**RECORDED AUDIO:** 

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LAUREEN KAPIN:

Great. Less is anticipated. So this Laureen Kapin, and we are getting started with our phone call for our safeguards and trust sub team meeting number seven. Thanks everyone for participating. And also thanks especially to our guest, Francisco Arias, who is going to be talking about name collision. And also to our presenters today, Drew and Carlos, who are going to be talking about the articles that are on our reading list.

And in that regard, I had sent out an email last week with proposed assignments, having not heard from people what their preference might be. So I tried to [inaudible] it what you either might be good at, or you might want to do. They're not set in stone. If you want to trade, that's fine.

I'll also clarify that some studies had two folks connected with them, and I tried to do that for the longer studies in the hopes that might things a little more manageable, but again, I'll leave that to folks to work out as they see fit. And I also, in that email, had a schedule of the dates that I thought it would be helpful for people to actually make those presentations.

So if there is anyone who didn't get that email, contact me and I'll be happy to resend it to you. And if anyone has any issues with their assignments, you could also either work it out amongst yourselves, or

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contact me. Are there any questions about the reading list assignments

before we move on to our first topic?

Cool. Okay. So, what I wanted to do for our first agenda item is, talk about and possibly close out, at least for now, our discussion of data needs. And looking into our other sub team, the competition and choice sub team, and the way they've approached some things, I thought it might be helpful to flesh out our first category of consumer, safeguards, and trust topics, our impact of the public interest commitments and other safeguards, to flesh that out with a couple of

more questions.

So that's what you see on the screen in front of you. Just some more questions regarding some of the topics within PICs and other safeguards that we've identified. And what I thought that could do, is try and inspire some further thought and discussion about what other data needs we might have. So maybe folks can take a quick look at that, it's on the screen now. And let me know if this brings to mind any other data needs we might have. And I'll open that question up for discussion.

CARLOS:

Hello?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

I'm sorry. Carlos your hand is up, now I see that. Please, Carlos. Thank you. Please, if I'm not seeing people's hands, it's because I focused on

so many things on this screen, so please just speak up just as Carlos has. Thank you Carlos, go ahead.

CARLOS:

Thank you very much. This is Carlos for the record. I have a question on this definition of public interest. So how do you define, because even a pretty recent one, and my question is, how do you define PIC and how does it relate with an ongoing PDP on right protection mechanism, which applies basically to the registrar, so registries, or both of them? [Inaudible].

I don't know if I made myself clear, but I'm wondering if this list should cover, or does not cover the exclusive of the right protection mechanisms.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thanks for that question, Carlos, and I'm glad you asked that, because it's a useful clarification that may be needed. PIC actually is a very specific term. It stands for Public Interest Commitment, and that is the very particular contract provision that was put into the registry and registrar agreement that provided the mechanism for the GAC advice on consumer protection safeguards. So these are actual contract provisions. They don't refer to something general like a general public interest concern, for example, which I think is something you might think it would be in the first instance.

These are really very specific provisions of the ICANN contract that were meant to implement certain GAC advice on consumer protection safeguards. So they're very specific, they are not general.

CARLOS:

Thank you.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Does that help?

**CARLOS:** 

Yes, thank you. It's very good clarification. Thank you.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay, good.

And again, this is a list that we can supplement, amplify, but I think as we start moving through these questions and some of the articles that are on our reading list, we may have further thoughts on what information we may want to gather on these points.

To the extent that it's available. I think the other challenge here is that the new gTLD track record, so to speak, is still fairly young. So we may have not as much data as we would like. But other questions or thoughts on the data issues?

CARLOS:

Yes, I have another question, Laureen. Carlos again. When we go down the list, in the third point of the first group, they talk about regulated and non-regulated gTLDs. I guess you're talking about this sensitive streams, sensitive streams in terms of being regulated by local jurisdictions like health, and [inaudible], and banks.

And my question there is, I think some of those new gTLDs, they are stuck. They have not been delegated just because of that. So although there is no data, I guess some of them are in the waiting line, and this is an issue, interestingly enough, and to analyze, why are they stuck and have nothing [inaudible].

LAUREEN KAPIN:

That's interesting. I know the ICANN Board, first of all, has specific identification of which gTLDs they consider falling within the GAC category of sensitive or regulated gTLDs. And there is actually a specific chart on that. Of those, certainly many have been delegated. I'm not aware of which particular ones haven't, or the number, but that's absolutely something we can find out.

But as to your specific question, why haven't they been delegated? I guess what I would want to bounce back to you is, can you give us more perspectives on how that relates to the consumer trust, consumer protection issues?

CARLOS:

No, it would be interesting to see the list, and see which ones have been delegated, and not and go straight into analysis, how the safeguards

were implemented, because I'm not aware of any case in particular, and following other group of cases which are the geographical ones. But it would be nice to have this table from staff.

If there is no problem with delegating them, then we can jump directly to the [inaudible]... [CROSSTALK] I don't know, do you have a chart of this list or do you know if there is one?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

No, there absolutely is one, because it has been the materials that comprise sort of the back and forth between the GAC and the ICANN regarding these topics. So, ICANN staff likely knows where this is anyway, but I certainly can also direct them to where the list is, as to what's delegated and what's not, perhaps we can have that as an action item for staff to look at the list and then give us information about what has and what hasn't been delegated.

Can we add that as an action item?

[Inaudible] who is holding the pen for, okay, Pam, okay, great. So that's going to be added as an action item, thank you Pam. [CROSSTALK] Yes.

**ELEEZA AGOPIAN:** 

So Laureen, this is Eleeza. Could you just explain again what you meant. I'm not quite sure I understood. This is a list of regulated strings, is that what you were saying?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Yeah, and again, I can actually point you to exactly what I'm talking about. Basically, in the back and forth between GAC advice on what safeguards should apply to what categories of gTLDs, there was certain conventions, and one of these were sensitive or regulated strings. And in the course of the back and forth, ICANN actually created a chart of what gTLDs fell within that category.

So, there is a chart that actually contains that sort of identification. That was what Carlos has requested, and again, I can help point you to that. And then it's just a matter of within those categories, showing us what's been delegated and what hasn't. Is that helpful?

**ELEEZA AGOPIAN:** 

Yes, that makes sense. Thank you. I think I didn't quite catch the first part.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Got it. Okay. Good. So, we will get that. The other thing that occurs to me is that I know that we had asked for a sort of a literature review on... I'm trying to find the... A literature review of awareness of the impact on new gTLDs on consumer trust and consumer protection. And I think that will be very helpful for us.

And maybe we can get a little better sense of timing on that, because if it turns out that there are things we should be looking at and adding to our reading list, I think it would be helpful to do that sooner rather than later. So maybe, at some point, offline, I can get just a quick update

about that from staff, about how that is progressing, if we should be giving more guidance, that sort of thing.

ELEEZA AGOPIAN: This is Eleeza again. Can I ask a question there?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Sure.

ELEEZA AGOPIAN: Is this separate from the...? Brian sent out a list of articles and other

studies about awareness more broadly of new gTLDs. Is this a separate

effort from that?

LAUREEN KAPIN: I'm sorry, yes. And this is me getting a little confused. I'm just dotting

down notes on my old list. And really, this is a new note. So let me re-

categorize this. I would like to add, thank you so much Eleeza for

keeping me [CROSSTALK]...

ELEEZA AGOPIAN: ...if we direct one piece of that, I just wasn't sure if this was a different

type of [CROSSTALK]. Okay.

LAUREEN KAPIN: It's me, not you. I would like to add an action item, if we can also have

some research done as to articles slash on the impact of new gTLDs on

either consumer trust or consumer protection, consumer safety, that sort of concept.

ELEEZA AGOPIAN:

Okay.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay.

JAMIE:

This is Jamie. May I ask a question?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Absolutely.

JAMIE:

So, I'm concerned about throwing around terms like consumer safety, consumer protection, when they're not in our charter and they can be considerably broader than consumer trust and consumer choice. And so I was just wondering whether you were thinking they were the same things as consumer trust and consumer trust?

Or whether it's something broader than that.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

So, this is Laureen. Consumer trust, I think, really is an issue that goes to our colleagues on the competition side. So none of those terms are

meant to relate to that, but in terms of consumer protection and consumer safety, I see those as related terms to the consumer trust issues, and my intent for asking for articles on these topics is really not to say that this is what we are going to be issuing recommendations on.

It's more an information source for us to look at as we continue to focus on the consumer trust issue. So this is more an information gathering exercise as to what is out there, and what can inform our effort. It's not meant to widen our charter, which is what I'm hearing your concern might be. Does that answer your question?

JAMIE:

Yeah, that's how... The concern is that it's more than just the charter, but it's also keeping in mind ICANN's rather narrow scope and mission, and not to you know, start making the review about things that are outside of our charter, which outside of our scope and mission, which the community has spent a lot of time just recently redefining and narrowing.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Right. That issue is a whole separate topic, but that's one of the good reasons why we have diversity of folks on our review team, so that we can have discussions about what's within and outside our charter. So I hear your concerns, and I'll count on you to raise those concerns, you know, as appropriate. But for now, I think it's fair to ask that we look at information sources so that we can figure out [CROSSTALK] to focus on.

JAMIE:

I'm all for information, I just don't want for there to be an impression that we are a consumer protection organization or a consumer safety organization, because that's definitely not within ICANN's remit.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay. So any other questions or comments?

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Laureen, it's Jonathan. I can't seem to raise my hand, so I would like to be in the queue if I could.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

You are next to speak.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Oh wow. I wasn't ready. I think we're going to find ourselves taking a step back periodically at our mission, and as Jamie said, in the context of the ICANN mission, and I think the greatest, you know, concern here is whether or not there was an erosion of trust that corresponded to the new gTLD program, as opposed to an assumption that there was a lack of trust that the new gTLD program was designed to fix.

Right? And so I think that taken in that context that we see that, something about that program led to a degradation of consumer trust. We then make recommendations to fix our own problems, so to speak. It feels like the way that the way it would be most powerful, you know, in terms of our recommendations and the impact of the new gTLD

program. I think that's the key. We're kind of doing an impact assessment of the program, and then to the extent of where we, you know, stepped on our own shoelaces, how do we make things better again?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thank you Jonathan. I think that's a very helpful construct, and to the extent that it narrows the way that we're looking at things in a helpful way, perhaps that's going to address some of Jamie's concerns. But I do think that that's very helpful, this erosion of trust concept.

JAMIE:

As well as we can also look at other measures that may have increased trust as well, like the trademark protections that don't exist in dot com and dot net, that do exist in new gTLDs, right? [Inaudible] assignment, an erosion, that there is more positive than negative, just that we don't start with a bias.

JONATAHN ZUCK:

That's right Jamie. I think that's right.

LARUEEN KAPIN:

Yeah, I agree also. I think that's perfectly fair. And when we have our cost benefit analysis, you know, captured in that first point, you're right, we have to start from a place of neutrality and look to see whether there have been benefits or whether there has been some sort of negative impact that's perfectly fair.

Okay, good. So, I think we should move on then to Francisco's presentation, which I'm very appreciative that he has agreed to give us today, on names collision. But if folks have more thoughts on the topics that we have just discussed, which I'm sure we'll be delving into again and again, then you know, we can take this up during our next conversation, or you can also circulate something via email.

So with that, Francisco, I'm hoping that you're ready for us.

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Thank you Laureen. Hello everyone. Can you hear me?

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Yeah.

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Excellent. So, name collisions, I think Laureen, you asked me to give a brief overview of what name collision is, and what issues are in place, and the prevalence of name collisions in new TLDs. So, name collisions, in the context of the new gTLD program, can be described as what happens when a corporate network or a home network is using a name, domain name that ends in a TLD that is not delegated in the root.

A nonexistent TLD. Then if later, that TLD is integrated into the root, that's when you have a name collision. The way we work is before this TLD is delegated that same network is using the domain name, and then in that TLD that is still un-delegated at the time, they will launch a query to the root servers, and they will get a response that says, this TLD does

not exist. And then they will proceed to resolve the name within the context of their home network or corporate network, and then reach out to the internal server that they are trying to access.

But when the new gTLD is delegated, then that behavior changes, and now instead of getting a response from the root server, they're saying that this TLD does not exist, they get a response that says, this TLD now exists. Therefore the query would end in the servers that someone that may have [inaudible] name that this particular party was using, is now ending, their internal networks is now ending somewhere else.

Then that's the basic idea behind name collisions in the context of new gTLDs. And we have had examples, and I guess I'll go very quickly before into the [inaudible] the mission that has been in place. We have had reports of name collisions, 32 valid reports so far. We have had a higher number than that of reports, but most of them have turned out to be not name collision cases, but 32 have been valid reports...

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Francisco, I just wanted to take a pause before you actually go into the actual incidents of reports, and just give people the opportunity to ask questions about what a name collision is before you move on to the next topic. I just want to make sure everyone understands what it is before you move on to the incidences of name collision.

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Yes, of course.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay, looks like everyone is fine, I don't see any hands up. So, perfect. Greenlight to go ahead. And did you say 52 or 32?

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Three-two, 32.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Got it.

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

And those are considered a small number of TLDs. Let me see the count, two, four, six, eight, 10, 12, 14. 14 TLDs are the ones that have got these reports. Now, it's important to mention that none of these reports involve to harm to human life, which is one of the thresholds of what defines us about, that would trigger an action, or would require an action on the part of the TLD registry operations [inaudible], to explain what our [inaudible] that have been in place, in order to mitigate the risk of name collision.

So then there are a few iterations in throwing out the measures to protect against name collisions. The first one was a Board resolution passed in 7<sup>th</sup> of October 2013. That define two strings to be considered high risk, [inaudible] and they were, the [inaudible] delegation TLD, and the...

LAUREEN KAPIN:

I'm sorry Francisco. I didn't catch which delegations those were.

FRANCISCO ARIAS: Home...

LAUREEN KAPIN: Home? H-O-M-E?

FRANCISCO ARIAS: Yes. I can type it in the chat if that helps.

LAUREEN KAPIN: Okay.

FRANCISCO ARIAS: Home and [inaudible]. There you go. Can you see it?

LAUREEN KAPIN: Got it. Yeah, I do. Thank you.

FRANCISCO ARIAS: So that was in the first iteration. There were other measures of works

in that in that, Board resolution, that was [inaudible] outreach campaign

to make network operators aware of this issues, so we contracted

[inaudible] in Google, and we put [inaudible] materials available

regarding the issue.

[Inaudible] the new TLD operators, a couple of mentions were put in place. One was to mitigate a specific issue related to the [SSL?] certificates. The certificate authorities that issues this [SSL] certificates. They have a practice that they issue these [SSL] certificates to anyone that asks for, if this, if the name related to the certificate is on a non-related TLD.

So if you were to ask for domain name that ends in home, or [corp], or something else non-affiliated, you get the certificate, no questions asked basically aware of the issue, that will cost with easily [inaudible] delegations. And they agree to just make sure they ask for 120 day period to be able to act, how do you say? Revoke the certificate for a TLD that has been delayed.

So 120 day [inaudible] period was put in the contract of the new TLD agreement. So that every new TLD, from the moment they sign a contract, they have, during this work around [inaudible], they cannot put a name in the DNS. They cannot activate it. They can still register names, but they cannot activate it in the DNS.

And at the end of that period, the [CA's?] agree to have taken care of rejecting all of the certificates they may have issued for that now [inaudible] TLD. So that was one of the measures we have. The other measure is the registries, the new gTLD registries,

So I can setup a page that allows any part in the internet to report name collision issues, and the registries are required to take action in case of name collision report. This measure was [inaudible] updated in the next iteration, and I'm going to explain a little bit about that. Next, just in

this [inaudible], another thing that what's added is an ability for the then delegated TLDs to move ahead, sorry, at a point, at that time, there were non-delegated TLDs, sorry. This was for the first set of activities that were going to be delayed.

So in order for them to move, they could block, at least second level domain names that were identified for them as potentially dangerous in terms of name collision. So they could move ahead in delegation and raise their names, as long as they blocked that list of circulated domain names, and that was particular to each TLD. It was a divide from, quickly available locks of traffic to the root zone that are kept by an organization called DNS, DNS [inaudible].

So that was our sort of [inaudible] that ICANN sponsor with some experts in the field. So that was the first iteration of measures that was defined. That set of measures also called for ICANN to [inaudible] update on the measures to solve the issue of the TLDs that were put in this block list.

So with that, I can a second iteration of work to define what it was called, a name collision management framework, that and the measures in that framework included, you need to find one more string as [inaudible] that was both male, I'm going to type it here in the chat.

So this was [inaudible]... and they were the [inaudible] delegation definitely. And they are another measure included here was to define that the emergency response regarding name collision report was limited only to [inaudible] where there was clear and present danger to him [inaudible]. That was the threshold that was agreed by the

community as the only one where there would be agreement, that there should be action as opposed to something, a lower, let's say, in terms of emergency.

There was also the vision to use mechanics to use, in the registry was responsive, or willing, or unable to act in regard to a name collision response, a name collision report where there is clear and present [danger] for human life. There was service level requirements set for the registry, they have to act within two hours of our report.

And if they were, when they were unwilling to act then ICANN will be empowered to take over the TLD, we already had a mechanics call emergency backend registry operator, that is used for another purpose. So we have a purpose that to also be able to take over the TLD, and add any measures that were necessary in order to stop the immediate threat to human life, including [inaudible] to remove the TLD temporarily while the issue is being...

So, in regards to the measures for the new TLDs per se. What I described was the things that ICANN put in place. The name collision report handling was said to be required for the first two years of the life of the TLD, so we put a boundary on when this measure was applied to them. As I mentioned before, they have a service level requirement to act within two hours of the request.

There was also another measure that was set called [controlled?] interruption. This is a [control?] interruption includes the insertion of a specific DNS records that are designed to, with the intention to flag to a user that is using an undelegated, a name undelegated TLD. [Inaudible]

network to have interruption in their service without the potential harm to being directed to an issues site. And we, as I mentioned before, we put informative materials available. We contracted ads in Google, with some keywords that we thought would be the most likely things that people will try to find if they were to find this [counter] interruption issue.

For example, there is a specific IPR that is very non-routable in the [inaudible], they were to see these IPRs, they were to do it first, they would see an informative page from ICANN. What else? With this, we instituted, with this [counter] interruption, we put an option for the TLDs that have opted for the block, the list of SLDs that we identified as potential issues.

They could release those TLDs if they performed this [counter] interruption measure in [inaudible] for a period of 90 days. Let me see if there is anything else here.

I think that's the full list of measures that we put in place. As of now, we have 550 TLDs that have completed [counter] interruption, under the whole TLD. They have coordinated one TLDs that have completed CI using the block list.

We have a few others that are still doing CI, and we have only three TLDs that have not started the measure. To be clear, the [inaudible] is not required to start CI immediately. The way it works is they are simply done from activating names until they finish the [counter] interruption measure. So I think that's all I have in terms of data on the name collision mediation.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thank you very much Francisco. That was very informative. What I'm thinking would be helpful, if perhaps you can, it doesn't need to be a slide, it could even be a document, but it would be great to have this data captured in some way we could refer back to it. So perhaps it's something you can circulate to us, just with a time period on it so that we know it's just data that relates the certain time period specified.

That would be helpful, just to have that data captured, regarding the number of name collisions, and these measures to protect against name collisions that have been put in place and then how they have been implemented. Is that something that would be fairly doable to get to us?

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Yes, of course.

LARUEEN KAPIN:

Terrific. Thank you so much. I'd like to open it up to questions from the group to Francisco while we have him here. If folks have questions about the material that he just presented regarding name collision?

Okay, I don't see any hands up. So... I'm sorry, does someone have a questions?

JONATHAN ZUCK:

It's Jonathan.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Go ahead.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Yeah. Thanks for your presentation about process. And I guess the question is, what is the degree to which this is going to be a little bit like Y2K? That we're going to have difficulty proving a negative in terms of the value of these perfections, and what collisions they prevented, or what issues they may prevent in order to assess this?

I know the community is kind of divided on this issue, in some respects, because some thought of it as, you know, of an unnecessary inconvenient, and other people were very concerned about it, and I don't know how to... The fact that we put the protections in place means that some collisions were prevented. Is there any way to assess what the impact of...? What the collisions might have been and what was prevented with the program that was put in place?

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Very good question Jonathan. So I think, if we look at the statistics in one of the name collision reports we released the first one [inaudible], you could see that strings like home, [corp], and mail, they were having a very high number of collisions in the root zone, and probably still have. So I think by preventing those high risk strings to be delegated, a good number of name collision issues were prevented.

But I see your point that is complicated to prove the negative in this case. Another point that I can present is in regards to the name collision

reports we have received. We have some cases, for example, one where a school district in the UK had, I think the number was around 15 [inaudible] systems that were affected by a name collision issue.

There was one of the cases where we work close with them, with both the registry to find a solution. At the end, of course, when you have a name collision like this, what needs to happen is the [inaudible] name collision is to change their network configuration, because it should not be used a TLD and in that they don't have control over it.

Not just because of name collision issues, it's just by the end of first place. Unfortunately, the idea is very common. We have a few cases like those, where organizations had impact on the number of [inaudible] systems that were impacted, and they have to quickly take action to fix those issues in their systems.

So I think that we have evidence that the name collision issue is real. We are, of course, lacking evidence on the other measures that we put in place like avoiding those three strings to be delegated, and [inaudible] interruption measure, by the way we made to work. We have no way to know how many people were actually able to see that, that measure in action and did something to fix their configuration without necessarily contacting ICANN about it.

And so I agree, it's a hard problem to find the evidence that things like this have worked. Like we have some data point to that the measures we have in place provide some help in this issue.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Thanks Francisco, thanks for the answer. And that may be all we're able to do. I mean obviously, I'm going back and forth with Jamie in the chat about some of the more extreme claims that were made, but in a basic trust issue, there is probably evidence to support that there was a high risk of an erosion of trust associated with not having put the protections in place that we did.

So I mean, that may be another way of looking at it, that there is at least evidence that there would have been a lot of end user, [inaudible] about the new gTLDs, had these protections not been put in place.

JAMIE:

This is Jamie. And the, absolutely. I think this is one of the huge successes of the program, or could be looked like that. And issue was identified, community quickly came together to find a solution. Some of the evidence, Francisco correct me if I'm wrong, but some of the evidence was the amount of leakage from private enterprise networks into the public DNS.

And you, there may... Maybe there is some way of, at least with the ones with home, [corp] and mail, of, you know, providing a narrative about what could have happened had those domains, have those TLDs been delegated, and the confusion that might have arisen. That might be easier than something that's not, you know, not one of those. That

did have some, you know, some risk, but with the measures, there wasn't the kind of collision that we were concerned about.

FRANCISCO ARIAS:

Yes, on the other issue that I forgot to mention, in response to Jonathan's question, is a measure to [inaudible] certificate authorities, [inaudible] period of [inaudible] of names. That is another one that I has also has helped. The CAs have been revoking those certificates, so that have certainly prevented issues, issues that have not come to appear in the interim thanks to that measure.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay. Well thank you, once again, Francisco for this information, and walking us through some of the issues here. And also the good discussion that we've had. So now, we have about eight minutes for our presentations, which I don't think is going to be sufficient time for both of them.

So I'm going to ask either Drew or Carlos, if either of you is able to give what you intended to present within our now seven minute time period. If not, we can push this to the next meeting, but I at least wanted to offer the opportunity for one of you to move forward.

DREW:

This is Drew, I think mine, and I don't want to speak for Carlos, I think mine, just because [inaudible] shorter, could go quicker and go in this timeslot. But I definitely don't want to imply that Carlos had a super long presentation planned if he didn't.

**CARLOS:** 

Go ahead Drew, go ahead. But I would like to speak 10 seconds at the end, because mine relates to a little bit to the discussion Jamie and Jonathan had, or I will write an email on that one. No problem. Go ahead, please, thank you.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Okay great. Take it away Drew.

DREW:

Great. I'll do a quick presentation. So hopefully everyone had a chance to glance at the report. This is something that I worked on, with the secure domain in terms of [inaudible] secure domain foundation, and I presented this report last summer in Buenos Aires, so I passed around the PowerPoint from that, and I'm going to go through that PowerPoint right now, if anyone wants to follow along, but I'll tailor the presentation for the purposes of this discussion.

So this report was based off of surveys that were conducted with registrars, registries, and hosting companies, and most of the input and participation ended up coming from registrars. So that was what the report was tailored for, but the research set out to determine what the business costs were for domain name abuse, for internet infrastructure providers in general.

And like I said, in the end, it ended up being more tailored toward registrars. And the second main research question was asking whether or not there were differences between proactive anti-abuse and

reactive anti-abuse, in terms of these costs. For the research methodology, the survey, which if anyone is interested, I can circulate the questions to the group, but the survey included open-ended questions and allowed for pre-responses, because the purpose of this report was to just get as much information as possible about the individual experiences of the different internet infrastructure providers.

And then, as you can see, then the initial few pages of the report, we also looked at what incentives effected behavior with regard to antiabuse measures that would be employed by these different parties. And so what was found in both those surveys, as well as the secondary research conducted, was that registrars definitely tailor their anti-abuse policies based upon legal pressures, of course, as well as, and that would be with regard to...

In the context of this discussion, with regard to some of the safeguards in place, such as the 2013 RAA. And as well as, some of them do care about reputational incentives, an issue that we discussed in this group in terms of keeping our clean TLD, or as a registrar, being perceived as being a registrar that, you know, is reliable and reputable, and isn't in trouble with law enforcement and other groups.

And in addition, there are financial pressures that effect the ways in which these entities will tailor their anti-abuse programs, because at the end of the day, registrars in particular don't want credit card chargebacks that will result after they have domain name takedowns, if those domain names use fraudulent credit cards or engage in some other sort of fraud.

And so all of this together, I think, just in terms of studying up what this report shows, I think could help us in terms of what we look like at, with the ways in which incentives have been created through these new safeguards that might have effect consumer trust, and effect what sort of abuse issues exist or don't exist, in any new TLDs.

This report focused on about 12% of the total domain name market. And the key findings with regard to the questions that this set out to look out, which are a little different than what we're looking at as a group, were that bad customers were bad for business because of the added cost that this created in terms of anti-abuse efforts. And that pro-active anti-abuse could lower the number of abuse complaints, and actually save money for the businesses.

And so that's something that I think might be pertinent to us as we're looking at whether or not larger registrars that might have more resources have more robust anti-abuse programs and may be less capable than anti-abuse because they're looking at economies of scale and carrying about the ways in which domain name abuse complaints can actually effect the bottom line, or maybe that wouldn't be the case.

But I think that's something we might want to consider in terms of how we look at our, how we shape our research at least. And in terms of questions we might add to any surveys we actually do with registrars and registries, we might want to look at putting some questions related to some of this.

And then another key finding for this report that was that reactive antiabuse, the main reason why it can cost more money is because of the

labor cost associated with paying the salaries of the staff members that have to respond to anti-abuse complaints.

And some of the respondents for the survey, specifically cited the 2013 RAA as increasing their operational costs because of the, because in section 3.18, and they also talked about the WHOIS verifications they had to conduct. I know I only have one more minute to speak, so I just think something that this report, could in fact, inform are the ways in which we shape questions going forward when we ask surveys about how these safeguards are actually being implemented.

And we look at maybe the degrees to which different sized registrars maybe [inaudible] safeguards they are, if in fact, these are costly, and the effect that that may have on abuse. So I think there is a lot of variables at hand here. And now I see, I was not able to finish my presentation in the allotted amount of time, so I'll speak more next week. I want to give Carlos his 10 seconds.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Thank you Drew. We will put you on the list to finish up next week, because I also want to give folks an opportunity to ask your questions. Carlos, you have 10 seconds starting now.

**CARLOS:** 

I took note from the conversation that Jamie and Jonathan had on the definition of trust erosion, and when I present the abuse report, I will add address and focus on a clear, the limitation of these terms. That was my 10 seconds. Thank you very much.

LAUREEN KAPIN:

Terrific. Okay, well we are at the end of our time. In fact, we are even a tiny bit over. But I want to thank everyone for participating in the call. I'll send around a revised schedule for the presentations, since we're going to adjust now to what remains to be done, and I'll also open the window once more, if you are unhappy with your assignment, you'd rather be doing something else, now is the time to communicate with me before I send out my revised timetable, which I will do by the end of the day.

So while it's on your mind, if there is any issue with the presentations, let me know now and I'll adjust, but with that, I will thank everyone for participating today. And a special thank you for our great support from the ICANN folks in getting what we need, and making sure we have all of our materials, and that seems to run so seamlessly. I really appreciate it.

Okey-dokey. Any other comments or questions?

CARLOS: Thanks Laureen.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]