

Cybersecurity and Cybersafety in the ICANN world

David Conrad
CTO, ICANN
david.conrad@icann.org



ICANN


What is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers?

- **A Community**

- Global, open, multi-stakeholder, bottom-up, consensus driven

- **An Organization**

- US (California) not-for-profit, public benefit corporation with one member (the ICANN community)
- As of 1 Oct 2016, no longer has a contract with the US Gov't for the "IANA Functions"
 - Now authorized by the ICANN community



What Does ICANN Do?

Community

- Provides a venue for discussion
- **Defines policies** for
 - Creation of **top-level domains**
 - Operation of generic name registries
 - Accreditation of domain name registrars
- Holds the ICANN organization accountable

Organization

- **Implements policies defined by the community**
- Operates the “**IANA Functions**”
 - DNS Root Zone changes
 - Allocate address blocks to RIRs
 - Manage registries for IETF
- Facilitates discussions
 - Hold meetings and other events

Some Definitions

“Cybersecurity”

- “measures taken to protect a **computer or computer system** (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack”

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity>

“Cybersafety”


- “the knowledge of maximizing **the user's personal safety** and security risks to private information and property associated with using the internet, and the self-protection from computer crime in general.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_safety

ICANN's Role in Cybersecurity & Cybersafety



- Identifying and helping the community be prepared for identifier-based threats
 - DNS, IP addresses, and similar technologies
- Working with the operational security community via trust networks
- Offering training and other capacity building services
- Providing neutral and unbiased data-backed analysis




Another Definition: “DNS Abuse”

- Using the Internet’s naming system for malicious purposes.

Examples:


- Denial of service via DNS protocol
- Botnet command/control synchronization
- Spam-vectored threats:
 - Phishing for distribution of malware or fraud
- Infrastructure-vectored threats:
 - Cache poisoning
 - Resolver Redirection
 - DNS tunneling



<http://www.cioinsight.com/security/slideshows/10-things-to-know-about-the-cost-of-dns-attacks.html>


ICANN's Efforts to Mitigate DNS Abuse

- DNSSEC
 - Signing TLD zones (90% signed)
 - Encouraging turning on validation (20% of Internet users protected)
 - **Updating the root key**
 - **11 October 2017**
- DNS Abuse Mitigation
 - Methodologies
 - Data collection and analysis
- Denial of Service targeting Root/TLDs
 - Vulnerabilities
 - Mitigation




DNS at a (Very) High Level

- Three components
 1. Client
 - Built into applications
 2. “Resolver”
 - Run by network operators
 3. Authoritative Databases
 - Run by DNS registries



ICANN and Cybersecurity

- Encouraging:
 - Protecting the client/resolver links (1 and 8)
 - VPNs, running resolvers locally, etc.
 - Enabling DNSSEC validation in resolvers
 - Protects links 2 - 7
 - DNSSEC-signing zones
 - Protects databases
- Capacity building, training, information sharing, etc.



Why? A (Very) Recent Example...


- “[A] major Brazilian financial company with hundreds of branches, operations in the US and the Cayman Islands, 5 million customers, and more than \$27 billion in assets.”

<https://www.wired.com/2017/04/hackers-hijacked-banks-entire-online-operation/>

- “[A]ccording to security researchers at Kaspersky, **the bank is just one of ten** around the world that has been almost **totally compromised** in a comprehensive cyber attack.”

- “**If DNS was under control of the criminals, you're screwed.**”

<http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/3007938/brazilian-bank-customers-targeted-after-hackers-transfer-all-of-the-banks-domains-to-phony-websites>



The screenshot shows a web browser displaying a news article on The Register website. The article title is "Brazilians whacked: Crooks hijack bank's DNS to fleece victims". The sub-headline reads "Usernames, passwords swiped for hours, malware dropped on PCs". Below the text is a photograph of a person in a dark hoodie and balaclava standing next to a large, complex piece of industrial machinery, possibly a server or a piece of equipment. The article is dated "5 Apr 2017 at 07:33, Iain Thomson". The page also features a navigation menu with categories like "DATA CENTRE", "SOFTWARE", "SECURITY", etc., and a sidebar with sections like "More like this" and "Most read".

ICANN and Cybersafety


- Contractual obligations on generic top-level domain registries and registrars
 - Require contact details of registrants
 - Force compliance with IETF standards
 - “Public Interest Commitments”
- Capacity building, training, information sharing, etc.

Contractual Compliance

This page is available in: English | العربية | Español | Français | 日本語 | 한국어 | Русский | 中文



Getting to Know Contractual Compliance



What is a Contractual Compliance Complaint?



Transfer Complaint




WHOIS Inaccuracy Complaint

<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/compliance-2012-02-25-en>

Why?

<http://www.gmail.com/>



<http://www.xn--gail-qd5a.com/>

Ongoing DNSSEC Efforts

- DNSSEC: Security enhancements to the DNS
 - Fixes a known vulnerability, improves DNS trustability
- Two Inter-related Efforts
 1. DNSSEC-sign zones: **add cryptographic signatures** to DNS data
 - Done by domain name holders, i.e., IANA for root, Registries for TLDs, Registrants for 2nd-level domains, etc.
 2. Enable DNSSEC validation: **check those signatures**
 - Done by resolver/network operators, e.g., ISPs, enterprise network administrators



Changing the Root Key

- Root DNSSEC-signed in 2010
 - Commitment to update (“roll”) the key “after 5 years”

October 11, 2017

- Resolver Operators **MUST** update the root key in their servers
 - If they do not, all lookups in signed zones will fail



Internet ^{not} Doomed

- Failure to update the key: very bad.


However....

- Most modern resolvers can handle the key change automatically
 - Should be tested: <https://automated-ksk-test.research.icann.org>
- Communication Plan: Let People Know
 - Outreach to network operations groups, RIRs, industry groups, governments



On the Topic of Root Servers

- 13 Root Server IP addresses
 - Labeled A – M.ROOT-SERVERS.NET
 - 12 organizations in 4 countries
- 600+ root server machines
 - 50+ economies
- ICANN (“L”) manages 157
 - If interested, contact me
- But...
 - Root has been DNSSEC-signed
 - Doesn’t matter from where you get it
- RFC 7706 provides a way **any** resolver operator can mirror the root
 - Reduces latency, increases resiliency
 - **Protects against root DDoS**



<http://www.root-servers.org>

What Can You Do?

Regulators/Governments

- Participate in ICANN
 - Government Advisory Committee
 - GAC's Public Safety Working Group
 - Engage in capacity building workshops
- Enquire about DNSSEC plans with your network operators
 - Ready for root key update?
- Support a national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

Network Operators

- Participate in ICANN
 - Internet Service Providers and Connectivity Providers Constituency
 - Technical Experts Group
 - RSSAC Caucus
- Enable DNSSEC validation
 - Prepare for root key update
- Deploy DNSSEC
 - Sign all your zones
 - Encourage your customers to sign their zones
- Mirror the root zone
 - RFC 7706 is easiest

Asante!

