

Michelle DeSmyter:Dear all, Welcome to the GNSO Next-Gen RDS PDP Working Group call on Wednesday,17 May 2017 at 05:00 UTC.

Michelle DeSmyter:Meeting agenda page:

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A_community.icann.org_x_HMPRAW&d=DwIFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrw113mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=8_WhWIPqsLT6TmF1Zmyci866vcPSF04VShFqESGe_5iHWGlBLwwehFBfjrsjWv9&m=Eog9BciBokalwuPa-TgTeJMKfTibesj552YwyZJEn7Q&s=F7m-9N-dE2LFnSWJO_X_163uB2Xs9RYclgE_VSqWJlQ&e=

Chuck Gomes:Greetings all

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:Morning

Stephanie Perrin:not hearing anything, is it me or are we just extra quiet tonight?

Lisa Phifer:All waiting for call to start

Jim Galvin (Afilias):@stephanie - extra quiet :-)

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):Hello All

Vaibhav Aggarwal(NCSG)(New Delhi):Good Morning Team

andrew sullivan:I'm on. I'm in an airline lounge at HKG and will avoid talking. Also I'll have to drop in about an hour

andrew sullivan:(oh, and of course hello all :-)

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:No sound here?

andrew sullivan:sound working for me

Michelle DeSmyter:Hi Benny, I will send you a private chat, if you are in need of a dialout

andrew sullivan:my experience is that the Adobe near-malware regularly wrecks audio on my machine, and if I kill the browser and restart it often that clears things

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:Will try restart sounds like hungry lions

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):Question: is there an agenda of the tutorial / slidedeck going to be shared in advance?

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):thanks

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:restart cured it

Lisa Phifer:Document displayed now:

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A_community.icann.org_download_attachments_64078620_DataOfRecord-2DProposal.pdf&d=DwIFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrw113mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=8_WhWIPqsLT6TmF1Zmyci866vcPSF04VShFqESGe_5iHWGlBLwwehFBfjrsjWv9&m=Eog9BciBokalwuPa-TgTeJMKfTibesj552YwyZJEn7Q&s=9XRNW4qaGX6_qoazJfJzRleazpdM5x6htqRiSJgvJ1_I&e=

Lisa Phifer:Proposal in document: "2) A purpose of RDS is to facilitate dissemination of gTLD registration data of record, such as domain names and their domain contacts and name servers, in accordance with applicable policy."

Lisa Phifer:Proposed Definition: "the data set at a given time relevant to a given registration object that expresses the data provided in the then-current registration for that object."

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):it was an attempt for+

David Cake:Thank you everyone

Lisa Phifer:Handout now being displayed:

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A_community.icann.org_download_attachments_64078620_Charter-2520Question-25205-2520-2D-2520Handout-2520-2D-2520For17MayCall-2520v2.pdf&d=DwIFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJP6wrcrw1l3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=8_WhWIPqsLT6TmF1Zmyci866vcPSF04VShFqESGe_5iHWGlBLwwhFBfjrsjWv9&m=Eog9BciBokalwuPa-TgTeJMKfTibesj552YwyZJEn7Q&s=fE2iSBIH_bgrfx10m5V763WkQY2MiDmnbCpzRp5rIk0&e=

Lisa Phifer:Poll results summarized starting on slide 2

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):it is minimal, identify themselves -> without identification

Stephanie Perrin:themselves is the plural of itself. Perhaps add, "inquirers, be they human or entities"

Amr Elsadr:"gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without inquirers requiring identification"

andrew sullivan:There is no reason to suppose there is a "person" at the end of this at all

Jim Galvin (Afilias):SUGGESTION: gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without identification or stated purpose.

andrew sullivan:for instance, a mail system could use the RDS to detect new registrations

Amr Elsadr:"gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without inquirers requiring identification or stating their purpose"

andrew sullivan:(Registrations that are less than a day old are more suspicious as mail sources.)

Jim Galvin (Afilias):"without inquirer identification or stated purpose"

Lisa Phifer:gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without requiring identification of inquirers or statement of purpose?

Amr Elsadr:Proposed change "gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without inquirer identification or stating purpose".

Lisa Phifer>Note that we are developing requirements to guide policy development; these are not yet policies

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):)

Lisa Phifer:This is a proposed revision to the agreement of 2 May

Lisa Phifer:Does it make sense to combine option e) with this

revised statement?

Lisa Phifer:For example, Proposed change "gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without inquirer identification, authentication, or stating purpose".

Greg Shatan 2:What's the point of changing "requestor" to "inquirer"?

Lisa Phifer:@Greg, inquirer was the term used in the 2 May agreement, but requestor is the term used in our charter - we should pick one

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):removal of word identification and replacement to identificating

andrew sullivan:I don't care whether we call it requestor or inquirer, myself

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):so we do describe process and not actor

Greg Shatan 2:Agree with Lisa that we need to be consistent. It says requester in. a lot of other places.

Greg Shatan 2:Requester and inquirer both identify the actor.

Amr Elsadr:@Andrew: Did you mean "without identifying inquirers"?

Stephanie Perrin:no we can't create words Chuck. we have enough problems...

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):Identifying

Greg Shatan 2:Whatever we use it should be consistent across all uses.

Stephanie Perrin:nope

Patrick Lenihan:They are equivalent words.

Lisa Phifer:Is there a reason to introduce the new term "inquirer"

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:I would say requestor clearly define it is a request

Greg Shatan 2:Would a state actor be a "National Inquirer"?

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):replacement of themselves to requestors is good enough

Rod Rasmussen:LOL

Greg Shatan 2:Let's stick with requestor(s).

Lisa Phifer:Proposed change "gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without inquirer (or requestor) identification, authentication, or stating purpose".

Greg Shatan 2::-)

andrew sullivan:Then a theoretical example actor in our examples can be a Notional Inquirer :)

Greg Shatan 2:Oooh.

Alex Deacon:lets stick with requestor (v. inquirer)

Patrick Lenihan:Requestors is a stronger word.

Greg Shatan 2:Querier?

andrew sullivan:(It's not even the middle of the night for me -

- I'm in HKG! -- but apparently I'm still giddy.)
Greg Shatan 2:"Clinical giddiness" is an actual diagnosis.
Lisa Phifer:Here's the current Proposed change "gTLD registration "thin data" should be accessible without requestor identification, authentication, or stating purpose".
Greg Shatan 2:That would be "the other Greg" (unless I am the other Greg).
Jim Galvin (Afilias):"stating purpose" --> "stated purpose" ??
Lisa Phifer:I hate to raise it but should should be must
Greg Shatan 2:I must agree with Lisa.
Tapani Tarvainen:should must be must
Stephanie Perrin:I thought we had agreed on must, should does not get us anywhere really...
andrew sullivan:I think we agreed about must, yes
David Cake:It is worth noting that a fully authenticated query can still satisfy the RFC definition of anonymity.
andrew sullivan:@David: see my note to the list, but that's only maybe true.
Lisa Phifer:Revamped Proposed change "gTLD registration "thin data" must be accessible without requestor identification, authentication, or stated purpose".
Jim Galvin (Afilias):@chuck - yes, all should be nouns - identification, authentication, or stated purpose
andrew sullivan:I think this is good enough
Jim Galvin (Afilias):I think this is good enough
andrew sullivan:since it doesn't actually use the word "anonymous"
andrew sullivan:fortunately :)
Lisa Phifer:Greg A has suggested in his poll response: "Access to thin registration data must be provided to anonymous requestors."
Jim Galvin (Afilias):and we don't ask for anything extra from the requestor
Stephanie Perrin:and therefore avoids explaining the lengths one might have to go to to make things anonymous...
Jim Galvin (Afilias):"anonymous" is a red herring
andrew sullivan:@Lisa: yes, and I think that creates a new definitional problem that we get around with the current words
andrew sullivan:because the current proposal says what the requestor does not have to give, rather than trying to create an attribute of the requestor
Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):I think we'd better leave the process description and to avoid word anonymous at this stage
Alex Deacon:I think Lisa's "revamped" change covers things well - including anonymity.
andrew sullivan:agree

David Cake:In this statement, no we do not have to talk about anonymity. I suspect we will have to continue this conversation later in hte PDP though

Stephanie Perrin:Why do we need to define anonymous now? Thick data for LEA we may need to define anonymous and untraceable and a whole slew of things but we are only on thin data now, right?

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):the defined process might be equal , but I do not think we need anonymity to be mentioned ...

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):*equal to anonymity

David Cake:Nota ble that RFC definition does not necessarily match what many of us regard as true anonymity.

Farzaneh Badii:it's fun!

Tapani Tarvainen:I like herrings but not red ones.

Rod Rasmussen:Regular Herrings are tasty

Greg Shatan 2:I like matjes herrings.

David Cake:Whether or not true anonymity is possible, the use of privacy enhancing technology to complicate de-anonymisation is well outside current discussion.

Rod Rasmussen:Big +1 to Andrew/Jim

Greg Shatan 2:+2

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):most probably yes

Rod Rasmussen:WRT Thin data? Probably not - with gated data, absolutely, so we don't get out of jail, but we can punt for now.

Stephanie Perrin:I was going to say no, but agree with Rod we need to later.

Tapani Tarvainen:+1 Rod & Steph

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):so we might need to define it later (since we say that there is no authentication required for thin data)

andrew sullivan:We will need to define it at some point

andrew sullivan:We do not right now, I agree with David

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):+1 @Andrew

andrew sullivan:(sorry, I keep dropping, so I'm having a hard time following some of the voice questions.)

Alex Deacon:lts leverage an existing definition - no need to define something new.

Alex Deacon:s/its/lts

Lisa Phifer:@Alex, are you suggesting we adopt an existing definition

andrew sullivan:Once we want to say "you get access to \$data if you have \$credential" then we'll need to say what \$credential means, and that will require some sort of def of authentication of \$credential

Lisa Phifer:Proposed WG Agreement (to test with poll): "gTLD registration "thin data" must be accessible without requestor identification, authentication, or stated purpose".

Amr Elsadr:Proposed Statement: "gTLD registration "thin data" must be accessible without requestor identification, authentication, or stated purpose".

Alex Deacon:for authentication yes

David Cake:+1 to Andrew

Stephanie Perrin:ONE would hope we are going to use existing definitions....the question is which one.

andrew sullivan:and yes, it's not like there are no bodies out there who can tell us what authentication and authorization is :)

andrew sullivan:Given that any new RDS that can do credential-based stuff is going to use OpenID and OAuth, we should follow those defs

Lisa Phifer:slide 6 has the IETF definition for authentication

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):side note ... GDPR might be a good reason for THIN data to exist after may 2018 , hypothetically for current THICK Registries

andrew sullivan:"The IETF definition for authentication" is somewhat more complicated, but we don't need to explore that rathole today :)

Sara Bockey:i need to drop. thanks all. good discussion

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:Problem, we havent clearly defined the thin data

Greg Shatan 2:Can we restate the question?

Lisa Phifer:@Greg, do you agree with Proposed WG Agreement (to test with poll): "gTLD registration "thin data" must be accessible without requestor identification, authentication, or stated purpose".

Greg Shatan 2:Thanks, I've green checked.

andrew sullivan:sorry, was trying to clear checkmark :)

marksv:sorry

Lisa Phifer:yes chuck for those two proposed agreements

Amr Elsadr:I believe so, Chuck.

Stephanie Perrin:actually Benny, since we have said early according to policy, that policy may remove some data elements from the thin dtt

Greg Shatan 2:"sloppy hand" is a new one....

David Cake:+1 to Andrews point about using a defn of authentication that aligns with the technology that will be used to implement it.

Lisa Phifer:Slide 7 corresponds to the next agenda item d)

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):at which slide are we now?

Amr Elsadr:@Maxim: Agenda item 4(d) is on slide 7. We're about to get to that now.

Amr Elsadr:@Maxim: But Greg and Stephanie are still discussing the proposed statement for the poll on requestor identification, authentication and purpose statement.

Lisa Phifer:Note slide 1: We still need to finish deliberating on purpose and data elements to agree upon required "thin data" elements and their purpose

marksv:Now we know how Greg reads his fortune cookies

Lisa Phifer:Everyone jump to slide 7

andrew sullivan:I'm afraid I have to drop because I have to go find an airplane

andrew sullivan:apologies & bye all

marksv:bye

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):new profession " CAPTCHA recognition operator" :)

Greg Shatan 2: Need to drop as well. Bye all. I am not a robot.

Lisa Phifer:Comments from those who agreed and disagreed revolved around what reasonable and unreasonable restrictions might be

Benny Samuelson / Nordreg AB:Greg going to read fortune cookies?

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):I think legitimate is well defined in laws

Greg Shatan 2:... in bed.

Stephanie Perrin:How would that apply here though Maxim?

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):I mean we do not need to define it here

Lisa Phifer:"legitimate purposes" were identified when we deliberated on purpose, we still need to go back to that list

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):the reason is -> we discuss future policy -> it comes with a contract ... most our contracts have provision of prohibition of illegal activities

marksv:what sort of gaming? I don't have that context

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):100k requests per minute is a danger to infrastructure

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):of small parties

Lisa Phifer:This clause from the RAA may be somewhat relevant:
3.3.5 In providing query-based public access to registration data as required by Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.4, Registrar shall not impose terms and conditions on use of the data provided, except as permitted by any Specification or Policy established by ICANN. Unless and until ICANN establishes a different Consensus Policy, Registrar shall permit use of data it provides in response to queries for any lawful purposes except to: (a) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission by e-mail, telephone, postal mail, facsimile or other means of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations to entities other than the data recipient's own existing customers; or (b) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that send queries or data to the systems of any Registry Operator or ICANN-Accredited registrar, except as reasonably necessary to register domain names or modify

existing registrations

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):and 1M per minute equal a DDoS

Rod Rasmussen:gaming may not be the best word - but putting artificial restrictions on access in the name of "systems protection" that really provide unreasonable limits on data access.

Stephanie Perrin:I distinctly recall Michele saying he did not want to be restricted from rate limiting, but perhaps I have misconstrued that....

Rod Rasmussen:For example, after my IP address (which could be a gateway!) hits 100 queries in a day, I no longer get access. Seen these before.

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):Registries and Registrars need means to protect infrastructure

Rod Rasmussen:This issue conflates the concepts of "reasonable access" with "systems protection" - what do those mean?

Rod Rasmussen:@Maxim - absolutely agree they need protection.

Jim Galvin (Afilias):perhaps rather than saying something about rate-limiting per se, we need an SLA about the level of access that must be supported.

Tim Chen:+1

Tim Chen:rate limiting already happens today, without any new language or permission needed. I'm more concerned about the opposite. as per Rod and Jim.

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):@Jim, Do we have evidence that we need it (SLA)?

marksv:I'm hearing examples of legit efforts to protect infra - not really any examples of rate limiting as a means to block or obfuscate access

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):I mean the way to test load is to put additional load ...

Lisa Phifer>Note Jim's comment: perhaps rather than saying something about rate-limiting per se, we need an SLA about the level of access that must be supported.

Rod Rasmussen:Time for a cage match!

Jim Galvin (Afilias):@maxim - maybe not. just making suggestions.

Stephanie Perrin:my rationale is that we have just agreed a statement that is silent on it and demands access. I think we have to qualify it somehow without getting into detail.

Lisa Phifer:Red if you oppose statement in Q3: There must be no RDS policies that prevent RDS operators from applying operational controls such as rate limiting and CAPTCHA, provided that they do not unreasonably restrict legitimate access.

marksv:ha

Rod Rasmussen:Mortal Kombat

Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):we could declare strong non-opposition
Stephanie Perrin:we are still punting the concepts of
legitimate and "unreasonably restrict" down the road
Vaibhav Aggarwal:+1 ROD
Stephanie Perrin:plus there appears to have been no enforcement
of the bulk data access rules in the RAA, right?
Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):I think reference to "reasonable " will
lead to situation where unhappy party can complain that the
access is not provided without proper reasoning .. and it is good
Vaibhav Aggarwal:I volunteer
Vaibhav Aggarwal:Yes as we can out some research and specific
case examples to draw conclusions
Vaibhav Aggarwal:also basis on the different geographies
Lisa Phifer:Chuck, to clarify - you are not asking for a policy
that states what is reasonable, but rather what reasonable means
in this statement?
Vaibhav Aggarwal:I will be happy to commit to Rod's time zone
Vaibhav Aggarwal::-)
Vaibhav Aggarwal:Sure
Stephanie Perrin:the term is unreasonably restrict, right?
Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):holywar style e-mail flaim ?
Stephanie Perrin:which is different than reasonable access
Vaibhav Aggarwal::-)
Rod Rasmussen:Probably - we'll see
Vaibhav Aggarwal:We could come up with Questions in the due
course
Stephanie Perrin:if you find that attempts to restrict
access at the moment are IP address related, does that go back
to our previous commitment ?
Rod Rasmussen:@Vaibhav - see private chat question I sent you
Amr Elsadr:Next week's tutorial webinar will take place
immediately following the WG call for one hour.
Maxim Alzoba (FAITID):bye all
Jim Galvin (Afilias):bye - thanks all
Amr Elsadr:Thanks all. Bye.
Patrick Lenihan:Thanks to Each and All!
Stephanie Perrin:Bye!