



# Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in gTLDs (SADAG)

Background, Methodology, and Planned Research

SIDN and Delft U. of Technology | ICANN 58 | 10 March 2017

# Agenda

- ⦿ Introduction from ICANN: Background of Study
- ⦿ Presentation on Methodology and Planned Research from SIDN and Delft University of Technology (TU-Delft)
- ⦿ Q & A

# Study Background

2009

## ⦿ [Mitigating Malicious Conduct: New gTLD Program Explanatory Memorandum](#)


Question	Recommendation(s)
1) How do we ensure that bad actors do not run registries?	1. Vet registry operators
2) How do we ensure integrity and utility of registry information?	2. Require DNSSEC Deployment 3. Prohibit “wildcarding” 4. Encourage removal of “orphan glue” records
3) How do we ensure more focused efforts on combating identified abuse?	5. Require “Thick” WHOIS records 6. Centralize Zone File access 7. Document registry- and registrar-level abuse contacts and policies 8. Provide an expedited registry security request process
4) How do we provide an enhanced control framework for TLDs with intrinsic potential for malicious conduct?	9. Create a draft framework for a high security zone verification program

# Study Background

2016

⊙ [New gTLD Program Safeguards Against DNS Abuse: Revised Report](#)

- ⊙ Research aid to Competition, Consumer Trust, and Choice Review Team
- ⊙ How to measure effectiveness of safeguards?



# Study Background

2016 -2017

## ⦿ Competition, Consumer Choice, and Trust Review Team

- ⦿ Mandated by AoC to examine “effectiveness of...safeguards put in place to mitigate issues involved in...the expansion [of the top-level domain space]”
- ⦿ Required comprehensive descriptive statistics as **baseline measure** of abuse rates in new compared to legacy gTLDs in order to gauge safeguard effectiveness
- ⦿ Also serves as proxy for “trust”, i.e. changes in abuse rate → changes in trust
- ⦿ CCTRT Draft Report recommends ongoing DNS abuse measurement

## Study Timeline

- ⦿ RFP issued August 2016
- ⦿ SIDN contracted November 2016
- ⦿ Research began December 2016
- ⦿ Final report expected June 2017

Big Project!  
Tight Timeframe!  
Need Data!



# **Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in gTLDs (SADAG)**

Methodology and Planned Research

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# Project

## Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in gTLDs (SADAG)

**Consortium:** SIDN and TU Delft

**Requested by:** Competition, Consumer Choice, and Trust  
Review Team

# Goal

- Comprehensive statistical comparison of rates of DNS abuse in new and legacy gTLDs
  - Spam
  - Phishing
  - Malware
  - Botnet Command-and-Control
- Statistical analysis of potential relationship with abuse drivers
  - DNSSEC
  - Other drivers as identified by future Review Teams



# Motivation

- New Generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) Program enabled hundreds of new generic top-level domains
- Safeguards built into the Program intended to mitigate rates of abusive, malicious, and criminal activity in these new gTLDs

# Current data providers (1)

## Domain Blacklists

- Anti Phishing Working Group
  - Phishing URLs
- StopBadware
  - Malware URLs
- Secure Domain Foundation
  - Malware URLs (Command & Control, EXE, Compromised)
  - Phishing URLs
  - Highly suspect domains
  - Bad Faith domains

# Current data providers (2)

## WHOIS data

- Whois XML API
  - All new gTLDs
  - Subset of legacy gTLDs

## Domain data

- Zone files
  - Per gTLD
  - Per day
  - 3 year period

# gTLD groups

## Legacy gTLDs

- E.g. .com, .org, .net, asia, .biz etc.

## New gTLDs

- Part of the New gTLD program
- E.g. amsterdam, .xyz

Study component	# Legacy gTLDs	Source
TLD level aggregation	17	Zone files
Maliciously registered vs. compromised domains	9	WHOIS data
Registrar aggregation	9	WHOIS data

# Data limitations

## WHOIS data

- Collection method
  - No continuous scanning
  - Might be missing short-lived domains

# More Data Requested!

- Abuse feeds
  - Phishing
  - Malware
  - Botnet C&C
  - Spam
- Uptimes





# Security metrics

- Concentration of malicious content:
  - Number of unique domains
    - E.g. **malicious.com**

# Security metrics

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  - Number of unique domains
    - E.g. malicious.com
  - Number of FQDNs
    - E.g. **123.malicious.com**, **456.malicious.com**, **789.malicious.com**, (...)

# Security metrics

## – Concentration of malicious content:

- Number of unique domains
  - E.g. malicious.com
- Number of FQDNs
  - E.g. 123.malicious.com, 456.malicious.com, 789.malicious.com, (...)
- Number of URLs
  - E.g. **malicious.com/wp-content/file.php**, **malicious.com/wp-content/gate.php**, (...)

STOP BADWARE (SITES)	F.I.R.E. (COMPOSITE)	PHISHTANK
Planet.com (AS21844)	ThePlanet.com (AS21844)	NJ INTL INTERNET EXCHANGE (AS16812)
PLANET BACKBONE (AS14035)	PAH Inc GoDaddy.com (AS26496)	MetroRED Telecom Services (AS13591)
Inc GoDaddy.com (AS26496)	OVH - OVH (AS16276)	RAPIDSWITCH-AS (AS29131)
	BLUEHOST-AS (AS11798)	CENTROHOST-AS (AS41126)
m Inc. (AS6151)	IPNAP- GigeNET (AS23522)	ThePlanet.com (AS21844)
gle Inc. (AS15169)	EcomD-Coloquest/GigeNet (AS32181)	iWeb Technologies Inc. (AS32613)
ayer Technologies (AS36351)	GNAXNET - Global Net Access (AS3595)	Softlayer Technologies (AS36351)
ent Co/PSI (AS174)	iWeb Technologies Inc (AS32613)	OVH - OVH (AS16276)
ET Beijing (AS17431)	Softlayer Technologies (AS36351)	Limestone Networks Inc (AS46475)
frican Internet Svcs (AS6130)	Bizland-SD - Endurance Intl (AS29873)	SOVAM-AS Golden Telecom (AS3216)
<<----->>	<<----->>	<<----->>
<b>ARBOR TOP ASN THREATS</b>	<b>EMERGING THREATS COMPROMISED IPS</b>	<b>EMERGING THREATS RBN</b>
NTL INTERNET XCHANGE (AS16812)	CHINA TELECOM (AS4134)	Softlayer Technologies (AS36351)
K -AP (AS4847)	Korea Telecom (AS4766)	ThePlanet.com (AS21844)
PLANET BACKBONE (AS14035)	Deutsche Telekom (AS3320)	CHINA TELECOM (AS4134)
Planet		
- OVH		
UMBUS-NAP (AS10297)	Telecom Sao Paulo (AS27699)	Leaseweb (AS16265)
ayer Technologies (AS36351)	China Network Comm. (AS4837)	HETZNER ONLINE (AS24940)
riapl (AS16138)	HANARO Telecom (AS9318)	NJIX (AS19318)
ET (AS3462)	National Internet Backbone (AS9829)	Layered Tech (AS22576)
ZON (AS14618)	CHINANET-BJ-AS-169 (AS4808)	OVH - OVH (AS16276)

Source: <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/03/naming-and-shaming-bad-isps>

# Security metrics

Size matters!



# Size estimates

- Size of a TLD can be used as an explanatory factor for the concentrations of abused domains
- Size of a TLD could be interpreted as the “attack surface” size for cybercriminals.
- Number of 2<sup>nd</sup>-level domains registered in each gTLD (zone files)
- Limitation: There is a large portion of domains in new gTLDs with NS records that do not resolve yet
  - Solution: active measurement to determine domains in use per gTLD



# Size estimates

- Number of 2<sup>nd</sup>-level domains registered in each registrar (WHOIS data)
- Limitation: single entity can have multiple different names, e.g. , we found a registrar using 52 distinct name variations
  - Solution: an additional entity resolution step to try to group together the different names of a single registrar (58% reduction)
- Limitation: missing WHOIS data

# Compromised versus maliciously registered domains

## – Definitions:

- Maliciously registered domain – domain registered by a miscreant for malicious purposes
  - Compromised domain – domain registered by a legitimate user and hacked by a miscreant
  - Third party domains – domains of legitimate services that tend to be misused by miscreants (e.g. file sharing services, blog post services, URL shortening services)
- For compromised domains, the TLD size could be interpreted as the “attack surface” size for cybercriminals.
- For malicious registrations, the TLD size could serve as a proxy for the “popularity” of the TLD. What makes it popular?

# Distinguishing between compromised and maliciously registered domains

- Distinguishing between compromised and maliciously registered domains is critical because they require different mitigation actions by different intermediaries
- Assumption: maliciously registered domains are involved in a criminal activity within a short time after the registration
- Limitation: (lack of) WHOIS data, maliciously registered domains involved in a criminal activity within a longer time after the registration, or delayed blacklisting
  - Solution: more advanced machine learning approach (requires more “features” and the “ground truth” data)

## Future work

- Incorporate more blacklist feeds
- Analyze abuse per:
  - Reseller
  - Privacy / proxy service (if data available)
  - Geographic region
- Analysis of the time-to-live of domain names
  - Requires uptime data
- Inferential analysis of potential relationship with abuse drivers

# Schedule

- Final report available early June 2017

# Questions?

