

1 Stress Test #35: (NTIA-4) Unintended consequences of “operationalizing” groups that formerly only gave advice to the ICANN board. (for example, the GAC)	
2 Consequence(s): An AC that previously gave only advice on a narrow scope of issues could affect voting on community powers that extend beyond that narrow scope.	
EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES	PROPOSED ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES
<p>3 Advisory Committees (ACs) have no community powers or voting rights under ICANN’s Bylaws.</p> <p>4 That said, ICANN has given significant deference to GAC advice in the new gTLD program, resulting in significant effects on operations for new gTLD registries and registrars.</p>	<p>5 In the true spirit of ICANN’s multistakeholder model, CCWG proposes inviting all AC/SOs to exercise community powers.</p> <p>6 While an AC such as the GAC could expand its scope of influence by voting on community powers, there are several ways that CCWG proposed to reduce GAC’s ability to affect ICANN operations:</p> <p>7 Per Stress Test 18 and the proposed Bylaws change, GAC advice would obligate ICANN to try to “find a mutually acceptable solution” only when the GAC provides consensus advice.</p> <p>8 In Core Values, we say the Private Sector leads the multistakeholder process.</p> <p>9 In Core Values, we restrict ICANN’s scope of activities.</p> <p>10 For the Affirmation of Commitments reviews, the GAC Chair would no longer approve/appoint review team members.</p> <p>11 The new IRP gives community ability to overturn a Board decision to accept GAC advice that goes against the Mission and Core Values in the amended bylaws.</p>
CONCLUSIONS:	
12 Existing accountability measures have already given advisory committees significant influence over ICANN operations.	13 Proposed accountability measures would treat ACs as multi-equal stakeholders in exercising community powers, while also reducing the GAC’s ability to affect ICANN operations.