RECORDED VOICE: This meeting is now being recorded.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Welcome everyone to Plenary Call number 57 of the CCT Review Team. Is there anyone that is on the phone only and not in the Adobe Connect for roll call purposes?   Okay, and is there anyone with an updated statement of interested?

Okay, I see we have apologies from both Jordyn and Jamie, which I think is problematic on the discussion of DNS Abuse recommendations.   That said, I think we should dive in, and Drew, why don't you give us your overview and we'll have what discussion we can on the DNS Abuse paper.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks, Jonathan.   Yes, I guess a brief update, we discussed this on the subteam call but for the plenary the updates to the DNS Abuse chapter from last week -- and actually, Jean-Baptiste, would you mind putting the redlined version up if you have that?   And otherwise I could send that again.   The changes are first of all to the body, incorporating the suggestions from last week, Waudo had a few language suggestions, Calvin had a comment about one of the sentences for the end, and then the rest of the changes are reflecting that I try to use more precise language from the report.

I went back to make sure that when we had discussed rates in the body it really was rates and that volume and things like that and just tried to

make sure the language was as precise as possible. For the two recommendations we discussed last week, I incorporated the suggestions that were discussed. For the first one, Kaili had suggested broadening it beyond financial incentives and then we had a discussion about that of course.

So I ended up using our time of consensus language we came up with whereby -- and when we have it on screen you'll see it -- whereby we are recommending that incentives including financial incentives -- we're now saying, "Provide incentives including financial incentives to registries especially open registries to adopt proactive anti-abuse measures." This is reflecting the fact that we do not want to constrain the development of incentives for all registries, nor do we want the incentives to only be financial if potentially other good ones could exist but that our emphasis is of course on financial incentives and on open registries since we seem to have data that suggests that's an avenue that is important to address, so that's all that's changed there.

On the second recommendation, it was suggested to expand this, I believe maybe Jordyn suggested it, to expand this one to registry agreements as well, and so the language has been mortified to describe that. Those two recommendations are the ones where unless you tell me otherwise, it seems we have consensus and we've worked in all the feedback.

And so I guess briefly I'll stop there. If anyone has any questions or comments about that and then I'll get into the two new purposed recommendations that we have not yet discussed. For

recommendations one and two or the body of the text, does anybody have any feedback or comments? Great, Jordyn?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Yes, thanks Drew. I think I tried to express this on the chat last week, but with regards to the incentives section I think something that is important to end a state where support ended up in is it's not possible for a registry to simultaneously offer really low prices and no enforcement of anti-abuse mitigation mechanisms.   I feel like the current language feels like, "Oh, we should give registrars who behave well like a cookie," and I know that last week Carlton in particular was sort of uncomfortable with that approach, and I am too as well for different reason; just because I think it has the potential to end up without that baseline of saying that it's just not possible to offer really cheap domains if you're not doing anything proactive.

What we may want to include in the statement it's just like, "ICANN should consider a cost structure that makes it…," I don't know, I don't want to necessarily use the word impossible in our recommendations but, "ICANN should consider a cost structure whereby registry operators who do not adopt anti-abuse mechanisms won't be able to offer domains at prices that are attractive to abusers." And so Drew, I could potentially adjust some language that's not totally on the fly but that's the only concern I would have with the current recommendations; otherwise, they look good.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks, Jordyn. And so I'll quickly respond to you before calling on Waudo. With regard to that, and obviously yes, you've talked about this a lot, we've all talked about how best to tackle this price issue, so then are you okay with the current language if some sort of language like you are suggesting, like you said no need to come up with on the fly but some language like that to incorporate into the rationale or are you taking issue with the actual recommendation as worded, or what you're saying be perhaps an additional recommendation, even though obviously it's completely complimentary and along the same lines of this broader discussion?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I don't think it`s a new recommendation.  I do think it affects the recommendation text.  Maybe it`s just a matter of saying ÌCANN should consider incentives or price structures charged to registries and incentives including financial incentives, or something like that, just to make it clear. Like fundamentally, as long as it`s possible for a registry to only charge the ICANN 25 cents and not have to do any proactive abuse mitigation, we`re going to end up with the situation that we have today.

Even if you offer people a 100% refund of their ICANN fee or even if you give them an award or something like that, some registries are just not going to bother, and so then you will end up with -- it's hard to imagine ending up with anything but the status quo when there`s at least some registries that just don`t bother to do anything and just sort of put a bunch of TLD`s out there for mass consumption without any real proactive enforcement.   [Inaudible] price charged.

DREW BAGLEY: Sorry, I missed all that, could you repeat the last 30 seconds?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Sure. So I think without some sort of price floor that's higher than 25 cents for registries to just do nothing at all, I think you're going to see the status quo play out again. I think just including some statement about price structure alongside the financial incentives, then we could put more text in the rationale as well. But I think a little bit of text belongs in the body of the recommendation.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah thanks, if you could get me that as soon as possible, that would be terrific. Waudo?

WAUDO SIGANGA: Okay, thank you. I hope you can hear me. Regarding recommendation one, your first recommendation, I remember last week a bit of talk about wording it in a different way, so rather than talking about incentives we could talk about penalizing people; it's much easier to implement. Did you consider maybe as your wording the recommendation in that way?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, I remember that discussion, but then we also talked about how recommendation two, so ones the carrot and ones the stick, and so

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recommendation two would really provide the penalties and the disincentives for anyone to engage in systemic abuse because then there would be a way for ICANN to investigate and suspend based off of waste of abuse instead of individual complaints; and so that's the way those work together, but could you be more specific about what you're seeking?

WAUDO SIGANGA: Yeah, about using more specific language, recommendation two, so amend the registrar, accreditation agreement with what you just paid down with penalties and so on. Can you be more specific with that recommendation?

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, if you have some language, I just don't know if I [CROSSTALK] sort of language. I certainly remember that point being brought up last week, but then I thought since we have recommendation one and two it seems to address the [inaudible] providing some sort of good, positive incentives to good [inaudible] recommendation two was punishment if you don't. Certainly if you have some language to suggest and just like Jordyn's doing, that would be great if you could send that to the group. But otherwise, I do not, this is my latest version based off of where it seemed like we had consensus.

WAUDO SIGANGA: Okay.

DREW BAGLEY: Jonathan.

WAUDO SIGANGA: Okay, I don't know if it's right now but if you think that it's included then that's really the way it is.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay, thanks, Waudo. Jonathan, I see your hand up.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, Drew. I actually wanted to call on Jordyn again before we lost him because he raised a concern about the outside conflict resolution proposal on email that I wanted to try and air on the plenary today. Jordyn, I'm hoping that you can jump back into that, cause I did my best to kind of represent your point of view on the call yesterday, on the sub team call, but I'd love for you to [CROSSTALK].

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I was just going to say, I think we're not to those final two recommendations yet.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Okay, I'm just worried about losing you, Jordyn, because you said you had to leave, so I just wanted to make sure that --

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I'm around for the next 42 minutes at least.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Great thanks, never mind then.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks, Jonathan. So for recommendations one and two, I guess I'm still trying to gauge whether or not we have consensus, cause incrementally we've been updating these based off of each discussion but at this point, I would certainly say if anyone has specific language or specific edits then please send them to the entire group so we can consider them because the language so far, the way it's been shaped has been based off of what appears to be consensus from each call, the points where we do have consensus.

No one seems to disagree with these notions, whereas inside from what I'm hearing it seems like there are of course suggestions to use sharper language and maybe go further, so I would encourage everyone to send those just so we can stick to our deadline and get this out for public comment. So especially Jordyn and Waudo for recommendation one, and then for recommendation tow real quick, just want to gauge if that's one where we do still have consensus where it's at or if you think we need any modifications before submitting this for public comment.

After we discuss recommendation two briefly, then I'll get to the new ones and then that's where Jordyn should definitely chime in because he has some strong opinions about the dynamics of that. For recommendation two we are currently proposing amend the registrar accreditation agreement and registry agreement to prevent systemic use of specific registrars for technical DNS Abuse.

Does anybody oppose that language as is or is everybody supportive of that language? I guess if you could vote and use the disagree if you disagree with that language and otherwise I'll assume we still agree with that language. Oh Waudo, I see your hand, go ahead.

DAVID TAYLOR: I can't vote, Drew, but it's just David butting in, I agree.

WAUDO SIGANGA: What is significant of the word "specific"? [CROSSTALK] What kind of registrars --

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah sure, and actually that part needs to be updated anyway to reflect that we added registry agreements so it should say, "Use of specific registrars and registries."   We could say "certain", we could use a different word, but the intention there is to prevent cyber criminals from being able to just go to one place because they know that that registrar will not suspend them no matter what they or go to the one registry because it's okay that their whole zone is bad, they know it's a safe place for them to send their spam emails from or launch whatever sort of malware campaign from, so that's what we're trying to get at.

It's intended that they would of course prevent systemic abuse, we could say it's any, but from what we're seeing with the data we noticed that there were specific registrars that were associated with abnormally high levels of technical abuse and so that's how that language was

shaped. We can certainly wordsmith that but are you okay with the general premise of it or do you have any other feedback about that?

Okay, I'm going to assume we have consensus on this one, and so if not then just certainly send an email to the group with any other proposed language and I'll fix that omission of where we need to add the word registries to it.

Now we're moving to the new ones that our sub team has briefly discussed but the group has not, the plenary group has not discussed. We have recommendation three, further study the relationship between specific registry operators, registrars and DNS Abuse by commissioning ongoing data collection, regularly publish in order to be able to identify registries and registrars that need to come under greater compliance scrutiny.

This recommendation proposed by David goes a bit further than our general recommendation of it being the DNS Abuse Study because instead this is recommending that the specific variables are looked at, many of which were identified in the latest DNS Abuse Study but also that this would be ongoing abuse collection that would actually enable some sort of action to be taken so that way it's not purely academic.

David's still on the call, David can chime in and explain that a bit better and then we could -- David, why don't you chime in for recommendation three. We'll discuss three and then we'll move on to your other recommendation, recommendation four.

DAVID TAYLOR: If I could hold for about five minutes, I'll be back in the office and I'll be able to speak easier cause it's still a bit noisy, as you can hear. Maybe start the discussion based on what you've said and then I can chime in, I'm listening in and I'll flip [CROSSTALK] in about five minutes. Okay.

DREW BAGLEY: Alright. So Jordyn, I see your comment, don't we have an existing recommendation about the DNS Abuse Study, and yes, that is correct and so that recommendation is -- and I can't think off the top of the top of my head but in another chapter in our report and not one that's getting revised I believe, unless it was in this original one. I'll have to go back and look at, but I know it's still in the body of the Word document that has our full report in there and so I think the intention was this one with David was for there to be kind of along the lines of what Jonathan's been proposing, just ongoing data collection that's actionable and useful to actually achieve something.

In this case, this recommendation would feed our prior recommendations, particularly recommendation two because you would have this ongoing data and then already readily have available the data of that which registrars and registries are associated with abnormally high levels of abuse and how other variables are playing a roll so common registry operators across zones, which is something that the current research could only touch upon but could not really go in depth on.

This would also likely be complementary to the current DARE initiative by ICANN, even though that initiative as of right now appears to be a lot

of good data but not a mandate on how to use that data; and so I think this would be complimentary of that as well. I'm reading your latest one, yeah so that's a good idea, we could certainly do that. I'll let David address that when he gets back in case he has any other thoughts as to why they shouldn't be consolidated, but that sounds good.

The next one is the one I think that would generate the most discussion so I would really like to move on to that unless anyone has any specific comments on recommendations three, and please let me know if anyone is a opposed to recommendation three other than potentially this getting consolidated; but is anyone actually opposed to the substance of recommendation three?

Seeing no objections, now to the recommendation that I know Jordyn will definitely chime in on. This recommendation is one presented by David because of his experience with how he perceives as the dispute resolution mechanisms being another way to create incentives and also provide a venue for redress in the event of high levels of abuse by various registry operators as well as registrars, and so what David has proposed with this recommendation is the creation of a brand new dispute resolution process called the DNS Abuse Dispute Resolution Policy.

The way that this would be envisioned is that if you had an aggrieved party, and so this could be a victim of abuse in some way and sometimes this could be purely a victim of a fishing campaign or malware campaign or something, and on the other hand it could be someone that maybe finds out that they're a victim because perhaps there's some trademark infringement and one of their domains is

registered by an abuser not to do just trademark abuse but they're using it to actually do some sort of this technical abuse to' well then this would provide -- and he can ascend it better who else he thinks it would apply to, but I know those are examples, but then those people would be able to file a complaint and there would be a fee associated with the complaint of course like there are with all of these dispute resolution processes where they'd be able to file a complaint and as part of that they'd actually be able to file a complaint if the operator was associated with extremely high levels of abuse.

In this case, perhaps a lower threshold than those suspension thresholds discussed in recommendation two, but perhaps this would be around 10% or something and then only if they met that criteria that they were actually somehow a victim of the abuse and there was data to support the fact that the registry or registrar was associated with at least 10% of their registered domain names being on black lists, then they could file a complaint and then that would be another means by which a registry or registrar operator that is absolutely not doing anything about abuse would have a disincentive to do that, a disincentive to not care about abuse. I know that Jordyn has some feedback on this, and so if David is not ready to present -- David, first of all, are you there to discuss this more?

DAVID TAYLOR: I'm just getting on to Adobe in about 30 seconds.

DREW BAGLEY: So let's let David articulate this better than I did and then after that, certainly, Jordyn, chime in.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Alright.

DREW BAGLEY: If you're getting an echo, I think that means David's phone is working.

JORDYN BAGLEY: Okay, seems better for the moment. I was just going to say I think it seems to me that we've addressed the general issue of registries just not doing anything about abuse in the revisions to recommendation two here, and I gather that the intent here is well what if ICANN doesn't do anything, even though there would be a contractual obligation for registries to do things.

My take is simply that that's the wrong way to approach the problem, that if we are worried about ICANN not enforcing its contracts, we should fix ICANN and not start to add third party enforcement for ICANN's contracts into the agreements. I think that a) it's more expensive, it means only people with deep pockets that can afford to file these sorts of claims could expect reasonable anti-abuse response. Secondly, it creates a lot of uncertainty for registries and registrars who can understand the ICANN regime but if some random third party is unhappy with the way ICANN's interpreting the contract they just get to go off and try to separately enforce the agreements, so registries and registrars they have come to an arrangement with ICANN as to what the

interpretation of the contract is, and to have third parties reinterpreting it I think is really problematic.

So I don't support this recommendation; I think it makes a lot more sense just to amend recommendation two as we've done already. If we think that we need to add more specifics to recommendation two to make it more strongly enforceable by ICANN that we should do that, but we shouldn't add this third party right of enforcement.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks Jordyn, and David, are you able to speak now so you can respond to Jordyn and then also even probably better articulate the recommendation than I may have?

DAVID TAYLOR: Yes sure, thanks Drew, thanks Jordyn. I heard partly what you were saying, Drew, and I thought you articulated it quite well, what I was aiming at by this recommendation. First of all, I don't think, I mean one it is to discuss it because to me it's a key area and it's a key area that if I look at it today and I see dot science with 51% abuse levels, what is ICANN compliance doing about dot science with a 51% abuse level and what has it done since it's had that high level of abuse?

And I do agree, we need ICANN to enforce and do the necessary, and so as long as we can recommend, that is very clear, I see that as a strong path forward and I would agree with Jordyn there. Personally, I think that is the preferable route to resolving all sins shall we say.

The idea of this DADRP, the DNS Abuse Dispute Resolution Policy was something in the kin to what we did in the IRT, the Implementation Recommendation Team for trademark abuse, the PDDRP, which we discussed on our calls, and at the time that was proposed 2009, that was something which ICANN were very favorable over because I think they didn't want to be the body that was necessarily enforcing and dealing with all these issues, so they wanted it to go out to a third party.

I don't think it should be a random third party but going out to third parties, and we reluctantly went down that route and said, "Well okay, we kind of see why this is a good option potentially but we prefer ICANN to be doing this and resolving it with the various contracts, but yes, if you can't then why not put something in place," and then you go through a whole process where what was proposed was somewhat watered down but ever the less it's there, it exists and it is something which can be uses.

But it hasn't been use, which doesn't necessarily mean it's not a good thing, because there's not systemic abuse in TLD's of trademarks. There's quite a lot but you're not seeing anything like 51% or 30% or 25%, you're seeing it and we're seeing it, and that's what we get on the INTA study and that's we're seeing, but we're not seeing this level of abuse. This level of abuse to me is massively problematic, the trust, if we're looking at trust and we're looking at exactly what we're doing.

It just struck me when I was thinking about this and reading the report and going through things that maybe there was an avenue for a separate thing to be proposed, to be considered so the wording in areas really trying to be considered by the community. We're not saying it

should be done, but it should be there to deal with the registry operators and registrars where they have excessive levels of abuse to define. Obviously we have to let other people define what excessive is, we're not set down what it is. To me it's clear that 51% according to Spamhaus for dot science is excessive, dot study 33% is excessive and it shouldn't be there and why is it still there today.

Now, if it's somebody with deep pockets that comes along, having filed 20 various takedown cases in a specific TLD and says, "I'm getting sick of going through this process each time cause it's cost one, two thousand dollars, maybe five thousand dollars with lawyers each time, I want to go after the registry because they are clearly a bad actor," I think that should be an option for them to go after the registry.

And I think that the mere factor of it existing is not something that we're seeing as abused with the PDDRP, which was heavily pushed back on by certain registries, registry operators cause they said, "Well, this is bad, you can come and take the whole business;"it's not being used, so the proof is in the pudding, it's not being abused and we don't want this abused if we put in to place clearly. There is always an avenue for some sort of abuse but if we define it correctly and we don't put the bar too low nor too high, I think we've got something which might be useful.

The main goal of it to me would be to act as a de-tempt, so if you have a dot science with 51% abuse, when they're sitting at 20% and our data from recommendation three is pointing to this is a serious issue and ICANN starts investigating it or whatever, but then we've got StopBadware, Spamhaus, [inaudible] all pointing to this registry operator being a bad actor, somebody can come up and say, "Well, I'd

like to file a case and I'd like to use this because this is wrong and let's do something about it." That's really where I'm coming from on this.

And I don't think it's a bad thing and any good registry operator isn't going to be scared, and if you look at the 10%, which is the level I was just suggesting, dot com and Verisign are way clear of that, they haven't got 10%, so the dot com names. There's no issue, it's not going to go after any registry that does it and it's something as well which -- you know, I'm trying to be quite specific in the wording there, it's something which they've given an opportunity to resolve, they can get rid of those names. If they've been identified, they can go in and get rid of them.

The issue I have is a registry operator which might be notified and we've got certain examples of this of their bad behavior, the problem is the registrar which registered it is also getting money off this and they're linked parties, and they don't want to let go cause it's revenue and the longer they can send us round and round in circles for six months of the year, they get more and more revenue from it. And you can't just go and play whack a mole and try and get the individual domain names. I think again you go after the registry operator; you don't take them down, you just say clean it up and potentially put in some registration policy. That's where I'm coming from so I wanted to share that and obviously take any comments, thoughts back.

DREW BAGLEY: Jordyn, I see your hand up, did you want to go ahead and respond?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: My general point, I don't want to be too repetitive, but I think the whole premise of recommendation two is that ICANN doesn't have any ability to look at systemic problems today and we believe that's important so therefore it makes sense to give them the ability to not play whack a mole with individual domains and we'll get overall patterns within registries and registrars. That's exactly what recommendation two is designed to address.

For me it's just not necessary to create this additional mechanism which will come a quite a cost for both the community in defining it and then like I said add some uncertainty. The other point I would make is that it's not just a matter of taking dot science as an example; David sort of said that's an example of a bad actor, however the current premise I think that we have as a working model is simply that dot science is cheap and bad guys like cheap domains, and dot science doesn't have proactive anti-abuse mechanisms implemented.

It's not clear to me that they're required to have proactive anti-abuse mechanisms by the contract. The registry contractual obligations with regards to abuse are actually quite a bit softer than the registrar requirements, which is essentially just that the registries need to have an agreement, have to force registrars within their TLD to have their own prohibition on abuse, not that the registries are supposed to be taking action on abuse per say other than to document it through periodic reports. I wouldn't go so far as to say dot science is a bad actor; they just happen to have really cheap domains that the bad guys like to buy.

I think our vision and the set of recommendations we're putting together is to somewhat change that paradigm to make it so it doesn't really work to offer cheap domains if you're not going to be proactive about abuse mitigation. That's just not a framework that exists today. I just don't think it's fair and reasonable to look at the framework as it exists today, especially one in which we don't see increases in overall abuse and sort of say, "Oh we've got this urgent problem that we need to deal with."

We've identified a few tactical problems which is that we want low prices with abuse mitigation and that we want to give ICANN the ability to look at systemic abuse, particularly registrars where there is stronger obligations to do something about it. That all makes sense to me but once again I think this just creates a lot of work and uncertainty where we haven't even put appropriate mechanisms like recommendations one in two in place yet.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks, Jordyn. Calvin?

CALVIN BROWNE: I can go along with quite a bit of what Jordyn is saying and I understand that. I have another issue which I raised yesterday and that was what is the definition of abuse? Then I have a further problem in that it comes to the wording, "Should ICANN not take any action themselves?" How does one know that ICANN doesn't take action? Do you get a certificate of non-action from ICANN and then you can dispute the DRP? How do we [inaudible] that actually working as well?

DREW BAGLEY: David, did you want to go ahead and answer and respond to that?

DAVID TAYLOR: Sure as well I can. Abuse, completely agree, we need to define it, it needs to be defined, that's the place we're stuck generally on that, but I put in there registrars/registries are identified as having excessive levels of abuse to define. We clearly have to define it, so fully agree with that. What is the level and where do you put that, so I suggested 10% of the domain names are black listed domain names and I'm suggesting those are domain names which maybe three or four out of six or seven or eight of the providers that look at this all identify that they're over 10% and you get something which is quite high.

I think the key thing there is, saying in the recommendation, I'm trying to do this in a way that works with ICANN and ICANN compliance, so obviously they explain to ICANN compliance why it is, so dot science can explain, so it's because our names are very cheap etc., etc.; and somebody might be saying, "Well it actually it might not be just that, what about this, what about that?" And that obviously comes to ICANN compliance' attention, and they may or may not take action but the point there was there's a commitment to clean up the abuse within a certain time period. That's something which ICANN compliance will probably say themselves and/or adopt stricter registration policies within a certain time period.

So the DADRP to me is a sweeping up thing at the end of it. If things just aren't happening and you've abuse which is ongoing, six months later, a

year later, for whatever reason that is because the various terms and conditions in the agreements haven't been ratified, haven't been signed by those registries, you know what it's like these things, you can spend several years before you sign them which gives you a lot of time to do a lot of abuse. This is something, which okay, it hasn't been taken within a specific period, so do you get a certificate of non-action?

I think I've suggested it a couple times before where TLD's should have a certification of being a good TLD, a clean TLD and get some INTA approval or some DNS approval. What a great way of going about, they get badges of approval, so consumers can go to them and say, "Well this is a good TLD," where XYZ happens and people look for that and there's some sort of a [inaudible] for that. Obviously those things need to be defined; we can do that in this recommendation now and that's why it's to be considered by the community and explored basically.

If the community will fight over this and obviously some people will say no and some people will say this a good idea, but to me it just seems like a debate that needs to be had and maybe this is something which we should put to the SSC committee review team as well, if they look at it. It's to get an idea which you just [inaudible] about, just because I do think this discussion is what we had in 2009, which is eight years ago with the PDDRP for trademarks and the same arguments were put there about the cost to the community, the fact that it was something very negative and it would be abused and registries would be taken down, etc., and you ended with a very graded level of enforcement actions which could be taken and experts which would consider the case; and they'd be considered properly, it's a proper group of experts, they're not going to take down a whole TLD because of it.

But it's something which to me was a strong stick and it hasn't been used, and that fact that it hasn't been used is the exact thing where we talked about the time, the example of the dot apple which says, "We're dot apple, we're to do with the apple growers of California, we're nothing to do with Apple and iPhones," and they get today 60 of their launch and suddenly they realize they've got eight registrations to the apple growers of California don't care about domain names and they start allowing iPhones and Apples and iPads etc. all in there from around world and they say, "Well you know, it's nothing to with us."

That is why it was designed for, where people and registry operators are looking for the revenue stream from the bad actors, and I just think we should try and cut that off and be seen to cut that off for consumer trust. I'll get off my soapbox now.

CALVIN BROWNE   I'd just like to go over two points that I saw in your soapbox thing. The first one is that ICANN doesn't have any relationship with these people who do this abuse reporting type things. There's no relationship between them per say. At the very least, if you're going to go and use their services to enforce contracts, you're going to have to set up some kind of relationship there and agree on some kind of methodologies and so forth.

Then the second thing is when you said that contracts take a while to be signed, the simple fact of the matter is no one has been allowed into the root without a signed contract. I think just on that point there's a bit of misapprehension. Certainly from what I've seen, what I've experienced,

you don't get delegation to a zone if you don't have a signed and sealed contract with ICANN.

DAVID TAYLOR:

Thanks a lot and both good points. I think setting up a relationship with one of the abuse providers, I turn that around and say, "What a great idea, why isn't this something that we're doing and recommending as a recommendation that that is something which ICANN carry out in their search for data?" Why is it that we're going this for the DNS Abuse Study and going through all of this sort of thing? It should be something that ICANN does of its own accord, to deal with bad actors that are in the TLD's which are effectively run or offered by ICANN, so I think that's a great idea and perhaps we should be going down that with a recommendation.

My point with the signing contracts is just when you have one contract, yes, you can only get into the root, but then if we have another contract which is put in place to deal with this because ICANN say they want everyone to sign it, you can still end up with quite a bit of time before the various registry operators, registrars, and I'm thinking both things here, do actually go ahead and sign it.

So that was seen as quite a long period of time before that gets in place and the time it takes to actually renegotiate one of those agreements is quite long. So a lot of abuse can happen, it's not something which happens in three months or six months, and that's my thinking, there's a lot of abuse going on in the mean time.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks David, and thanks Calvin and Jordyn. Real quick, David, in response to you and in response to the point Calvin made. I think the ICANN DARE initiative is a first attempt at ICANN collecting large amounts of abuse data and analytics, and so I think for where we're at we should probably be method neutral in our recommendations like what we're suggesting with recommendation two, so that way if that initiative continues and that ends up being a source for them to use in identifying registries and registrars with systemic abuse then that's great, but if for whatever reason that initiative goes away and there's some other more reliable data or if there's some sort of third party group that's reputable and has a bunch of data and is identifying all this abuse, then we want to make sure our recommendation is so prescripted that they couldn't consider that body of data because it wasn't the official ICANN body of data.

I definitely thought a while about that when thinking about these things, but with that said I guess does everybody think that recommendation four could be edited and incorporate some of these other ideas and some of -- for example Jordyn's feedback? Jordyn's main point being, "Hey, if we're already going to try to change the dynamics of things with recommendation two and empower ICANN the organization as well as really take a stand against systemic abuse, then do we need recommendation four?"

So with that in mind, do we have consensus that recommendation four with some edits would be a good idea to put in the draft or is this something for which we don't have consensus yet and perhaps we might be able to before the final report but that it shouldn't go into the

draft? Does anybody else have any other commentary? I see Calvin's typing. [AUDIO BREAK]

Recommendation three changes the need for four. Okay, so recommendation three for the data point, ongoing data collection point, okay.

Okay, then Jordyn's feedback is that there shouldn't be a recommendation four. Does anybody else have any feedback? Waudo would like for everybody to have scrolling.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Hey Drew, I'm not sure you saw my hand, it was a late hand. I've been listening to the conversation and unfortunately I think David's very persuasive and Jordyn's very persuasive, and so is Calvin, I'm in a little bit of a conundrum. One of the threads that I thought was a fair point that maybe relates to some of our other recommendations is that many times the entity that makes the complaints and certainly the community doesn't know what happens with complaints, so it may actually be difficult sometimes to even figure out if there's been an adequate response by ICANN compliance which is of course the first entity responsible for making sure the contracts are enforced properly other than the parties themselves.

So I thought that that was a good point because this whole recommendation four seems to be based on the premise that there's a gap by ICANN compliance and therefore another mechanism is needed. I'm wondering if there's any way to try and get some more information about that, although as Carlton and I, I think, have pointed out, there

certainly is a lot of correspondence about a lack of concerns about things not being robustly enforced, at least in the eyes of the folks who are making the complaints.

I personally would still be in favor of asking the community to consider what other mechanisms should be available as a compliment to ICANN enforcement activities. Because it seems to me there still seems to be a gap there. That's my two cents.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks, Laureen. I just pointed out in the chat, we already do have one recommendation elsewhere in the report that will not be part of the DNS Abuse chapter regarding more transparency from ICANN compliance for the complaints.

LAUREEN KAPIN: That is the subject matter of the complaints. What we're really talking about --

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, something was done, what was the outcome.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, I think that would be a very different approach to what ICANN compliance currently has now. Which as Dave explained it, is meant to encourage the contracted parties and the folks making the complaints to freely provide information because it's not such an adversarial

setting. I don't think we've really made any recommendations that suggest changing that. Just to speak to that, I'm just saying that our recommendation about more transparency does not have to do with the outcome; it has to do with the subject matter of complaints as the first step.

DREW BAGLEY: Right, and so without knowing the outcome, we wouldn't have the trigger for recommendation four.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Exactly.

DREW BAGLEYL   Okay, so then are you interested in us proposing a recommendation that would change all of that, and as you mentioned, that would probably have other effects on the whole process because you'd be changing the dynamic, but of getting more information on the outcome?

LAUREEN KAPIN: I think it would probably be helpful to know if there's actual enforcement action taken or the basis of compliance's decision not to act. Right now it's fairly okay.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay. So then maybe so those suggestions it sounds like would still fit into that other recommendation where we could broaden that recommendation instead of including it in the DNS Abuse chapter?

LAURENN KAPIN: Yes, I'm just saying they're related because this --

DREW BAGLEY: Right, because this requires a trigger. Alright, and then David, I'll let you respond.

DAVID TAYLOR: Thanks, Drew. If I look at an example which is just been public, it's just a case which has been published and we discussed it, Drew, yesterday, it's an Instagram dot EU, which is a homograph of the Instagram trademark, the disputed domain name is for the lowercase L instead of the I, so it visually looks like an uppercase I. So the people have registered this, it was clear homographs spoofing, so it's a bit like typer squatting via trademarks etc. You normally just go, "Well we can't try and protect a brand across every TLD, to cover all homographs, all everything," it's just phenomenal cost and we've clearly seen from the part Jordyn's been looking at, brands are just not doing it, the cost is just too much.

But if a brand doesn't do that because of the intense cost of covering every variation including homographs, you end up with gaps which the bad guys can use and this was a domain name registered. There's no trademark infringement per say which you're going after, it's purely because of the fishing site which is there. The end of it you got a fishing

site, a copy of the Instagram website and you're deceiving Instagram users into revealing their account details; and then based on that if you go online and you look at this thing, it's the same with Facebook, Instagram; there you can go and buy all of these user details and get into them, which is a massive problem.

Now, I'm not saying that dot EU is by any means anywhere near the 10%, obviously registry operators have these issues and that comes in, and you've got mechanisms to deal with it. We file the UDRP, we won it, there's no issue there, 40 odd days to do it but there's not a big issue. That's fine and I'm absolutely fine doing that against any domain name registrant, but when you see the same people doing the same thing in the same TLD and you're wondering why it is, you start realizing there's actually a patent behind it and there is an encouragement somewhere, there's something going on because there's so many of them and you realize that these things are happening in certain TLD's and certainly TLD's are havens of abuse, and certain registrars allow that abuse.

And that is my point, if that's happening, it's a heck of a thing to go to compliance and get them to do something with that. Obviously the stronger compliance gets and it's a lot stronger in the last two or three years; so don't get me wrong, I'm not criticizing that per say, but you get all this information together, if there was a complaint which could be filed, I can think of quite a few examples where you would potentially would file it because you would have not 10 or 20 examples, you'll have close to 1000 examples in some of these cases in a particular registry.

And if you got a 1000 of those you can't file a 1000 UDRP's or URS, you can't do that, it just won't happen and that's the problem, is those things just sit there and you can't deal with them without going to the registry operator. Something like that which is there I think would encourage or discourage registry operators, just the bad ones, from allowing it, and hence that's my point with this whole thing, it's a graded response, it's a last resort shall we say because you've got that thing that you're encouraging ICANN [inaudible], they commit to clean it up, it's pointed out.

You're not going after registry operator in the first instance, it really is a clearing up potential mechanism to be explored by the community. Let's look at it, let's look at the PDDRP; honestly, has it worked, has it not, has it does something good for trademarks and prevented abuse? Is this something we can mirror with DNS abuse that could help prevent it, so that if we all meet in five years time with another CCT review study we don't see any TLD's that are out there with over 10% abuse and that should be the world we should be aiming for. [AUDIO BREAK]

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks David, and thanks for giving that example. I know that we need to move on to the other topics here. It sounds like perhaps there is not consensus on this. There's certainly not full consensus on this but perhaps this is something where we could put it out there, maybe tweak the language, put it out there and then for consensus as a team we would say no there and still look at feedback or perhaps this is something that we would not put in the draft report and we would I guess explore again as we get to the final report after we've gotten

feedback on recommendations two and three, which perhaps would affect the need for recommendation four. I guess we should all at least achieve consensus on what our path, since we don't have consensus, should be. And David, is your hand up again?

DAVID TAYLOR: No, it's down, thanks.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Can I ask Jonathan a question? If we don't have consensus can we still publish a recommendation that just reflects no consensus, but as Drew suggests, put it out there?

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yeah, I mean obviously it's not my preference, but we do signify with our recommendations whether or not there was consensus, so we can certainly signify there wasn't consensus around a particular recommendation but that we just wanted to get it out there for discussion purposes. And that's I guess kind of why I raised a question in the chat, which is how do we imagine that discussion happening going forward? Who would take up this discussion?

And maybe this is targeted at David, is it the PDP or is it targeted to this subsequent procedures working group? How do you imagine the conversation that you're trying to get going would take place? On its face, it's hard to be opposed to something that involves discussing something more. Where does this go from here if we make this recommendation?

DAVID TAYLOR: Thanks, Jonathan. I'm not necessarily at that stage yet because I'm still thinking of the recommendation where it goes.   Yes, thinking on subsequent procedures, thinking on SSAC as well because they've got the review team ongoing, and I wondered whether that's not something that they could be looking at as well. To whom it may concern, really.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Alright, did I answer your question, Laureen?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes, you did. It sounds like this is something as long as we can note it clearly that there's lack of consensus.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, Eleeza, for bringing up the text. [AUDIO BREAK]

LAUREEN KAPIN: And I think to the extent we can phrase this, I'm wondering if there is still a possibility for any sort of consensus, to the extent we can make very clear in our phrasing which I think you do somewhat already, Drew, that this is a proposal basically for discussion and of course debate within the community about whether this could be a helpful adjunct.

Maybe if we make that language perhaps a bit more prominent than it is, that could be more palatable to the folks who have reservations. I see Jordyn has his hand up.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Thanks, Laureen. I was going to say, while I think it's reasonable for the review team to have the ability to advance recommendations that don't have consensus and document those, I feel like there should at least be a strong set for that recommendation even if there's some outliers of the review team, and so far in this discussion, I see Calvin [inaudible] with significant reservations about this.

I think Carlton's weighed in on that chat saying he doesn't think it's necessary given the revisions to the other recommendations and particularly recommendation number three here. Laureen sounds like is on the fence. What I don't see is -- like I see David supporting this, it doesn't seems like there is a significant set of other support and so other than not wanting to offend David by just removing this recommendation, I think we need a stronger set of support for this within the review team before it would make sense to include it, and if David thinks it's appropriate to include and we don't have support for it within the review team it seems like he could easily submit a minority statement saying that he has an extra idea that the community may want to consider.

Which I think seems fine anyways given that we don't even know where this is targeted to. I think it's complicated to imagine implementing something like this as a particular recommendation of the review team if we don't even know who's suppose to be implementing it. The idea is just to let the community know they should have a discussion about this, I'm not sure we need a recommendation to do so as much as awareness raising.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Would it be helpful -- because I think you're right that it's unclear perhaps whether there is a majority consensus for this; would it be helpful if we actually used our voting buttons because there are also people on the call who we haven't heard from yet. I'm wondering if it would just provide at least more visual clarity if folks either use their buttons to agree or disagree? Just so we can actually see that.

DREW BAGLEY: Sorry Laureen, how are you phrasing the question? Are you asking us to vote on whether we agree as is or could agree if the language was modified?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Well, why don't you, Drew, phrase it in the way you think it would be most helpful. If you're intending to modify it then perhaps restate how you would want to modify it and then it could be a contingent, you know, raise hands. But I'm just saying that it would be helpful to get a sense of exactly what the numbers here are regarding this recommendation, if it's going to tweaked, just so we know whether this is being cast in a -- this is a recommendation that we don't have consensus on or this a minority view. We need to know how to categorize this for the purposes of even our initial draft going out to the community.

DREW BAGLEY: Right, okay. I'm assuming like it's all these recommendations so far that we're going to -- even if there was consensus for the idea, we are going to want to tweak the language because this has been an [inaudible] process in general. I guess first question, please vote using the green checkbox if you support the general premise of recommendation four, assuming that maybe we would slightly tweak the language to be more specific about who it's addressed to or how it would triggered; but if you're supportive of this recommendation, please vote with a green checkmark. [AUDIO BREAK]

LAUREEN KAPIN: And the compliment is, if you disagree with this, vote with a red.

DREW BAGLEY: Oh yeah, if you disagree to the vote, do the red. Yeah, sorry.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Stacking the deck.

DREW BAGLEY: Do the red like Jordyn's doing, do that icon. The red X.

LAUREEN KAPIN: I think Calvin's said he has reservations -- oh no, he needs to abstain, okay.

DREW BAGLEY: Okay, it seems like there is general consensus of this premise. So then with that decided from reading the chat it seems like perhaps our proposals to either tweak this language or to add this language as a contingence to recommendation two.

And then, Carlton, could you elaborate on what you mean about making it clear and recommendation three? [AUDIO BREAK]

Carlton, maybe you can't do the audio but if you can type and just kind of clarify your last comment, just trying to understand your vote. [AUDIO BREAK]

Well, others are typing more in the chat, I think where we are at now is that we have general consensus that this recommendation should at least be worked on and that it's not dead on arrival. Then we will have to work with a obviously relatively short timeline to edit the language so that it would then be ready to go out as part of the DNS Abuse Study draft, but it sounds likes support for the general idea does not necessarily mean support for this as a standalone recommendation but support for this general language instead, and so this language maybe would best be incorporated with recommendation two or on its own, but I'm still trying to figure out what [inaudible] about recommendation three but maybe on its own but only if the language of one of the other recommendations changed.

It sounds like we have either we're going into editing this we should think of course about how a trigger would actually work and be more precise as to how a community member would know one way or another whether or not ICANN compliance had done anything assuming

recommendation two's adopted, and so we definitely need to come up with some sort of trigger mechanism in that way.

Also I think even though Jordyn is not supportive of recommendation four, we should incorporate his feedback to the best of our ability to make recommendation four more palatable for the concerns he expressed that I think will be concerns expressed by others in the community that if we are calling on ICANN to have the power and the means to address this systemic abuse then we need to better justify why this would be needed as well.

I guess everybody sends feedback to the whole list and then David and I can go back and work on this recommendation with the feedback we've received today. And then I guess we're looking at recommendation three as perhaps addressing -- okay, maybe what Carlton's envisioning is recommendation three would then also have compliance outcomes pegged to that sort of data, so if we've seeing DNS abuse data and we're in -- by the way, the whole time to address Calvin's point about definitions, I think with all of this we're still only talking about technical DNS abuse even if that definition, the community decides to expand these recommendations in the future to apply to other forms of abuse, that's what we're discussing here.

It sounds like perhaps one way to look at recommendation three would be to modify it so that compliance data is correlated with the abuse data from these registries and registrars identified as having high levels abuse and then we'd be seeing from that what whether ICANN compliance had taken action or had not yet taken action pursuant to the powers in recommendation two against systemic abuse. And then

maybe that would then create the trigger for recommendation four. Please let me know if I'm saying that incorrectly, Carlton. [AUDIO BREAK]

Okay, and then Jordyn's just clarifying that his opposition is not for recommendation four as worded but instead to the premise of private rights of action with regard to DNS abuse. So with that said, it sounds like going forward, since most people are supportive of recommendation four with modifications, we need to modify it and then we would know that we would not have absolute consensus in presenting even the modified recommendation to the community if it still creates a private right of action.

That's I guess where we're at going forward. Jonathan, I'm going to call you, but I'm also going to pass this to you cause you need to get on with the rest of this meeting.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, Drew. This is really important paper, so I'm not concerned about the time. I have a question for Jordyn, not to put you on the spot, Jordyn, but given that your concern is foundational, if this was some sort of dependant or contingent clause of recommendation two that was designed to give compliance a broader view that said, if not or it's ineffective then the community should consider or something like that -- given the foundational nature of your concern, would that undermine consensus then in that other recommendation?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I'd prefer not to move it into the other recommendation cause I totally agree that we should give ICANN tools to deal with systemic abuse, but I totally disagree with the notion of allowing third parties to just because ICANN's not doing a good job and start taking actions against registries and registrars themselves.

So if we want and make ICANN do a better job, we should try to fix ICANN and not add these extras rights for third parties. If we include this in recommendation two, yeah I think it would undermine support for recommendation two so we should leave it as is.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Okay. I just wanted to get that clarification. Thanks for the discussion. We'll continue ahead and let some set of folk that are supportive of the recommendation tweak the language and we'll revisit it, and it sounds like if it's included as a recommendation it will be a non-consensus recommendation, or as Jordyn suggests, maybe something that we build into the text or the justification or something like that so that's a less specific recommendation, but [inaudible] to be discussed further or something, which is partial the intention; so look at ways to modify it in that way.

Thank you, Drew, for all your efforts on this. I don't have another version of the parking paper. My understanding from the plenary that I missed was that the only change that came out of the plenary was Waudo -- I took another shot and called them inactive domains at John McCormick's suggestion and Waudo shot that down on the plenary, so I'm happy to change that back to parking.

I guess the only other thing that I want to do to finalize that parking paper, Jordyn, is make sure that we're on the same page in terms of the data that's used inside of it and whether or not the data that got generated by Eleeza and her team is what you were after before we call that paper final. I just want to put that onto your radar if we can and in the very near future -- because Jean-Baptiste is going to yell tomorrow on the leadership call about being behind on our interim…

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I know that we're a little bit behind on that. I think Waudo made an important observation on the list though that we may just want to deal with for a moment here which is the parking rates for the new gTLD's have actually [inaudible] quite a bit since we last looked at them. Is it worth noting that -- it has taken us awhile to put together the report so the data [inaudible] is stale, and so how much of an effort do we want to make to bring fresh perspectives in to the report I guess is an open question.

JONATHAN ZUCK: The irony, Jordyn, is that those rates probably because of nonrenewal.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Perhaps, right? [inaudible] possible, in which case maybe we should look at our renewal study again.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yeah, I don't know, it's a funny situation. But it is a good point about all the data, starting to get stale. Luckily [inaudible] recommendations are, "Hey, study this some more," and it's too soon to tell.

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I'll try to take a look by the end of the week. If I haven't updated by the end of the week, we should consider it good to go and I'll make sure the data is fresh as we can make it between now and then.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Sounds good. Alright, so let's jump right ahead to, Jordyn, if you aren't off the call yet, can we have whatever -- further discussion on the choice paper?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: I am not off the call yet but I'm about to be, but I don't know that there's much discussion to have here. I haven't seen any feedback on the choice paper so I don't have anything new say about it. I guess this is a point at which if you have anything to say, you should say it now cause otherwise we're probably going to lock this in and consider it approved by the review team.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Waudo, go ahead.

WAUDO SIGANGA: Sorry, Jordyn, what changes are we expecting with the choice paper? Are they the ones that are coming from the INTA study?

JORDYN BUCHANAN: That's correct, yeah. I resent the redlined, and hopefully it works, last Thursday.

WAUDO SIGANGA: Okay. I have some things that I want to put in and I'll circulate it on the email, from the INTA study [inaudible].

JORDYN BUCHANAN: Okay perfect, thank you. [AUDIO BREAK]

JONATHAN ZUCK: Any other comments on the choice paper? [AUDIO BREAK]

David, is that you, I just unmated you. I hear the echo. Well then we're going to call this final pending any comments back to Jordyn by the end of the week. So in the next couple days please take another read through this or forever hold your piece. David, now it's your turn.

DAVID TAYLOR: Thanks, Jonathan. I'll let Jean-Baptiste get up the INTA paper which I'm sure he's in the midst of doing. So we discussed this paper on the safeguards call yesterday. So this is basically [inaudible] amendments you can see in red here is what is over and above where we were on the

13th of September draft, when I discussed this on the plenary. These include the suggested modifications from Laureen, Jamie, and Antoinette, as well as some additional points on the safeguards call yesterday.

That's where we are on this paper. Nothing major in the changes, it's in there; I don't know if I've got scrolling right, I'm not sure if I can move to the next page or we just move to the next page. I've added in the fact there that we've got 33 respondents in total, cause we didn't have a mention of the actual number or respondents, and also some footnotes after some discussion with Neilson earlier this week, at the end of last week about the takeaways that we've got a response rate to the survey which is above the norm for a similar sample.

Their explanation of why those comments, that their comments, I was trying to get their feedback and exactly what we were looking at and they said it confirmed that it's indicative of key themes and trends, it's certainly not a defined trend per say but it's indicative and they were comfortable with that, with a certain margin of error as you get in any of these things. That all points to the rumination 40 of us wanting to do this more regularly, and the same with DNS abuse studies so we can get the data, we can look at the data and have more than 33 respondents so we do need to have a question out which is somewhat simpler, so that the respondents can actually get the data together.

One of the key ones we discussed yesterday which was the takeaway four there where we got respondents reported that the average total enforcement costs was 150,000 per year, the average of it was just under 300,000 but for two years. This was on the Neilson calculations,

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the last slide which is six but the extra costs vary quite widely among the survey respondents, so that's where we got some data and I think it was from 0 to 5,000,000 depending on the respondents but underlying that something we certily benefit from further investigation. That 150,000 is the total cost and that was quite interesting cause it's the total cost for all TLD's, it's not gTLD's specific, but we got the takeaways there for gTLD specific ones as well.

If I'm going down there, again, nothing major changes, so any additional queries, thoughts, chat now, happy to send them any query back on the email, and then this one I'm going to try and finalize it, just to let you know where I am on this. I'm hopefully finalizing this and integrating it into the RPM section, and then we've also the bit which I haven't done yet is the ICANN statistics which we discussed briefly yesterday because the ICANN statistics are used originally for the draft report, highlighted then when were presenting it at the ICANN meeting.

There seemed to be an error cause it was contradictory with the WIPO statistics and ICANN were feeding off of WIPO so there was an issue there with the data coming through. That's been corrected and I've been sent the new data and I've been very slack and not got onto that bit because I've been so concentrating on the INTA impact study I haven't got around to that, but I need to just recheck the stats and just define what was wrong or what wasn't wrong with the draft, so I don't look at that as being a massive thing, I'm looking as an afternoon's work.

I'll try and look at that, circulate that and I'll integrate that. I don't think there will be any comments on that because the conclusions are very

similar to what we got; we just got a little better data I think, but I'll get the data right on that and then finalize it. I'm open to any comments or thoughts or discussion. Thank you.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, David, for your work on this. Are there other comments or concerns on this? Waudo, please go ahead.

WAUDO SIGANGA: I'd like to ask again a question now. This INTA Surver paper it's also impact. Quite a number of [inaudible] our draft report, I counted more than 11 [inaudible]. So, are we also going to maybe edit the references that you have made within the main document to INTA Survey?

DAVID TAYLOR: I can respond to that, yeah. Sounds like a sensible plan, completely agree. I'm looking to insert this in in one area but obviously where we've got references to it we need to make sure that they are caught, yeah.

JONATHAN ZUCK: That's a good point, Waudo. In fact, the choice report we were just looking at discusses defensive registrations and I wonder if there's a reference to this report that should be added to that. Jordyn's gone now but that's where it's dealt with in the competition in choice whether it's legitimate choice, the registrations are defensive. I don't

think it needs to be extensive, but it might be worth a reference to the survey in that section as well.

WAUDO SIGANGA: I think [inaudible] references to the INTA study in the main report. I think I'll circulate them and then we can work together to see what changes need to made to the main reports to reflect the reference to the INTA report. I'll circulate it by email.

JONATHAN ZUCK: That would be very useful, Waudo, thank you. [AUDIO BREAK]

Other questions or comments about this section? [AUDIO BREAK]

Alright folks, thank you. David's going to finalize this report and begin the integration process; the other was Waudo. Is there any other business for the call today?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Where did this put our schedule, Jonathan?

JONATHAN ZUCK: We're a little bit behind schedule. My guess is this will be the topic of discussion on the leadership call tomorrow. I don't off the top of my head know exactly where this puts us, but we're trying to finalize this and the DNS report and the parking report to circulate very soon.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay. Just as an FYI because of the holiday tomorrow, I will be out of pocket. I don't know if we want to consider rescheduling; we can take that up offline.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Alright, we'll take that offline or just assign you a bunch of stuff.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, right.

JONATHAN KAPIN: Alright. Any other business from anyone else? Sorry, I don't have a crisp answer on the schedule but we have an overall schedule that we're still keeping to, but this interim release for interim public comment we're behind on and we need to try and get that out the door as soon as we can.

Alright. Well everyone, thank you very much for being on the call. We'll see you on the sub teams call next week. Thank you.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]