropped out from the rationale.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah that can be, I can go and take a look Lauren and see if there's anything [inaudible] and try to put it back in.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Okay, I just think for completeness that thread should also be picked up in the rationale and related findings. There is a rationale and related finding for that [inaudible].

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: That makes sense, I will... I didn't.... the original recommendation was in your sub group, so I will look to see if I can find anything, if not, I may have to sort of defer back to you and the sub team to figure out where to pick that thread up.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: That's fine. It should be actually in the section that just precedes it in the text.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah, I will see what I can pick up and take a look at it and the history.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Okay, [inaudible].

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Jordyn, is that realistic end of day Monday as well?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Hopefully, I will try.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I think it's going to be a line.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah if I can find text already that I can copy paste in, it will be easy, otherwise, hopefully... I will see what I can do.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Okay, if you have trouble loop back with me.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yeah, I will.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Okay, alright I think we're there. So, we will make that addition, either Jordyn on his own or together with Laureen and make that addition but otherwise we'll consider this to be approved language. Excellent. Next steps. Jean-Baptiste, do you want to take the floor for that?

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Yes, [inaudible] one slide on screen. I just wanted to provide an update on where we are right now and just wanted to mention as well, that there was some... there were many updates to the record and you receive today the latest version of that final report. So, this is what I had prepared before this call, but I have changed a bit regarding recommendation B, but this will evolve in parallel, as per your discussions today. [inaudible] today the new and latest version of the final report and you have until the 20th August to submit your edits, comments, suggestions, or concerns on the final report. Next we do the plenary call scheduled to highlight the changes made to the report, and ensure calls for consensus. I guess there will also be another discussion on the updates made to recommendation 17, well the merge between 15 and 17, and after the plenary call next week, there will be another week for you to submit any final objections and that [inaudible] report, and then after that, so in two weeks from now there will be a plenary call for final consensus and adoption of the final report and also will be confirming the [inaudible] that will remain available once the

recommendation [inaudible] provide input. Do you have any questions on this timeline?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Thanks Jean-Baptiste, I think this is very reasonable schedule approach. We had a little editing session here in DC that made a lot of tune ups to the language and also went through a process of looking at each of the public comments that were submitted and kind of given them a plastic case as to how we'd handle them which I think will be the first time we've seen that in the context of the ingestion of comments and so there will be a lot for folks to take a look at, when you see the final report, a lot of it is in the details. So please do give it a read when [inaudible] circulates it today. So, thanks everyone for your efforts on this and do take a look through it, but we're very very close, just a couple of things we're trying to get going here. Any other questions or comments? Is there any other business? Alright folks, thanks for getting on the call. We're almost there [inaudible].

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Thank you, bye-bye.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Thank you.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]