GISELLA GRUBER:	Carlos Vera has joined us on the Spanish channel. Then hand it over to you.
ALAN GREENBERG:	Then why don't we do that?
GISELLA GRUBER:	Fantastic. We're just going to get the recording started now in English, French, and Spanish. Thank you. Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to everyone. Welcome to the At-Large Capacity Building Program 2015 webinar on the topic of Input of At-Large into the Transition/Accountability Process.

GISELLA GRUBER (cont.):

Today is Monday, the 28th of September 13:00 UTC. We have English, French, and Spanish on this call. If I could please also remind everyone to state their names when speaking, not only for transcript purposes, but also to allow the interpreters to identify you on the other language channels.

Also, if I may ask you to please speak at a reasonable speed to allow for accurate interpretation.

There is no roll call, as this is a webinar, but we will be noting people's presence on the meeting page.

I'll now hand it over to Ariel Liang to give us a few housekeeping updates. Thank you. Over to you, Ariel.

ARIEL LIANG: Thanks very much, Gisella. As you probably noticed, we have a different layout in the Adobe Connect room. We're using two new pods in the Adobe Connect room. Now you can see on your red bottom corner there is a pod called Q&A. If you have questions during the webinar, you are encouraged to type your question in that pod, so that staff can take notice of that and can communicate that to our speaker. All of the questions will be addressed at the end of the webinar. If there's not enough time to answer all of the questions, the questions will be sent to the speakers and then they will try to answer them in writing and then we will post them on the webinar's wiki page. That's in the bottom-right corner, the Q&A.

The next new pod is called poll pod and that's going to be used for evaluation of the webinar. We will do all the evaluation on the spot at the end of the webinar. There are only five questions and they're all multiple choice, so we'll go through them really quickly within two minutes or less. Please stay around a little bit after the webinar to complete the evaluation. Your feedback is key for us to develop better webinars catering to your needs in the future.

That's all the housekeeping notes. By the way, Gisella will share the evaluation questions at the end. Thank you, and over to Olivier?

ALAN GREENBERG: No, over to Alan.

ARIEL LIANG: Over to Alan, okay. Alan, please?

ALAN GREENBERG: But just for a moment. It's Alan Greenberg. As most of you, I presume, know I'm chair of the ALAC. It's my pleasure to welcome you to this webinar. The purpose of this webinar is to try to get people up-to-date on where we are on the various aspects and activities that are related to the IANA transition.

The two main parts we'll be talking about today are the ALAC submission to the ICG, the coordinating group that is overseeing the actual transition plan itself, and Olivier will be going over the ALAC input and perhaps – I'm not sure – the current status of affairs in that group or with that group.

Then it will be turned back over to me on to accountability. The ALAC has submitted a rather extensive comment into the accountability and we have just finished two days. To call it an intensive meeting is not quite reflecting how the meeting went, but a two-day meeting in Los Angeles on accountability. I'll be talking about that at the end of my presentation. I will also be asking – but I'll defer until I get there – how many people have attended the ALAC Comment Accountability webinar we had a month ago on the 27th of August, because there's a fair amount of overlap. To the extent that many of the people might have already seen that, I'll go at a different speed. But I'll ask that question when the session is turned back over to me as a presenter.

We have Olivier Crepin-LeBlond right now who will be talking about the IANA transition. Olivier, it's all yours.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Alan. Just first checking whether you are all able to hear me.

ALAN GREENBERG: This all can.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay, perfect. IANA stewardship and ICANN accountability ALAC positions. We're going to start today with the IANA stewardship transition. I thought it would be important to start with that because a big part of the IANA stewardship will actually depend on the work that the ICANN accountability is going to do or is doing at the moment.

First, I thought I would let you know a little bit about the proposal itself of the IANA Stewardship Working Group, and then feed into the questions and comments that the ALAC has fed into the system for the past few months. I'll try and go quickly through this because I think that we probably have to discuss a lot more the ICANN accountability work that is currently still taking place. As Alan told you, there's been a lot of work taking place in the past weekend.

Let's go to the first slide. I hear that I've got the ability to scroll forward. Yes, I do. It works. Excellent.

The first thing is to look a little bit about a system that has been in operation until now. The stewardship is all about contracts to start with where before the transition – so the current status, the current contract is such… Let's see if I can have a little green arrow here. The current contract is such that it is possible that at the moment the NTIA – the US government, effectively – has a contract with ICANN to run the IANA functions, and ICANN is the IANA functions operator. And the oversight of this contract and making sure that all these functions are carried out properly is also undertaken by the US government.

With the US government going away, the working group tried to explore several avenues and still went on the idea that there would be a need for a contract. In this case, the contract would be actually taking place between ICANN and between an entity that would be a wholly owned subsidiary of ICANN called Post Transition IANA – PTI for short.

Additional numbers of bodies would be created. Bodies that are not different entities that have different legal standing, but entities that were mostly part of the ICANN community. We've got an IANA Functions Review Team. We've got a Customer Standing Committee. We have also customers of IANA. Here we are looking just at the registries, the registrars as far as the names are concerned, the Regional Internet Registries as far as the numbers are concerned, and the Internet Engineering Task Force as far as the protocols are concerned. These are the customers that would be feeding into post transition IANA.

Outside of this, you can see another little box here, which is the accountability mechanisms that would be coming out of the CCWG accountability and that would make sure that the overall system post transition is accountable. Accountable to whom, accountable to what? That I'll leave over to Alan to answer after this. So that's where we are.

Current contract and post transition is what will happen after the US government gives its green light and says that the plan are working and should be implementable.

Let's look a little bit at the different component parts quickly. First the post transition IANA. That's established to basically run all of the existing IANA functions. As you know – I just noted it – there are three customers, three operational communities (the names, the numbers, and the protocols). So far, only the names have decided to move forward and deal directly with post transition IANA. The numbers and the protocols would be dealing or would be having [inaudible] contract with ICANN and ICANN would subcontract that work over to post transition IANA. There hasn't been any problem associated with this. Everyone is okay with that.

The idea with having a post transition IANA and not keeping the functions within ICANN is for the administrative staff, the related resources, all of that to move to this post transition IANA, for this post transition IANA to be completely funded by ICANN; and therefore remaining a wholly owned affiliate. But for the ability, as I've mentioned, of a contract being there.

So if after all discussions and negotiations, if the work that post transition IANA does is below the standards of the service level agreements that are needed and there's no other recourse but to basically fire them, I guess, one can break the contract and the contracting of the IANA functions can be then opened up to another organization through some kind of a request for proposal system.

The important part of post transition IANA here is the PTI board. Because it is a separate entity, it needs to have a board. The proposal that was done by the cross-community working group was to have one ICANN executive responsible for the PTI, to have the ICANN Chief Technical Officer there, to have the IANA and IANA managing director (the current director of IANA), and then two independent directors.

The reason for this being primarily just technical people is because this really is just a technical function. There's no politics supposed to take place with this post transition IANA. That was the first proposal.

The next one is the Customer Standing Committee. The mission of the Customer Standing Committee is to effectively perform the work of the US government and make sure that the performance of the post transition IANA is up to the level that is needed in the service level expectations or service level agreements. It was important to have this.

The Customer Standing Committee, as its name implies, is basically just made up of the customers of the functions. So you'd have two gTLD (generic top-level domain) registry operators, two country-code top-level domain registry operators, one additional top-level domain

representative that would be neither [inaudible] non-gTLD, non-ccTLD. I think it was a bit of a mistake on that slide. I'm afraid I just took the slide from the main slide. It's actually a non-GNSO and non-ccNSO. That's one additional TLD representative.

One liaison from the IANA itself, which is important because that's where you will get that link between the Customer Standing Committee and IANA. Then a liaison from each of the ICANN supporting organizations an advisory committees. At the moment, there are five of them.

The difference between the members themselves and the liaisons is that if it comes down to a vote, the members would be having a vote. The liaisons would not have a vote. But it is important to note that the input from the At-Large community, from the ALAC, would be coming into there. Of course, having a liaison [inaudible] on that committee means also that the work of that committee would be very transparent indeed.

If we go to the next box, that's the accountability part of it, effectively. The IANA functions review. Periodically, there would be some review of the function to find out if the work has been undertaken correctly. So independent committee has been chartered to do this. It's going to just look at the performance of PTI and ensure the quality of service and the accountability by which those processes take place and the work takes place.

The IANA functions… It used to be called IANA Functions Review Team. Yeah, the functions review function itself is undertaken by the review team. You will notice at the bottom of the page – and I hope you can see this, because the characters are rather small – it is composed by of course all of the different customers of IANA, but also with representatives from At-Large, from the Root Server Advisory Committee, from the Security & Stability Advisory Committee, etc. And also the Government Advisory Committee is also on there.

It is hoped that the work of this committee will able to say everything runs well and we have nothing else to do. Of course if there is something that needs to be done because the functions have not been carried out properly, at that point really it is this functions review team that would be effectively pushing things forward for ICANN and basically make the decision and say, "Well, look, there's something majorly wrong here. We need to either find a way to resolve the problems or engage into launching a request for proposals," and breaking that relationship with post transition IANA.

Now, the ALAC has had several chances to gives its positions on these points. Needless to say we didn't agree on absolutely everything in the working group. In fact, there were some points that were finally seen as being consensus points where the ALAC had a different point of view. The three most recent consultations – and in fact, out of these, there are two recent consultations and one is just a ratification – where in the past year… So there was one on the 26th of May when the second draft proposal of the cross-community working group came out for public

comment. The ALAC submitted a very long response to that, and we will go into this in the moment.

Then there was of course the time when the ALAC met in the last face-to-face meeting in Buenos Aires. That is where we had ratification of the proposal. There were a few amendments made, thanks to our first set of comments. We ratified and gave a couple more comments associated with our ratification of the actual proposal itself.

More recently there was a short comment made in the public consultation that was launched by the IANA Coordination Group (the ICG). The ICG is the body that has put the names proposal, the numbers proposal, and the protocols proposal together, brought them into one large report and we made a few comments on that.

If we look at the first of the comments of the consultation of the 26th of May, as you can see there were quite a few comments on there. I will go briefly through those because I think that they are important and I'm not sure that they have been completely addressed. I'll let Alan and others who are part of the working group add to this later on during the question time and commenting time.

First, we had a real concern regarding the lack of multi-stakeholder oversight involvement. As you've noticed, the ALAC has a liaison onto the Customer Standing Committee, and only one seat on the IANA Functions Review Team. But compared to the overall community, it was felt that this was not really enough. There were certainly concerns over the control of the PTI board, the post transition IANA board, because it

was all made up of industry and there was very little chance of having ALAC seats on there or seats from communities that were not direct customers.

And there was a concern regarding the budget. The benefit of pre-defined boundaries and budgets can be achieved much more easily by just having ICANN establishing them in IANA, in coordination with IANA, rather than going through a longer process which I think Alan will dig into, which is the whole vetoing of budget, vetoing of IANA budget, by the community.

There was also a lot of concern in our community about the benefits of needing really a contract. Could you imagine that ICANN… Well, post transition IANA being a wholly owned subsidiary of ICANN would then have its contract stripped from ICANN with all of the associated legal wrangle that this might bring in, because effectively what you're having is the same people on both sides saying we want to stop working with each other. It's just some complexities that I think our community felt were not needed at this point.

Nevertheless, we can live with what's on the table right now. It's very difficult for the ALAC to go against absolutely all of the other communities that were really pushing very hard for all of these contracts and for this functional separation as such.

Somewhere along the escalation process – and I didn't add the diagram on the escalation process, because ultimately and unfortunately, we've never actually seen a full clear diagram on how the escalation takes

place when something goes wrong and the IANA Functions Review Team or the Customer Standing Committee says that they are unable to get the quality of service that they require from IANA.

Somewhere along that path, the ccNSO or the Country Code Name Supporting Organization and the Generic Names Supporting Organization, have to basically filter the process. They have to give their green light for a functional separation to take place.

The ALAC doesn't believe that these are appropriate bodies to which the Customer Standing Committee could escalate problems. They're policy bodies. They're not operational bodies. The only recourse that the GNSO or the ccNSO would have would be to invoke the community empowerment mechanisms [inaudible] by the Cross Community Working Group on Accountability. Having to go through one or the two registry supporting organizations, instead of a community-wide group, actually has the power to take action would be a lot better than going through the GNSO and through the ccNSO.

We just see that intermediate step just as another delay in any possible action, because I have to remind you, if we do have to go through a process of separation and replacing the IANA functions operator, it really means that the current IANA functions operator is not doing its job and it's not doing its job to the level of actually endangering the stability of the Internet under the domain name system.

These are a few points. There were more points that we made regarding geographic diversity or skill sets in composing those committees. There

doesn't seem – or it didn't at the time seem to be – any emphasis on this.

Finally, as far as the Customer Standing Committee charter is concerned, all of those changes should be approved by the overall ICANN community, and not just by the ccNSO and the GNSO. These were just a summary of the many points we made in May 2015.

Thankfully, the majority of those points have been taken into account. When in June 2015 the ALAC ratified the names proposal only two points were made and repeated.

First, to do with the post transition IANA board members. Because at that point things had moved a little bit… And as you've seen, there are two board members that will be selected in a specific way. It was designed that the Nominating Committee would be selecting those board members, and we basically have decided that it would be important to address geographic diversity without sacrificing competence of course.

Secondly, the success of the post transition IANA would be absolutely contingent on ICANN ensuring the adequate operational and research and development funding as well as other resources. You cannot starve post transition IANA of funds and then accuse it of not being able to live up to its service level agreements. That was one set of points that were made.

Then, finally, during the IANA Coordination Group consultation, which has just closed last month, one more set of points was made and that actually looks at the overall three proposals which were submitted.

It appears that the IANA Coordination Group did not actually mix the three proposals. They just cut-and-pasted them together and said, "Well, there we go. We have three proposals there." And therefore there was one point which was seen as missing from there. That's the direct coordination between the different operational communities.

Suppose that, for example, the names community was very unhappy with the performance of the post transition IANA and decided that they would wish to actually break this relationship and issue a request for proposals and get another operator to run this function.

How would it tell the other operational communities that it was about to do that? The view from At-Large and from the ALAC was that having different operators run their functions in a separated way might actually endanger the stability of the [inaudible], and therefore a direction coordination – operational coordination – between the three operational communities would be important because if one of the three operational communities is not happy, well perhaps the others are not happy either. Therefore, everyone – all three of those functions – should be moved to a new operator.

In effect, that was the comment that was made there; and basically discussing the decision across with other operational communities.

That's most… Well, that's all of the input of At-Large and of the ALAC in the current process of IANA stewardship transition. As I mentioned earlier, a large part of the proposal of the IANA Stewardship Transition Cross Community Working Group depends on the input of the Cross Community Working Group on ICANN Accountability.

If I go back, you can actually see here in that diagram the important overall framework is here. The accountability mechanisms from the CCWG Accountability. That's what now this working group is waiting for and that's what everyone is waiting for in order to proceed forward and then pass the overall plan and projects over to the NTIA, to the US government.

I'll stop here and the floor over for this accountability work to Alan Greenberg. I don't know, Alan, should we just have questions here, a little break, or should we move straight into accountability?

ALAN GREENBERG: Let's see if there are any particular questions right now while things are fresh in people's minds.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: I was going to also add of course colleagues that are part of the working group are in this room as well. Alan and others, if you have any additional points to make on the points that I have made, now is the time I guess. Go ahead, Cheryl.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: We do have [inaudible].

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay, thanks. I gather I'm still running this part of the call. Let's have a question from Cheryl, and then we'll have a question from Joly afterwards. Cheryl Langdon-Orr?

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Thank you very much, Olivier. Along with Alan, Olivier and others on the team, here today part of the group that has worked with the transition cross-community working group as well.

I just wanted to mention before we get perhaps into some of the details that Olivier raised that regarding some of the budget matters there's a strong cross-over with work that is still ongoing within the accountability work, which Alan will be dealing with.

The nexus between the desires for accountability mechanisms that the transition work has created and the work that is still happening within the cross-community working group on accountability is more like a [inaudible] I think than a simple cross-over relationship that we might want to pick up questions on that during or after Alan's presentation. It's more of a suggestion and a comment than a question. Thank you very much.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you, Cheryl. That's absolutely fine. You're quite correct. Most of the question marks that still remain in the Cross Community Working Group on IANA Stewardship Transition have now filtered over to the ICANN Accountability because they are internal ICANN processes, and the budget is definitely one of them. Very important.

I was told there is the question from Joly MacFie, but I'm not quite sure where the question is, so if someone could please read it out. Oh, here we go. Question from Joly: "Is there no need to coordinate [v6 number] [inaudible]." I'm not sure—

Yeah, Alan. Go ahead.

ALAN GREENBERG: That was based on a random statistic I quoted in the chat box. Someone from ARIN at the meeting I was at last Thursday mentioned that the total number of interactions from all five RIRS with ARIN per year is 13. So that's compared to, perhaps, hundreds per day for the IETF. So it was just an interesting statistic. Joly, as far as I know, the rules are established so the RIRs go to IANA for allocations, but I don't think there's any question about the processes. Those have all been worked out long ago, as far as I know anyway.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thanks for this, Alan. Any other questions or comments on IANA stewardship transition? I don't see any hands up at the moment. Maybe this will come to you when Alan goes through his presentation. So I

think we can pass – oh, I see now. Dev has put his hand up so let's have the question or the comment from Dev Anand Teelucksingh.

DEV ANAND TEELUCKSINGH: Thanks. Just a question on that Customer Standing Committee. It talked about there's mention of having two gTLD registry operators and two ccTLD registry operators, but I mean who is defining whatever the three operator is either a gTLD only or ccTLD only. I had a queston. There's a mention about an additional TLD representative that is a non-gTLD and a non-ccTLD, and I guess I don't understand what kind of TLD, what registry is either not a gTLD or ccTLD registry?

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Yes, thanks for this, Dev. And that's where I think there was a mistake in the slide. Unfortunately, there was a slide that I took from the overall slide deck that was presented officially a couple of months ago by the Cross-Community Working Group itself. Can we go back to this slide deck, please, so we can focus on this?

So in the post transition IANA – sorry, in the CSC, as you mentioned, yes – it should be two ccNSO-registered ccTLD registry operators and two, of course, gTLD registry operators, I guess, is fine. They are all part of the GNSO. But in the next ccNSO, some ccTLD registry operators are not part of the ccNSO and this is where there was a need to have a registry that is not part of the ccNSO that would be included in that committee.

Let me just go to this. There we go. That's the one. So that's what it is. Oops. Someone has done something with this. Oops. How do you turn this off? Well. Okay, here we go. We've got PTI, we're on CSC, there you go.

So yeah, it would be non-ccNSO country code top-level domain operators.

ALAN GREENBERG: Olivier, if I may join in for a moment. The first question that Dev asked is how do you decide if someone is a CC or gTLD? Dev, did I get that question correctly?

DEV ANAND TEELUCKSINGH: Yes, that's correct. I mean, who's making this determination? Yeah.

ALAN GREENBERG: Well, it's quite clear. We know who the ccTLDs and the gTLDs are. Now, any given business might be running both, but we're not talking about back-end operations, we're talking about the entity that is responsible according to IANA for the registry.

DEV ANAND TEELUCKSINGH: Ah, okay.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah. Thanks for this, Alan. And, actually, Dev, you do raise a question because there are indeed some country code top-level domain registries now – registry operators – that also run gTLDs. And there is indeed in the GNSO a discussion at the moment as to whether this could be some kind of a double dipping in a way with them being part of the GNSO itself and also part of the ccNSO.

So far, the understanding that I have is that they're allowed to be in both the GNSO and the ccNSO. I'm not sure whether it will go down to the rules where a specific representative might need to be either the representative in the ccNSO or the representative for the GNSO. But I think that they are still questioning this because I've certainly not seen any rules so far regarding a GNSO counselor, for example, being able to be also part of the ccNSO counsel.

Correct me if I'm wrong. I know we have experts from the ccNSO who are here who could tell us, but so far I've not seen any such addressing such issue. And I guess the rules for GNSO or ccNSO registry operator would be not rules set by this process but rules set within the GNSO and within the ccNSO.

ALAN GREENBERG: We may be getting a bit off topic here, though.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah. So let's then move over to you, Alan, for the accountability. As I said, a large part of the work here is pretty much complete as far as

Cross Community Working Group on IANA Stewardship Transition. The big question now is whether this whole new process can be accountable to whom and how. So over to you, Alan Greenberg.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you very much. What we'll be talking about is the current draft proposal of the CCWG Accountability looking at ICANN accountability, methodologies and issues. And the proposal itself is available in multiple languages and there is a slide deck describing the current proposal, also available in multiple languages. And if anyone wants to quickly note down the address.. But this slide deck that we're looking at now is pointed to by the wiki, the agenda for this meeting. So you can go back and get it later.

The CCWG Accountability at this stage has two work streams, one was originally intended for the things that were – accountability issues that were necessary for the transition and Work Stream 2 was other things that we believe would be for the good of ICANN.

It has been changed somewhat and that is subject to a significant discussion at this point for the first one to include all aspects of accountability that the community needs specifically to allow those that are not needed for the transition to be mandated by the community with essentially no board discretion at Work Stream.

So essentially, we're getting the tools this time to make sure that Work Stream 2 can go through without cause, without any problems. And that

indeed has caused some of the problems that we'll be discussing as we go forward.

Before we continue, just a quick show of hands. How many people on this call attended the webinar we did a month ago on the draft statement of the ALAC on the CCWG Accountability? I see one tick. Anybody else? Okay. So most people – okay, a few. Well, Sebastien and – okay. So I see not many ticks and most of those are people who have been very familiar, so I can't skip over too much of this, but I will try to do it fast so we have some time for questions at the end. Thank you for your ticks.

Comment on multi-stakeholderism. We say we need multi-stakeholderism and we want diversity, and they're important because people's backgrounds or different people's expectations, interests are different. But it implies that we have different views, and finding common ground and doing that in a timely manner can be very, very problematic because we are going into this quite differently with quite different mindsets.

And that's true in the CCWG reaching closure and it's also true within ALAC and At-Large reaching closure on our particular statement. So something to factor in as we go forward.

The intent of the statement is multifold. Some issues we're raising because we feel they must be changed, and that we do not expect, although clearly at the decision we have to take later that the ALAC would ratify the statement if these were not satisfied. Some issues we

simply want to say they probably should be changed, and in some cases, we're simply stating our position for the record but don't expect it to be changed.

There's been a lot of At-Large participation. We have five members of the working group, the Cross Community Working Group, and a number of participants. And there's a distinction between the two. In theory, only members could vote if we ever came to a vote. So far, we have not come to a vote, and although not everyone agrees with this methodology, all participants have been treated equally in terms of contributing to the work. And in fact, in some cases, very significant parts of the work have been taken on as penholders and drafters by people who are in fact participants.

We have what has been called the Ad-Hoc IANA Issues Working Group within At-Large. It started off being just IANA. It has morphed or changed into a group that also looks at accountability, and we have been meeting for the last several weeks twice a week in the process of drafting the statement and then reviewing other issues.

And indeed, At-Large members and our statements have had significant impact on the drafts as we have gone forward. AFRALO in particular has drafted its own statements. They have contributed to the ALAC work but have also drafted and submitted their own statements. So lots going on in this area.

Our overall position is we can support the proposal that was made. We're not particularly happy with parts of this, but we could support it

with some reservations, and there are a moderately small number of things that we felt must be changed. Preference is we would have preferred no membership, we would have preferred less legal enforceability, less complex structure, and we're worried that the same mechanisms that make it difficult to override the board may also make it difficult to change the ICANN organization as might be necessary in the future.

Into the substance. Part of the ICANN bylaws – and all of this focuses essentially at changes to the ICANN bylaws, which will change the nature of ICANN and how the ICANN Board operates. There are a number of mission statements in the mission and commitments and core values that essentially are the guiding road posts or signposts that tell ICANN how it should behave.

There are some significant changes that have been recommended in those mission and commitments and values, and some of them we think are much for the better and some of them we have some concerns over. The first one is of the concept of the private sector. The current bylaws say ICANN is driven by the private sector, and that is as opposed to government.

Now if you go to Google or somewhere and look up definitions of the private sector, you'll find multiple versions of it. Sometimes the private sector is indeed identified as everything except government. And sometimes it's identified as business. So it was felt important by some people within the group, and certainly At-Large, that we define private sector, and they have done that.

But, unfortunately, At-Large and users have all been grouped into the concept of [inaudible]. Now there are …

STEFANO TRUMPY: Okay.

ALAN GREENBERG: Hello?

STEFANO TRUMPY: Hello? I just then joined through the Adobe Connecton, so I'm just listening.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. I don't know who you are, but I'm glad you're listening. Thank you.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: It's Stefano Trumpy.

STEFANO TRUMPY: Stefano Trumpy. Yes.

ALAN GREENBERG: Ah, Stefano. Welcome.

STEFANO TRUMPY: Stefano from Italy.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you, Stefano.

STEFANO TRUMPY: Okay. Thank you. Bye.

ALAN GREENBERG: So we have been grouped within as part of civil society. Now certainly, many parts of At-Large are civil society. Civil society definitions tend to say that they are groups that are focusing, that are not government and not-for-profit. There are other definitions which are either more or less restrictive than that, and certainly there are parts of At-Large, such as our individual users within RALOs, that are not within the normal definitions of civil society. So we would like to see an explicit inclusion of users and At-Large within this grouping.

There are some references to a judgment-free DNS that have been added. We don't know what that means – at least I don't know what that means. Does it mean that ICANN can no longer make any judgments related to TLDs, which it does right now?

It looks at TLDs and says they shouldn't be confusingly similar. Does it say the DNS itself must be judgment free? Well we know some countries do filtering. Does that mean we're supposed to police them?

As Olivier mentioned out, spam filters can be considered a judgment on whether a particular domain name is something that we should want to pass or filter. So it's a very confusing statement and if it's going to be there, it really needs to be defined better than what is there now.

One of the core values says that the current one says, "To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegate coordination functions to policy bodies is important."

So specifically, the GNSO is responsible for setting gTLD policy. Sorry, for recommending gTLD policy. But it then goes to the board and thebBoard has to decide whether it makes sense or not. And among other things, the recommendation is to drop the phrase, "To the extent feasible and appropriate."

It also says that we should essentially transfer policy relationship to external bodies that are not even under our control. And again, taking out the discretion – and we have found that rather problematic.

Again, where feasible and appropriate depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment. Well, dropping the "where feasible and appropriate" essentially says ICANN no longer has the ability to factor in things like the public interest. If we're simply going to turn things over to market mechanisms, the market mechanism will go where they want to go, and we believe strongly that ICANN has a responsibility for both certainly security and stability, but also other issues related to the public interest.

Principle eight is striving to achieve a reasonable balance between interest of stakeholders. Again, a statement simply saying look at stakeholders without factoring in public interest and security and stability, we believe is a mistake.

Okay, next section. One of the concepts that is being introduced are fundamental bylaws. Currently, all bylaws can be changed unilaterally by the board. That is the nature of a board of a non-membership organization. We are introducing the concept that bylaws in general, the community can question a bylaw change. In general, after the fact. However, there are some bylaws, particularly the bylaws related to accountability, that we believe must require community approval prior to be enacted, and those we are calling fundamental bylaws.

The At-Large supports the proposals. There are a number of detailed inconsistencies in terms of voting thresholds and things that we have identified, but overall the concept of fundamental bylaws is something we strongly support.

The proposal is improving ICANN's appeal mechanisms. Both the Board reconsideration and the independent review process, which goes to an outside adjudicator. One of the points we had, but I believe it has been clarified already, is we were somewhat worried that an outside panel could set ICANN policy. And indeed, that is not the case. The outside panel can make judgments on whether ICANN has followed its bylaws.

If ICANN is deemed to have not followed its bylaws in any given process, then the issue is sent back to ICANN to address. But the outside body is

not to decide how to redress or how to fix the problem. Just saying, basically, we support it, we have some concerns, but overall we're fine with it.

The next set of slides is looking at how the community can take action. Now what is currently being proposed – and I will be talking later about what will happen because this has been a real major subject of contention – is something called the community mechanisms as a sole member.

Normally, membership organizations have multiple members. In this case, we are saying that the various parts of the community, the ACs and SOs, will together form the member, and any decisions of that member to influence ICANN must be made communally among the ACs and SOs.

The waiting threshold of how each of the ACs and SOs contribute to those decisions is one of the points of contention. You can see the proposed one was to give the three supporting organizations – the addressing supporting organizations, generic TLDs, and ccTLDs – five votes each, five votes also to the GAC and the ALAC, and two to the Security and Stability and RSSAC.

The latter two, however, have made a pretty strong statement saying they don't plan to participate in this. They are indeed advisory committees and would like to stay that, and not play any other role, and the GAC it is far from clear whether they are interested to or will be able to play.

So we might have as few as four (the three SOs plus the ALAC), and at this point, it is unclear that the ASO will participate. So we might have as little as the two registry groups and the ALAC participating. That is one of the problems with getting this whole proposal approved because there is some feeling that three entities of the seven is not sufficiently inclusive of the multi-stakeholders, even though non-participation is maybe the choice of those individual groups.

And as you can see, there are the main proposal I just described. There's an alternate proposal that everyone has five votes, a second proposal that the SOs have two and all ACs – or rather the SOs have four and all ACs have two. And our position is pretty clear we would support the first option but we feel that if the SSAC ever becomes independent of the board... Currently, the Board appoints SSAC members and RSSAC members. That if they become independent of the Board, then they should have the full status of five votes.

We would certainly support everyone having five to begin with and we categorically refuse the concept of the ALAC and GAC having less status than the SOs. And I suspect to date that is the only issue that we have seen that would definitely cause us to not ratify the report if it went forward. That's not a decision we've taken formally, but that's my gut feeling.

In terms of the community powers, there are a number of them. There is the ability to reject strategic plans, reject – which means veto – strategic or operating plans or the budget, reconsider standard budgets,

standard bylaws, approve fundamental bylaws, remove individual directors, or remove the whole Board.

Although we'll be talking about the latter ones, the one we have had most problem with is indeed the budget. The budget provisions that are currently planned saying we can try to veto twice, the second veto has a higher threshold than the first one, and if the board refuses to adjust the budget as per the request in the veto, then the previous year's budget will continue. Perhaps augmented by a little bit.

Certainly I find that rather problematic on several grounds. Number one, the most likely cause of a veto is that we feel ICANN is spending too much money. And the revenue has dropped and therefore the expenditures should drop, and maintaining last year's budget to perhaps increased certainly does not address that.

There's also the issue that budget vetoes might be used for improper reasons. They may be used to gang parts of the organization to gang up the others.

And lastly, it is not clear how setting the overall envelope of the budget really stops the board from making allocations within that budget. Because it's quite clear that the board has the ability and will continue to have the ability to adjust the budget mid-year as necessary.

The ability to remove individual directors has been something that is… I will say I'm not sure contentious is the right word, but certainly is something that we have had different positions on within different parts of At-Large, whether we should be able to do it at all, whether the

decisions should be taken by the AC or SO that has appointed the person or by the overall community, and whether there is the ability of the director to defend him or herself, essentially making this into a trial which might be appealable, which could have several implications, including the potential for lawsuits for slander or libel or defamation, which might have real significant implications.

Recall the entire Board. This is rather a nuclear option and it's hard to imagine a situation where we would be willing to do this. With one exception, and we'll come back to that in a little while. It's certainly a major nuclear option.

There are statements in the report about diversity. That is, there should be diversity among several groups. It's a difficult issue and one of the recommendations calls for the ATRT – it calls for diversity reviews, and there's some question to where those reviews should sit. And that's another one of the items we put in our comment.

The current Affirmation of Commitments, which guides a lot of ICANN's commitments and its processes and review, is something which can be canceled, and we believe that it needs to be put in the bylaws so the ICANN board on short-term notice cannot simply say, "We're walking away from these things." And that's something we support. Again, there are some details that we are quibbling with, but the overall concept we definitely support.

That slide just goes into a little bit of some of the details. These slides seem to have been reformatted from the versions that I have on the

web. I'm not quite sure why, but hopefully the versions, if you look at them yourselves, all of the text is there.

There are a number of resources that you can find things at. The ICANN, the ALAC wiki statement. The ALAC wiki page has the final statement we made and all the previous versions, if you want to go through the history of it. It also includes the AFRALO statements that were made.

There's a mailing list, if you're not a member of it. If any of this sounds interesting, there's still work to be done, and the CCWG itself has published an immense amount of information.

Now, current situation. So what most of what I've given you was true, as of the middle of last week. There was a face-to-face meeting in Los Angeles on Friday and Saturday attended by a large part of the working group and virtually all of the board members.

Larry Strickling from the NTIA was there and made a short statement, which is not particularly surprising because it echoed a lot of what he said in his blog that, currently, the proposals that are on the table are not sufficient for them to evaluate. There just isn't enough detail.

There were strong statements made that they need to be simplified because they are just far more complex than are likely needed to satisfy the transition. And again, that goes back to the original statement I made that much of what we has been put in this accountability is to satisfy ICANN accountability in general and not necessarily related to the transition.

The entire board was there and the board several weeks ago had made their comments on the transition plan, supporting a lot of the concepts, supporting some of the implementation, and making some categorical statements. They do not accept a number of things. One of them was the concept of a membership model that they believe that this changes the nature of the organization in ways that are potentially onerous. They are using untested processes and there may be the possibility of capture or other bad things happening that we cannot predict at this point.

That statement is pretty well completely in line with the position the ALAC has been taking all along. They also have a very significant problem with a veto of the budget and, again, that was something that was paralleled by the ALAC statements. So although some of the details of their proposal are not acceptable, the board's proposal are not acceptable to At-Large, much of it is very in line with the direction that we have been pushing in.

The meeting was not as productive as we had hoped, and there were a number of occurrences which ended up potentially fracturing the community even more, very much as a board versus the CCWG instead of the board working with the CCWG. The chances at this point of closure of having a proposal to endorse, formally endorse, in Dublin is virtually nil. The chances of having something to discuss in Dublin which is close to final, which is what we were hoping for going into the two-day meeting is not nearly as clear and probably unlikely.

There is a lot of resentment over some of the board statements. I'm not sure they're justified but it is there anyway. There is a feeling that the board is trying to control it, control the process. I don't think that's reasonable. The Board has always said they would comment NTIA and moreover any changes to the bylaws must be enacted by the current board.

We have to presume, because of their fiduciary duty, the board is not going to take actions that they feel unwise. So ultimately, the board has ultimate approval, and that's not a surprise. And I don't know why people are quite acting surprised on it.

And one of the other items is there is one of the stress tests that we have done, which essentially talks about under what conditions the board must exercise the bylaws which give the GAC advice special consideration. The bylaws say that the Board must not only consider advice from the GAC, but if it refuses it, it must enter into discussions with the GAC.

And there is some feeling that that must be – one must specify it in some detail how the GAC advices arrived at, and there are very strong feelings in the GAC that this is not appropriate for the bylaws to make specifications essentially on GAC processes and how the GAC arrives at recommendations. And conceivably, the GAC could refuse to ratify over that issue. So that's another potential stumbling block.

So at this point, clearly, the IANA transition is dependent on a successful accountability proposal, accepted and adopted by the board. And in

fact, before the actual transition, the changes must be made. In some cases, the changes must be made before the NTIA will even try to sell this to Congress.

There are a number of people in the working group that really don't care about the transition and are in this purely for accountability, and are willing to forego the transition if we don't get the accountability that they would like to see.

And just to note that in some circles, people believe that this whole process is essentially a test of the multi-stakeholder model, and that failure to be able to deliver a transition will be a black sign against the multi-stakeholder model, and that could impact other things in the world.

Certainly, the position that the ITU takes on whether we should be playing our role in Internet governance or they should, it certainly will be taken as that way by a number of countries. And it would be nice if we really succeeded. It remains to be seen whether we will be able to at this point.

Some of us are trying to be optimistic and are hoping we will come through, but the exact path forward is not clear. There are some people who have been pushing the membership concept that are starting to soften it and understand that the Board is not going to give in, and that we need to find something else that will meet the needs of the community.

The ALAC, I think, arguably could be said to be the most flexible. As you noticed, when I went over a lot of these things, I said, "We could accept the membership model. It's not what we want, but we could accept it." And we've done that in a number of areas. So I think we're also in a good position to try to lead the effort to find a middle ground. And certainly, there are discussions going on in that direction.

The changes that will be made will almost certainly require another public comment, and that means since we cannot close in Dublin, we are either going to have to ratify all the ACs and SOs that our charter members will have to ratify intersessionally, which is particularly difficult for the GAC and the ccNSO, or we will have to have an extra meeting probably in December or January to bring these groups together. It wouldn't be a full-fledged ICANN meeting, but sufficient to be able to ratify the proposal that comes out of it.

But all of that is – nothing is cast in concrete at this point and the last statement is purely a supposition on my point. I'll note in late 2002 when the last major change in ICANN happened, there was a fourth meeting in the year in December of 2002. But it was a simpler world then than it is now.

And that's it for me. And I'll turn the meeting back over to me and open up questions. We are an hour and 12 minutes. I believe this is a 90-minute webinar. Is that correct? Someone on staff?

GISELLA GRUBER: Correct, 90 minutes. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. So we have a little bit over 15 minutes. I see we have a queue. I'm not quite sure the order, but Olivier first and then Aziz.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Alan. Actually, Aziz was way before me. He put his hand up. So I'll let Aziz first.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. Aziz, go ahead.

AZIZ HILALI: Thank you. Firstly, I wanted to thank Alan and Olivier for their presentation. Alan spoke of ALAC's objections, and I would like to know whether there's any specific reservations he thought of while saying that.

ALAN GREENBERG: I'm afraid I don't understand the – okay, it's going on.

INTERPRETER: I cannot hear him properly, so I'm trying to make sense of what he's saying. Okay. The last bit he was saying that at the joint AFRALO AfrICANN meeting they're going to draft a statement on this joint

statement regarding this matter. Hold on a second, I'm going to ask him to repeat louder the first part of his question.

ALAN GREENBERG: Perhaps Aziz can put his question in the chat.

INTERPRETER: Okay. I'll ask him, but just he's saying that, Alan, during your presentation, you spoke of different reservations regarding the statement, ALAC statement, and he says that he would like to know whether the reservations are important or if it's just the details.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. They vary. The reservation, for instance, on if the weighting, which would give ALAC significantly less votes than the GNSO, I think that would be a reservation which would probably cause us to reject. The ones on core values, where we are removing the ability of ICANN to make decisions, I think, are very crucial.

Some of the other ones are less so, so they vary from one to another, and when we see how the CCWG reacts to these, we'll have to then make a judgment call on whether the changes were sufficient for us or not. So they vary between them, and as I was talking, I tried to give an idea.

For instance, we said the membership model, which is probably dead anyway, but nevertheless, is something we could live with even though

it wasn't a preference. There are certainly things related to removal of directors where different people in At-Large would prefer to see it differently, but would not likely reject a proposal over that. So I hope that gives some idea.

Olivier, you're next, and then I see a question from Joly in the chat that I'll answer after Olivier.

OLIVIER CREPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Alan. I was going to actually ask a question very similar to Aziz's question, which was where are our own red lines? Where do we draw the line and say where we're not going to go from that, and we will therefore not ratify this work?

That said, I think you answered it very well here. The question I had for you, then, coming from that, is the Board has made some counterproposals during those two days, and even prior to the two days in Los Angeles. Do you see any convergence between the board's points and the proposal of the community?

Because you just said just now, the single-member model, or the membership model, seems to be dead now, and that was not the case four days ago. There were some in the community who had said that their red line, it's the membership model or it's nothing else. Which direction are we edging, then, for this? And would the community, having been there, did you sense that the community was ready to actually move and agree to the points that were made by the Board?

There are certainly some people within the community who may be members or may be participants, and that might become important. But even if they're members, there are some people who feel very strongly that the membership model is essential.

The board has made it quite clear they will not approve a membership model. Therefore, it might be that if you cannot come to closure on that impasse, then the transition doesn't go ahead. Accountability doesn't go ahead, transition doesn't go ahead. It's that simple.

So do I believe we can come to closure? Yes. I think a significant number of people who would prefer to see membership model, and perhaps are saying it is mandatory, will be willing to move. It's not unlike Contract Co discussions we had in the CWG. Do I know exactly how that will happen? No.

With regard to our position and the board proposal, in general, I think we are supportive. I think the board made a strategic mistake in instead of simply critiquing the parts of the CCWG proposal that they could not live with, they replaced huge parts of it with other mechanisms. And I think that was an error. They should have simply taken the parts that they could live with and modified the other ones. And I think we will probably go back to a middle ground, which in fact does that.

One of the aspects of the board's proposal is that if legal action needs to be taken through a request for arbitration or going to the courts, it would be done by the chairs of the ACs and SOs. That is something the CCWG considered early and we rejected because we believe that will

introduce liabilities on the individuals, even if compensated by ICANN or covered by ICANN, but there are personal liabilities.

There are issues of a court battle, or for instance taken out by a chair who then ceases to be the chair. How do you transfer that to the new person? There are not normally processes to do that and I believe we have replacement mechanisms that we already have come up with to replace that concept. So they reverted to a very old concept that was rejected for good reasons.

So we have a number of problems with their proposal, as well, but we're probably moderately well-aligned with much of it. So I hope that answered the question. Let me address Joly's question of what's the rush.

The rush is that we're going into a US presidential election. Right now, we seem to have, with the exception of a few people, bilateral support in the US Congress for going ahead, if there is a viable plan. Once we go past the summer – the midsummer or early summer – we get into the real major parts of the race. And at that point, we have no idea what any candidate will raise and the ability of Congress to act at that point becomes very limited.

So if we go past the point of the election is in full-fledged process, the chances of the transition happening under this administration approaches zero. We don't know who's going to win. If the Republicans win, we believe that the chances of them reintroducing this are not very large.

This is a window of opportunity. It may close very soon, and we don't know when it will reopen. So that's really – there are large numbers of protections in the US who feel the Internet is essential for US Congress, why should they give up control? Now that ignores the position of many other governments and what else is going on in the world, but that is their prerogative.

So that's where we stand right now. If it is going to happen by June, which is pretty much the drop-dead date, it must go to the NTIA for review very early in the year because there are specific waiting periods that have to occur. It's going to take a certain amount of time for the NTIA to do their formal evaluation. And if it doesn't go to them by early in the year with the bylaws already enacted, then it's likely not to happen. So that's the rush.

Questions? I have two. I can't tell. The first person, I assume – I see Akin-Awokoya and Ema, but I think that's Emanual or something like that. I can't see all the letters, but whoever you are, you're on. Is he on the French channel?

INTERPRETER: No, I don't think so. I don't hear anything on French.

GISELLA GRUBER: I'm just trying to get Akin to see if his microphone is activated. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG:	Alright, let's go on to Sebastien. There's a question from Graham Schreiber in the chat that I'll deal with afterwards but, Sebastien, go ahead. If we can get Akin on, we'll do that afterwards.
SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET:	Thank you, Alan. I hope that you can hear me well.
ALAN GREENBERG:	We can.
SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET:	Thank you. I have a few comments. The first one is about the rush. Yes, I agree with your answer totally, Alan, but I want also that we take another stand on that. We always say that our organization as a multi-stakeholder organization must do better and quicker than an intergovernmental organization. We have to keep that in mind that if we want to stand on that in the future, we can't spend years and years on the subject if not one day the government will say, "Hey, guys. We can do better and quicker than you can do."
	The second point is about red lines. Our love of redlines and [ready rings], whatever. The question is which one will stand. Here, for example, about membership model or the model in general. There are people with one red line in one [sense] and the other in the others. If globally the organization doesn't stay with their red lines, then we will be in trouble to find any solution about the model.

If we think that some of those issues are just red herrings and, yes, I agree with you, Olivier, that going to court is one; the nuclear option is another one. Just if we could leave them away from our work, then we will have a simpler and easier to implement solution. It will be better. I am not sure that we are willing to do so.

The last point is that the proposal from the board is good in general, but they didn't get the point about the model that we don't want. What is important in the proposal today from the CCWG, it's not the membership too much. It's the sole. What is important is that we didn't end up [to court] between whoever will speak on behalf of the GNSO and whoever will speak on behalf of At-Large - or you can take any other two organizations like that. It's why we came up with the sole solution. Now we put membership because it was the answer, even by the legal, that it was our advisor that was the only solution. But from our point of view, I guess, what is important is the sole. It's not membership. Thank you very much.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you, Sebastien. We have a question from Graham Schreiber. I'll read it, but I honestly am not quite sure what it's asking. It says, "Why don't genuine ccNSOs, ccTLDs represent consumers and domain registrants on the Board of ICANN?" I cannot speak to how the two what the two ccNSO representatives act, so I'm afraid I certainly can't address that. "ICANN maintains to function under US laws. New gTLDs can't be represented because they're akin to media all rooted in the US and business." That sounds like a statement and not a question. If I've

misinterpreted something, Graham, either put your hand up or restate, but there's nothing really I can add to that.

Did we ever find out if Akin can speak or not?

EMANUEL AKIN-AWOKOYA: Yeah, I can speak. Can you hear me now?

ALAN GREENBERG: Yes, we can hear you now. Go ahead.

EMANUEL AKIN-AWOKOYA: Yeah, I have a few questions. My first question is you said something about a group of people [inaudible] currently preferring accountability of ICANN without the transition, without considering the IANA transition. I don't know which particular group you are referring to.

Secondly, you said something about not coming to a completion before January. Then how are we're going to present something to NTIA before June?

Again, [probably] that we've come a long way with the multi-stakeholder model. I think I also agree with your statement that it would be very nice if it succeeds because [a lot of other models] want to [compete, too]. What's your statement now that you can say that we can have to [go with] multi-stakeholder model, considering that we're having issues now with the board members [inaudible] having issues with some of what's ahead now?

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay, thank you very much. We seem to have lost him. Thank you. Gisella, we're one minute past. Do we have an ability to extend with the interpreters or not?

GISELLA GRUBER: Alan, yes. We have a 10-minute extension. Also, if you would be so kind as just to summarize Emanuel's question, as there was no Spanish nor French interpretation due to the poor quality of the sound. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay, thank you very much. I will try to summarize. I had trouble hearing it also. The first one is could I explain what I mean by some people only worried about accountability and not the transition? The second part is how can we present something to the NTIA if we do not come to closure? And I'm afraid I did not get the last part. If Akin can put something in the chat, then I will try to answer it.

In terms of the first part, there are people who don't care whether we do that IANA transition. That's a fact of life. I'm not guessing; I'm saying what they have said. They are active in the accountability process just because they believe ICANN must be more accountable. They are quite willing to say, "If we cannot get good accountability, the we don't care if the transition goes ahead and we will keep on pushing for good accountability." That's simply a statement of their position.

How can we come to closure and submit something to the NTIA if we don't get closure? Well, we can't. If we don't get closure on accountability, accountability is a mandatory part of the IANA transition – certain aspects of accountability. If we cannot get those, then we will not have the transition. It's that simple.

Again, if Akin can state in the chat what the third question is, I'll be glad to try to answer it.

Olivier, you have your hand up.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yes, thanks, Alan. Just adding to what you said in response to Akin's question, it seems to be a real case that some of the participants think that this is the opportunity for designing ICANN 3.0. I think that it's being more and more understood that designing ICANN 3.0, the next version of ICANN, from scratch is going to take a lot more time than a few months working on it at a breakneck pace.

I'm not sure. Is it still the view of the participants that if ICANN 3.0 does not come out of that process – especially just looking at Work Stream 1, which is the work stream that needs to feed into IANA stewardship transition – if they don't reach ICANN 3.0 and they just get ICANN 2.1 or 2.5, are they ready to say, "Well, we're not going to [inaudible]"?

ALAN GREENBERG: Olivier, I don't think there's a single answer to that because different people have different positions. My personal position is this ICANN 3.0

is a buzzword. I think if we are looking at a new version of ICANN like the transition that happened in 2003, then we have to look at more than just board accountability.

Certainly, although it's nominally part of the current process, accountability of the ACs and SOs and community accountability in general is something we really need to look at because right now you, and certainly many of us, are aware of problems that we see when the public interest comes at odds with other interests and whether ICANN can address it. If we're going to take responsibility away from the board, it has to be given to someone who is accountable and has to address those issues. Right now, there is no one else.

I would think an ICANN 3.0, although I dislike the title, would have to include a very careful revision or review of, are the ACs and SOs effective at this point and is the overall structure of the organization the proper one, not just Board accountability. I don't think this ever was, in my mind, an ICANN 3.0 exercise, but it certainly is a buzzword that has been used by others.

Cheryl, go ahead.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Thank you very much. I want to follow on from that because it's something that I certainly want to support your statement on, but I think we need to refresh our intent with the work we are going in this Cross-Community Working Group Work Stream 1. That is for things that are dependencies that are seen to be essential for transition and are

vastly and metamorphosed. However necessary that may be, ICANN is not what is required there. A high and acceptable degree of accountability is, however, required there.

Now in the Work Stream 1 work, we've constantly used the term perhaps more in the beginning of our process than in more recent times. But I did hear it over the weekend [inaudible] several times coming back, and that is that a strong commitment to and requirement for project planning and specific timeline points and immutable guidelines for what has to be then done as ongoing and continuous improvement.

I agree with you, Alan. I think the ICANN 3.0 terminology is a buzzword but, hell, we use them and it's shorthand. We need to get to an understanding, in my personal view, that what is required is a big jump in what we need in terms of accountability and, indeed, transparency now, and that's the primary work we're doing.

But we also need a clear and bright line that says "and there will be a commitment to continuous improvement" because those who experienced the previous jumps in evolution with what was ICANN to what ICANN is now know how long it takes – as many of us do who have gone through these sorts of things in other organizations – to get it right. And there isn't time to do that now.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you, Cheryl. We have two minutes left and we have three to four minutes needed for the survey, so I'd like to thank everyone for their

questions and for their attention at this webinar. I'll turn it over to Gisella for a very fast version of the questionnaire she wants to do. Go ahead, Gisella.

GISELLA GRUBER: Alan, thank you very much. We've now gone over to the quick survey. We would just like to get your feedback on this webinar, how we can improve it, and working towards the next capacity building webinar series we'll hold next year.

To start off with, unfortunately the questions that have been put up… Just bear with me. There we go. Question one, reading it out for the French and Spanish participants and all those who are not on the Adobe Connect, how is the timing of the webinar for you? Three answers: too early, just right, or too late. If all those of you on the call would be so kind as to cast your vote, I'll give you a few seconds to do this.

ALAN GREENBERG: Gisella, I presume you mean should it have been a few weeks ago or a few weeks from now, not is it at the right time of the day.

GISELLA GRUBER: Alan, actually, is it the right time of the day? Thank you very much, Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: Oh, okay. So the question is: is this webinar at the right time of the day for you?

GISELLA GRUBER: Yes. Thank you very much, Alan. Yes. How is the timing of the webinar, as in timing of the day. Thank you. I see that we have seven people who have cast their vote, if you would be so kind giving a few more seconds. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: What does broadcast results mean?

GISELLA GRUBER: Alan, that is for us for the time being. We're not forecasting the results. That is something we will pass on after the webinar. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Sorry, I guess I only saw that because I'm a presenter.

GISELLA GRUBER: Yes, thank you, Alan. We have nine people, ten people, who have cast their votes. Just a reminder, how the timing of this webinar is for you today: too early, just right, too late. Ten people responded so far. Okay, thank you very much. We are going to now pass over to question number two.

Question number two: how is the technology used for the webinar? That is, audio, video, phone bridge. We have a rating from 5-1. Five being very good, four good, three sufficient, two bad, and 1 very bad. If I

could give you a few seconds to complete the vote, thank you very much. If there happens to be anyone on the webinar who is not on the Adobe Connect, we will double check afterwards with attendance, and if need be, send you the questions. Thank you.

Reminder, the question is: how is the technology used for the webinar? Again, we have ten responses so far, eleven. Doing well, thank you. Thank you very much for your patience. Okay, we will now be going on to the next question.

Question three: did the speakers demonstrate mastery of the topic? Again, a rating from 5-1. Extremely strong mastery of the topic, 5; 4, strong mastery of the topic; 3, sufficient mastery of the topic; 2, weak mastery of the topic; and 1, extremely weak mastering of the topic. I'll give you a few more seconds. Nine people so far. If we can maybe have a couple of more people responding, it would be much appreciated. Again, the question is: did the speakers demonstrate mastery of the topic?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: I'm not answering this because I think as a presenter, it's going to be very hard for me to ascertain whether I know what I'm doing or not.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Just give yourself a 5, Olivier. Both of you deserve a 5. I'll go on record saying that. I gave you a 5.

GISELLA GRUBER: I feel that [inaudible]. We'll now go on to the next question.

ALAN GREENBERG: I was going to ask what if you think one of the presenters was rotten and the other one superb?

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: That's a good point.

GISELLA GRUBER: Point taken for the next webinar, if we have more than one presenter, which is going to be the case. We will have made note of that. Thank you very much.

Question four, which I see people are already responding to, are you satisfied with the webinar? Again, a ranking from 5-1, 5 being extremely satisfied, 4 satisfied, 3 moderately satisfied, 2 slightly satisfied, and 1 not satisfied.

Repeating the question, are you satisfied with the webinar?

There we go. We seem to have had ten responses. We will now go to question number five.

Question number five is: what topics would you like to use to cover for future webinars? What topics would you like us to cover for future webinars. If you would like to type your answer into the box, thank you.

I'm just double checking. We have one answer for this question, which is what topics would you like us to cover for future webinars? We're getting quite a few responses in.

Alan, I think while people are typing here, if you would just like to give the closing remarks, as we are now 15 minutes over the due end time of the webinar. Back over to you, Alan, and I will [inaudible].

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you, Gisella. Actually, I think I already did. I thanked everyone for attending, for participation, and for the questions. I thank Olivier for what I thought was a good presentation. We'll see you next webinar or the next other meeting that we happen to cross paths with. Thank you, all.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Thanks, Alan. Thanks, Olivier. Bye.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you very much to our interpreters who stayed another almost 20 minutes after they were originally scheduled. Thank you very much. And thank you, of course, for staff for doing all of this great work including the new survey. Bye-bye.

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Bye!

GISELLA GRUBER: Thank you, everyone. The webinar has been adjourned and the audio will be disconnected. Thank you again for joining today's webinar, and enjoy the rest of your morning, afternoon, or evening. Thank you.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]