

# Effects of KSK Roll over

## *Oops, so what now?*

Jaap Akkerhuis  
just a messenger


# What we wanted

- Report about effects of the KSK roll
  - Supported algorithms
  - Packet size
  - To gather knowledge
  
- Will report about mechanism

# Ripe DNS Atlas Hackathon 2017

- Test which probes see DNSSEC
- What Algorithms are supported
- Test against various name servers
- Display in a nice way

# ICANN-60 NS servers



	RSA-MD5	DSA	RSA-SHA1	DSA-NSEC3-SHA1	RSA-SHA1-NSEC3-SHA1	RSA-SHA256	RSA-SHA512	ECC-GOST	ECDSA-P256-SHA256	ECDSA-P384-SHA384	ED25519	ED448
SHA-1												
SHA-256												
GOST												
SHA-384												



DNSSEC validation succeeded for this DS and signing algorithm combination




This DS and signing algorithm combination are not validated by your resolver(s)



This DS and signing algorithm lead to a `SERVFAIL`

Re-run test

# Google



DS Algorithm	RSA-MD5	DSA	RSA-SHA1	DSA-NSEC3-SHA1	RSA-SHA1-NSEC3-SHA1	RSA-SHA256	RSA-SHA512	ECC-GOST	ECDSA-P256-SHA256	ECDSA-P384-SHA384	ED25519	ED448
SHA-1	✗	🔒	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🔒
SHA-256	✗	🔒	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🔒	🔒
GOST	✗	🔒	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🔒	🔒
SHA-384	✗	🔒	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🟢	🟢	🔒	🔒	🔒



DNSSEC validation succeeded for this DS and signing algorithm combination




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
Re-run test

# Continue measurements



[\[go back to the main Root Canary site\]](#)

## Live Root Canary Monitor



### Log:

```
Thu, 26 Oct 2017 14:11:03 GMT: ID 2874 Resolver 75.75.76.76 New State expired Old State undefined; { "rsasha1_nsec_ds_sha256": [
```

# Root Canary was born



## The Root Canary

Quantifying the Quality of DNSSEC Validation in the Wild



# Canary in the virtual coalmine

*(Now stealing slides from Moritz)*

- Goals:
  - **Track operational impact** of the root KSK rollover, act as a warning signal that validating resolvers are failing to validate with the new key
  - **Measure validation during the KSK rollover** from a global perspective **to learn from this type of event**




# Canary in the virtual coalmine

- Goals:
  - **Track operational impact** of the root KSK rollover, act as a warning signal that validating resolvers are failing to validate with the new key
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# Measurement methodology


- Use four perspectives:
  - Online perspectives:
    - RIPE Atlas
    - Luminati
    - APNIC DNSSEC measurement  
(current thinking: use data during evaluation)
  - “Offline” perspective (analysed after measuring)
    - Traffic to root name servers (multiple letters)

# Measurement methodology

- **Luminati:** HTTP(s) proxy service 
- 2.3 Million exit nodes - usually of residential users
  - Allows us to send HTTP(s) traffic via a central Luminati server through the exit nodes
  - This HTTP request triggers a DNS query
- Covers > 15,000 ASes
- Of which > 14,000 are not covered by RIPE Atlas

# Canary in the virtual coalmine


- Preliminary Findings after 2017-09-19:



<https://rootcanary.org/>


# Canary in the virtual coalmine

- Preliminary Findings after 2017-09-19: Root




# Canary in the virtual coalmine

- Preliminary Findings after 2017-09-19: Root




# Algorithm Support

- For common signing algorithms:




# Algorithm Support

- Luminati vs RIPE Atlas: SHA256-RSA-SHA1



- ~ 13,000 VPs
- 7% validating







































- ~ 9,000 VPs
- 42% validating



# Fingerprinting Resolvers

- 1319 VPs
- Google Public DNS

		RSA-MD5	DSA	RSA-SHA1	DSA-NSEC3-SHA1	RSA-SHA1-NSEC3-SHA1	RSA-SHA256	RSA-SHA512	ECC-GOST	ECDSA-P256-SHA256	ECDSA-P384-SHA384	ED25519	ED448
DS Algorithms	SHA-256												
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
# Fingerprinting Resolvers

- 19 VPs
- PowerDNS Recursor or Knot Resolver


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# Serving Stale Data?

- We've messed up automatic resigning



# Serving Stale Data?



# Serving Stale Data?

- 552 resolvers keep validating, among
  - 25 of 280 IPs from Google's Public DNS
  - 29 out of 32 from French ISP Free SAS
  - 9 out of 10 from Dutch ISP XS4ALL
- Future work: How long is their timeout?

# You can help!

- Run small shell script that uses *dig* to query our test domains from within your network
  - Using your default resolvers
  - Once every hour
- Please come talk to <sup>Them</sup> me if you're interested

Roland van Rijswijk-Deij <r.m.vanrijswijk@utwente.nl>

<https://rootcanary.org/>

# More info

- Project webpage:  
<https://rootcanary.org/>
- Online algorithm test:  
<https://rootcanary.org/test.html>
- Current results for RIPE Atlas-based measurement:  
<https://portal.rootcanary.org/rcmstats.html>
- Live feed for RIPE Atlas-based measurement:  
<https://monitor.rootcanary.org/live.html>


<https://rootcanary.org/>

# While waiting ...

- Twiddling thumbs
- New test might be added







# Questions?

