



DNS Security and DNS Abuse Handling

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Acknowledgements

- Dave Piscitello
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Threats and Risks
in DNS

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Importance of
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and Policy
considerations

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Case Studies and
Use cases


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Collaboration with
ICANN




Threats and Risks in DNS

DNS Resolution Recap




Reflection and Amplification Attack




- Attacker sends DNS messages to recursor from spoofed IP address of target
- Recursor sends LARGE responses to targeted host
- *Amplified* responses delivered to targeted host consume resources faster

Distributed Reflection & Amplification Attack (DDoS)



All sources spoof source
IP of target: 10.0.0.1

Targeted host
IP: 10.0.0.1



- Launch reflection and amplification attack from 1000s of origins
- Reflect through open recursor
- Deliver 1000s of large responses to target

Basic Cache Poisoning

Attacker

- Launches a spam campaign where spam message contains <http://loseweightfastnow.com>
- Attacker's name server will respond to a DNS query for loseweightnow.com with malicious data about ebay.com
- Vulnerable resolvers add malicious data to local caches
- The malicious data will send victims to an eBay phishing site for the lifetime of the cached entry



My Mac

What is the IPv4 address for loseweightfastnow.com



My local resolver

I'll cache this response... and update www.ebay.com


loseweightfastnow.com IPv4 address is 192.168.1.1
ALSO www.ebay.com is at 192.168.1.2



ecrime name server

Query Interception (DNS Hijacking)


- A man in the middle (MITM) or spoofing attack forwards DNS queries to a name server that returns forge responses
 - Can be done using a DNS proxy, **compromised** access router or recursor, ARP poisoning, or evil twin Wifi access point






Importance of DNS Security

DNS: Data Flow




DNS Vulnerabilities



Securing DNS

- There are two aspects when considering DNS Security
 - Server protection
 - Data protection
- Server protection
 - Protecting servers
 - Make sure your DNS servers are protected (i.e. physical security, latest DNS server software, proper security policies, Server redundancies etc.)
 - Protecting server transactions
 - Deployment of TSIG, ACLs etc. (To secure transactions against server impersonations, secure zone transfers, unauthorized updates etc.)
- Data protection
 - Authenticity and Integrity of Data
 - Deployment of DNSSEC (Protect DNS data against cache poisoning, cache impersonations, spoofing etc.)

How DNSSEC Works




DNSSEC ccTLD Map




<https://rick.eng.br/dnssecstat/>

DNSSEC Deployment


% of TLDs signed in root




% of TLDs signed



Approx % of 2LDs signed



Trend



<https://rick.eng.br/dnssecstat/>

DNSSEC: So what's the problem?

- Not enough IT departments know about it or are too busy putting out other security fires.
- When they do look into it they hear old stories of FUD and lack of turnkey solutions.
- Registrars*/DNS providers see no demand leading to “chicken-and-egg” problems.

*but required by new ICANN registrar agreement

A world map where the continents are defined by a complex network of white nodes and connecting lines, set against a dark blue background. The nodes vary in size and are densely packed in some areas, creating a digital or network-like appearance of the globe.

Handling DNS Abuse

Common Uses for Maliciously Registered Domains

- Counterfeit goods
- Data exfiltration
- Exploit attacks
- Illegal pharma
- Infrastructure (ecrime name resolution)
- Malware C&C
- Malware distribution (drive-by pages)
- Phishing
- Scams (419, reshipping, stranded traveler...)



Abuses of other peoples' Domains & DNS



- Host criminal DNS infrastructure
- Domain, NS, or MX Hijacking
- Hacktivism (e.g., defacement)
- Host file modification (infected devices)
- Changing default resolvers (DNSChanger)
- Poisoning (resolver/ISP)
- Man in the Middle attacks (insertion, capture)
- etc.



How Abusers acquire DNS resources


- Purchase using stolen credit cards, compromised accounts
- Abuse “free” services
- Leverage bullet-proof or grey hat hosting/ domain providers
- Hack and exploit legitimate hosts
- Phish registration account credentials and use to modify domain zone data or buy domains

Best practices in collecting evidences when handling DNS Abuse

- Be aware of questionable WHOIS contact data (Names and IP addresses)
- Check whether privacy protection service is involved
- Check for suspicious values in DNS Zone data
- Examine the spoofing or confusing use of a brand
- Check on the name servers? Are they suspicious?
- Check for hosting locations? Are they suspicious?
- Examine the Base site content? Is it non-existent or bad?
- What about the linked content? Is it suspicious or bad?
- Analyze the mail headers, sender, or content? Are they suspicious?

A world map where the continents are defined by a complex network of white nodes and connecting lines, set against a dark blue background. The nodes vary in size, and the lines represent connections between them, creating a digital or network-like appearance of the world's geography.

Pop Quiz



Tools, Techniques and Policy considerations to Handle DNS Abuse

Tools for Abuse Handlers

- Many tools to help you identify the abused or malicious resource
 - Domain names, host names, IP addresses, ASNs
 - Hosting location (web, DNS, mail) or origin
 - Content (URL, file, email, attachment)
- Many tools to identify whom to contact or report the resource
 - Databases of domain registrants, operators, ISPs
 - Block list and analysis sites and data providers

SAVE A COPY OF EVERYTHING YOU VISIT OR QUERY

How the policies and guidelines can assist?

- When collecting abuse related evidences
- Dealing with registrars, privacy protection services, registries etc.
- Acceptable Use Policies (AUP)
- WHOIS database data accuracy
- Dealing with National CERTs
- Dealing with Law Enforcement
- ICANN Compliance


A world map where the continents are defined by a complex network of white dots and thin white lines. The dots vary in size, and the lines connect them to form a web-like structure. The background is a solid dark blue color.

Case Studies



Collaboration with ICANN to
keep Internet Secure, Stable
and Resilient

Collaborative Measures at ICANN



Threat Awareness and Response

Trust-based Collaboration

Capability Building

Identifier SSR Analytics

Working Together - SSR Capability Building

Capability Building

SSR Training

- Security
- DNS Operations
- Abuse/Misuse

Knowledge Transfer

- Europol
- Interpol
- RIRs

+ Training and Outreach

- Security, operations, DNS/DNSSEC deployment training
 - for TLD registry operators
 - Network Operators / ISPs
 - Enterprises, Corporates etc.
- Information gathering to identify Internet Identifier Systems abuse/misuse and Investigation Techniques
 - Law Enforcement Agencies
 - CERTs
 - Internet Investigators etc.

A world map where the continents are defined by a complex network of white dots and thin white lines. The dots vary in size, and the lines connect them to form a web-like structure that outlines the major landmasses. The background is a solid, dark blue color.

Pop Quiz

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Thank you and Questions



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