
DREW BAGLEY: Hello, and welcome to whatever sub-team call this is. I don't know the number, but Jonathan does.

LAUREEN KAPIN: 39. 39th sub-team call.

DREW BAGLEY: Oh, 39. There it is. I see it: 39th sub-team call and perhaps the lowest attended. I am going to go over the feedback we received for the DNS abuse recommendations and the modifications I've made to either the recommendations or the body of the DNS abuse chapter itself to try to address concerns that were highlighted or take into account suggestions that were made by members of the community in the public comment period.

Starting with Recommendation A, Recommendation A was we had looked at our approach as being a carrot and a stick model if you looked at our recommendations holistically. This was the carrot recommendation where we proposed that there perhaps should be incentives given to registries and registrars that adopt certain best practices with regard to proactive anti-abuse.

Our mechanism for doing this was to suggest that such incentives be part of new contractual agreements when they're negotiated and that ICANN org should actually go about negotiating agreements that take into account such measures. We suggested that it would be up to the

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community to figure out what those incentives would be but that they should also look at financial incentives among other things.

With our feedback for this – and Jean-Baptiste just told me we have presentation rights. So I'll scroll to the recommendation itself so we can go over that before I go into the edit. Here it is with the edit.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Wait. Could we just make that bigger? This is tiny. Great. Much better, thank you.

DREW BAGLEY:

With the feedback we received, this is one where we had members of the community that absolutely supported it. Seven supported it, four comments were against it, two were neutral, and three did not address this. Of the people who commented, there were more that were supportive of it than opposed to it. But in terms of the opposition, it seemed to be concerns around ICANN's mandate itself, liability shifting in terms of what this would mean then when there was abuse if there was now this expectation and some sort of incentive given as part of that expectation that a contracted party would be implementing some sort of a DNS abuse best practice. And then also one party was concerned that our analysis actually did not prove that there was any sort of need for this.

So those who were supportive of us, I would categorize them as being enthusiastically supportive. Some even proposed going a step further

and being more proscriptive the types of mandate and making sure everyone [inaudible] registry and whatnot.

But we obviously discussed the diversity of the DNS and the fact that there is going to be and should be a lot of different models as far as being completely open registries as well as registries that try to tailor themselves toward different needs and therefore might be closed to certain registrants. So when we came up with this recommendation, we did take all of that into account.

Nonetheless, I went back through and realized some of this might be that it might be a caution with implementation is all that's really needed to address some of the concerns and for others I saw that it was important to actually better highlight and point out some of the text we already had in the body.

In terms of changes I made to this, I made minor changes to the recommendation itself so that the community could look at both whether there should be a mandate or incentive so that way we're not being so proscriptive with that. Because this is something where to address some of the concerns with how an incentive would turn out it might be that there are certain things that would be mandated that all parties need to do and other things would be incentivized. That could, I think, address some of those liability concerns.

And then also I reiterated in the rationale ICANN's actual mandate and what's part of its commitment to "the operational stability, reliability, security, global interoperability, resilience, and openness of the DNS and the Internet." And then made the text a bit more specific to talk

about what we saw in terms of there being technical abuse issues. It could have been flagged from the get-go and then therefore prevented before they became abusive registrations. And also included the term “best practices” in our rationale and findings so that it’s more clear that we’re deferring to the community to identify those best practices.

Along those lines, I pointed out some best practices of actually one of the commenters, M3AAWG, up at what is now maybe Footnote – let me scroll up – or 73, rather. I did not modify our language here. We talked about the fact that “Consequently, monetary incentives may exist for registry and registrar operators to prevent systemic DNS abuse by proactively screening registrations and detecting malfeasance.” So as far as proactively screening registrations and detecting malfeasance, that actually is in M3AAWG’s best practices for cloud and hosting providers, so other parties in the Internet infrastructure ecosystem. But I wanted to point that out because I think that was good for us to have another resource as to where this is already being done in the Internet ecosystem and where it has already even been recognized as a best practice. So there’s some additional language there.

And then with regard to this specific recommendation, I did go ahead and add another sentence with one of the highlights from the study about where proactive anti-abuse would have likely made an obvious difference because the study noted the top domains that were registered and later for used for abuse and 75 of them were permutations “apple,” “icloud,” or “iphone.”

So I added a sentence afterward in case that wasn’t clear for some of those who commented in the public comment that these registrations

were presumably suspicious at the time of registration but nonetheless delegated and later associated with abuse. So that way, I'm hoping that better highlights the example where we see that proactive anti-abuse would make a difference where the existing safeguards put in place as part of the new gTLD program that were supposed to prevent the proliferation of the issues identified by the community beforehand, such as this type of abuse, those alone did not prevent this sort of thing. So that's why I added that, to highlight that.

I think for this particular recommendation, I think those are the modifications for that. There certainly could be another I'm forgetting about. I'm scanning the text again [to see] if I made any others, but I think that's it.

So for Recommendation A as far as the feedback and our update, does anybody have any feedback?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Drew, just to recap to make sure I have the gist of the public comments, the people who opposed mostly opposed because they felt that this may go beyond ICANN's mandate and our definition of abuse wasn't precise enough. Have I covered the ground there, or were there other reasons for opposition?

DREW BAGLEY:

Sure, yeah. There are three buckets, like I was saying, that I put the opposition in: ICANN mandate, liability shifting, and then the underlying basis of our conclusion.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay, so liability shifting, can you just go further into that?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. That feedback was about the fact that if a contracted party is accepting some sort of incentive, such as a financial incentive, in exchange for adopting abuse best practices, then the fear would be they would be held to a higher standard if DNS abuse occurred in their zone for registry operators or with domains that they had registered for a registrar and consequently they would be liable for abuse in a way that they're not today. Which that certainly was not something we discussed. That certainly was not something I read from our recommendation. But I think hopefully the language is clarified a bit both so that we're talking about the fact that there could be mandates and incentives as well as making it clear we're talking about the adoption of best practices in the rationale/related findings.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Right. That seems a little speculative to me.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, it was speculative and I think that we were purposefully broad with our recommendations because we're being so deferential to the community to fill in the gaps with the specifics. So that's a concern that maybe would need to be addressed then if there was some sort of specific proposal that came up that would imply a shift in liability.

But I read and re-read ours and could not find a way to read it that way where all of a sudden we're making them culpable for the parties that are actually engaging in the abuse. Instead, we're trying to provide more responsibility for preventing abuse to begin with and not shifting the liability of harm and damage caused by the abuse with Recommendation A.

Obviously, you could talk about Recommendation D – which we're not talking about today – but in a way about liability shifting and all that, but not Recommendation A from my reading. But nonetheless, I'm hoping this is now clarified there.

And then with ICANN's mandate, it was about the fear of the slippery slope of content regulation as well as disrupting the market and effectively doing content regulation that way where you're giving incentives to some and not others and that's blocking some people from participating in the market was the way I read that critique.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

That's helpful. Thanks. I know you went over it twice essentially, but I just wanted to make sure.

DREW BAGLEY:

No, absolutely. I probably go over things [awful] the first time, so you help me. All right, Carlton has a comment. Carlton, by any chance, I know you generally do not have reliable audio, but do you have reliable audio today? If you could speak a bit more about that. You are typing, so that's probably a negative.

LAUREEN KAPIN: I read Carlton's comment as saying how could they object and interpret the suggestion for incentives to be more proactive is somehow increasing their liability. That's how I am reading Carlton's comments. Have I interpreted correctly, Carlton? Oh, there we go.

DREW BAGLEY: Great. All right, thanks, Carlton. Okay, so then with Recommendation A, I think here just if anyone has any feedback, it probably should just be focused on how we can improve it and make it a better recommendation because I think already with the clarifying language I've added I think we already have overcome what would have otherwise been valid criticisms because they were criticisms that were based on perhaps a different interpretation than we intended for this recommendation.

So I think that's clarified, and then similarly the critique that our analysis did not support the underlying basis of the shift from reactive to proactive anti-abuse, I think that criticism itself is actually flawed. It only addressed the study itself, which obviously our analysis is based off of looking at the history of what was identified by the community and then what was called for to mitigate the problems anticipated by the community.

Looking at all the safeguards as they're implemented and then looking at quantitative DNS abuse analysis to see whether or not the new gTLDs had drastically less abuse because all these safeguards were functioning so beautifully and that's all that was needed and obviously doing a

holistic review of everything we came to the conclusion that the safeguards alone did not prevent abuse and that there was more needed.

And then, in fact, the DNS abuse study did actually show where proactive anti-abuse measures would make a difference in terms of those maliciously registered. [inaudible] distinction could be drawn between maliciously registered and those legitimate registrations that are later compromised.

With regard to the example we have with the iPhone technique but then obviously with M3AAWG's own best practices, you can be looking at things ahead of time before something goes bad or before something is reported as bad to determine if it's actually being used for something bad.

If anyone has any other feedback, just please e-mail me. I anticipate it will just be edits to the chapter of Recommendation A to get it better but not drastically changing it. But obviously, if someone has a different idea on that, then let me know too.

With that, I'll move on to Recommendation B. Oh, and then I guess here's one other. You may have seen this, Laureen. I don't know if you have scrolling rights, but here is the other language I added to Recommendation A in the Details.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

No. Jean-Baptiste, could we all get scrolling rights? Because I would actually like to be able to move up and down in this document.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Drew, is that okay?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Okay.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Great, thanks.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: You should have scrolling rights now.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Perfect. Thanks. Okay.

DREW BAGLEY: So I included this sentence. Sorry, I thought everyone could see this before when I was talking about the language I put in to clarify the liability shifting in Details.

LAUREEN KAPIN: “If mandated, ... [it] should be focused on....” Right, right, right. “If mandated, then this...” You know, I’m not sure that just saying it is

going to do it. Part of this is because – let me take a look at this. My struggle here is I’m not convinced that the comments make a sufficiently strong argument about this being interpreted as liability shifting in the first instance. I don’t know that we can simply say this doesn’t do that. I think I want to think about this a little more. I’m not sure that a simple statement saying this doesn’t liability shift is perhaps the right approach because I’m skeptical of the argument in the first place.

DREW BAGLEY:

Right. So this language is actually because I also added that because of the critiques about the ways in which incentives could modify the market since we’re deferring to the community to look at mandates as well as incentives, then this sentence is about those that would be mandate, so the requirements are mandated with regard to adoption of these best practices. That’s what that sentence is addressing. But with that said, I’m absolutely open to completely removing it.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Well, my thinking is maybe – but again I need to think about it a little more and maybe go back to the comments – but “If mandated, then this requirement should be focused on the technical abuse related to the security and stability of the Internet,” and then I would say, “and enforced like other contractual requirements.” And if we still want to deal with the shifting liability, maybe we can think about saying, “It is not intended to form the basis of an argument to shift liability for the

underlying....” You know, something about “it is not intended to” rather than just this bald statement.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay. Yeah, that sounds good. So then I will look at that. I’ll revisit it myself too, but then absolutely if you have some good language, then send it to me and I’ll incorporate that.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, I’ll add that as a note to myself.

DREW BAGLEY: Then for Recommendation B, when we talked about the carrot and the stick, this moves on to the stick where because we saw from the data as we know from published cybersecurity research that comes out even if you look at annual reports and whatnot, we know that there are registry operators and registrars for which there are very high levels of abuse. So to combat concentrated abuse, particularly systemic unabated abuse, we came up with this recommendation.

The feedback for this recommendation was overall supportive. We only had one against. That was the Registry Stakeholder Group. Their opposition was on a few different bases, but in particular the big theme of it was I guess this fear that they and others in the community might have about the use of third-party data to do enforcement and the data that would potentially come from the DAAR system and whatnot.

So again, it's one of these where we are directing it to the community to do the specifics of how this would work and whatnot. But with that said, obviously, we don't want data that's out there to be completely ignored and we're all just waiting for the perfect dataset and all this before even an investigation could begin.

So what I did is I went ahead and clarified this a bit more because, as I mentioned before, we were intentionally vague with these recommendations and broad. But now I'm realizing to make sure that these really do get adopted by the community, we need to perhaps be a bit more specific in the way we envision these things.

Then the other sphere of opposition was a presumption of guilt based upon this third-party data. So instead, I went into more specifics about really how this would work. Even though it's supportive of the initiative, it definitely mentioned ICANN Compliance. You would know this just as well as me, Laureen, but the GAC comment mentioned that their responsibility should ultimately lie with ICANN Compliance for this.

So you can see I went and did many edits, but it doesn't change the substance of what this recommendation is. Rather, it just changes our specific implementation recommendation and how an investigation would be initiated as well as how something would be rebutted.

What we're now calling for here with this language, if we agree on this language I've added, is something where ICANN Security would actually, particularly in an era in which they're getting more and more data and they see all this stuff, they would actually play a role in helping to verify the systemic abuse alleged against an operator here.

So if you had a complaint come in to ICANN Compliance or some sort of published research made ICANN Compliance aware of the systemic abuse of one particular operator, then they would launch an investigation. That's something where instead of just merely relying upon the fact that a bunch of domain names appear on a list, the ICANN Security team could go and actually attempt to resolve those domain names – and obviously, you would have some that would have aged out – but try to determine from a technical standpoint if they are in fact abusive and that there is merit to this concept. That's how it would go, and then it would still be rebutted in the same way.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

This is an interesting point, and this discussion, first of all I'm interested in Jamie's views on this because I didn't get the opportunity to see Jamie's edits yet, but it does make me wonder if some thought should be given to suggesting some sort of alert that the Security folks could actually give to Compliance when the data shows a systemic problem or a prolonged problem.

There's no meat on the bones of that suggestion in terms of specific triggers, but it does make me think that if we have all this information that actually can raise red flags in certain situations, then shouldn't there be some sort of mechanism for Security to be alerting Compliance so that further action can be taken? Because basically your Details now talks about Compliance stuff.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, that's what we have now, and that's exactly what Number 2 is: "ICANN Compliance should initiate an investigation into a contracted party's direct or indirect (such as through a reseller) involvement with systemic technical abuse if they 1) receive a formal complaint alleging unabated, abnormal, and extremely high rates of technical abuse, or 2) if they are otherwise made aware of such a situation, such as via published research" – oh, I have a typo there, but basically that's what I'm intending – "public research or by." Instead of "as by" it should say "or by the ICANN Security Team or SSAC."

LAUREEN KAPIN: Right, but my further assignment here would be to suggest maybe there should be some sort of obligation for Security.

DREW BAGLEY: Too? Okay, yeah, yeah.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Can I weigh in on that?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, yeah.

DREW BAGLEY: What opinion do you have? What do you know about Compliance?

JAMIE HEDLUND:

Not much, but I'm learning. A couple things. One is I'm happy to report that we are already – and now I'm speaking as a staffer and not as necessarily a member of the [team] – but we are coordinating closely with OCTO with David Conrad's group and gathering and responding to that data that emanates from the DAAR system. That's ongoing, and that is helping to focus our work.

The second thing is it would seem to me, and this is sort of like the discussion we had on whether or not we should formally recommendation a data scientist, so now I'm speaking as a member of the review team – it would seem to me the important thing is to get the principles in the recommendation documented and adopted by the board and then the board directs the staff rather than trying to operationalize how that principle works.

ICANN Compliance and OCTO, we're all part of ICANN org. It would be unrealistic to think that OCTO would come up with these reports which eventually will be public showing ridiculous levels of abuse and ICANN Compliance deciding that we don't need to listen to that because we're separate.

Getting the org to get these reports, gather these reports, pass down these reports I think is important. Specifying how OCTO needs to deliver those to Compliance and Compliance needs to accept them and report back I think can lead to some unintended consequences in terms of inefficiencies and doesn't really address an existing problem.

The big issue is, obviously, that we gather the data, analyze the data, and act on the data. It seems less important and perhaps unhelpful for

the recommendations to specify how that is to be operationalized internally. Does that make sense?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah. So then with that point, you're not referring to the language that's now inserted. You're referring to the proposal to go a step further and impose an obligation on the Security team?

JAMIE HEDLUND: Correct.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay.

JAMIE HEDLUND: We're all the same organization. In the past, there was criticism that Compliance was too separate and independent in the wrong ways, and I don't think that's the case. I think we're all working toward the same goals.

LAUREEN KAPIN: That's good to hear, especially because the example in the report was the perception that there was this sustained abuse that went on for a long time that went unremedied.

JAMIE HEDLUND: You're talking about the Alpnames?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes, well, the Nanjing Imperiosus. Yeah, I keep thinking of Harry Potter.

JAMIE HEDLUND: There was that and the Gibraltar based one.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Right, there were a couple in that.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Yeah, the Gibraltar based is related to Alpnames. The bigger issue there is not lack of interest or focus or awareness on the behalf of Compliance or OCTO or the CEO or anybody else. The issue there is the one that's addressed by other recommendations, which is the contractual language. One thing we hope to make more transparent to the community not everyone really understands is we go after some of these more abusive or highly abusive registries and registrars is that where we fail is not from lack of effort or care. It's because of these contractual provisions themselves.

DREW BAGLEY: Because they don't include a mechanism for that systemic abuse and they're too focused on the individual?

JAMIE HEDLUND: Yeah. The systemic abuse, they don't impose tougher requirements when presented with evidence of DNS abuse.

LAUREEN KAPIN: You raise a really good point, Jamie. I'm wondering if you think our recommendations go far enough then in terms of having the community look at the contract provisions to make them more effective. Do you think there are improvements we should be making in the area you just raised?

JAMIE HEDLUND: I have to be careful here given my Compliance role. I'm not going to make recommendations or oppose recommendations on contractual language improvements. But I will point out that as I think it's pointed out here and in other parts of Drew's thing that the obligations on registries and registrars are not really strongly directed at mitigating DNS abuse. Registrars have the obligation. When we're receiving a report to investigate and reasonably respond, registries have the Spec 11(3)(b) requirement. But a lot of these are somewhat indirect compared to the actual problem.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Right. Fair enough. It would be interesting perhaps to follow up at some point perhaps with some more informal discussions to get the benefit of insights from folks in your group who are on the front lines so that we have the benefit of that insight. That would be invaluable I think.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Okay, absolutely. I'd be happy to do that. Again, as a staff person and the head of the department that includes Compliance, I am not going to stand in the way of or object to or strongly advocate in favor of stronger obligations on registries and registrars with respect to infrastructure abuse. But I'd just say that the language that's there makes it harder to address in a way that parts of the community want us to.

DREW BAGLEY: Great. Thank you, Jamie. That was really helpful. I've taken note of that. So that's pretty much with Recommendation B, that's really the modification. I think that's it. I don't know that I made any changes to the body to reflect that. I will quickly skim again. I think the changes I made in the body of the report were in response to Recommendation A more so.

With that said, something I'm going to do in terms of just cleaning things up and seeing where I can add more sources in general is take a look at the body unrelated to the public comments necessarily but just to see areas where we can improve it on its own.

Does anybody else have any comments on the modifications to Recommendation B? I'll fix that typo, of course.

Okay, so then Recommendation C, this one was perhaps our least controversial Recommendation here. With that said, I am pleased to see that every single one of our DNS abuse recommendations wasn't necessarily super controversial. But for Recommendation C, we did not receive any opposition. Everybody was generally supportive. Instead

there was more so feedback about what the research should look like, whether the research should be publicized/not publicized.

Really, a lot of the comments focused on the DAAR aspect of what we proposed. Even though we were just talking about the fact that there needs to be ongoing data collection and that it should include DAAR, we were not at all saying DAAR should be the only system. Because in fact, we talked about the fact that we wanted whatever policy that came out of our recommendation to be something that survived even if DAAR on its own for whatever contractual reasons and everything else wasn't around a few years from now.

That's something where I think the recommendation is largely good as written. However, I did go ahead and add a little bit of language which is a little more specific about how often we're talking about the research being published. This is in response to both ICANN org's cost analysis as well as the NCUC who had pointed out we should have some sort of timeline here. So here I changed this to "ideally quarterly and no less than annually" because, obviously, I still really want to be deferential to the community in terms of figuring out what is eventually adopted.

But with that said, what we're talking about here is we're looking at the study we commissioned as being one that was a historic look at DNS abuse since the inception of the new gTLD program. Now what we're asking for with this is regularly updated reporting so that as a community we're understanding what's going on with abuse, where the trends are, whether it's going up or down, whether it's still concentrated, whether if it's concentrated with the same parties, and all

of the other associated data to help inform on an ongoing basis policy making.

So I added that language and then also clarified again that the DNS abuse study was the benchmark because I think there was perhaps maybe a little ambiguity there as to what we were intending, whether we were intending for it to be a full-on study using the same exact methodology every time or not. So I added that language you'll see at that end of Rationale/Related Findings.

Does anybody have any feedback about that? All right. Well, like I said, thought that one would be easiest since it was noncontroversial to the community. But if anyone has any ideas on how to improve this, certainly send them to me because that would be great if we can make it even better.

So that's the gist of the feedback on Recommendations A, B, and C. I think that the community feedback, the positive and the negative, has been really helpful for us to make these even better and to clarify areas where perhaps there's ambiguity or where we're causing some sort of concern that in our ideal implementation our recommendations certainly should not be causing and whatnot.

Then the individual statement we can go over on the plenary. But just as a reminder for this group, [the thought was] that ICANN should basically make sure that the reseller data is part of the registration record for domain names so that it's not one of these ambiguous things where you don't really know all of the parties involved in a transaction. Where you only know the registry and perhaps the registrar but don't really know

who registered the domain name to begin with, and therefore from a policy standpoint don't know if the problem is with the reseller or if it's at the registrar level.

That's something where, obviously, you need more data to be able to figure that out. So that's something that is going on as part of the RDS work stream and whatnot, but I think it's important for us with our mandate to make that broad recommendation. Because we don't care what form it takes; we're just saying that data should exist.

That's something where the three people who commented on it all supported it. No opposition to it. And then as a plenary team, we can hopefully decide to adopt that. Unless Jordyn Buchanan comes out with something.

LAUREEN KAPIN: So we'll take that up on tomorrow's call.

DREW BAGLEY: Right.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, you know I support that recommendation so, yes, we should discuss that in the plenary call. I think it's great that you got those supportive comments also.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, so that should be helpful for that. So I guess for next steps with this, Laureen, are you thinking that we will then not present these to the plenary until next week?

LAUREEN KAPIN: No. Actually, no. The fact that people weren't able to make the call is unfortunate, but I would like to keep to our schedule actually. If you can send out another e-mail, Drew, saying these will be discussed during the plenary call and ask folks to review. I would send it to everyone.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay, so I'll take a look at the e-mail Jamie sent me and then your e-mail.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, I'm going to send you an e-mail this morning so you'll have our comments. Then you can come up with a revised version to send out for the plenary group to discuss. Then we can also discuss the reseller.

If anything is particularly thorny, we could always hold it over. But I would prefer at least to make what progress we can.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Drew and Laureen, did you guys look at all my minor – I sent it right before the meeting, so I assume you [inaudible].

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, so the answer would be no. But I will look at it.

DREW BAGLEY: I opened it. I have it open though. I'm looking now.

JAMIE HEDLUND: [I might even give you a brief] explanation. The rest of the paper does a really good job in focusing on DNS abuse, infrastructure abuse, technical abuse as opposed to other forms of abuse often called content abuse. It just seemed a little bit unclear in that first paragraph what you were trying to – it just seemed to conflate the two a little bit. So I suggested separating them out.

Internally and in discussions with the ICANN community, we talk about DNS abuse as malware, botnets, phishing, and spam to the extent that it's a vector and not content. We talk about those as opposed to things like copyright infringement, child abuse, that kind of stuff which is horrible but it's content. It's not really – the DNS is use, but the DNS is essentially to [inaudible] as it is for some of the other forms of infrastructures used.

DREW BAGLEY: Right. Yeah, I see your edits, and I think they're really helpful. I think they're great, so I'll go ahead and accept those. Thank you for doing that. I absolutely see what you mean because we open up with talking about how abuse can be considered a bunch of different things but that obviously for the purposes of what was identified by the community before the rollout of the new gTLD program, the focus was on technical abuse and that's what the safeguards are about.

JAMIE HEDLUND: It's not only that. It's also what's within ICANN's mandate.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, exactly.

JAMIE HEDLUND: What's under our mission statement and bylaws.

DREW BAGLEY: The mission statement as well as the commitment, yeah.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Yeah. So for what it's worth. Thank you though. It's great [inaudible].

DREW BAGLEY: Oh, yeah. It's worth a lot, so thank you for that. Jamie, if after this conversation going over these recommendations, particularly since you know the reality of what something would look like if it was adopted

and implemented, let me know if you have any wordsmithing either with the new language for Recommendations A and B. And I know is Laureen is going to send me some.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Okay, sounds good.

DREW BAGLEY: Thank you. And then Carlton is in a meeting but he's probably not paying attention to that meeting because he's paying attention to us. Let me know, Carlton, if you want to e-mail me any recommendations. See? I knew you were paying attention to us, Carlton. Now you're going to laugh in the middle of your meeting, aren't you?

LAUREEN KAPIN: He's multitasking.

DREW BAGLEY: I know. [inaudible] Carlton. Oh, it's a workshop. Okay. I was picturing Carlton in a school board meeting. Okay, so Carlton, yeah, let me know too if you have any edits you would like me to incorporate either in the chapter itself or in the findings. And then, obviously, if not, then there could [inaudible] another shot when we go over it on the plenary.

All right, well, I guess that's that from me. Do you have any orders of business, Laureen?

LAUREEN KAPIN: No. Just that I'll get you my proposed revisions shortly, and then you can come up with the next version of the document so that the whole sub-team can talk about it tomorrow and hopefully we'll be able to progress from there.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay, sounds good.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Great. Thanks for all this very detailed, thoughtful work. I think this is one of the most important topics in the whole paper that is being done. So I really appreciate all the nuanced thought that you've given to this topic.

DREW BAGLEY: Thank you. Thanks for all the support from you and everyone else in getting a paper that is surviving the community.

LAUREEN KAPIN: It's being improved by the community, Drew.

DREW BAGLEY: Improved by the community. Actually, I think as a whole the public comments from everyone, the criticism as well as the supportive comments, are all really helpful. That was actually refreshing to see, I have to say, that people really took the time to substantively look at

this. Even if they had their own predisposed positions on things, the comments were really helpful.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, I agree. Good. Then, great. So we'll all hopefully be on the call tomorrow as well, and we can let people go two minutes earlier. Woohoo!

DREW BAGLEY: All right! And as Jonathan would say, spend those two minutes doing CCT work.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Right. Exactly. Go forth and do more CCT work. Thanks, everyone.

DREW BAGLEY: All right, thanks all. Bye-bye.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Bye, everyone.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Take care.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]