## Glossary

See also https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/glossary-2014-02-03-en.

| ADVISORY <br> COMMITTEE (AC) | An Advisory Committee ("AC") is a formal advisory body made up of representatives from the Internet community to advise ICANN on a particular issue or policy area. Several Advisory Committees are mandated by the ICANN Bylaws and others may be created as needed. Advisory Committees currently have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but report their findings and make recommendations to the ICANN Board. <br> See also: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylawsen/\#XI. |
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| AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS (AoC) | The Affirmation of Commitments ("AoC") is the 2009 agreement between ICANN and the NTIA under which ICANN reaffirmed its commitment to accountability and transparency, DNS security and stability, competition and consumer choice, international participation, periodic community reviews, and related activities. As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, ICANN's commitments under the AoC and the AoC Reviews will be incorporated into the ICANN Bylaws, and the AoC itself will be terminated. |
| AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS REVIEWS (AoC REVIEWS) | The AoC Reviews are periodic community reviews required under the AoC to assess and report on ICANN's progress toward 1) ensuring accountability and transparency (see ATR below), 2) preserving security, stability and resiliency of the DNS, 3) promoting competition, consumer trust and consumer choice, and 4) enforcing WHOIS policy. As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, the AoC Reviews will be incorporated into the ICANN Bylaws. |
| AT-LARGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (ALAC) | The At-Large Advisory Committee ("ALAC") is a body within the ICANN structure responsible for considering and providing advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users (the "At-Large" community). Following the IANA Stewardship Transition, ALAC will participate as a Decisional Participant in the Empowered Community. <br> See also: http://www.atlarge.icann.org/. |
| ADDRESS SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION | The Address Supporting Organization ("ASO") advises the ICANN Board of Directors on policy issues relating to the allocation and management of IP addresses. Following the IANA Stewardship Transition, the ASO |


| (ASO) | will participate as a Decisional Participant in the Empowered Community. <br> See also: https://aso.icann.org/. |
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| ACCOUNTABILITY AND <br> TRANSPARENCY REVIEW (ATR) | The Accountability and Transparency Review ("ATR") is a periodic review required under the AoC to assess and report on ICANN's progress toward ensuring accountability and transparency and to provide recommendations to enhance accountability and transparency activities throughout ICANN. As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, the ATR and the other AoC Reviews will be incorporated into the ICANN Bylaws. |
| ACCOUNTABILITY AND <br> TRANSPARENCY REVIEW TEAM (ATRT) | Each Accountability and Transparency Review is carried out by an Accountability and Transparency Review Team ("ATRT"). |
| BOARD GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE (BGC) | The Board Governance Committee ("BGC") is an ICANN Board committee currently responsible for conducting periodic evaluations of the performance of the ICANN Board and each of its members. |
| BOTTOM-UP PROCESS | A fundamental principle of ICANN's decision-making process is that policy analysis and decisions progress from a stakeholder level (made up of directly affected parties, Internet users, companies and anyone else who wishes to participate in the process) to the ICANN Board level. This "bottom-up process" provides the opportunity for open and equal participation at all levels, as practical and possible. |
| COUNTRY-CODE NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION (ccNSO) | The Country-Code Names Supporting Organization ("ccNSO") is a body within the ICANN structure created for and by ccTLD managers. The ccNSO provides a forum for ccTLD managers to meet and discuss topical issues of concern to ccTLDs from a global perspective. The ccNSO provides a platform to nurture consensus, technical cooperation and skill building among ccTLDs and facilitates the development of voluntary best practices for ccTLD managers. It is also responsible for developing and recommending global policies to the ICANN Board for a limited set of issues relating to ccTLDs, such as the introduction of Internationalized Domain Name ccTLDs ("IDN ccTLDs"). Membership in the ccNSO is open to all ccTLD managers responsible for managing an International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") 3166 ccTLD. Following the IANA Stewardship Transition, the ccNSO will participate as a Decisional Participant in the Empowered Community. |


|  | See also: http://ccnso.icann.org/. |
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| COUNTRY CODE TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN (ccTLD) | A country code top-level domain ("ccTLD") is an Internet top-level domain generally used or reserved for a country, a sovereign state, or a dependent territory. <br> See also: http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld.htm. |
| CROSS COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP ON ENHANCING ICANN ACCOUNTABILITY (CCWG-ACCOUNT ABILITY) | The Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability ("CCWG-Accountability") was convened to design a proposal that ensures that ICANN's accountability and transparency commitments to the global Internet community are maintained and enhanced following the transition of the U.S. Government's stewardship of the IANA functions. <br> See also: <br> https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhanci ng+ICANN+Accountability. |
| COMMUNITY POWERS | As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, the following seven Community Powers will be vested in the Empowered Community, through Fundamental Bylaws, to enable the multi-stakeholder Internet community to hold ICANN accountable for its actions (or failure to act): <br> - The power to reject ICANN budgets, IANA budgets or ICANN strategic/operating plans; <br> - The power to reject changes to ICANN's Standard Bylaws; <br> - The power to approve changes to ICANN's Fundamental Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation, and to approve ICANN's sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of ICANN's assets; <br> - The power to appoint and remove individual ICANN Board Directors; <br> - The power to recall the entire ICANN Board of Directors; <br> - The power to launch a binding community IRP or a non-binding Request for Reconsideration; and <br> - The power to reject ICANN Board decisions relating to reviews of the IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process for the IANA naming functions. |
| COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT PROCESS | As specified in Article IV, Section 3, of the ICANN Bylaws, prior to initiating an IRP, the complainant is urged to enter into a period of cooperative engagement with ICANN for the purpose of resolving or narrowing the issues that are contemplated to be brought before the IRP Panel. It is contemplated that this "cooperative engagement process" will be initiated prior to the requesting party incurring any costs in the |

$\left.\begin{array}{|l|l|}\hline & \begin{array}{l}\text { preparation of a request for independent review. Cooperative } \\ \text { engagement is expected to be between ICANN and the requesting party, } \\ \text { without the participation of legal counsel. } \\ \text { See also: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cep-11apr13- } \\ \text { en.pdf. }\end{array} \\ \hline \text { CONSENSUS } & \begin{array}{l}\text { Consensus is a form of decision-making employed by various SOs } \\ \text { within ICANN. The method for establishing whether a "consensus" has } \\ \text { been reached may differ among SOs. For example, the following method } \\ \text { is used in the GNSO: } \\ \text { "Full consensus" - when no one in the group speaks against the } \\ \text { recommendation in its last readings. This is also sometimes referred to } \\ \text { as Unanimous Consensus. }\end{array} \\ \text { "Consensus" - when only a small minority disagrees, but most agree. } \\ \text { When the GAC provides consensus advice to the ICANN Board this is } \\ \text { understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general } \\ \text { agreement in the absence of any formal objection. }\end{array}\right\}$

| FUNCTIONS (CWG- <br> STEWARDSHIP) |  |
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| DECISIONAL <br> PARTICIPANTS | Following the IANA Stewardship Transition, the following five ICANN <br> SOs and ACs will participate as the Decisional Participants in the <br> Empowered Community: ALAC, ASO, ccNSO, GNSO and GAC (if the <br> GAC chooses to do so). The Empowered Community will act at the <br> direction of its Decisional Participants to exercise and enforce the <br> Community Powers vested in the multi-stakeholder Internet community <br> as part of the transition of the NTIA's stewardship of the IANA functions. <br> The GAC, however, will not be able to participate as a decision-maker in <br> the Empowered Community's exercise of a Community Power to <br> challenge a decision by the ICANN Board to implement GAC consensus <br> advice. In such cases, the GAC will still be able to participate in an <br> advisory capacity in the other aspects of the escalation process, but not <br> as a decision-maker. |
| DIRECTORS | ICANN's Board Directors are natural persons who direct the activities <br> and affairs of ICANN as a California nonprofit public benefit corporation <br> and have fiduciary duties with respect to exercise of corporate power. <br> Directors are distinguished from observers and liaisons, who can attend <br> ICANN Board meetings but cannot vote. <br> See also: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws- <br> en/\#VI. |
| EMPOWERED | Ihe |
| COMMUNITY | The Empowered Community will be formed as a California <br> unincorporated association through the ICANN Bylaws and will have the <br> power as the sole designator under California law to appoint and remove <br> individual Directors or to recall the entire Board of Directors and take |
| DOCUMENTARY |  |
| INFORMATION |  |
| DISCLOSURE |  |
| POLICY (DIDP) | ICANN's Documentary Information Disclosure Policy ("DIDP") is <br> intended to ensure that information contained in documents concerning <br> ICANN's operational activities, and within ICANN's possession, custody, <br> or control, is made available to the public unless there is a compelling <br> reason for confidentiality. A principal element of ICANN's approach to <br> transparency and information disclosure is the identification of a <br> comprehensive set of materials that ICANN makes available on its <br> website as a matter of course. |
| SYSTEM |  |
| (DNS) |  |


|  | other action as directed by the community to enforce Community <br> Powers. The Empowered Community and the rules by which it will be <br> governed will be constituted in ICANN's Fundamental Bylaws. |
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| ICANN FIVE-YEAR <br> OPERATING PLAN | ICANN's Five-Year Operating Plan is a means of planning and executing <br> portfolios of ICANN activities that align with the strategic objectives and <br> goals articulated in ICANN's Five-Year Strategic Plan. This operating <br> plan links strategic objectives and goals with ICANN's Annual Operating <br> Plan and Budget, setting out planned outcomes (key success factors), <br> means of measuring progress (key performance indicators), operational <br> risks, dependencies and resources needed to accomplish goals. |
| ICANN FIVE-YEAR | ICANN's Five-Year Strategic Plan articulates ICANN's vision and long- <br> term strategic goals, which are developed through a collaborative, <br> bottom-up, multistakeholder process. |
| FTRATEGIC PLANDAMENTAL | As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, ICANN's Bylaws will be |
| BYLAWS |  |
| classified as either Standard Bylaws or Fundamental Bylaws. The |  |
| Fundamental Bylaws will be those Bylaws that are integral to ICANN's |  |
| organization, purpose and accountability to the global Internet |  |
| community. As such, the threshold of Board approval required for |  |
| changes to Fundamental Bylaws will be higher than that required for |  |
| changes to Standard Bylaws. If the ICANN Board proposes any change |  |
| to the Fundamental Bylaws, the proposal will require approval from |  |
| three-fourths (3/4) of all of the Directors on the Board and the affirmative |  |
| consent of the Empowered Community in order for the change to take |  |
| legal effect. |  |


| GENERIC NAMES <br> SUPPORTING <br> ORGANIZATION <br> (GNSO) | The Generic Names Supporting Organization ("GNSO") is the successor <br> to the responsibilities of the Domain Name Supporting Organization <br> ("DNSO") that relate to the generic top-level domains. The GNSO has <br> six constituencies, as follows: the commercial and business <br> constituency, the gTLD registry constituency, the Internet service <br> provider constituency, the non-commercial users constituency, the <br> registrar's constituency, and the IP constituency. Following the IANA <br> Stewardship Transition, the GNSO will participate as a Decisional <br> Participant in the Empowered Community. <br> See also: http://gnso.icann.org/en/. |
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| GENERIC TOP- <br> LEVEL DOMAIN <br> (gTLD) | A generic top-level domain ("gTLD") is one of the categories of TLDs <br> maintained by the IANA department of ICANN for use in the Domain <br> Name System of the Internet. It is visible to Internet users as the suffix at <br> the end of a domain name. |
| INTERNET <br> ASSIGNED <br> NUMBERS <br> AUTHORITY <br> (IANA) | ICANN has been performing the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority <br> ("IANA") functions on behalf of the global Internet community since <br> 1998. The IANA functions include the maintenance of the registry of <br> technical Internet protocol parameters, the administration of certain <br> responsibilities associated with Internet DNS root zone, and the <br> allocation of Internet numbering resources. See also: <br> http://www.iana.org/. |
| IANA FUNCTIONS | The IANA Functions Budget is currently part of ICANN's Annual <br> Operating Plan and Budget. As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, <br> the IANA Functions Budget will be prepared and considered as a <br> separate ICANN budget. |
| IANA FUNCTIONS | As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, ICANN will enter into an <br> IANA Functions Contract including a Statement of Work with PTI <br> pursuant to which PTI will perform the IANA naming functions. |
| BUDGET |  |

$\left.\begin{array}{|l|l|}\hline \text { IANA } & \begin{array}{l}\text { The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group ("ICG") was } \\ \text { frewned to coordinate the development of a proposal among the }\end{array} \\ \text { fRANSITION } \\ \text { COORDINATION } \\ \text { communities affected by the transition of NTIA's stewardship of the IANA } \\ \text { functions. The creation of the ICG was initiated and facilitated by ICANN, } \\ \text { and the membership of the ICG has been defined by the Internet } \\ \text { communities participating in it. The group's sole deliverable is a proposal } \\ \text { to the NTIA recommending a transition plan of NTIA's stewardship of the } \\ \text { IANA functions to the global Internet community, consistent with the key } \\ \text { principles outlined in the NTIA announcement on March 14, 2014. } \\ \text { See also: https://www.icann.org/en/stewardship/. }\end{array}\right\}$

| ICANN |  |
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| ARTICLES OF |  |
| INCORPORATION | ICANN's Articles of Incorporation are the instrument under which ICANN <br> was incorporated as a California nonprofit public benefit corporation. <br> They define fundamental aspects of ICANN's organization and purpose <br> and are ICANN's highest-level governing document. As such, following <br> the IANA Stewardship Transition, the threshold of Board and <br> Empowered Community approval required for changes to ICANN's <br> Articles of Incorporation will be the same as that required for changes to <br> Fundamental Bylaws. |
| ICANN BYLAWS | Subject to ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and applicable law, <br> ICANN's Bylaws define the framework and rules for governance and <br> operations within ICANN. As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, <br> ICANN's Bylaws will be classified as either Standard Bylaws or <br> Fundamental Bylaws. The threshold of Board approval required for <br> changes to the Fundamental Bylaws will be higher than the threshold of <br> approval required for changes to the Standard Bylaws, and any <br> proposed changes to Fundamental Bylaws will also require the approval <br> of the Empowered Community for the change to take legal effect. <br> Following Board approval of a change to the Standard Bylaws, the <br> Empowered Community will have an opportunity to reject the change <br> before it takes legal effect. Public consultations will be required on all <br> proposed changes to ICANN Bylaws (Standard or Fundamental). |
| COMMUNITY | Following the IANA Stewardship Transition, to exercise and enforce <br> Community Powers, the Empowered Community will first need to satisfy <br> the appropriate escalation process for the particular Community Power. |
| A Community Forum for interested stakeholders will be a component of |  |
| the escalation process for the Community Powers (except with respect |  |
| to the power to appoint Directors and the power to remove certain |  |
| individual Directors). This discussion phase will provide a forum for the |  |
| petitioning Decisional Participant(s) to share the rationale for, and |  |
| answer questions about, the proposed use of a Community Power, and |  |
| the discussion and information sharing among interested stakeholders |  |
| will help the Empowered Community reach well-considered conclusions |  |
| about exercising its new powers. |  |


| (IRP) | Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As part of the IANA Stewardship <br> Transition, the existing IRP will be strengthened to ensure that it is more <br> accessible and transparent, and the scope of the IRP will be expanded <br> to include claims relating to ICANN staff actions/inaction, certain PTI <br> actions/inaction, expert panel decisions and DIDP decisions. The IRP <br> Panel will also hear claims initiated by the Empowered Community with <br> respect to matters reserved to the Empowered Community in ICANN's <br> Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. IRP Panel decisions will be binding <br> and enforceable in any court that recognizes international arbitration <br> results. These enhancements to the IRP will be set forth in ICANN's <br> Fundamental Bylaws. |
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| INDEPENDENT | The Independent Review Process Panel ("IRP Panel") is an independent <br> standing judicial/arbitral panel charged with reviewing and resolving <br> claims brought by affected parties through the IRP. |
| PANEL (IRP |  |

$\left.\begin{array}{|l|l|}\hline \begin{array}{l}\text { NOMINATING } \\ \text { COMMITTEE } \\ \text { (NOMCOM) }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { The Nominating Committee ("NomCom") is an independent ICANN } \\ \text { committee tasked with selecting eight members of the ICANN Board of } \\ \text { Directors, five members of the ALAC, three members of the GNSO, and } \\ \text { three members of the ccNSO. } \\ \text { See also: } \text { https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/nomcom-2013-12-13- } \\ \text { en. }\end{array} \\ \hline \begin{array}{l}\text { U.S. DEPARTMENT } \\ \text { OF COMMERCE } \\ \text { NATIONAL } \\ \text { TELECOMMUN- } \\ \text { ICATIONS AND } \\ \text { INFORMATION } \\ \text { ADMINISTRATION } \\ \text { (NTIA) }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { The U.S. Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and } \\ \text { Information Administration ("NTIA") is the Executive Branch agency that } \\ \text { is principally responsible for advising the President of the United States } \\ \text { on telecommunications and information policy issues. NTIA maintains a } \\ \text { contract with ICANN for the technical coordination of the Internet's } \\ \text { domain name and addressing system. In March 2014, NTIA announced } \\ \text { its intent to transition out of its contractual role with respect to the IANA } \\ \text { functions and requested proposals from the ICANN multistakeholder } \\ \text { community for that transition. } \\ \text { See also: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/. }\end{array} \\ \hline \text { OMBUDSMAN } & \begin{array}{l}\text { The ICANN Ombudsman investigates and addresses complaints } \\ \text { brought by members of the ICANN community who believe that the } \\ \text { ICANN Board, staff or an ICANN constituent body has treated them } \\ \text { unfairly. The Ombudsman must maintain neutrality and independence } \\ \text { and facilitate fair, impartial and timely resolution of community } \\ \text { complaints . See also: } \\ \text { https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en. }\end{array} \\ \hline \text { REGIONAL AT- } & \begin{array}{l}\text { The At-Large community is structured into five Regional At-Large }\end{array} \\ \text { Organizations ("RALOs"). These organizations serve as the } \\ \text { communication forum and coordination point to promote and assure the }\end{array}\right\}$

| (RALOs) | participation of regional Internet user communities within ICANN activities as well as enhance knowledge and capacity building. |
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| RECONSIDERATION PROCESS | The Reconsideration Process is an internal ICANN appeals mechanism through which affected parties may request that certain actions or inaction of the ICANN Board of Directors or staff be submitted to the ICANN Board for review or reconsideration. As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, there will be several enhancements to the Reconsideration Process including expanding the scope of permissible Requests for Reconsideration and extending the time period during which an affected party may file a Request for Reconsideration . |
| REGISTRAR | Domain names ending with .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, .org, and .pro can be registered through many different companies (known as "registrars") that compete with one another. A listing of the registrars that have been accredited by ICANN appears in the Directory of ICANN-Accredited Registrars(https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html). |
| REGISTRY | A "registry" is the authoritative, master database of all domain names registered in each Top-Level Domain. The registry operator keeps the master database and also generates the "zone file" which allows computers to route Internet traffic to and from TLDs anywhere in the world. Internet users don't interact directly with the registry operator; users can register names in TLDs including .biz, .com, .info, .net, .name, .org by using an ICANN-accredited registrar. |
| REVIEW MECHANISM | A "review mechanism" is a process to assess how a decision or policy is being put in place. ICANN has a series of review mechanisms mandated in its Bylaws to ensure its accountability and transparency. |
| REGIONAL INTERNET REGISTRY (RIR) | There are currently five Regional Internet Registries ("RIRs"): AfriNIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC and RIPE NCC. These not-for-profit organizations are responsible for distributing and managing IP addresses on a regional level to Internet service providers and local registries. |
| ROOT SERVERS | The "root servers" contain the IP addresses of all the TLD registries both the global registries such as .com, .org, etc. and the 244 countryspecific registries such as .fr (France), .cn (China), etc. This is critical information. If the information is not $100 \%$ correct or if it is ambiguous, it might not be possible to locate a key registry on the Internet. In DNS parlance, the information must be unique and authentic. |
| ROOT SERVER SYSTEM | The Root Server System Advisory Committee ("RSSAC") advises the ICANN community and the ICANN Board on matters relating to the |


| ADVISORY COMMITTEE (RSSAC) | operation, administration, security, and integrity of the Internet's root server system. <br> See also: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/rssac-4c-2012-02-25en. |
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| ROOT ZONE | The "root zone" is the central directory for the DNS, which is a key component in translating readable host names into numeric IP addresses. <br> See also: www.iana.org/domains/root/files. |
| SEPARATION PROCESS | A "separation process" means any process pursuant to which PTI may or will cease to perform the IANA naming functions under the IANA Functions Contract. |
| SPECIAL IFR | Following the IANA Stewardship Transition, Special IFRs may be initiated outside of the cycle for regular periodic IFRs to address certain deficiencies or issues relating to the performance of the IANA naming functions when the prescribed escalation mechanisms have been exhausted. The procedures for Special IFRs will be set forth in ICANN's Fundamental Bylaws. |
| SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS (SOs) | The Supporting Organizations ("SOs") are the three specialized policy developments bodies that currently provide the ICANN Board of Directors with policy recommendations on issues relating to domain names (GNSO and ccNSO) and IP addresses (ASO). |
| SPONSOR | A Sponsor is an organization which is delegated some defined ongoing policy-formulation authority regarding the manner in which a particular sponsored TLD is operated. The sponsored TLD has a charter, which defines the purpose for which the sponsored TLD has been created and will be operated. The Sponsor is responsible for developing policies on the delegated topics so that the TLD is operated for the benefit of a defined group of stakeholders, known as the Sponsored TLD Community, that are most directly interested in the operation of the TLD. The Sponsor also is responsible for selecting the registry operator and to varying degrees for establishing the roles played by registrars and their relationship with the registry operator. The Sponsor must exercise its delegated authority according to fairness standards and in a manner that is representative of the Sponsored TLD Community. |
| SECURITY AND STABILITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SSAC) | The Security and Stability Advisory Committee ("SSAC") is the President's standing committee on the security and stability of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems. Their charter includes a focus on risk analysis and auditing. SSAC consists of approximately 20 technical experts from industry and academia as well as operators of |


|  | Internet root servers, registrars, and TLD registries. <br> See also: https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac. |
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| STAKEHOLDER | A "stakeholder" is any individual or group affected by the actions of <br> ICANN. Stakeholders at ICANN include ccTLD registries; gTLD <br> registries and registrars; regional Internet registries who manage the <br> regional distribution of Internet number resources including IP address <br> and Autonomous System Numbers; the thirteen root name server <br> operators; commercial interests, including those representing large and <br> small businesses, intellectual property interests and providers of Internet <br> and other communications services; non-commercial interests, including <br> non-commercial users and not-for-profit organizations; governmental <br> interests, including national governments, multi-national governmental <br> organizations and treaty organizations, and distinct economies; technical <br> experts from industry and academia; and Internet users worldwide. |
| STAKEHOLDER | ICANN "stakeholder groups" represent a wide variety of individuals that <br> compose the ICANN community. Stakeholder groups function as <br> caucuses and are intended to facilitate the creation of new <br> constituencies as well as self-growth and expansion. |
| SROUPS | As part of the IANA Stewardship Transition, ICANN's Bylaws will be <br> classified as either Standard Bylaws or Fundamental Bylaws. The <br> threshold of Board approval required for changes to Fundamental <br> Bylaws will be higher than that required for changes to Standard Bylaws. <br> If the ICANN Board proposes any change to the Standard Bylaws, the <br> proposal will require approval from two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Directors <br> on the Board. Following Board approval, the Empowered Community <br> will have an opportunity to reject a change to the Standard Bylaws <br> before the change takes legal effect. |
| BYLAWS |  |


| WORK STREAMS | CCWG-Accountability Work Stream 1 (WS1) has focused on <br> (WS) <br> mechanisms to enhance ICANN accountability that must be in place or <br> committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition. <br> Work Stream 2 (WS2) is focused on addressing accountability topics for <br> which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may <br> extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition. |
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