



AL-ALAC-ST-0418-02-01-EN

ORIGINAL: English
DATE: 10 April 2018
STATUS: Ratified

AT-LARGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ALAC Statement on the Plan to Restart the Root Key Signing Key (KSK)
Rollover Process

Introduction

Alan Greenberg, At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) Chair, Hadia Elminiaiwi, ALAC Member of the African Regional At-Large Organization (AFRALO), Javier Rua-Jovet, ALAC Member of the North American Regional At-Large Organization (NARALO), John Laprise, ALAC Member of the NARALO, Lutz Donnerhacke, member of the European Regional At-Large Organization (EURALO), and Sebastien Bachollet, ALAC Member of the EURALO, developed an initial draft of the Statement on behalf of the ALAC.

On 22 February 2018, the first draft of the Statement was posted on its At-Large workspace.

On that same date, ICANN Policy Staff in support of the At-Large Community sent a Call for Comments on the Statement to the At-Large Community via the ALAC Work mailing list.

On 25 March 2018, the ALAC Chair submitted comment. On 02 April 2018, a version incorporating additional comments received was posted on the aforementioned workspace and the ALAC Chair requested that Staff open an ALAC ratification vote.

In the interest of time, the ALAC Chair requested that the Statement be transmitted to the ICANN public comment process, copying the ICANN Staff member responsible for this topic, with a note that the Statement is pending ALAC ratification.

On 06 April 2018, Staff confirmed that the online vote results in the ALAC endorsing the Statement with 13 votes in favor, 0 vote against, and 0 abstention. Please note 86.67% (13) of the 15 ALAC Members participated in the poll. The ALAC Members who participated in the poll are (alphabetical order by first name): Alan Greenberg, Alberto Soto, Andrei Kolesnikov, Bartlett Morgan, Bastiaan Goslings, Holly Raiche, Javier Rua-Jovet, John Laprise, Kaili Kan, Maureen Hilyard, Ricardo Holmquist, Sebastien Bachollet and Tijani Ben Jemaa. 2 ALAC Members, Hadia Elminiawi and Seun Ojedeji, did not vote. You may view the result independently under: https://www.bigpulse.com/pollresults?code=539151mifrfBGRhjvyfkiYs6sA.

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The ALAC and At-Large Community understand the need to roll the KSK but parts of the community have strong concerns for the potential impact on users world-wide.

We believe that a holistic review is needed including a risk assessment of the alternatives, in time for further discussion at ICANN62. The assessment should include then current information related to the RFC 8145 trust anchor reports, the prognosis for availability of the in-development IETF "sentinel" mechanism and the potential for using the sentinel mechanism to create a greater level of comfort prior to the KSK rollover.

In parallel, ICANN should ramp up its awareness campaign using all possible conduits to reach ISP, telcos, and governments as well as critical sectors who must be able to continue to function post-rollover and who may be in a position to communicate with key DNS providers in their regions. Banking is one such sector that must not be put offline and which may have valuable contacts in their local areas. RIRs may have good contact information for large ISPs and other large users in their regions.

ICANN should also make available an information packet, in at least the languages ICANN normally supports, and preferably more, which will allow users and businesses to understand the issue (i.e. in simple terms) and tell them what they need to do/ask with regard to their local ISPs.

ICANN should provide a simple test web address and/or application that will allow users to verify if the resolver they typically use is DNSSEC-aware. If it is not, then they are likely to be unaffected by the KSK rollover. If their resolver is DNSSEC-aware, then they should be told what to do to try to verify that their provider is aware of and prepared for the rollover (recognizing that the technical support most endusers can contact will not likely be aware of terms such as DNSSEC, KSK or Rollover). http://dnssec.donnerhacke.de is an example on which such a tool may be modelled.

ICANN should provide a list (either viewable or searchable) of DNS resolvers known to be DNSSEC enabled for which we definitively know either do or do not have the new trust-anchor installed, and the awareness campaign should describe how end users can check this list. An automated app that users could run on various platforms would be even better.

Lastly, the At-Large Community has concerns that the rollover is scheduled to take place on a Thursday (and most likely Friday in some parts of the world). That seems like a plan designed to maximize and prolong any problems. We would like to understand the potential and possibility of a minimal delay to ensure that the day-of-the-week issue reduces impact instead of increases it.