LAUREEN KAPIN:

Hi, folks. Welcome to the 32<sup>nd</sup> CCT Safeguards Subteam call. Does anyone have any updates to their Statement of Interest? Okay, hearing none, we'll get started.

We're going to be trying to wrap up the subteam work on the DNS Abuse paper today and the INTA survey paper, so that can just go to a final plenary call.

And then we'll also, hopefully, be hearing from [Gao] and Carlton who have sent around revised versions of the recommendations in the format I had requested, and thanks to those who have gotten me that material and a plea for those who have not to proceed at pace and get that so that we're teed up to get our final report done after these new sections are done.

So with that, I think we'll go straight into Drew's DNS abuse paper. Perhaps we can get a red line of that up on the screen with everyone having independent scrolling rights. And what I'd like to do, with David taking the lead, is to draw folks' attention to Recommendations 3 and 4 because those have generated the most discussion and I don't think that we've really come to rest on those recommendations.

So we can independently now scroll to those recommendations. That is really what I think we should be focusing on to see whether there's consensus on these recommendations or if they can be edited in a way to gain consensus. That is the goal today.

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.

And perhaps, David, even though we've discussed these before, perhaps you can just give the two-minute background on what led to Recommendations 3 and 4 in light of the DNS abuse study and why we think these are a necessary addition to Recommendations 1 and 2. Does that sound reasonable?

DAVID TAYLOR:

[Sure], no problem, Laureen. Hi, everybody.

Yeah, I mean, the essential background to Recommendation 3 and 4, which is what I proposed back to Drew when we were liaising about this, Recommendation 3 was following on from the issues we were highlighting or seeing between registry operators and registrars, doing things that perhaps they should not be doing as the DNS abuse study highlighted. And I put that in there, that we received behaviors diametrically opposed to encouraging consumer trust in the DNS. So I thought we should ensure that we're positively encouraging them, or at the very least, ensuring that they can't willfully ignore DNS abuse when we're getting up to very high levels as I mentioned somewhere else with 51%, for instance, in .science.

So Recommendation 3 was just making sure we commissioned ongoing data collection. Underline "ongoing" so we don't do a data collect or something every four or five years, then spend three years discussing it, and eight years later, we finally have some sort of punishment dished out or encouragement dished out.

So hence, being ongoing, being regularly published so that it can be identified, and I think it was Calvin I see on the call, Calvin today, who at

one point said, I think on the last call, on the plenary call, I think it was about should we be getting this from third parties or should it not be something that ICANN are doing?

And I think I ran with that and said I think it would be absolutely brilliant if ICANN were obliged to collect this data and publish it as opposed to it being third parties because, again, that was one of the discussions I'd had with Drew about whether this could be captured by a party DNS abuse studier, should we say, who decides that certain registries are abusing and puts in a certain level of abuse and tries to take them down.

It's always saying, we always talk about the bad guys and there's always room for anybody to abuse any mechanism put in place. So we're always trying to dodge around and look who can abuse it and how... Whether that would happen or not remains to be seen. I would doubt it, but hey, it could be possible. But if ICANN was getting these themselves, then that makes it more independent, so I'd certainly actually encourage us to put something else in on that.

So that really is the recommendation. [It's taking] it a step further and suggesting a DADRP, a DNS Abuse Study Resolution Policy, which would be very similar to the PDDRP, which in design, should we say, wouldn't necessarily follow all of the ins and outs of it. But it's the essence thereof so that where we see an excessive level which needs to be defined in a registry operator, that if they don't explain sufficiently to compliance and if they don't deal with the abuse within a certain time period, or they don't adopt [strict] registration policies wherever ICANN provides for, the compliance provides for, then a DADRP could be

brought by an interested party, again, to be defined, but somebody was being in some way abused and you would have some mechanism to highlight how they'd been abused.

So again, it was just another stick, and again, my argument on this was one of the PDDRPs never being used, designed back in 2009 and hasn't been used on any of the TLDs and it was to deal with specific issues of the registry operator doing something particularly bad vis-à-vis trademarks.

And now I can [inaudible] say the PDDRP is successful by the fact that it's never been used, which means it's also never been abused and we've got a situation where we're not seeing, or at least I'm not seeing, I mean, not seeing that in any of the [INTA] impact study that we've got a 51% level of abuse in a TLD on trademark infringement or trademark abuse.

So presumably if that was the case, if I saw a TLD, certainly with 50% of the registrations infringing trademarks, I would have filed a PDDRP two years ago. And I think I would have succeeded. So perhaps, it's doing its job and should we get a thing in place that could do its job in DNS abuse as well? So that's the background.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thanks, David. So let's take these one at a time and we can start with Recommendation 3, which is for further study, basically to collect data and then publish that data to identify registries and registrars that need to come under greater compliance scrutiny. Questions, comments about that recommendation?

Okay, I see Calvin is typing so I'm going to wait to see. Generally okay. Generally okay with number 3. Any other questions and comments regarding number three?

I have one question or maybe it's more a clarity issue. When we say "greater compliance scrutiny," what do we really mean by that? And the reason I'm asking is [inaudible] there's no... I'll repeat that because we overlapped. The reason I'm asking is that there's no subject there, i.e. under greater compliance scrutiny by whom? Are you intending that to be greater scrutiny by ICANN Compliance or some other entity?

DAVID TAYLOR:

Spot on. "Greater [inaudible] scrutiny by ICANN Compliance," it should say, so I'm happy if anybody wants to amend that on the screen if we want to, if we wish to.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Can we do that, Jean-Baptiste, so that that is the version for consideration by the team?

I do think it's helpful to be as specific as possible here for these recommendations.

I think that was really your greater point here, David, which is that there are mechanisms in place for individual complaints to be handled, that there doesn't seem to be a process in place where something is done when there's a pattern of DNS abuse that's widespread.

The system seems to be designed to handle one-off incidents, but not track and respond to systematic levels of abuse.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Yes. Thanks, Laureen. Yeah, again, I think it's trying to get an obligation here on ICANN Compliance to, or a suggestion, that they do more with it because, again, I hear when I talk to people about the fact that some of these issues have been known for many years. And I'd love it to be explained to me. But I mean, when I see the abuse by the registrar names ongoing and it's been going for quite some time, you do wonder in the Internet world we live in and the speed which things happen, if you're abusing something and we see that time and time again, where we're going after a domain name which is phishing, we take it down. It takes us between five and ten days to take it down by persuading the registry operator or whatever means we use, or to 40 days if you file a UDRP and it just pops up again.

So it's a wonderful thing for making loads and loads of money time and time again because the problem never goes away. You just keep going after it. But frankly, it's not the sort of money I wish to be earning and I think something else could be done about it when we see it and we see a pattern.

And that's the thing is I just think that if we've got the data collection, that data is available, we can do things quicker and not wait a year, or two years, or three years because it's something that needs to be. If a TLD or somebody is abusing, you should have a minimum of six months or three months before it's dealt with. I just can't see why it can go on

for so long. And obviously, that's the issues, which I wonder whether in getting data collection and publishing it, we can do something to identify any bad actors and ensure that Compliance can deal with them. That's it, really.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay, thanks, David. Does anyone else have any other comments or questions on this?

So Jean-Baptiste, is it possible to do edits on screen or is this just an image that we can't edit?

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ:

Laureen, so this is a PDF but one possibility is I can share my screen and I can update if you wish.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So perhaps we can... because I want to make sure that this gets captured so it's redistributed in advance of tomorrow's call, whatever changes we make. And I think the change would be "regularly published to identify [registrars] that need to come under greater scrutiny by ICANN Compliance."

And David, I see your hand up. I don't know if that's an old hand or you have additional remarks on this Recommendation 3.

DAVID TAYLOR:

The comment which, helpful comment that Calvin had mentioned about this being something which — I do like your screen, Jean-Baptiste — whoa, that's cool.

But we this as something which I can collect and collect this data. In Recommendation 4, I talk about it using one more heterogeneous blacklists, backstop [inaudible] APWG, Spamhaus, etc.

I'm just wondering whether there is not a way for ICANN to collect that data or have a regular data request from certain providers and whether we shouldn't go down that angle so the date it comes from ICANN and is, therefore, more objective that it may be if it's provided by third parties which could be captured, essentially.

I don't know what anyone else thinks, but I think, Calvin, you were going that way and I quite liked that suggestion, so if we could take that further, I'm more than happy to.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So are you suggesting, David, then that there be a reference, perhaps, to, for example, the DAARS project because that is ICANN's current effort to collect different feeds that track different types of DNS abuse? Or are you thinking about adding a reference to that?

DAVID TAYLOR:

[Limit it] to just that, but I think that's a very good way forward. So if we got any wording where we suggest something under that or other so we're not saying it has to be that way and someone says, "Well, that's not going to happen," for whatever reason.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So could we then change that to "further study the relationship between specific registry operators, registrars, and DNS abuse by commissioning ongoing data collection including but not limited to ICANN's DAARS initiative, and I think that's D-A-A-R-S Initiative.

Yeah, so it would be "including, but not limited to ICANN's DAARS Initiative," and you can just put a comma there after DAARS Initiative and then it would be "regularly published in order to be able to identify registries and registrars that need to come under greater scrutiny by ICANN Compliance," and you can then delete the compliance before scrutiny. Yeah.

Okay, so folks can take a look at that and I think, unless people have questions, we can take a vote.

David, go ahead.

Okay, did anyone else? I wasn't sure if David wanted to speak. If anyone else has any questions or comments?

DAVID TAYLOR:

Sorry, Laureen. Yeah, I didn't realize I hadn't picked up. My mistake. So I was just saying on Recommendation 3, the parties we're addressing it to had been quite wide. They're saying "ICANN Board registry/registrar stakeholder groups, the GNSO and the Subsequent Procedures PDP Working Group." If we all agree with that, that's good. But it was the addition, I thought of the SSR2, the Security, Stability and Resilience Group because that ties into security and I just thought it was

something that was there. It's still ongoing and it might be something they could take forward when we're finished. Again, just a thought I'm throwing out.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

That makes sense to me because you're right. That Review Team, I think it's just getting started, actually.

So Jean-Baptiste, in the two section, could we add, is it the SSR Review Team? The SSR2 Review Team.

Okay, so with that, I'm going to ask folks to indicate whether they support including this recommendation in our next draft of the DNS abuse section. So if you can indicate by giving an agree or a disagree, that would be helpful.

So Calvin had indicated in the chat, said he agrees. So Fabro and Gao, you can either type in or let us know your views on this, that would be helpful too, since you're on the call.

Okay, Fabro agrees. Gao is on. Do you have an agreement or disagreement on this? Okay, I'm not sure that Gao can hear me because I'm not getting a response.

But most of the people on the call are in agreement that this should go forward, so Gao, if you disagree, I'll leave you the option to note that via e-mail or in the chat.

Okay. Then we can consider this to be approved by the subteam since folks have already had a lot of opportunity to give input on this over the past two weeks anyway.

Okay, so let's move on then to Recommendation 4, and perhaps, Jean-Baptiste, you can get Recommendation 4 on the screen and people can clear their agrees because now we're on a new topic, Recommendation 4.

I have a quick question for you, David, one thing which I wonder about is in the IP context, of course, the rights holder has standing and the interest to bring this to protect their own rights. But when I look at the way this is phrased, it almost strikes me that this recommendation would require some sort of public interest entity – law enforcement or some other such entity – to bring this because you're not talking about one incident and one victim. You're talking about excessive levels of abuse, which makes me wonder just from a standing point, even though that's a little bit of legal jargon, it makes me wonder who would be able to bring this. And it raises a level of complexity for me that I'm wondering if you had considered.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Absolutely. I mean, that's one of the issues that we need to look at, and when I put this recommendation together, I kind of thought we'd dissect it and go into it a lot more so it's sort of sitting there as the original one I sort of suggested when I was talking to Drew a couple of weeks ago. And that's exactly the sort of things we need to explore, but I would hope that we don't need to limit it to something. We want to try

and be as open as possible, and I agree with public interest. It could either be, and maybe that's the wording we need to put in, this obviously needs to be – we don't want it to be an abusive thing that anybody can come along and abuse it.

You need to show some sort of damage, some sort of issue, and I think that could be a grand total, an individual, you basically show that you've been phished or attempted phishing. You have the e-mails exactly the same. I got one from the police here yesterday where a person, although you do sort of look at it, they've missed the... [Due] to phishing scam, they've given away \$41.

So that's taken about two hours of my time yesterday trying to deal with this, trying to identify whose fault it is, and it's not our client's, but the police, you have to talk, you have to go through and my [end] discussion with a policeman, I said, "Can I just give the person \$41 and make this go away please, because I can't deal with this any longer?" because it's just such a mushroom effect. It's just so much time involved.

So I mean, that person would be a person who could bring it, for instance, or the brand that is having its lawyer spend six hours of his time trying to deal with it for \$41 could then start bringing it if it's a third, or a fifth, or a tenth of the time that's been in a specific registry or a specific registrar. So I mean, that's, I'd go for any of the above as long as we define it or whoever looks in it, whoever implements it, defines it in such a way that it's not something which can be easily abused, and that, therein lies the problem. Obviously, an individual \$41 isn't going to pay a \$5,000 pound filing fee unless somebody else funds it. But I mean,

somebody else may fund it. That's where the funds come for something

like that.

So it could be the individual. It could be the brand that's dealing with it. It potentially could be the police filing it if they're doing it, so some wording in there which we all are happy with and agree on, and covers

that point. So I'm open to anything on that.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thanks, David.

I mean, the way it's phrased, this is a "should be considered by the community" so I think that could be something that could be worked out. It is just something that struck me and when I read this, it really is something that would probably be that's directed to the community to work on among the stakeholders that you've identified, and perhaps, even others.

Other questions and comments regarding this recommendation? This is the recommendation that I think had generated the most comments in prior calls.

Jonathan, go ahead.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Thanks, Laureen.

I guess the key distinction in this is whether or not it's a direct recommendation or a recommendation for discussion and I think there

are elements the community would be very resistant to it as a direct recommendation, but [we had a good] discussion about it, I think would be difficult to argue against which is why I supported it on the plenary. So I think as long as we are diligent in figuring out the best venue for that discussion, this should be less controversial. But we probably won't get Jordyn.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So just following up on what you said, Jonathan, is there a way we can improve the phrasing here to make sure it's clear that we are looking for a discussion and community [state] on this rather than dictating that this should happen?

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Well this, maybe in an area where directing this to a particular body, as David suggests, the SSAC potentially... I'm really hearing my voice echoed back at me. Or yeah, I don't even know if it's a Subsequent Procedures group. I mean, the SSAC might be the best organization to take it up in a less political environment. So that's the only thing I can think to do to make this better is to be specific about what we mean by the community.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

David, would, is there a particular part of the community that you think would be the right stakeholder group to [shepherd this]?

JONATHAN ZUCK:

You put the SSR2 in the comment section.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Yeah. So would it make sense then to say, "DNS abuse dispute resolution policies should be considered by the multi-stakeholder community, particularly the SSR2 Review Team," to add that as sort of a parenthetical? And then, perhaps, pare down the two sections.

I assume all our recommendations are going to the ICANN Board, but it seems to me that perhaps it would make more sense to direct one particular group to consider leading this discussion, not that they wouldn't consult with other people, but I think if we... Just like when there's an emergency, if you want someone to do something, you don't just shout into the crowd. You say, "You in the green shirt, call 9-1-1." What do you think about that, David?

DAVID TAYLOR:

The best entity is, because again, it's a bottom-up process but I feel it's something, it just seems to be so fundamental and more so, it's almost easier for me to speak on this because it's not a trademark issue so I'm not biased towards trademarks and protecting the big, bad "baddies" who make millions from everybody.

This is DNS abuse. It's clearly dealing with bad people and I just find that, what is the justification for it? So it seems to me it's something which the ICANN Board should be saying, "This is something which we do not wish to see, full stop," so it almost becomes a top-down process.

But I would like to see and I don't fully understand why the registry, or registrars, or anybody would say this is a bad thing, we shouldn't be doing it because apart from the fact of it being something which can damage profits because that's the whole problem with this sort of thing, is if someone has got the registered domain name and they're paying money, it's a loss of profit. So there seems to be this wish to have it as hard as possible to get rid of that person because while it keeps going, everyone makes the money from it to put it bluntly.

So that's where I think it's wrong, and I think it's where this sort of stuff continues. It's where the trust and the DNS is the issue, and there will be the downfall of the DNS system as we look ahead and go to ten years. I mean, that's what I think.

So I think it's fundamental on all of us to be doing something, so I don't know where it should specifically go, and it could be the SR2, or they could potentially, I haven't spoken to them. I mean, so maybe we should be talking to them and asking them whether that's something they want before we put them to it.

But would they lead it over and above the ICANN Board or the registry/registrar stakeholder groups, the GNSO? I don't know. To be honest, I'm not sure what the best [route] forward for this hence going wide.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Well, I think talking with the SSR2 would be a good idea before we called them out specifically.

And this is just a question. The GNSO, would they be the organization that typically would also take on this sort of issue? That seemed to be more... that's just a point of information. Anyone? We're the ICANN organization.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Certainly within the remits of the GNSO. It's within the remit of the GNSO, and obviously, part of it is the GNSO is made up of the Registry and Registrar Stakeholders Group.

I would have thought if we pushed this to any other aspects or elements of the GNSO, the BC would agree, the IPC would agree, but it's where it should go and who can do it. And this should be a sub-section of any of those, which think that this is a good idea.

I do think the SSR2 is a potential conduit and also a potential group of people who can look at this and they're going to come out with something which should be as objective as it can be. So I just think this should be included.

But where we come down which should do it, or we say this is something [out] too, maybe something we say. We think this is so important and so fundamental to Safeguards and Trust that this needs to be considered as a priority within ICANN as a whole, so the ICANN Board, the registry, and we list them all. I don't know. I'm up to anything on this, really.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay, so then one thing I would suggest is at the very least, is add the SSR2 Review Team to the "2" section just so they're included. But if we wanted to call them out more specifically, I think that would benefit, perhaps, from touching base with that Review Team, and maybe David, you could do that to at least get a temperature, to see what their temperature is on this.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Just to answer, before we go ahead and publish, not a problem.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So other questions or comments? I think Calvin has asked how this fit in with the various contracts that regulate the contract as it stands.

My initial take on this, this is not part of the current contract that's not in the existing mechanism so if this were to be adopted after appropriate policy procedures, it seems to me that it would need to be added to contract. And if it were going to be added, that could be something that could be done for subsequent rounds. It could be done for subsequent contract renewals. But it would have to be added because it's not a part of existing contracts.

CALVIN BROWNE:

I'm sorry. I'm struggling with my connectivity in terms of Adobe Connect. There is something wrong with my ISP, it seems.

I had a quick look, for instance, at the 2013 RRA and there is a mechanism in that, for instance, for a registrar to have to answer abuse

reports and a process whereby they have to do various things and so forth.

David, I'm wondering, you've run into a specific problem here and then you've got clients who are feeling pain here, and I'm wondering, have they submitted abuse reports to the appropriate registrar and/or registrars concerned, and what is the actual or have you found that process to be if they have? And if they haven't, why not?

DAVID TAYLOR:

Thanks, Calvin. Without going into the specifics, yes, in some clients they have and the issue you generally come up against, especially if you're going to the registry is they just want a court order each time, so you're faced, "We'll do it if we have a court order," so you have to go to court and I can think of several clients here. We got a list of about 300 issues ongoing of phishing attempts, 300 court orders across 10 or 15 jurisdictions. I'll make it 92 out of 1,000 on that and they just can't do it. That's the problem. So I just imagine how many others are out there not able to do that.

And some registrars do take the things down. We've had issues specifically that I can talk about with Hogan Lovells as we're getting spammed more and more, a certain member of our firm is sort of gone more into the political side, should we say, and so their e-mail was heavily phished and we're getting a lot of those attempts. It moves around and many registrars will deal with it, but that's partially because I know the registrars as well so they'll take it down, but some just won't.

There's a lot of registrars there who will not deal with it and so we want a court order or file a UDRP. We can file a UDRP. It's still 40-50 days and \$5,000 to \$10,000 U.S. to go after it, to stop one domain name, and then they just go and bridge it with three apples instead, and start again the next day. So that's the issue. And it certainly seems to, should we say, tend toward specific registries and specific registrars which the bad guys know that they're going to insist on a court order, so that's where they start going because they know they're safer there, which is an actual thing. If I was a bad guy, I'd do exactly the same thing. So that's why I think we need to be going after those entities rather than the individuals who keep moving.

**CALVIN BROWNE:** 

Yeah, so I think two things there. I heard that you had some success when you approached registrars sometimes and it seems like you have less success when you go direct to the registry itself. And I almost want to say that seems as it should be because the registry should send you to the registrar. The RRA, the 2013 RRA, has Section 3.18 which puts obligations on a registrar to actually do these things and what I don't see is a correlation or what I haven't seen is a correlation between the third party stuff that we've seen and complaints to ICANN in terms of registrars. I need to just wrap my mind around that to understand that, I guess, anyway.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thank you, Calvin.

DAVID TAYLOR: Yeah, and I don't know whether we've got that data. Can you hear me

or not? Hello, Laureen. Can you hear me?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes.

DAVID TAYLOR: Hello?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes.

DAVID TAYLOR: Oh, you can. Okay, so I just replied to Calvin there, and I think – I forgot

what I was going to say now when I started. What we don't have,

perhaps, unless I've missed it, is with the trademark abuse, I was going

through the statistics which ICANN have personally or ICANN

Compliance have on the number of complaints they have received

regarding trademark issues.

I don't know whether we've done that on DNS abuse. Maybe we have,

maybe we haven't, but I think Calvin, you raised a very good point

there, is how much or how many complaints go to ICANN Compliance

and are dealt with, and how are they dealt with and is that data which

we have?

I certainly hear time and time again, rightly or wrongly, and I tend to be

very protective of ICANN and ICANN Compliance. When a client says

there's no point in writing to ICANN, they just ignore it, I generally say, "Well, send me the e-mails where they have ignored you," and then they reply, "Well, no and it's just pointless, they don't do anything."

So you've got a lot of, rightly or wrongly, preconceptions out there of what can and can't be done. But I do know that when they go to the registrars and a registrar doesn't do something, they will then potentially go to the registry and some registries do, do something. And if I was to start looking through and qualifying, I would say, certainly when I'm looking at the DNS abuse study, there is no registry that I've seen there which is high up in the abuse level, which has ever refused a request. The ones that are clean are the ones that do, do something when you point out to them that their registrar hasn't done it or whatever.

So you can go up that stream, but that is one of the big issues from the outside world when you're dealing with this, unless you're an expert, you're going after so many different entities. You're going after the registrant. Then you're going after the registrar. Then you're going after the registry. Then you're going to ICANN. That's four engagements and you might throw in an ISP at the same time in four or five different jurisdictions. It's phenomenally complex and costly, which just makes it so easy to do.

So that's where I think we've got something fundamentally wrong with the process that we're not able to deal with these things in any way in an efficient manner. Anyway, that's me.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thanks, David. Calvin, did you want to respond?

**CALVIN BROWNE:** 

Yeah. Look, it really would be interesting to see if the data that we received from third parties ties up with the data and [inaudible] ICANN Compliance.

I can tell you just over the weekend, I got a final reply to my first... I did a WHOIS complaint about WHOIS data and I can tell you that my personal experience kind of bears up what David is saying. I can quite clearly see that the WHOIS data is incomplete. ICANN seems to see a different thing for me and the complaint has just been closed with a survey and in terms of the whole process, I feel that yeah, there is something there that broke down and I'm not too sure how to solve it.

So I can understand David's pain. I'm still very unsure as to how this recommendation fully fits in with it, that pain and solves it. I still have issues with it, but yeah. Yeah, I'm not too sure how to solve this yet.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

David, do you want to respond? I think the key question is Calvin's query about how this mechanism relates to the harm that you are identifying in terms of by analogy, rights holders or victims of abuse to use the right lane that we're in here, how victims of abuse can have another alternative, perhaps more nimble mechanism to obtain relief, especially if it involves a registry or a registrar that has an excessive level of abuse.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Yeah, thanks, Laureen.

I'm trying to think of potential examples here.

The idea of it is something in addition to compliance, so I think I'd reiterate that because that was Jordyn's point. We need compliance to be stronger, this should be for compliance to do, etc., and I'm all for that. So let's do that and that should be covered. And that's maybe possibly the Recommendation 3. We're saying ICANN Compliance needs to prepare this data and need to do things and be tied in with the other recommendations. That's certainly a general thing.

This is really a sweet mechanism, so as for a specific example, somebody who has been phished three times, four times or five times from different TLDs and identifies that the last three have come from a specific TLD and it's just moving around in that TLD or between several TLDs could then bring a complaint as an individual who may have \$5,000 to throw away because they're sick of being scammed or having their money taken away, or their reputation damaged.

So it could be that. It could be a prank where a bank has its own process in places and sees that the fishing attempts are coming almost exclusively from a set of four to five to ten registrars and ten TLDs. They would be filing it as a bank, as a financial institution. Then if it's a brand which sees it, they could file it.

If it's another registry that thinks it's a bit unfair that they're put in place, these very strict registration policies, and other ones don't have those policies and they're making more money, if they find that they are actually a damaged party, not just because they find it uncompetitive.

They wouldn't be able to file it then, obviously. But if, for some reason, they've been damaged and they've also been phished, and I know certain registrars who have been phished because we've helped them.

So that happens everywhere. So I think the key thing is anybody who has had some sort of damage and can show it, the damage, and you've got the traces of this, you've got the e-mails — that's the basis of your complaint — and you tie that in, I would have thought with the statistics out there showing that a certain registry or registrar has high amounts of DNS abuse over a certain level, and therein, you've got a complaint and those people would file. So it's really, it's another avenue, another option.

I honestly don't think it would be used. It shouldn't be used. The fact that it's there should hopefully do something about this because, as I said, the .science is at 51%. If it's hit hard by several people, it has to clean itself up and if ICANN Compliance haven't managed to, then this is helpful and maybe ICANN Compliance would welcome something like this. They welcome the PDDRP when that was put in place, and that hasn't been used, as I say. So I think it's good. I think it's got a lot of potential for doing something and not being used, so hopefully [inaudible].

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay, well, Calvin, now I see your hand is up. Did you want to respond and then our time is rapidly coming to an end? Calvin?

**CALVIN BROWNE:** 

Sorry, my Internet connectivity is going up and down so I can't turn the hand off. So no, just ignore it for now.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay, fine. It seems to me we're still in the midst of discussions here, and David, I see your hand is up again so I will give you the last word, but I think we're going to have to take this up again at the plenary [too].

Go ahead, David.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Thanks, Laureen. Yeah, no, just pointing to the chat there when I've asked and Brian has come up under these is something that's important. I said, "Do we have ICANN Compliance stats on DNS abuse and complaints filed, and whether resolved with a takedown or not?"

I just think that's something which we should try and get, and have in the study because that goes to the heart of whether Compliance is able to work and do its job. So [inaudible] Brian said that you've taken that away as an action point so that would be great to have and it's something we can hopefully put into the study and take it from there.

And I'm done.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay. I'm sure we have ICANN Compliance information on number of DNS abuse complaints. What I don't think is published is how those are

resolved. So I'll be interested to see what Brian and [Elise] will find out. But that's my understanding.

In any event, I think this still needs some discussion and we're going to need to decide how we want to handle this for the final – not the final – for this interim version of the report which contains this new information. So for tomorrow, when folks participate in the call, what I'll ask you to consider because we're going to need to come to rest on this, is whether this is something we want to include as a draft recommendation and let the community react to it and see what kind of public comments we get, and then we will have another to react and refine for our final report or whether this should be handled another way. So folks are going to have to make a call about whether they stand on this.

But that is all our time for now. I'm going to apologize to Gao who has been put off for the past two meetings even though she was on the agenda and hopefully, Gao, we will get to you next week, but I'm wondering if you and Brenda, perhaps, can connect to make sure we have you next week in a position where we're able to hear you because that would be beneficial for you to be able to present your recommendation.

And with that, I'm going to thank everyone, particularly David who handled the lion share of today's discussion.

For the INTA survey paper, I think we were pretty much closed out on that. If anyone has any other comments or feedback, please get it to David as soon as possible. But I think that's something we had already

reviewed and people had given fairly constructive, but not major, feedback on it. So my sense is that is also teed up for tomorrow's plenary call.

And that's it. So thanks, everyone, for participating today.

And yes, the version projected on the screen can be shared with the Review Team. That should be the version that's sent around tomorrow, and perhaps, it would be convenient for people to also [inaudible] see the INTA section again, just so everyone has the right things in front of them for tomorrow's call.

Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Bye.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, Laureen. Thanks, David.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]