
LAUREEN KAPIN:

OK, thank you folks who are participating, and thanks for folks who have also gotten me a revised recommendation. So, we're going to start off today with an update from Drew about his DNS abuse paper, and I know he circulated a new version to us last night, I believe, and I encourage everyone to read that, because we should be giving Drew our second round of comments, and that, of course, is going to be part of the new material in the report that's going to be subject to public comment. So, that will be discussed in Abu Dhabi, and we should all be familiar with it. So, with that very slight introduction, I will let Drew take it away.

DREW BAGLEY:

Thanks, Laureen. I'm just going to go over the two recommendations, but the gist of what you'll see in the updates of the DNS abuse chapter are—I've corrected typos that people pointed out, and then added a bit more explanation, clarity, or substance to some of the paragraphs. I think the most notable difference about this version are that I went ahead and rewrote the recommendation we discussed last week, and then I added a second recommendation. And so, for both recommendations, the thing I especially need input on, assuming the substance is OK—we'll get to that in just a second when I read them—but the thing that I absolutely need input on is how to go about directing these.

So, Jamie wrote a response this morning just offering some suggestions on that, and so I could definitely use some help with that, with making sure that, if everyone agrees with the recommendation itself, that we direct it properly, in accordance with the multi-stakeholder model. So,

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the first recommendation that I rewrote was the one that was dealing with what sort of incentives we could provide to registry operators that were engaging in a form of best practices that combat DNS abuse, and so last week's discussion was very helpful for figuring out how to improve that recommendation, not only with who, it's directed to, but also the substance of it.

And so, what I've done is, I've actually narrowed the recommendation significantly, because what the DNS abuse study showed was that registration restrictions and price appear to be the dominant factors in determining the likelihood of abuse. However, as we know, different registries are operating under completely different business models and aims, so that some registries are highly restricted, and maybe high-priced, because of that, because of the premium domain names that are in their zone, and therefore, they would not have the same issues that an open registry would have.

So, whatever recommendation we would come up with, of course, we would not want to discourage there from being a diverse ecosystem of registries, to where we would need to swing either from being—or discouraging open registries, registries with an open registration policy, similar to the legacies like dot-com. And so, therefore, I've instead targeted this recommendation to providing incentives for those registries with open registration policies, because the other registries appear to already have factors they can use to mitigate abuse already built in. And so, the new recommendation—do we have it up on the—do I have scrolling? I do have scrolling. All right, let me get out. The new recommendation is right here, and I definitely need help on who to direct it to, but as it reads now, "The ICANN board should pass a

measure to provide ICANN fee discounts to registry fee operators with open registration policies that implement proactive measures to prevent technical DNS abuse in their zone.”

And so, what this would hopefully create is an economic incentive for registry operators that would otherwise be attack sectors for cyber crime to actually implement measures, instead of just waiting on a complaint-by-complaint basis to take care of the individual instances of abuse. And so, such measures—we don’t necessarily—I don’t think we have to define them here, but those measures, of course, could include not allowing, or at least scrutinizing manually later with a human review, an attempted registration for paypal.deals, if PayPal was spelled differently, or if clearly the registrant was providing data that was associated with past known suspicious behavior, or things like that. And then also, in the face of reports and blacklisting of domain names, especially now that we know that operationally, sometimes, the whole zone—it can block the network, that registry operators will proactively go ahead and look at their zone and see where there are high instances of abuse and actually do something about it. So, then I have more specified rationale underneath, explaining everything I just said. So, is there any feedback on either the substance of that, and then secondly how to improve, how to direct that into action?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So, Drew, I’ll start off, because I don’t see hands yet. I thought the big issue that Jamie raises, which I’m sure we look at comments on, and we should probably be thinking about proactively, is, “What is your view of how this fits into ICANN’s mandate?” because we’ve already gotten

public comments about abuse and the potential for abuse to lead to content regulation. We've heard these issues raised again and again, so I think it behooves us to really think through quite specifically our view of how this fits into ICANN's mandate, because we need to be able to either articulate that or adjust our recommendations in a way that fits squarely within the mandate, because that was Jamie's thought as I read it.

DREW BAGLEY:

OK, yeah, and I'll go back and read Jamie's email. I have too many windows open. I was thinking part of the problem was he said he did not—as I recall, he said he did not disagree with the substance of it. It was more of how I worded that the ICANN board should pass the measure, versus going through other processes.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Yeah, and I could be misinterpreting his email, because I agree with you. He specifically didn't say that—he specifically said he does agree with the substance. Oh, and he's saying it exceeds our remit. So, I'll make it two questions. One, how do you think this fits within our remit? And my view is that it fits squarely within our remit, because we were tasked to look at safeguards, which are really focused on DNS abuse. But second, I'll adjust my comment so it's not attributed to Jamie, and it's more just me anticipating. We will get comments about asserting or asking how this fits into ICANN's mandate, so what's your view about that?

DREW BAGLEY:

Yeah, so going with the second question first, for ICANN's remit, there's already precedent, and I mentioned that in the preceding paragraph. There's already precedent for ICANN implementing adjustments of fee structure specifically to tackle a form of behavior that's harmful to consumers, and that was done in 2008, and that's where ICANN adjusted the fee price structure to stop domain pasters, basically, from influencing the marketplace in a way that harmed consumers and drove up prices. And so, that's where I don't think this is an odd thing for ICANN to do. And then, in terms of—and it goes to ICANN's overall remit, with regard to the security and stability of the DNS, and then in terms of us, I think this goes directly to what we've been tasked with, as far as looking at issues associated with the expansion of the DNS and the safeguards put in place to address those issues.

And so, the issues associated with the expansion of the DNS, as articulated in past reports, was this type of technical DNS abuse, and we've gone ahead and looked at that, both on our own, individually, looking at these safeguards, as well as through this data we now have to correlate data to the safeguards. And with all things being equal, it seems that there's still a gap where the safeguards alone are not doing anything, in and of themselves, to prevent abuse, and therefore behavior that would harm consumer trust and ultimately consumer choice, if you're going to have wholly bad zones or zones being blocked. It also affects, of course, as I mentioned, I think, early in the chapter somewhere—it absolutely affects universal acceptance and universal acceptance initiative, because if this type of abuse will continue existing, because it will put no other novel incentives in place, or safeguards or anything in place, and then the operators then therefore will have

incentives to continue blocking TLDs, that will run counter to expanding the new gTLDs to be equals to the legacy gTLDs, in terms of function. And so, I think it's actually directly applicable to both our mandate, as well as ICANN's remit, and I think that, if anything, this is a recommendation that could actually have an effect, but it still encourages the existence of registries with open registration policies, which is something that obviously proponents of free speech, proponents of a free and open Internet, and even proponents of breaking down economic barriers, everything—many people obviously agree that those types of registries should really flourish, and that we shouldn't be gravitating toward highly restrictive registries, and so I see this as a way to balance that.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

I'm sorry, Drew. I missed the connection about how you're balancing this and taking into account registries with fewer restrictions.

DREW BAGLEY:

By focusing this on registries that do not have restrictive policies—registries that have restrictive policies, from what the data shows, are either less likely to have abuse or have an instrument through which they can likely curb abuse through the registration restriction, whereas the registries that are completely open are going to be much more dependent on price, and so rather than telling them all, "You have to have \$50-per-year domain name registrations," because you have open registration policies, then this is instead encouraging another form of behavior, like I'm saying, through the form of simple things that some

registry operators do to not let known repeat offenders go ahead and register suspicious domain names.

LAUREEN KAPIN: OK, I see.

DREW BAGLEY: And so, I'm trying not to be too prescriptive with what we're saying would be those proactive measures, but there are absolutely plenty of proactive measures that registries could take, or even registry enforcement against the registrars registering their domain names, and there's all kinds of stuff like that that they could do that do not include raising prices, nor include increasing registration restrictions. And so therefore, if we're going to have this whole category of registries with open registration restrictions, and we don't want to drive up prices or make it harder for people to register domain names, then this is kind of the third way I see, as to encouraging the behavior, and it's not mandated. They're going to get a fee discount. If they want to continue operating as is, they can continue operating as is, but there's an economic incentive now.

LAUREEN KAPIN: I see, OK. Thank you for explaining that more clearly to me. Everyone else may have already understood it.

DREW BAGLEY: No, that might be—you could help me, perhaps, explain it more clearly in the paper, because you know the topic intimately, and so if I did a poor job explaining it to you, then I'm doing a poor job explaining it to the world broadly.

LAUREEN KAPIN: I'm going to take a look at your latest version anyway and get back to you, and I'm encouraging everyone to do the same. This is a really important topic, and it's not only really important, but it's also one of our denser topics, particularly because the study itself is rather technical and dense. But if we're going to be able to communicate clearly about it, we need to be able to get the big picture, both in terms of what the study has done, and how that fuels our recommendations, and the only way you're going to be able to do that is to take the time to really read it and ask questions, and I know that Drew would appreciate everyone's input. So, that's one of our action items. Please send your comments to Drew. Drew, what is our current schedule? And Jean-Baptiste, you may also chime in on this, because I want to set a due date for people to get comments to Drew that works within our latest timeline.

DREW BAGLEY: Yeah, I'll have Jean-Baptiste chime in. Jean-Baptiste, could you chime in? I think there were two deadline scenarios, so what would be great is to know the deadline version that ensures that we get to Abu Dhabi with a final report submitted, which might mean this going out for public comment next week, perhaps, if I'm remembering correctly.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Jean-Baptiste, do we have you?

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Can you hear me?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, now I can.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Yeah, OK, sorry, I was on mute. Yes, Drew, so there are a few deadlines I'd like to mention. First of all, I think it's important if the review team has comments, that they do ASAP. The reason behind that is, as soon as we have your final paper, the sooner we can send it for editing and proofreading, and also to Language Services, and while we have that ready, we'll wait for the NCA survey paper, as well. And once we have both of them, the one from the relevant subteam, then everything can go out for public comment. So, right now, if we think of a deadline, we were hoping that by mid-September at the latest, we would be able to hand everything to technical leaders for editing and proofreading.

And another deadline that I wanted to remind everyone, as well, is that we will have our presentation on the DNSF study with this idea on the 12th of September, and so the review team will have, of course, you to submit questions until the 8th of September, which is a Friday.

DREW BAGLEY: Thank you. So, just to clarify, the mid-September deadline—that still ensures that we are on schedule to have our final report submitted before Abu Dhabi?

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: No, unfortunately not. If you recall, the original plan was to have both sections ready by this Friday, so that we could have our final report published—I mean, by “final report,” I mean the final one, the draft report plus the new sections report, so—

DREW BAGLEY: So, if we have this DNS abuse chapter done by Friday, which I think is completely doable, and then the parking paper, which I imagine that would be doable, because I think that’s pretty much ready to go, then it’s just the—

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: No, unfortunately.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Unfortunately, no.

DREW BAGLEY: Oh, it’s not? OK.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: I'm doing the NCA study paper, where there is a call scheduled next Wednesday. So, unfortunately, that's not feasible.

DREW BAGLEY: OK, so at this point, under no scenario would we have the report submitted before Abu Dhabi?

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: No, the final report, no. The new sections report, yes, but the final one, no, I don't think so. Based on where we are right now, in terms of deadlines and the different work that was produced from each subteam, I don't think so.

DREW BAGLEY: So, unless Jonathan pulls an all-nighter and writes all these chapters himself—

LAUREEN KAPIN: We won't—

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Tempting.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Herculean efforts! But either way, since we are still having our goal as getting the new portions of the draft reports done for public comment before Abu Dhabi—that's the DNS abuse study paper. That's the INTA

paper. And I wasn't sure where parking fit into that, if that's going to be something that's going to be put out separately for public comment, or just part of the final report. But in any event, I would like people to get Drew their comments on the DNS abuse study paper. Today's Wednesday. I would really like folks to get Drew comments by Friday, if possible. Does that work, Jean-Baptiste, with the timelines we're now working under? Because if it doesn't, then let me know.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: That would work.

LAUREEN KAPIN: OK, then let's do that.

DREW BAGLEY: OK, and then I know you have other recommendations to get to, so I'll just read the second recommendation I came up with.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yes, please.

DREW BAGLEY: So, certainly I need plenty of feedback on the first one. Hopefully now there's an understanding of the intent behind that one, the intent to accomplish. And then, for the second one, this is dealing with amending the RAA itself, and this is another one where I am sure I have not articulated well how this policy recommendation should be

implemented, so that's another one that I'm sure, to Jamie's email, I definitely need help in figuring out how exactly to state the beginning, as to how to direct it. But essentially, what we would be proposing with this one is amendments to the RAA to prevent systemic use of specific registrars for technical DNS abuse. Such language would impose upon registrars a duty to mitigate technical DNS abuse, whereby ICANN may suspend registrars found to be associated with unabated, abnormal, and extremely high rates of technical abuse.

ICANN must base such findings on multiple verifiable, reliable sources, and such findings may be rebutted by the registrar upon sufficient proof that the finding is wrong, the registrar engages in proactive anti-abuse measures to prevent technical DNS abuse, the registrar was itself a victim in the relevant instance, or the registrar has since taken necessary and appropriate actions to stop the abuse and prevent future systemic use of its services for technical DNS abuse.

And so, first and foremost, grammatically, it's wordy, and it needs improvement there, and that was a stream-of-consciousness writing late last night, so that part, absolutely, I would criticize myself. But basically, one of the existing problems that the DNS abuse study has shown is that, even though the RAA imposes a duty to investigate upon registrars, everything is currently focused on an individualized complaint-oriented process, and there currently exists no power for ICANN to deal with a situation such as Alpnames, which is currently—that's the Gibraltar-based registrar that has consistently shown extremely high levels of technical DNS abuse, and yet it's still accredited. And similarly, with—and I have to scroll to remember the name, but the registrar that was suspended, ultimately, was suspended

on different grounds. And so, you could have a registrar sitting there with 93% abuse, and I'm thinking of Nanjing as the other one.

So, Nanjing operated for a while with extremely high levels of abuse, and so that could be going on for six months and be a true conduit for cyber crime, and yet, if there haven't been individualized complaints that Nanjing has failed to demonstrate that it's investigating to ICANN, or something else going on in that process, then there really isn't a lot of a piece in the RAA for ICANN, in and of itself, to go ahead and take care of that problem.

And so, right now, what we're having is, obviously, what the DNS abuse study shows is there's plenty of reputable sources that track all of this stuff and can demonstrate where the DNS abuse is, but then also, ICANN itself now has in beta their DAAR system, which is going to be looking at this DNS abuse, and yet, at this point, when pressed on how ICANN will use this data, it seems like there isn't a very concrete answer on how such data would be or could be used to actually address problems. And so, this would allow for that, and allow for ICANN to basically stop, like on the back end already there are safeguards to make sure a criminal themselves isn't going to run a registry or registrar, but on the other end, there's nothing to stop criminals from having a safe haven through the form of technical DNS abuse, and so this would empower them for that, and then also the language provides for a rebuttable presumption, so that if a registrar is wrongly accused, or they are accused, but it really wasn't that they were being complacent at all—they actually are making an effort, but just some measures didn't work or whatever—there really is room for that sort of rebuttable

presumption. But this would at least really strengthen the ability of ICANN to ensure the stability of the DNS and protect consumers.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thanks, Drew. I think that's a really excellent point about the current systems in place to combat abuse via the ICANN contracts, which really focus on responses to individual complaints, but this whole aspect of what happens when a registry is really the subject of multiple blacklists over a sustained period of time. What power, then, is there to act, in terms of enforcement against this registry? That is something that is lacking, so I think this is an excellent idea that we should refine in a way to make it as useful and implementable as possible. And maybe having a phone call with Jamie about this might be helpful, so we can make sure that we are knowledgeable about procedurally the best way to proceed with such a plan, but I think it's really an excellent point.

Do folks have questions or comments for Drew? And kudos to Drew for tackling this very complicated subject, from all his hard work in spearheading getting this study off the ground, and now to at least this first iteration, hopefully the first of many, and then applying this work to a report. So, thank you, Drew, for all that effort, and all those who helped him, certainly particularly folks within ICANN, Brian and Eleeza, Antoinetta, and others who I'm probably forgetting to mention. Questions/comments for Drew?

OK, I'm not seeing any, other than Jonathan's in the chat, about getting the raw data, and Drew will respond to that. OK, so now, what I'd like to move on to is—we were going to hear from Carlos and Carlton today,

but unfortunately, neither Carlos or Carlton are on the call. So, Fabro, since I know that you are going to need to leave soon, can we hear from you about your revised recommendations? You had some minor revisions to recommendations 31 and 32. Is it possible, Jean-Baptiste, to get those on the screen? Yeah, upload in process, and Fabro—oh, OK. OK, Fabro, so it sounds like it's not a good time to hear from you.

OK, so actually, I'm going to pivot, being the exceedingly flexible person that I am, and move on to my recommendations, since it sounds like Fabro's going to be better positioned to talk about these next week. And Fabro, what I would also ask you is to give us a sense about whether there were public comments that directly addressed your recommendations that you've taken into account from your adjustments, and in fact, if you can perhaps, if there was public comments received that you've taken into account through your modifications, it would be helpful to have that included in your paper. And also, if there's any adjustments that need to be made to the rationale, because I think that what you did is, you edited the recommendations, but I don't believe I saw any adjustments to the rationale.

So, OK, great. Thank you, Fabro. And then, before I launch into mine, Calvin and Gao, I think, also, I still need to hear from you about your revised recommendations with revised rationales and taking into account the public comments. And for everyone, what I would advise in response to my emails—please don't revise your recommendations by using the entire preliminary draft report. Please create a separate document that just cuts and pastes the recommendations you're dealing with and limits it to those. Otherwise, you end up sending a

very large document, where your material is hard to find, but if you just create a stand-alone document that just includes your material, it's a lot easier to work with. And if people have questions, they can let me know, but I have sent out several emails where I've tried to lay out exactly what I think we need to do for next steps, which is look at the public comments, decide whether your recommendation needs to be revised and consolidated, and then adjust the rationale and the recommendation in a way that is both implementable, expresses a very specific rationale about what you're hoping to achieve and why it's important and who this is directed to, and also, if possible, measures for success. So, these are in my prior emails. If folks have questions, they can absolutely have a discussion with me about it. But that's what we really need, so I appreciate everyone's work thus far, but I just want to make sure we get to this final level of detail, where we are making these adjustments, we're bolstering our rationales, we're phrasing this in terms of implementable language, and we are also including, if possible, measures of success.

OK, any questions just about that? That's sort of my general spiel about this, because I feel we all need to catch up a little bit on that. OK, I'm not seeing hands, so what I'm going to go to is one of the steps for recommendations which I haven't discussed yet, which I've sent around, and that deals with recommendations 25 through 30. So, I think people have individual scrolling rights. I'm making mine a little bigger, since it's very, very tiny. And I'll go through this, and then if folks have questions or comments, I'll appreciate it. And this, as a reminder—I sent this out, I believe, on August 16th, before I left for my vacation. By way of background, recommendations 25 through 30 all dealt with performing

a study on highly-regulated gTLDs, and they were separated out into separate recommendations, but really, they all related to safeguards for new gTLDs operating in highly-regulated sectors.

So, therefore, I propose to consolidate them. Generally speaking, most of the input we received on these recommendations, and you can see the summary of the input in my document on the screen, were positive. Almost all of them were positive. ICANN had some specific questions about current initiatives that they thought might be able to contribute data to this effort. The non-commercial stakeholders group did not support this recommendation, and really believed that existing ICANN processes could cover this. But we did get a lot of support from other stakeholder groups, including the GAC, the UK GAC, verified top-level domains, and some other registries.

I'm losing my connection, which means I can't see what's on the screen anymore. Hold on while I get reconnected, because then I want to turn to the recommendation itself. Let me see if I can get my documents up on my separate screen to look at that. Technical difficulties—OK, I am overcoming the technical difficulties with my backup document on my computer screen. Always have backup. OK, so—lost with connectivity—OK, let me move to mine.

Basically, I've consolidated this so that it is one recommendation to perform a study on highly-regulated new gTLDs that include certain elements, and these are tied to the specific safeguards that are already in the contract for highly-regulated gTLDs, and that involves steps the registry operators are taking to establish working relationships with relevant government or industry bodies, to find out volumes of

complaints that are received, both by the registrants for highly-regulated gTLDs, and the governments and regulatory bodies that respond to those complaints. There's also a specific recommendation to assess a sample of websites to see whether contact information to file complaints is sufficiently easy to find. That was also one of the recommendations.

There needs to be a way to file a complaint determining the volume of the subject matter of complaints by seeking detailed information from contract compliance, comparing rates of abuse between highly-regulated gTLDs that have agreed to verify and validate credentials and those highly-regulated gTLDs that don't have those procedures in place, and then also to assess whether restrictions regarding possessing the necessary credentials are being enforced by auditing registrars and resellers. And that really gets at the issue of—there's a safeguard in place that says you have to have the proper credentials, and in fact, you need to represent that you have the proper credentials, but we really don't have visibility into whether that's working or not.

To address some of the ICANN organization's concerns, I added language which recognizes that, to the extent current ICANN data collection initiatives and compliance audits contribute to these efforts, we're recommending that ICANN assess the most efficient way to proceed to avoid duplication of effort and leverage current work. So, basically, my intent here is to include the current initiatives that ICANN is engaged in, the star system—there's also the marketplace health index and the—you know, I only know it by its acronym, because it sounds similar—the ITHI initiative. That's the third initiative that also deals with the identifier health index. There's the acronym explained.

And also ICANN's audit from ICANN compliance—those all may be data contributors to such a study.

So, that is my proposal. I have bolstered the rationale to make this more clear, and you'll see that in the red—well, it's red on my screen. Let me see if I'm reconnected now. So, my screen is totally blank for ICANN, for this Adobe Connect, which means I can't see any comments in the chat, and I can't see your hands, so you'll have to speak up. But in terms of the rationale and related findings, what I added was a recognition that the surveys indicate new gTLDs are not trusted to the same extent as legacy gTLDs, and that the public is concerned about misuse of their sensitive information. And the recognition that domains in highly-regulated sectors are more apt to collect sensitive public information, and hence trustworthiness is even more crucial in this subset of highly-regulated domains. Therefore, it's important to understand whether the safeguards put in place to mitigate the risks associated with these domains are being enforced and whether they're effective. And then also, I included a sentence about ICANN's data-gathering initiatives that could shed light on some of these issues. And again, I called out the data abuse activity reporting projects, the marketplace health index, and the identifier technology health indicators project.

So, that's my proposed revision. And I am happy to hear any questions or comments on that, and I'm trying to re-enter the Adobe room while I'm putting that out for questions and comments. And again, you'll have to speak up, because I can't see hands or comments, so make it verbal.

DREW BAGLEY: Hey, Lauren, I think that's great to call out all those initiatives, and so just the quick suggestion I have is just now the new domain reporting initiative is no longer called DART. Now it's DAAR.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Yeah, I've called it by the right name, even though I may have mispronounced it. I've called it by the now-known-as-DAAR.

DREW BAGLEY: Oh, maybe you even said it right, and I'm—

LAUREEN KAPIN: No, I probably—

DREW BAGLEY: OK, because I think they had some sort of intellectual property issue with calling it DART. But no, I think that's great to call out all those initiatives, because especially, I think it's really important for the community to understand that the recommendations we're making about data gathering and even specifically what Jonathan has been championing is being done with us being aware of all of these initiatives going on, and that we're not making these in a vacuum, but cognizant of all these initiatives we still strongly believe in all of our recommendations with regard to more data-gathering and with regard to more formalized data-gathering.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thank you, Drew. Do we have any other questions or comments on that? OK, so once Drew gets done with his yeoman's work on the DNS abuse, we'll also look back to Drew to hear about his thoughts on other recommendations focused on DNS abuse and the public interest commitment. So, we have a few minutes left, if people have any questions or comments generally about how we're proceeding. My sense is that we will be meeting in Abu Dhabi on the 27th, which is the Friday before the meeting. That will be our time to prepare for presentations that we will likely be making to stakeholder groups about the new material in the draft report, and again, in order to be effective with that, I urge you all to become familiar with the DNS abuse study and Drew's material, because that will likely be the topic of a lot of questions.

The other action items for us, besides giving Drew feedback and becoming more familiar with that report, are for everyone to make sure that their recommendations are revised in a way that's consistent with the emails that I've sent out. I can't emphasize that enough, and also to create separate documents that just include your revised recommendations, rationale, and a summary of the public comments. That is going to be helpful, not only for making editing of the final reports, but also, at some point, we're also going to have a report that responds to the public comments, and that's why I am asking you to include that in these documents, because then you'll get a twofer. You're going to have something that also has a summary of public comments when we have to provide this report about our response to them. So, please emphasize that.

For my recommendation 25, which replaces 25 through 30, if you have any comments for me, please get them to me, also, no later than Friday, so I can take your thinking into account. And maybe we can just, Jean-Baptiste, add an action item for everyone to make sure that they have their assigned recommendations submitted in a stand-alone document that takes into account the public comments, possible consolidation efforts, and revised rationales.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Yes, I reported that already.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Perfect, yes, you did, right at the top. You're right at the top of things, Jean-Baptiste. Thank you. Then do folks have any other questions, any other business? OK, it doesn't sound like it, so then, I will say thank you, and encourage everyone to get through this final stretch. Have a good rest of the week, everyone.

DREW BAGLEY: Thanks, Laureen, and thanks to everyone in advance for getting me feedback to improve the DNS abuse chapter.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Thanks, Drew. Thanks, everyone.

JEAN-BAPTISTE DEROULEZ: Thank you.

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