## Q1 Your name (must be RDS PDP WG Member - not WG Observer - to participate in polls) If you are a WG Observer and wish to participate in polls, you must upgrade to WG Member to do so.

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0

| # | Responses | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Benjamin Akinmoyeje | 5/27/2017 9:59 AM |
| 2 | Nathalie Coupet | 5/27/2017 2:10 AM |
| 3 | Benny Samuelsen | 5/26/2017 4:16 PM |
| 4 | Rod Rasmussen (#2 - duplicate deleted) | 5/26/2017 12:02 PM |
| 5 | Stephanie Perrin | 5/26/2017 6:36 AM |
| 6 | Andeww Sullivan | 5/26/2017 6:30 AM |
| 7 | Roger Carney | 5/26/2017 5:27 AM |
| 8 | Sara Bockey | 5/26/2017 5:24 AM |
| 9 | Christopher Doman | 5/26/2017 2:05 AM |
| 10 | Vicky Sheckler | 5/25/2017 9:47 PM |
| 11 | Tim O'Brien | 5/25/2017 2:18 PM |
| 12 | jonathan matkowsky | 5/25/2017 6:53 AM |
| 13 | James Galvin | 5/25/2017 3:18 AM |
| 14 | Kal Feher | 5/24/2017 6:13 PM |
| 15 | Carlton Samuels | 5/24/2017 4:50 AM |
| 16 | Sam Lanfranco | 5/24/2017 3:25 AM |
| 17 | Maxim Alzoba | 5/24/2017 2:57 AM |
| 18 | Patrick Lenihan | 5/24/2017 1:13 AM |
| 19 | Tim Chen | 5/24/2017 12:55 AM |
| 20 | John Bambenek | 5/24/2017 12:54 AM |
| 21 | Adam Lanier | 5/24/2017 12:52 AM |
| 22 | Farell FOLLY | 5/24/2017 12:39 AM |
| 23 | Chuck Gomes | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM |
| 24 | Greg Aaron | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM |
| 25 | Michael Hammer | 5/23/2017 10:38 PM |
| 26 | Scott Hollenbeck | 5/23/2017 9:14 PM |

## Q2 Definition for DoR During the 23 May call, WG members discussed alternatives to replace the footnoted definition of Data of Record: "The data set, at a given time, relevant to a given registration object, that expresses the data provided in the then-current registration for that object."Please indicate your level of support for each of the following alternatives by using the "Response" pull-down to choose from: This is my preference, I could live with this, I do not support this, or leave blank if no opinion or not applicable.

Answered: 24 Skipped: 2




| Response | This is my preference | I could live with this | I do not support this | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) Data set that, at a given time, can be proven to match the data supplied at the origin for each data element. 13 - 8 = 5 | 23.81% 5 | 38.10% 8 | 38.10% 8 | 21 |
| b) Data set that, at a given time, is asserted to match data as acquired at its point of origin. 16 - 6 = 10 | 40.91% 9 | 31.82% 7 | 27.27% 6 | 22 |
| c) A data set, at a given time, relevant to a given registration object, that expresses the data provided in the then-current registration for that object. 13 - 7 = 6 | 40.00% 8 | 25.00% 5 | 35.00% 7 | 20 |

| # | Comment Box (use this box to provide rationale or your own alternative) | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Avoid "proven" - that's a whole other problem space | 5/26/2017 12:02 PM |

Rasmussen

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | I think definitions should be neutral. Data that "can be proven to match data supplied" implies a massive technical capability. I dont think we should introduce these elements in a definition. It is what it is....from the perspective of data quality | 5/26/2017 6:36 AM Perrin |
| 3 | I feel particularly uneasy with "proven", since whois today does not provide any mechanism for that. | 5/26/2017 6:30 AM Sullivan |
| 4 | The difference for me between a) and b) is that a suggests (mandates?) that the client with the data must take action to validate (i.e., "prove") the integrity of the data. | 5/25/2017 3:18 AM Galvin |
| 5 | "can be proven" in a) and "is asserted to match" in b) imply a secondary "authentication process" whereas c) is directly evidence based and says "it is what it is". Let's avoid complications and keep it simple and direct. | 5/24/2017 3:25 AM Lanfranco |
| 6 | I can't fathom the reason we'd put a processing layer on top of registrant data where "asserted to match" or "expresses the data" makes any sense. It's either a private registration or it's the same identical data. There is no reason to introduce functionality to create additional complexity, points of failure, or obfuscation layers. It's either the same data or it should be a private registration. | 5/24/2017 12:54 AM Bambenk |
| 7 | "Asserting" does not hold up for technical or legal standards. How does one "prove" the data matches? For thin data, the trusted, reliable repository is the registry -- why don't we just say the thin data of record is the data held at the registry? (Yes nameserver info is provided by registrants through registrants, but the nameservers in the registry record are what goes into the DNS and make the domain work.) | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM Aaron |

## Q3 Guiding principle, based on EWG principle 41 During the call, WG members discussed EWG principle #41: “A minimum set of data elements, at least in line with the most stringent privacy regime, must be accessible by unauthenticated RDS users.”Please indicate your level of support for each of the following statements (based on principle #41) by using the “Response” pull-down to choose from: This is my preference, I could live with this, I do not support this, or leave blank if no opinion or not applicable.

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0




| Response | This is my preference | I could live with this | I do not support this | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) A minimum set of "thin data" elements must be accessible by unauthenticated RDS users. 21 - 3 = 18 | **29.17%** 7 | **58.33%** 14 | **12.50%** 3 | 24 |
| b) A minimum set of "thin data" elements, at least in line with the most stringent privacy regime, must be accessible by unauthenticated RDS users. 9 - 17 = (8) | **11.54%** 3 | **23.08%** 6 | **65.38%** 17 | 26 |
| c) A minimum set of "thin data" elements, at least in line with applicable RDS privacy policies, must be accessible by unauthenticated RDS users. 14 - 10 = 4 | **29.17%** 7 | **29.17%** 7 | **41.67%** 10 | 24 |
| d) None. WG Agreement #20 replaces this guiding principle for "thin data." 13 - 3 = 10 Agreement #20. gTLD registration "thin data" must be accessible without requestor identification, authentication, or stated purpose. | **43.75%** 7 | **37.50%** 6 | **18.75%** 3 | 16 |

| # | Comment Box (use this box to provide rationale or your own alternative) | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | re d) please remind us what Agreement 20 is, re a) we need to define the elements re c) we don't have any RDS privacy policy at the moment and we are a long long way from getting one. | 5/26/2017 6:36 AM Perrin |
| 2 | I think the remark during the meeting about "most stringent privacy regime" is right, which is why I don't support that line. | 5/26/2017 6:30 AM Sullivan |
| 3 | I doubt that there is one solution here that will cover all situations and avoid downstream issues. Even "most stringent" is subject to change over time. | 5/24/2017 3:25 AM Lanfranco |
| 4 | I need a definition of a minimum set...what is considered "a minimum" varies to one definition to another therefore it is difficult to compare. | 5/24/2017 12:39 AM Folly |
| 5 | Privacy concerns are not relevant to thin data. No one knows what "the most stringent privacy regime" is, and may never know -- it can change at any time. | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM Aaron |

## Q4 Guiding principle, based on EWG principle 44 During next week's call, we will also consider EWG principle #44: "Access must be non-discriminatory (i.e., the process must create a level playing field for all requestors, within the same purpose)."Please indicate your level of support for each of the following statements (based on principle #44) by using the "Response" pull-down to choose from: This is my preference, I could live with this, I do not support this, or leave blank if no opinion or not applicable.

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0




| Response | This is my preference | I could live with this | I do not support this | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) RDS access to "thin data" must be non-discriminatory (i.e., the process must create a level playing field for all requestors, within the same purpose). 19 - 4 = 16 | **30.43%** 7 | **52.17%** 12 | **17.39%** 4 | 23 |
| b) None. This guiding principle does not apply to "thin data." 12 - 6 = 6 | **44.44%** 8 | **22.22%** 4 | **33.33%** 6 | 18 |

| # | Comment Box (use this box to provide rationale or your own alternative) | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | I don't quite know why we are agreeing on this at this point. if a requestor places a burden on registrars, we have established that we are not going to interfere with rate limiting. This is discrimation, totally justified in my view. | 5/26/2017 6:36 AM Perrin |
| 2 | I wonder if "the process must be predictable for all requestors" could replace "the process must create a level playing field for all requestors, within the same purpose". | 5/25/2017 3:18 AM Galvin |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Anything short of a one-to-one "thin data <=> non-discriminatory" relationship will lead to problems. | 5/24/2017 3:25 AM | Lanfranco |
| 4 | If access to thin data in unauthenticated, then it really doesn't matter. Everyone is the same world-wide. | 5/24/2017 12:54 AM | Bambenek |
| 5 | It might be helpful to say something like "within the set of approved purposes" to avoid a need to match a requestor's exact purpose with one of the approved purposes. | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM | Gomes |
| 6 | Option "a" assumes that users are identifying their purpose. I thought the WG has already decided to access to thin data should be non-discriminatory -- it should be offered anonymously and users do not need to state their purposes. | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM | Aaron |
| 7 | I do not support "a" because it begs the question of "what is the same purpose." | 5/23/2017 10:38 PM | Hammer |
| 8 | I support the general thrust of this principle, but I do not see a way to associate a purpose with a query for which there is no client identification and no client authentication. Any statement of purpose made by such a client can not be verified or trusted. | 5/23/2017 9:14 PM | Hollenbeck |

## Q5 Guiding principle, based on EWG principle 45 During the call, WG members discussed EWG principle #45, bullet one: "To deter misuse and promote accountability, all data element access must be based on a stated purpose."Please indicate your level of support for each of the following statements (based on principle #45) by using the "Response" pull-down to choose from: This is my preference, I could live with this, I do not support this, or leave blank if no opinion or not applicable.

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0




| Response | This is my preference | I could live with this | I do not support this | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a) To deter misuse and promote accountability, all "thin data" access must be based on stated purpose(s). 9 - 13 = (4) | **13.64%** 3 | **27.27%** 6 | **59.09%** 13 | 22 |
| b) To deter misuse and promote accountability, RDS policy must state purpose(s) for public access to "thin data." 18 - 6 = 12 | **37.50%** 9 | **37.50%** 9 | **25.00%** 6 | 24 |
| c) None. This guiding principle does not apply to "thin data." 14 - 4 = 10 | **55.56%** 10 | **22.22%** 4 | **22.22%** 4 | 18 |

| # | Comment Box (use this box to provide rationale or your own alternative) | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | An authenticated user can easily make a false declaration of purpose; no way to verify it, so no accountability and doesn't prevent abuse | 5/27/2017 2:10 AM Coupet |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Depends on what we decide as thin data | 5/26/2017 4:16 PM | Samuelson |
| 3 | Thin data is assumed public - makes little sense to declare purpose to access publicly available info | 5/26/2017 12:02 PM | Rasmussen |
| 4 | Even thin data relates to personal info, it is simply not nominative data. Relinking is triivial. | 5/26/2017 6:36 AM | Perrin |
| 5 | Without some sort of mechanism to state purposes -- a mechanism that has not been invented -- this is not something we should specify. | 5/26/2017 6:30 AM | Sullivan |
| 6 | "stated purpose(s)" open a pandora's box to criteria and decision rules. Techniques to prevent widespread data harvesting should be enough to prevent "harvesting" abuse. | 5/24/2017 3:25 AM | Lanfranco |
| 7 | If you want to put in RDS that thin data is public data and needed for troubleshooting, etc. That's fine, but in general the entire point of thin data is some minimally necessary data that's public. Many of these data fields are already and MUST be exposed by the registries for DNS to work via non-RDS means, so it makes little sense to gate it in RDS while making it completely public in DNS. | 5/24/2017 12:54 AM | Bambenek |
| 8 | To be consistent with rough consensus item #20, I think we need to avoid any implication that the requestor has to state a purpose, which could be assumed in the way option a is worded. | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM | Gomes |
| 9 | I thought the WG has already decided that access to thin data should be non-discriminatory -- it should be offered anonymously and users do not need to state their purposes. Also, it is probably not possible to state all allowed purposes. | 5/23/2017 11:32 PM | Aaron |
| 10 | As noted in my comment above, I do not see a way for an unidentified and unauthenticated client to provide a purpose for a query in a manner that can be trusted and verified. If the allowable purposes are specified by policy, I don't really understand what this gets us. | 5/23/2017 9:14 PM | Hollenbeck |

## Q6 Additional guiding principles Are there any additional guiding principles for access to "thin data" that you feel must be deliberated upon now, before returning to deliberation on purposes for each "thin data" element?

Answered: 25 Skipped: 1




| Answer Choices | Responses | |
|---|---|---|
| Yes (propose guiding principles in comment box below) | **4.00%** | 1 |
| No, not now | **96.00%** | 24 |
| **Total** | | **25** |

| # | Comment Box (use this box to provide rationale or your own alternative) | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Proportionality | 5/27/2017 2:10 AM Coupet |
| 2 | I think I submitted this without my name - redoing it now and updating based on re-read | 5/26/2017 12:02 PM Rasmussen |
| 3 | Principles beyond those that defined "thin data", and anti-harvesting techniques, are both enough and do not introduce further "who guards to gate" issues. | 5/24/2017 3:25 AM Samuelson |