

## ALAC Comment on CCWG-Accountability 2<sup>nd</sup> Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations

### Introduction

[Introduction saying that we appreciate the work that has gone into the creation of this 2<sup>nd</sup> Proposal.]

The ALAC is generally very supportive of the overall proposal. Although the ALAC preference was to have less “enforceability” than some other groups in ICANN, we believe that the overall direction now being taken is acceptable.

The ALAC nonetheless has a number of concerns, both at a conceptual and at a detailed level, and we will also take this opportunity to comment on a number of options provided by the minority views and minority statements within the document.

In many cases, the ALAC is of a single mind on issues. In other cases, the group is divided, and this statement will clearly identify those.

### Section 3. Principles

**Paragraph 154, Bullet 2:** The ALAC strongly supports the minority position that end-users should be explicitly referenced. Although many user organizations can be classed as civil society, that is not true in the general case. [Need additional rationale demonstrating cases where the two are different].

### Section 5. Appeals Mechanism

**Paragraph 288, Subsection 18:** The ALACs understanding of the IRP is that it is an evaluation of ICANN actions and a determination of whether the ICANN Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation were followed. The proposal text implies that the IRP will order that the breach be remedied, but does not dictate exactly what the remedy will be. The ALAC Supports this, but believes that it must be explicit that the IRP cannot dictate specific courses of action. If this interpretation is not correct and the intent is that an IRP can dictate specific remedies, then the ALAC strongly objects.

Paragraph 268, Subsection 2b: The ALAC supports the ability of the IRP to reconcile conflicting “expert panel” decisions, but notes that such decisions will not simply be a judgement that the Bylaws were not followed. The proposal should allow for an IRP outcome that specifically addresses the IRP addressing such issues.

[Paragraph 268, Subsection 12: Should the diversity requirement mention panellist skill sets? All panellists may not be interchangeable. Does diversity trump skill sets?]

## Section 6. Community Mechanism as Sole Member Model

**Paragraph 319-334:** The ALAC supports the (5x5)+(2x2) model, with the understanding that should the ICANN Bylaws be altered to no longer have the SSAC members and Chair appointed by the ICANN Board, that the SSAC would be granted a weight of 5, commensurate with the importance of security and stability in ICANN's mission.

The ALAC would also support the (7x5) model should there be any overall support for this position (and in fact, some within the At-Large community strongly prefer this mechanism).

Under no condition would the ALAC support the (3x4)+(4x2) where the ALAC and the GAC are given less weight than the SOs.

## Section 7. Community Powers

**Section 7.1 Reconsider/Reject Budget:** The ALAC has concerns about the ability of the community to reject budget items related to a single SO or AC. Given the apparent view of some community members that particular groups should have lesser status than others, it could follow that these groups should also be denied financial support. The Board is given the responsibility of balancing the various needs and priorities of the constituent parts of ICANN and should be given the discretion to do so.

**Section 7.3 Removal of and Individual Director:** There must be an explicit statement (and perhaps waiver from each director) that there is no right to appeal, no right to claim unfairness to the Ombudsman, and no legal right related to libel, slander or defamation.

**Paragraph 407 and 409:** The process should be adjusted to allow for parallel removal of multiple directors without having to convene the ICANN Community Forum multiple times.

[Further discussion needed on Sebastien's comments on 7.4]

**Paragraph 429-430 Removal of the Board by a single SO:** The ALAC categorically rejects the minority view that a single SO be allowed to remove the entire Board.

## Section 8. Accountability Requirements

### Section 8.1 Diversity:

**Paragraph 467, Subsection 2:** The ALAC strongly agrees that diversity reviews should be included in the overall ICANN review program, and perhaps even a formal component of the AoC Reviews. However, this recommendation is too prescriptive. Although the ATRT is a possible place to perform diversity reviews, some past ATRT members believe that this would place an unreasonable load on the ATRT, removing focus from its original purpose and that the ATRT members might not be the best group to perform such a review.

**Paragraph 467, Subsection 3:** The ALAC notes that the sentence fragment after the closing parenthesis should be removed, as it is a rationale rather than part of the recommendation.

**Paragraph 465, Subsection 4:** The ALAC supports this recommendation and notes that it could be a sub-task of the Review team formed as part of Recommendation 2.

## **Section 9 Incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments**

**Paragraphs 580-587:** The ALAC strongly believes that this section must be adjusted to allow the “WHOIS” RT to address the appropriate issues for the then current Directory Services and should not be limited to the wording written into the 2009 AoC. Moreover, if the terms of reference of this review need to be further adjusted in the future, it makes no sense to assign this task to the AoC RT, which will have little expertise in this area. It should be assigned to the Whois RT.

**Paragraph 549:** As recommended for the Whois Review, all AoC Review Teams should be responsible for recommending revision to their respective Bylaws. The responsibility should rest with those who best understand the specific issues. The ATRT could have overriding rights to do so as well, but should not be solely an ATRT responsibility.

**Minority Statement from Eberhard Lisse:** The ALAC does not support this statement.

**Minority Statement by Sebastien Bachelet:** [Requires further discussion. AG:I support some of the comments, specifically those related to budget veto and the extraction of non-mission-critical AC/SO Bylaws into what is referred to as an “Operational Document”.]

**Minority Statement by Edward Morris:** The ALAC rejects most of what is being proposed. The only part that may have merit is ensuring that individuals or organizations do not exercise voting rights in multiple AC/SOs or subdivisions thereof. However, this would need to be carefully examined to ensure that such restriction fixes an accountability problem and does not merely restrict individual rights.