RECORDED VOICE: This meeting is now being recorded.

LAUREEN KAPIN: So, welcome folks to our safeguards sub-team meeting. Thanks, a big thanks to everyone who has already submitted papers, and also submitted feedback to their colleagues. That's a really important function, and I'm hoping that people will continue to contribute to each other's work product by giving that feedback.

And in terms of procedures there, it's perfectly fine to reach out directly to the person to give them feedback, or copy the list, however you want. And then if there is disagreement, there can be discussions within the fuller sub-team.

So thanks everyone for doing that. I shouldn't say thanks everyone. Not everyone has done both of those things, but for the people that have, thank you.

Are there any updates to statements of interest? Any updates to statements of interest?

Okay. I am not hearing any. We were supposed to start off with Gao and Carlton's paper. But I'm not sure either Gao or Carlton are on the line. Am I missing something? We don't have… I know Gao is running late. And I don't see Carlton has joined us. So what I think we'll do, then since we have Jamie on the line, thank you Jamie, also points for being prompt.

Jamie, why don't you give us an overview of your consumer trust in the DNS paper? And hopefully, people have already read this paper and provided feedback to Jamie, but if you haven't, this is time to hear a quick overview, and also provide feedback.

And I think we've designated 10 minutes to this discussion. So govern yourselves accordingly. And what we don't get to during the discussion today, there is still an opportunity to always provide feedback directly. So with that, Jamie, take it away.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Thanks Laureen. And thank you again for the feedback you've given, which I will incorporate in the revised version to be sent shortly. This paper is based on results of both the registrant and consumer survey one and two, and it looked to the section of the questions dealing with trust in the DNS.

The basic question was, do folks do respond…? How do respondents assess the DNS prospective in trust in comparison to other text services, ISPs, applications, etc.? And for both registrants and consumers, the trust level was high. It was at least trust as much, if not more so, then other tech industries.

It also showed over the one year period between the two surveys, that the level of trust remained the same, and in fact, appeared to increase, for reasons that Neilson explained before that kind of increase is not necessarily solid evidence in support of the view that the trust has increased over the past year, just that…

We can at least conclude that there made the same. A one year period with different levels of familiarity with new gTLDs, isn't really enough to say that there is trust. One interesting aspect of the survey that was on a regional basis, Asia and Africa have the highest levels of trust. There was some more, in some instances, skepticism in Europe and North America, particularly with those gTLDs that were associated with a highly regulated industry.

So it is, it's good information. It's good data. I mean, there were… Presumably, if there were a major decline in trust, that would have showed up. But at the very least, we can say it hasn't gone down over the past year. But we can't… We can also say that registrants and consumers trust the DNS more than they trust their own parents.

So, but it was generally positive. Any questions?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Questions for Jamie?

Okay. I'm not seeing questions. I had provided some feedback for Jamie, particularly regarding the issues of restrictions. Because I think the Neilson surveys had shown, excuse me, that there was support for some restrictions in specific cases, but not within the dot com or other legacy generic spaces.

So I felt that point needed to be made a little more clearly. But, overall, I think the results show that at least, at the very least we can say that the launch of the new gTLDs has not decreased trust in the DNS. And that it's something that's important to be able to say.

Any other questions or comments, or do you have any other statements Jamie?

JAMIE HEDLUND: On your last, one thing was, there was also related to what you were saying about expectations. There was an overt desire for restrictions. There was also evidence of both an expectation that the registry was in fact running, was not, was taking steps against fraud and as well as a confidence that they were doing so.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Exactly, right. You're exactly right. And of course, those are the expectations. It's harder to figure out whether that's actually happening, but I think… That's absolutely right. The expectations are very clear that consumers expect some level of protectiveness, and expect some restrictions, and expect that they're going to be protected in some way.

Okay. So, then let's move on then, let's move on to… I don't think we still don't have Gao or Carlton. So let's move on then to the item four, which is under the base topic, of has the new gTLD program put mechanisms in place to improve trustworthiness in the DNS?

And this starts off with one of my papers, which handles a lot of different topics at once. So I'm trying to figure out how to get this. I think I'm going to open this up separately so I can toggle back and forth, and folks will forgive me if I don't see you, raise your hand while I'm speaking, but I absolutely will go over the questions at the end.

So first up, I revised this paper in response to our discussions from, I think, two sub-team calls ago, where there was a view that, we still very much wanted to do a comparison between what the GAC recommended and what was actually implemented, but what we really wanted to do in most cases, most but not all, is focus on what has actually been implemented.

And then you can see from the title of my paper, what I wanted to focus on even more specifically is whether they implemented in a manner that promotes effective enforcement. So I started off with what are the implemented safeguards, or I could determine what would be the intended goal of the safeguards, and there a special thanks to Brian for the work that he did on several of his papers, which I liberally consulted and borrowed from.

And then I asked the final question, have the safeguards been implemented in a manner that promotes effective enforcement? And there, I really did a look at the language of the safeguard itself, and then I also consulted the available information from ICANN compliance. So that was my basic approach.

And then I divided this into safeguards applicable to all new gTLDs, safeguards applicable to regulated gTLDs, and safeguards applicable to highly regulated gTLDs. So this is the sort of thing where the paper is rather dense, and it's not going to be productive for me to read the paper to you, but I would like to read the paper and provide feedback, particularly if something is confusing, or there is a substantive comment you want to make.

But this paper basically goes through the safeguards one by one by one, starting with the safeguards applicable to new gTLDs. So, the first one involves WHOIS verification and documentation checks. And one of the interesting aspects of this, is besides the very, very specific provisions in both the registry agreements, and more importantly, the registrar agreements, because they, of course, are the entities who deal directly with the registrants, who are providing the WHOIS information, besides these very specific provisions, most particularly in the registrar agreement, there was also an ICANN initiative regarding the WHOIS accuracy reporting system.

And I want to speak about that in a moment. But the intended goal of the verification safeguard was trying to combat identified abuse, because if you don't know who is behind the website, of course, you can't take step one off into mitigating that abuse. So when we assess this, and I'm not going to be going over everything in this amount of detail, but the WHOIS safeguard is particularly important, when we assess this looking at the clear contract language, this is actually language that is not only very clear and very specific, but it's quite rigorous in the specifications that are provided for.

There are very specific things that each registrar is responsible for making sure happens vis a vis its registrants. So clear obligations and timeline. Now the interesting thing, in addition, is ICANN's own initiative for the WHOIS accuracy reporting system. The GAC had asked registry operators to do this, but in response, ICANN took this on and then engaged in a series of reports, and they're still issuing reports, on the accuracy of the WHOIS information.

And there have been focused on accuracy of syntax and operability. There is a whole website, you can look at the reports. These are… I'm just very much overstating that things are generally accurate, the statistics are pretty high in terms of accuracy, but there are differences depending upon the particular field involved.

Now, what's interesting is there has been a study on the syntax, i.e. is it in the proper format and the operability, is it an operating email address or phone number? Does it work? The last phase of that was identified, was supposed to be an identity validation phase, i.e., is the person who is listed there? You know, Joe Smith, is Joe Smith the actual person responsible for the domain?

And in that case, there hasn't been a commitment to progress to this identity validation phase, which likely would be the most resource intensive phase. So, you'll see that that feeds into one of my recommendations, because the phase is not being done yet. So again, I'm going over this one in more detail, because A) it's important, and also it gives you sort of my approach.

So recommendations would be to analyze these studies, to see whether WHOIS accuracy has increased under the 2013 RAA. The reports were very dense and also deal with different… And I'm talking about the ICANN WHOIS accuracy system reports, they're very dense and very difficult to call out what data relates to the 2013 RAA and new gTLDs versus what data relates to pre-existing versions of the registry accreditation agreement, primarily from 2009.

So, a recommendation is to try and see whether data exists to determine whether our WHOIS accuracy has increased as a result of the 2013 RAA. And also to figure out if ICANN contract compliance can provide more information about the subject matter of complaints, so that we can actually determine in terms of the large volume of WHOIS complaints they refer to.

Do they refer to syntax? Do they refer to operability? Or do they refer to identity? So that we can see if identity is actually a significant issue in terms of generating complaints. So that is sort of an overview of the approach that I took to all of these safeguards, and now I want to move on to highlighting specific ones, not going through the whole thing.

There is a safeguard about mitigating abusive activity. That is an all new gTLD. And in a sense that is, you know, that's a don't do that thing safeguards. There are also security checks. The security checks actually are a current initiative underway in ICANN. The safeguard that was enacted was for registry operators to conduct this security check, a technical analysis to make sure, to see whether their domains are being used in a way that would undermine security, like farming, phishing, and malware bot nets, etc.

But the registry agreement didn't say how the registry operators were going to do this. And there is a current initiative underway to try and figure that out to develop a framework. So once that framework is actually completed, and again, this is the subject of sessions in our working group, one recommendation I posed to be to assess whether the framework is clear, effective, and enforceable to mitigate abuse. And one of the things we would flag is whether this is a voluntary effort,

or whether this is a mandatory effort, whether this is set forth as set practices, or this is set forth as something less than that.

Again, since we haven't, since this process is not complete, we can't assess it. Making and handling complaints, this really refers to being able to give the public a way to complain that is easy to find, and that there is going to be a particular abuse contact.

And also, in terms of recommendations, the safeguard particularly wanted this abuse contact to be able to take complaints from the public and government agencies. But that sort of begs the question whether the public or government agencies would know to be able to complain to registries. So it would be interesting to survey the registries to find out whether this point of contact is actually being used.

And also, since the goal of this was to allow registries to report and handle complaints to combative use, to find out whether registries are actually taking action on these complaints, and what actions they take, again, generically, to see whether the goal is being met. Now I'm going to move on to safeguards that refer to regulated gTLDs. And the more specific language of gTLDs that raise consumer protection concerns, contain sensitive strings, were strings in regulated markets.

For shorthand, I refer to these as regulated gTLDs. So here, there are a series of safeguards. Again, we find a compliance with applicable law, make sure you're following all of the applicable laws regarding your particular gTLD. And also a much more specific safeguard reasonable security measures for collection of sensitive financial and health information.

Again, the goal of the safeguard is to mitigate abusive activity. But, when I looked at this, it was difficult to find out whether the safeguards had been the subject of complaints to ICANN, because ICANN doesn't report its complaints with this level of specificity.

So, one of the things that we would recommend, at least my proposal is, it would be useful to get more detailed information on the subject matter of complaints from ICANN compliance, so we can figure out if this safeguard is actually generating complaints, and enforcement. It also would be interesting to survey registrars to find out how they're complying with this safeguard, and then perhaps follow up with an audit to see whether registrars are sufficiently protecting users' sensitive information.

And finally, I'm going to move on to implemented safeguards applicable to new gTLDs, highly regulated gTLDs. So these are gTLDs that raise consumer protection concerns, and contain sensitive strings, or strings in highly regulated gTLDs. And here, I did feel it was important to at least state that some of the differences between the GAC advice and the way it was implemented.

And Jamie has a very helpful comment here, providing some feedback about why the safeguards weren't implemented as posed. But generally speaking, the GAC had identified a larger number of safeguards in the regulated and highly regulated categories, and ICANN shuffled this a little bit by taking, by plucking out a smaller number of gTLDs and putting it in these categories.

And in part, that was because, as Jamie points out, the GAC advice had identified certain subject matters, but not particular strings. So the implementation of the GAC advice was different than what was advised. And the reason I highlight that is because this is for the highly regulated strings, which were really a focus on a lot of discussion, because it was felt that those highly regulated strings, by their very nature, for example, dot bank, dot pharmacy, charities, convey a sense of, convey words that consumers are more likely to trust, and therefore the risks are higher if there is abusive activity going on in those domains, because along with that trust might come a willingness to provide more sensitive information, like health information, like financial information.

So that's by way of background. So, have the safeguards been implemented in a manner that promotes effective enforcement? Here there was an obligation that the registrants would have to represent, present the appropriate credentials for the particular gTLDs they were seeking to buy. And then their… I'm talking here about the verify and validate credentials.

Then there is a duty to consult if there is a registry operator receiving a complaint that they have to consult with national authorities. And then there is a duty to update. So my paper contains a more detailed discussion of this, of the background here regarding the advice that was given by the GAC, and the way it was implemented. And this particular implementation, has generated both a lot of input from community stakeholders, particularly the ALAC and the business constituency, and it has been the source of continued GAC advice.

And those references are all in the paper. Now, why was there a difference here between what the GAC advised and what was implemented? Well that actually is also set forth, also the NGPC was concerned about the practical ability to implement these safeguards as advised. For example, you know, each country's requirements, save for pharmacies, maybe a little different, and the registry operator, it was positive, might encounter difficulties about how to figure that out in each and every jurisdiction.

So here, the recommendations are assessing whether the restrictions regarding possessing the necessary potential, whether they're actually being enforced, i.e. there is this representation being required, but it would be very interesting to see if that, if an individual or entity without the proper credentials could buy a highly regulated domain. Could you just make a representation and still buy the highly regulated domain?

That would be interesting to see. And I guess the question, at an even more basic level, is, if you don't make the representation, can you buy that domain? So that's one recommendation to assess that. Also it would be interesting to see what the volume and subject matter complaints regarding this particular safeguard is, since it did generate a lot of concerns, it would be interesting to see whether there are complaints going on in this area, and sources to look at maybe, ICANN compliance and also registrars and resellers of these highly regulated domains, to see what kind of complaints they're getting.

And then finally, a recommendation to compare rates of abuse between highly regulated gTLDs, who have voluntarily agreed actually to go through a verification and validation program, that would be above and

beyond just accepting a representation, but to actually verify and validate, and to compare rates of abuse in those highly regulated gTLDs, with gTLDs that have chosen to do that.

And then finally, I'll be very brief here, finally, there are certain safeguards that are very specific to certain gTLDs. Those with inherent government functions, and those with gTLDs that have increased risk of bullying or harassment. And you'll see I'll go through, those are my papers at the end, and I guess that was the ultimate finally. Here is the final finally, there is also a separate category of advice and safeguards regarding those gTLDs that have restricted registration policies.

And this is an area, actually, that I think is very suited for our competition sub-team, brothers and sisters in this effort, because Eliza's safeguard advice here, was really aimed at making sure that these restrictions are not unfair, don't give someone an undue advantage given the nature of the gTLD itself.

So, that is sort of an overview, perhaps too lengthy an overview, but you can read the original source for yourselves. And at this point, I'm going to take questions. I see that David and Calvin already have their hands up. David, why don't we start with you?

DAVID TAYLOR: Okay, thanks Laureen. Can you hear me okay?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes, I can.

DAVID TAYLOR: Brilliant, that's good. Yeah, thanks for that. I was just going to go back to the WHOIS and the WHOIS accuracy, when we were looking and saying that the accuracy verification point where you said that it was generally accurate. So, I recall now, it was quite a while ago when you mentioned that was going to be one of the potential finding or not.

But I was just…

LAUREEN KAPIN: It's not a finding. I know I'm interrupting, but I just want to make sure that I didn't create misunderstandings. It's not a finding, and I was referring to the reports in the accuracy reporting system, that indicate the syntax and operability are generally accurate.   So I'm vastly overstating that, and I don't present that as a finding here.

DAVIDY TAYLOR: Okay. No, that's fine. I just wanted… It's one of those things where, depending where you look, and depending on how you look at things, we can obviously get things wrong, because it struck me as one of the big differences, which I'm sure many on the call here, know is that maybe 10 years ago when you were going after bad guys who were doing bad things, you would invariably find that they had incorrect WHOIS and you couldn't locate them, because obviously they weren't there, which was driving a lot of this.

We need to verify WHOIS. We need to get to somewhere. And then since we have all of the privacy shields in place, certainly from my

perspective, the bad guys now hide behind the privacy shields, and it's rare, much, much rarer, to find the false WHOIS. So that's a problem, which has certainly morphed in the last decade.

And I wouldn't say that… I would never certainly conclude on that, or that shows that WHOIS accuracy is genuine or accurate, because it might be that, because obviously the privacy shields data is accurate, but it doesn't quite capture the issue, which is obviously where the WHOIS battle goes on and on. So just raising that so that we're aware of it and we focused on that as well.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Thank you David. And I agree with everything you've said. And in fact, I think that reinforces one of the concerns I've raised in my paper which is that, we may have information about syntax accuracy and operability accuracy, but we don't have information about identity validation, necessarily. And of course, that is where the rubber hits the road at the final point, which is who really is responsible for the particular domain.

And then you raised the related issue, which isn't covered in my paper, but certainly is a real world issue, of data protections, which may hobble someone's ability to actually find out that information, and the use of privacy proxy services, which also add another layer in between someone trying to find out that information and actually getting access to that information.

So thank you for that real world perspective. Calvin, I see your hand is up.

CALVIN BROWNE: Yeah. And my points, and my question, or yeah, my point more. The… I also think of a list of points when we're involving the ICANN [inaudible] scenario that the entity that is in the registrant details, was not the real person responsible for the domain name, particularly when it comes to privacy services and circles.   In [inaudible] we had a pretty straightforward philosophy that, and it was actually part of the contract, that what was listed on this, was the authoritative source of a domain, and that was it.

So, people were welcome to do privacy services, and offer them. I would explain it with the following example. You know, if we had been approached by the authorities, I would under oath say that the registrant of the domain name was as listed in the WHOIS, and it would be up to that privacy service to give up the actual registrant and get themselves out of the way or the pending action.

I always thought, I always wondered about whether, if there is something in the ICANN scenario when we did away with that.

LAUREEN KAPIN: I'm not sure I exactly understood your point, Calvin, I'm sorry. I'm trying to figure out if you were drawing a distinction between what WHOIS information is listed, and whether that's the person responsible for the domain, and something else. I didn't quite understand it. Would you mind explaining it a little more for me?

CALVIN BROWNE: Sure. So let me try to make it a little simpler. [CROSSTALK] Basically, you know, we regard it as actually the people listed as the registrants of the domain name. And any registrants of the domain name, assuming that they were correct, then had to put themselves out of harm's way if they were acting on behalf of somebody else, if that makes sense.

LAUREEN KAPIN: No, that's the part that I'm missing. When you're talking about like someone who is involved in some sensitive political protest scenario?

CALVIN BROWNE: No. You know, we [inaudible] on WHOIS, we had to [inaudible] who would be registrants of the domain name. And basically, if we were dragging to a cause of action, for example, or a second [inaudible], which is a criminal action by the police, you know, we would, as a matter of course, state that [inaudible] was the registrant of the domain name, and they are the people who are responsible for the domain name, and that's whose door you should knock on, or the attorney should serve papers on to recover damages and that kind of thing.

And it seems like in the ICANN scenario, we've lost that absoluteness of the WHOIS, accuracy issues aside. Hopefully I'm explaining it clearer now.

LAUREEN KAPIN: And we've lost this because why?

CALVIN BROWNE: Because it seems like we don't regard it as absolute anymore. We are [inaudible] privacy services in there, and things like that.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay, okay. So I think actually, your point backs up the point that David was making, and you're drawing a contrast between perhaps a best practices scenario where there would be an absolute requirement for the registrants to provide accurate information about who is behind the domain, versus the current practices, which allow for a layer of privacy services, most often privacy proxy service providers to be able to hide the identity of the registrant, that is actually the service they're providing, that's why it's called the privacy or proxy service.

And so we've gravitated away from that sort of direct disclosure of who is responsible for the domain. Is that your point Calvin?

CALVIN BROWNE: Almost. I think, you know, you can still [inaudible] WHOIS privacy services, but making the WHOIS privacy service provider absolutely responsible for that domain name, looks like something [inaudible] in the ICANN context.

LAUREEN KAPIN: It's… I didn't hear what you just said. It's not what?

CALVIN BROWNE: It's look like we've given the fact that WHOIS, [inaudible] this information is absolute, yeah.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Thank you Calvin. Yeah, it's definitely a complicated issue. Do we have any other comment? Carlos, I see that you say you've commented in the Word document. Is that something you sent me? Because if you did it in the G-Doc, I don't have access to it. For everyone, what I would prefer is if you have comments for me, send them to me in a Word document, that is the best way to reach me.

And although you still can hear me, I am actually losing connectivity, which means I can't see if you're raising your hand.

Okay. So now I need to go into the system again with my….

DAVID TAYLOR: If it helps, Laureen, you've got hands from Antonietta and Brian in the queue.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Thank you Calvin. It's David, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. David, I am always giving you short-shift. It's a wonder that you don't feel that I've got something against you, which of course, I don't.

DAVIDY TAYLOR: I'm used to it and I deserve it.

LAUREEN KAPIN:	All right. I've gotten you used to that poor treatment. Okay, Antonietta, thank you David.
	Antonietta, do you have a question?

| DAVID TAYLOR: | Sorry, that was weird. I had a hand going up on my thing now, and now I haven't got any hands. So you can ignore me completely, but that was Antonietta and Brian, and they had a raising hand, which is gone. So I don't know what's going on there. |

LAUREEN KAPIN:	Okay, so now I'm reconnected and I don't see hands from either Brian or Antonietta. That's okay. No questions from me, says Antonietta, got it. Good.
	So, let's see. I want to go back to our agenda. I think we're actually unlikely ahead of ourselves. But the next topic up was technical safeguards. I am going to loop it back to the voluntary public interest commitment, because Drew and I can speak about that on this call, although folks haven't had much time to look at it, but we have extra time, I think Drew and I could speak to that also.
	And then also I am going to check in with folks who are on the call, even if they haven't gotten their papers in, about where they are on that. But Calvin, let's go to you to talk about the technical safeguards, and discuss your paper and see if folks have questions for that.

CALVIN BROWNE:	Okay. I see it was a [inaudible]… Just checking if this is my latest one that you put up here.
LAUREEN KAPIN:	That's the wrong paper. We need Calvin's paper on the technical safeguards.
CALVIN BROWNE:	I can talk to it without anything there, [inaudible] ones.
LAUREEN KAPIN:	I note that your paper is there, because I just accessed it. So maybe I can help people find it. It is in that link that was sent out in my email under 5A sub one, technical safeguards and Calvin has listed there. If that helps whoever is uploading the document now.
	Does that help? Who is handling the [CROSSTALK]? There we go. Thank you powers that be.
CALVIN BROWNE:	Okay. [Inaudible] All right, this is, yes, yes, this looks like a reasonable version that I've worked on. Okay. So basically, I went, it seems like this was part of what I might consider learning [inaudible], where the, where ICANN was really able to put in stuff into the registry agreements. So it enforces the safeguards on a [inaudible] manner.

So I'm not going to go into too much detail, but the end of it was that most of these safeguards as discussed were implemented in contractual terms with the appropriate registries, and are subject to contractual compliance, which includes things like [inaudible] and such like. And there is a whole website that I've linked in there, dedicated to one thing and that's contractual compliance.

I've sent it through to the list as well, and Brian came up with some really good feedback, which I've incorporated in a red lined version [inaudible]. And then he also, thank you Brian, sent a nice paper that he has written, and [inaudible] this paper around five or six times, but each time I get interrupted, so I haven't as yet managed to find enough time to go through the entire 50-page paper and add on to my paper when necessary.

[Inaudible] find the appropriate time shortly. All right. Are there any particular questions on the stuff that I've written here? I'm assuming that everyone has actually looked through it.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Since we do have time, and I'm not sure actually whether everyone has looked through it, can you give us just a two-minute executive summary of it, Calvin? Especially if you think there are any technical safeguards that are worthy of more discussions and explanations than others.

CALVIN BROWNE: Sure. Okay. So basically the, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine safeguards have their registry operator technically vetted.

DNSSEC deployed as well [inaudible] …appropriately managed. Thick WHOIS being implemented, and [inaudible] …been implemented. For those seven questions, basically the answer is yes. It really has, when it comes to thick WHOIS, we know that WHOIS has been implemented, which as at least solved the problem of having authoritative WHOIS information in two different places, as it is in dot com.

It doesn't, of course, match for the activity of the accuracy problem of the WHOIS information. The last two safeguards, the [inaudible] security [inaudible] process, Brian informed me via email that that has not, not as yet been implemented for any of the new gTLDs. And the voluntary framework for high security zones and high security top level domains [inaudible] program, that is basically the idea that were raised, the information of the gTLD program, that [inaudible] have been implemented or completed [inaudible].

And hopefully that's not too much of a high level overview. I did make some recommendations. And I've added, let me just see if I've got my… In here.

Just a sec, let me grab my latest [inaudible] copy, there we go. We need to… I say that maybe we want to consider the effectiveness of the monitoring of the safeguards, and see how [inaudible] and maybe the cost benefit relationship of the safeguards. And then I also [suggested?] that we want to consider the WHOIS accuracy reporting system as well, it's a bit of a bold or it's very similar to what you recommended in your paper as well, looking at the WHOIS accuracy reporting system and see if we can find out whether the effectiveness of the thick WHOIS

implementation requirement would lead to improvements on that safeguard.

I guess that's it.

Hello?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Sorry, Calvin, I was on mute. Thank you Calvin. Brian has his hand up.

BRIAN AITCHISON: Yeah, thanks Calvin and Laureen. I just wanted to add just a few sort of levels of detail. Calvin, I just sort of agree with you. I think this is the sort of low hanging fruit in terms of, it's sort of a yes or no, have they been implemented type of question for most of them. So I agree with your overall assessment. And if you go through the new gTLD safeguards paper that you mentioned, it's going to give you some sort of nuance to each one of these safeguards that may be worth adding.

Just to note on the ERSR process, that was never really intended as a kind of contractual obligation, but it's more of a process that's available to registries in general, who are facing a security threat, and need a quick way to address it. Also on DNSSEC, as it relates to the DNS abuse study, that I'm sure you're all very eager to hear about, but we can't really tell you everything about it yet, that is something we're going to probe a lot deeper into, into the effectiveness of DNSSEC as a safeguard.

And there is also some pretty interesting research coming out of it next year, that I sort have encountered, but again, I can't distribute it yet

because it's still in drafting with the researchers. So I just wanted to add that, and encourage you to look at the new gTLD program safeguards paper, and it will give you some more details on your paper.

So thanks. Let me know if you have any questions.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Thanks Brian. Any other questions or comments for Calvin?

Calvin, I had a quick question, not being as well-versed in some of the terminology here.   You talk about wild carding being prevented by contract. Could you just explain what wild carding is again? And also, why…? You made two statements. It's not possible to monitor this on an ongoing basis, given the nature of registry deploying. Wild carding will be quickly found out. I just wanted a little more explanation about that.

CALVIN BROWNE: Sure. So the thing, in trying and do that as well. Basically, there are two possible answers for a domain name when you query for its existence. And that is yes, it [inaudible] them, and because of the information about it, or not it doesn't exist. Wild carding is where the registry takes that answer that should be no, it doesn't exist, and puts its own answer and says it exists, and here is the information, and it gives its own information for that domain.

And the reasons for doing that is invariably something like they want to get all of the traffic done there, or they want to sell services to potential

registrants of those domain names, or something like that. So that's basically wild carding in a nutshell, hopefully that's understandable.

LAUREEN KAPIN: And, it would be quickly be found out because people would be complaining that they've known they've been diverted in a way they didn't intend to?

CALVIN BROWNE: Exactly. So, it's quite difficult to proactively check, because a domain name could come into existence at any time. So if you pick a random domain name and check for that one, it doesn't, it's not a good [inaudible] of whether something has been wild carding or not.

So the checking for this is quite difficult problematically, but when it is done, it is something that is picked up quite quickly, because a lot of people… Well, basically what will happen is that, you'll never get an answer that a domain does not exist. You will always be redirected, and invariably you will be directed these same websites, or information for that domain name.

LAUREEN KAPIN: So basically, if I'm searching for a domain name like Kapin dot com. Instead of being told that's available, I would be diverted to a registry trying to sell me other services or something like that. That's what wild carding would be?

CALVIN BROWNE: It's at a slightly lower level than that. So, if you type it into a browser, Kapin dot com, for example, and it would maybe resolves to a registry page, and that's a good indication of wild carding having taken place.

LAUREEN KAPIN: So instead of being told it doesn't resolve, or can't find that, I'm diverted to an entity that wants to sell it.

CALVIN BROWNE: There you go.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay. Thank you. So one suggestion I would have is just for these terms that aren't intuitive necessarily, at least not for me, would be to just give a brief explanation of what it is. Because at some point, when we are writing this report, we don't want to have it be… And this is really for everyone, everyone.

We don't want this to be inside baseball, and we have to realize that the people reading this report are not necessarily going to be limited to those who are well-versed in all of these technical terms, or even those that are well-versed in all of the ICANN acronyms. We want to make sure that people are able to understand what we're discussing, because we have explained terminology and we have spelled out acronyms.

So what I would ask Calvin and everyone is, make sure you are spelling out what these terms mean, whether it's DNSSEC, or wild carding, or [inaudible], or thick WHOIS, or for me, verification and validation of

credentials, even explaining what WHOIS information is. Let's just make sure we're explaining this terminology.

CALVIN BROWNE: I'm hearing you say that I could do a little bit of explanation of some of the acronyms and terminology there.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes, yes, I think that would be helpful as we're moving towards ultimately producing a narrative report, because you know exactly what this is, but we need to make sure everyone who is reading it has sort of this foundation.

CALVIN BROWNE: I'm editing from a red line.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay. David, I see your hand up.

DAVID TAYLOR: Thanks Laureen. One, I was just going to pick up on that point about definitions, which I think is a good one. Should we actually be separating these off and have a definition section in the report as a whole? Because I think many of us may refer to something like wild carding, so we don't want to be defining it in those places with different definitions, so maybe we can collect these at the end of all of our papers

and put them into a central bit of the report, the end where we've got all of the acronyms in there.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah. Actually that's a good idea. Either definitions or a glossary, because you're right. We're referring to a lot of the same terms the same way. Maybe what we can do is have people add this, well let me say it this way. If you haven't already defined it within your paper, add a section on the end that defines terms so that we'll be able to have that as a resource when we're writing the final report.

Does that sound reasonable to folks? Does that make sense?

DAVID TAYLOR: Yup, definitely.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay, hearing assent and no dissent, I'll ask folks to do that. It looks like we have Gao with us now. Gao, are you able to hear and speak to us? I know that you are participating in the chat, but can we hear you?

David, I see your hand is up again, or is that the old hand?

DAVID TAYLOR: It's kind of a new hand popping up. So I was just going to go back and, Calvin will know this, but on your discussion saying about the wild carding there, and that issue because it's an issue that goes back a long way and there is a lot of history in it, and some people on the call here

may remember that VeriSign, I can't remember when it was, 2002, 2001, 2003, 2004, somewhere around then, well over 10 years ago, by themselves, introduced specific changes in that deploy a wild card service on dot com and dot net, and there was an outcry.

And there is a list, I remember that because there is a list of the things that it was doing and the issues which it caused. So Calvin will know those, but I might be able to find that thing and send it to him, because I do remember we looked at adding quite a bit of depth at the time. And that was where obviously this rule has come out in the agreement, the registry agreement, you can't do that anymore.

LAUREEN KAPIN: That's actually helpful background, and I think it also raises another good point that I wanted to bring up with folks. So thank you David. As we're writing these papers, besides making sure that they're accurate, of course, to the extent that you have background sources, or sources in general, please put that in your papers because one, it's a good check for ourselves to make sure what we're reporting is accurate, you know, we just don't want to be reporting our own individual understanding of things, because we may have a complete understanding.

We may have an incomplete understanding. We may have an understanding that's a misunderstanding. Which is why it's so important to document our sources, because that helps us to be accurate. And two, it helps the folks, like our fabulous ICANN staff, check our work to make sure we're accurate. And if you don't have

sources, it's very, very difficult and much more time consuming to check work.

So for everyone, put your sources down. If you make a statement, put your source down. I can't emphasize enough how important that is, because we want papers that convey facts and data, and engage an analysis based on those facts and data. People have great memories. People have impressions. People have opinions, but that is secondary to actually reporting the facts and the data.

And if you're reporting the facts and the data, you're getting it from somewhere, and that needs to be reflected in your papers. So please make sure you engage in that process. It's a way that we can be accountable for the information representing, and even more important, it allows staff and our colleagues to have a check to make sure that we're actually presenting information accurately.

So, please do that. It doesn't seem like Gao is going to be able to speak on the call. I know you're participating in the chat.

Gao, are you able to speak?

GAO MOSWEU: Hello?

LAUREEN KAPIN: We can hear you, or at least I can hear you.

GAO MOSWEU: Okay, all right, let's try this. Good afternoon. After the last call, we went back to the drawing board, and had another look at sub-questions, and we've revised our paper, as you can see it now. So we, I think the main thing that came out of the last call was that we must not be discussing awareness [inaudible] of awareness of these new gTLDs, but awareness in comparison to trust.

And so we've written [inaudible]… paper should not be taken in isolation, should not be reviewed in isolation, but should also be viewed side by side with other discussion papers on our sub-team. And typically the most basic, fundamental manage of a domain name extension. And then a familiarity, which is what we also discussed, and had [inaudible] actually [inaudible] some other information regarding, from the other team, can then be considered as a much a high level of awareness, more knowledge and better understanding about a particular domain name and extension.

And so in terms of the sub-questions, we've removed some of the questions we've had, and these are the sub-questions that we now have, but are not talking about awareness and trust, and whether awareness has, if greater awareness has therefore also led to increased trust.

And we're also looking at the [inaudible] or practices of new gTLDs have led to inclusion, and [inaudible] checking if anybody can hear me.

LAUREEN KAPIN: I can hear you. [CROSSTALK] Sounds like you're good Gao.

GAO MOSWEU: Okay, great, okay. So, if you look at that second page there, where we've tallied up the awareness… increasing [inaudible] …which hasn't changed from the last paper that we prevented. So I won't go…

…over the what we had presented previously, I'll just go over the changes, if that is okay.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay.

GAO MOSWEU: So then we looked at awareness and trust in the new gTLDs. [Inaudible] read works like…

Okay. So, [inaudible] …in new gTLDs that have [inaudible] …and less than 40% of new gTLDs, including geographically targeted gTLDs, are [inaudible] trustworthy by the majority of registrants. And we've been also compared at this consumer trust by year [inaudible]

…and this you can look at…

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay. I think now we're having some trouble hearing you, Gao. So what I'm understanding though, is that this is the new version of your paper, and you have… Yeah, you're not, we can't hear you anymore Gao.

So what I… Since we are having trouble now hearing Gao, let me ask folks to give Gao feedback directly on the new paper. And I would focus on the findings and recommendations.   And also, if folks have comments now, or questions for Gao, even though we can't hear her, I do believe she can hear us, and we can see her chat.

So, if folks have questions or comments for Gao, it's still a good time to…

GAO MOSWEU: Okay, so… Hello.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Now we can hear…

GAO MOSWEU: Can you hear me?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Now we can hear you.

GAO MOSWEU: Okay.   Well, [inaudible] technology [inaudible]… I'll just quickly rush through two-pages [inaudible] talks about actually that new gTLDs that have led to include trust.   We've put there restrictions, registration restrictions, increased trust, [inaudible] restrictions in terms of,

especially the registrants. The reputation of the gTLD and this was actually [inaudible] on page 19 of the global consumer [inaudible]…

Where consumers had said that the reputation of the gTLD [inaudible] and its users, and their familiarity with the extent or use thereof as a factor that would make them trust the gTLD a bit more. Then I will also skip right through to our recommendations, because we've struggled…

Okay. So, one of the recommendations that we've proposed [inaudible] about these, is consider choosing domain name [inaudible] that [inaudible] purpose. [Inaudible]… improve the familiarity for the new gTLD. The basic example that I think we use a lot is, if we've got dot bank, we've got to expect that [inaudible] people would expect that dot bank would be a bank, right?

And so, if we look at domain name [inaudible], as related to the purpose so that people don't get confused when they're looking at these new gTLDs. Another recommendation… We've also said that this recommendation [inaudible] to give indications of what domain name extensions [inaudible] for subsequent rounds, in the sense that we want always more, we count always more what consumers [inaudible] are familiar with, or what certain…

Or what certain, what… What certain names have associations with what, according to the consumers. Particularly the recommendation… Awareness and trust are closely related, not look at, you know, enhancing attributes that might improve trustworthiness in new gTLDs, and therefore would aide in [inaudible]… And these are the attributes that we have mentioned on page seven.

And we had one review there, which of course, we will look for your input on, is to repeat what the document are concluding and consumers and registrants [inaudible] …focus on that recall of more new gTLDs without promising, rather than [inaudible] attribution of the new gTLDs, because we notice that in the last two ways, what we actually were asking people, is [inaudible] …do you know these, you know, [inaudible] rely on somebody to say, okay, I'm familiar with dot bank or dot email, and so on, rather than if we look at consumer actually say.

I know that dot bank, I know dot… dot [inaudible], or dot diamond. I think that is all, so we look forward to receiving your comments and input.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Thank you Gao. What I would like folks particularly to focus on are the, are really giving thoughts on recommendations and reviews here, because there is a lot of good information here in the findings, and I think the challenge is to then use our group think here, to thinking about what recommendations and thoughts on review might flow from this.

So please, please distribute that sort of feedback, both to Gao and on the list so that we can think about these issues. David, your hand has been up for a while now. Apologies for making you wait so long.

DAVID TAYLOR: No, my mistake. I just left it up since my last comment. Sorry.

LAUREEN KAPIN:	Okay. That makes me feel better anyway. Okay, just picking up on the chat. Drew had raised the point about margin of error regarding the decrease in consumer trust, there was about a 5% decrease reported between wave one and wave two.
	And it sounds like the margin of error is five points. So, just to make sure I'm understanding. Does that mean that it might not be a significant decrease as we think, because that's within the margin of error? If Brian and Eleeza can comment on that. I just want to make sure that I'm understanding that correctly.
ELEEZA AGOPIAN:	Hi Laureen. This is Eleeza. Yes, that's right. There is, within the margin of error, it could be that this is the number of [inaudible] plus or minus five points of that number. So, it's a little bit hard to say, but it's within the margin of error. Take that result with a grain of salt.
LAUREEN KAPIN:	Okay. The grain of salt was exactly the phrase that came to my mind also. Thanks. That's very, very helpful. So we are at the end of our hour and a half, which thankfully does not cut off automatically. But, what I want to allow for just a minute or two, is also to just get a brief update from folks who haven't submitted their papers yet, about how things are going and timing.
	So, if we can hear from Steve, I'm going to start with you. Just to get a sense of timing. I think you had said later this week.

STEVE: Yeah, I have to talk about that, yeah. I'm aware that I haven't gotten to it, partially it's due to trying to get the data, so I'm doing a lot of sort of digging, background checking, speaking to [Wy-Po?], various things like that, which obviously by itself takes up the time. So I'm just trying to see where I can get to instead of having a blank piece of paper, should we say, and handing in a blank.

I'm, well I'm kind of out of time, really, between now and Hyderabad, because I've approximately got two days in the office, of which I kind of have a lot of work to do in those two days, so I'm trying to juggle how I do that. And as I mention, over email, I'm supposed to be going off for a conference for two days and speaking at it Thursday and Friday.

So my goal is to do a large slog through tomorrow, and see what I can come up with, and then if and when I don't make that, I may got part of the conference, and I hope none of the conference people are listening. So and then no longer go, or I may go for the conference and shut myself away in the hotel there, but that's obviously a little bit difficult as well, because it never works in that way, with a goal to try and ensure you've got something on the weekend or on Monday, because I've got the problem of extensive travel coming in that week, and I don't have my visa either for India yet.

So I have a lot of fun to do to try and get that, to get my visa to then get to India, but we'll see.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah. Visas are a challenge. Just so folks know, ICANN does have a visa expediting, has a contract with visa expediters that you will be

reimbursed for, I believe. So if you have any questions about that, connect with ICANN staff to get the information, if that would be helpful.

STEVE: Just to let you know, if it helps anybody else, I've had ICANN support, the visa support have been in contact yesterday actually, which was certainly helpful. I don't know whether it's the same for everybody else, the problem is I've had to give my passport away to the embassy using a concierge service, and it just seems to be stuck there.

So it hasn't come back yet, and it's blocking me because I was due to be away this week, and I can't get out of the country, which is what's been pushed to next week, assuming I get the passport back. And if I haven't gotten it back, then it pushes to Hyderabad.

So I'm not quite sure what I'm doing at the moment, but it's a little bit painful. I've never had a lack of a passport for three weeks like this.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, it's been very challenging. Thanks for letting us know, because I know that you're not the only one who is having visa challenges. Okay. In terms of voluntary public interest commitments, Drew and I have circulated our papers on that. So we will be talking about that the next time we have our sub-team meeting. In fact, we may even be juggling the schedule a bit to make sure that that gets discussed before Hyderabad.

But either way, you have the papers now, so please read them and give us feedback. Fabro is not on the call, so we can't hear about technical safeguards. Jamie, you [inaudible] work assignment chart from several weeks ago. I had slated you in for looking at enforcement of the voluntary picks, which I don't think there is actually a lot of information on, but I know that there is some.

But I wanted to make sure that that's on your radar screen.

JAMIE HEDLUND: I'm sorry, I think I'm on the wrong call. Who is this?

LAUREEN KAPIN: That's very funny, Jamie. No secret identities here.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: That was really well rehearsed.

JAMIE HEDLUND: I've said it before. No, I am working on it, I will get it to you within the next couple of days.

LAUREEN HILYARD: Perfect, thank you.

JAMIE HEDLUND: Yup.

LAUREEN HILYARD: Okay. Great, does anyone have any questions, comments before we end the call a little late? Apologies. Questions, comments? Okay. You all know how to reach me offline if you have any questions or comments. So thanks everyone for your continued work. If you owe things, I'm going to thank you in advance for getting that to us as soon as possible, and I'm also going to encourage everyone, please give your colleagues feedback.

That's helpful. And then finally, make sure your papers have sources so that we're presenting accurate information. So that's it. Thanks everyone, and again, thanks for our great support staff who are endlessly patient and helpful. Take care folks.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]