TERRI AGNEW:	…26th of August 2015 at 13:00 UTC.

On the English channel we have Tijani Ben Jemaa, Cheryl Langdon-Orr, Olivier Crépin-Leblond, Yasuichi Kitamura, Baudouin Schombe, Gordon Chillcott, Alan Greenberg, Eduardo Diaz, Sébastien Bachollet, and Glenn McKnight.

On the Spanish channel we have Aida Noblia.

I show apologies from Alberto Soto.

From staff we have Heidi Ullrich and myself Terri Agnew.

Our Spanish interpreters today are Veronica and David.

I would like to remind all participants to please state your name before speaking, not only for transcription purposes but also for our Spanish interpreters. Thank you very much and back over to you Olivier.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND:	Thank you very much Terri. Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking. And have we missed anyone in the roll call?

We have not. Okay. So the roll call is complete. Now we have to look at the agenda for today. Again, CCWG accountability. We've got a statement in the works, then we'll have IANA coordination group with also a statement in the works, and finally we, if we do have some time, we'll go through the matrix of the ICANN bylaws, or perhaps VeriSign root response transition proposal discussion in CWG IANA.

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.

Without any further ado, does anyone wish to make any amendments to the agenda, or add any other agenda items?

I'm not seeing any hands up, so the agenda is adopted. And we can go to the action items from our last meeting. It was only a few days ago. The first agenda item involves León Sanchez, and I do know that he had requested a dial out at the moment, that he was on the Adobe Connect. I cannot see him on the Adobe Connect. So I don't believe that he is with us, in which case, we'll probably will have to…

If no one else knows the outcome of this action item being to check on the document core verify with Becky, if no one knows the outcome of this, we'll have to come back to this one when León comes on the call.

And the next one is to do with the call, the Doodle, which of course, has been affected. So that's done. So please, can I ask staff, when León comes up, please notify us, and then we'll probably interrupt whatever work we're doing then and turn to this section to find out from León about core value five.

Next, agenda item number three. And that's the CCWG accountability, as you know. We have a statement that is currently in the works, and for this, I will turn the floor over to Alan Greenberg, who hopefully now has got his coffee ready, and he's ready to take this part of the call. We've got about 60 minutes for this. Alan Greenberg, you have the floor.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you very much. And I note there is the wrong document shown in the pod. There was a version that was added about six hours ago, that's version 3, rev 2 is the one we're looking for.

And also [CROSSTALK] while we are, are waiting for it. There has been a lot of changes done here. There was a version 3 posted for a while. What we will be looking at is the changes from both version 2 to version 3, and 3 to 3 rev 2. The changes are in a different color so we can differentiate between them, but I suspect most people haven't looked at either, so it doesn't really matter which.

The first item is, we really need, we'll have to wait for it to come up. Let me tell you what I've done. The first changes, the ones that will be showing in red, are the changes which essentially we discussed during the last meeting. The, or things that have been added completely, and there is one of the things that were not discussed. The changes that are in blue are incorporation of parts of Sébastien Bachollet's minority statement into the document.

The first one, which you'll see in a moment, or you can look at your private copies, is the lead in statement where Sébastien is concerned that the complexity, the multiple layers of the new methodology, of the new empowerment, will make ICANN very difficult to change, should change be necessary. He was talking about rigidity, stagnation, un-governability because the various aspects of the community may be headed in different directions.

I didn't feel comfortable going into that level of detail, but I have, in the statement where we say that we would have preferred less

enforceability, but we we're willing to live with, what we we're talking about, I've added the following sentence and I'll read it. That being said, the ALAC does support concerns expressed in Sébastien Bachollet's and I noticed I spelled his name wrong when it comes up, minority statement that the result and complexity and multi-tiered control, may make it overly difficult, or impossible, for ICANN to evolve.

The high threshold set to ensure difficulty in overriding the Board, may also allow certain parts of the community to have an effective veto over change that is in the public interest. And essentially what that says is, if indeed the remit of ICANN should be changing, but it is not in the interest, perhaps of contracted parties, perhaps of interest to registries in general, but would be deemed in the public interest, it may be very difficult to make those changes.

Now that may simply be something that we have to live with, but I think we need to note it. The document is now showing on the screen. And I guess I'll pause there. This is a strong statement. The question is, to what extent do we believe that, indeed, we want to say this? It wasn't something that we had in our original statement, but I personally think it's true. It goes along when we said we wanted less enforceability, we wanted less process.

And the process is something which may prevent something from happening, even though there is a strong will in the community, we may not get the numbers essentially. Or we may get some parts of the organization opting out, which means we do not meet the voting thresholds, or do not make the quorum thresholds if we have them.

And I have a tick from Cheryl, a tick from Olivier. I see no negatives, so I guess it stands. Thank you. The next change is a new one, which I may have discussed briefly, but I don't, but it wasn't in the document. It is at the bottom of page one. It goes along with something that Olivier, that Sébastien had noticed, and we'll be talking about in a moment. This is a change in what is currently core value four. And by the way, the core values are renumbered in the new version, so we have to be careful that when we're talking about old or new ones.

In this particular case, I think it's core value four in both cases, in both old and new, but I'm not 100% sure. And the old one read, to the extent feasible and appropriate, and that's the phrase that is the key one, feasible and appropriate, delegating coordinating functions to or recognizing the policy role of responsible entities, that reflect the interests of affected parties. Essentially, what has happened, is they have added, or we have added, at the end, an external expert bodies, I'm not 100% sure what that refers to.

And maybe Sébastien or, not Sébastien, Cheryl, I think might have been involved in this, I'm not sure, to explain it. But the key one, from my point of view, is removing the, to the extent feasible and appropriate. Now, that goes along with the general trend in ICANN to say things like the GNSO have an almost sacred responsibility to have all things related to policy.

It's one of the implications of the policy and implementation working group outcome that is in the process of being adopted. I think, personally think it gives the Board an escape hatch to say there are times in the public interest where it may have to act. That's out of

vogue in ICANN right now. So I'm not to what extent we can make any change, but the question is, do we want to raise the issue?

And the substantive statement is the last one, the change removes the Board's ability to override a SO, and particularly the GNSO. Now that's my comment to this group. I'm not saying we're going to word it that way in the final statement. So the question is, do we include this segment or not? Or this reference?

I think it's important, but I don't think we're going to win, and it may be something that we just end up being silent on. Cheryl, Sébastien, Olivier, Tijani, the people who have been very vocal on these kind of things, I would not mind some guidance on.

Everyone is silent. All right, then I take that as implying, no tick marks. Does that mean we leave it in for this draft?

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: I'm going hmmm, Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: Oh, okay. Well if you go hmmm…

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Hmmm, I'm quite ambivalent, and I'm certainly not humming in agreement, but hmmm.

ALAN GREENBERG: Leave it in temporarily and we'll review it…

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: Yeah. The thing is, it would be a square bracket, I think, yeah.

ALAN GREENBERG: All right. I'll leave it in the square brackets, but take out the white, but leave it in the square brackets. Take the highlighting rather. The highlighting just says it was in from left field that no one had mentioned before.

    All right. Eduardo, you have your hand up. Go ahead.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Alan, which paragraph are you talking about now?

ALAN GREENBERG: I'm looking at the bottom of page one in the statement, it's in highlighted in yellow, and it's in reference to paragraph 216.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Okay, okay, thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. We'll go onto the next one, 218. That's the one that was raised by Sébastien originally. And here too, there is the removal of a statement, of a phrase, to the extent feasible and appropriate. This

time it's in relation to market mechanisms governing the DNS, the DNS marketplace. So the current statement reads, where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a healthy, competitive environment in the DNS market that enhances consumer trust and choice.

That was in the previous version. The healthy and consumer trust and choice was added. This version, the consumer trust and choice was removed, I believe it moved somewhere else in the document, and the where feasible and appropriate was dropped, leaving, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a healthy and competitive environment in the DNS market.

Now, I believe, although ICANN is not technically a regulator, we have a responsibility for monitoring the DNS market, the gTLD market essentially, or perhaps even to seize, and I don't think we can walk away from our responsibility, to say whether if it's appropriate or not. We are not purely pushing the free market, we are looking at making the environment safe, nothing else.

Certainly stability and security trump the free market, and I don't think we can walk away from it.

Any thoughts, comments? In this case, I believe it's a strong statement and I don't think, don't see how we can walk away from it. Now the description of why we believe it is appropriate maybe needs to be enhanced, and if anyone has suggestions of words, certainly I think security and stability should be mentioned there.

All right. I see no negative comments, we're going to go along with that. The next one is the section on fundamental bylaws, section four, the first one is… This whole thing is related to the articles of incorporation. You'll remember that Avri raised an issue that she had not seen how changes to the articles of incorporation should, she misread something and thought the articles of incorporation could be changed unilaterally by the Board, and did not require member approval. That was incorrect, but in looking at those paragraphs, it became clear that the thresholds for changing the articles of incorporation was two-thirds, whereas for fundamental bylaws, the CCWG had increased the threshold to 75.

And I'm suggested that it be increased for the articles of incorporation also, that might be against California law. I'm not sure. So we may be stuck with the two-thirds in that case. But I think that all of these changes are in line with that. And Eduardo, you have your hand up.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Thank you Alan. Sorry. I got my speakers on. I wanted to comment on the previous one, paragraph 218.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay, go ahead.

EDUARDO DIAZ: My question there is, when we say that the ALAC disagrees with, but could not accept the removal of the reference to so and so and so. You know, if we say [inaudible], does that mean by… Well, my question is,

do we, will ALAC be one of the SOs that will be compelled to accept the CCWG proposal at the end?

And if so, if we say something like this, and it doesn't get into the final proposal, are we bind not to agree to, to attend that proposal because of that statement there.

ALAN GREENBERG: I don't think so. We're not bound by any decision that we make today, we can always change it. So I think Eduardo, your question is, if we are not successful in getting this phrase put back in, and by the way, there was a brief discussion of this, I put a comment into the chat, in the CCWG meeting yesterday, and Thomas picked it up quickly and said, "Well, can you point out what it is, so maybe we can fix it?"

So they're going to have to come up with a compelling reason why they removed that phrase, and I don't think they're going to make it. But your question is, if in the end, the phrase still stays out, are we bound to reject the whole report because of that? No, we can change our mind.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Okay. Thank you so much Alan. That was my question, thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay.

All right, back to the fundamental bylaws, yeah. So essentially just says that we should make the changes of articles of incorporation equivalent

to changing fundamental bylaws. There is also one paragraph where the wording is a little bit fuzzy, and I'm suggesting that they clear it up. But I don't think that's controversial, and if for some reason it's against California law to do that, then so be it. We live with whatever is there.

Sébastien, your hand is up.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Thank you Alan. When Eduardo asked you a question, I reread the last paragraph, just on top of fundamental bylaws, and the second line, it's written, but the ALAC cannot accept the removal. I guess of the, or something different that other, you have a typo there [CROSSTALK]…

And my question is that, I must know, but we discussed about the fact that we, it was my proposal in my statement and in other places, that we may end up to have fundamental bylaws, normal bylaws and operating principle. Maybe, I don't know where it is in the document, if it is, but I guess it's something we need to speak on, because it will decrease the number of difficulty we can have to enhance our own personal way of working [inaudible]. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. I agree, but I'm not sure we want to make a statement here. Let me go into a little bit of detail on that, because it's something that I've looked at in conjunction with the ALS criteria and expectations. There is lots of stuff in the bylaws right now, which is very detailed and very specific, to, you know, what RALOs do and what ALSs do and things like that.

And in many cases, it's wrong. It referred to something which was going to be there, but isn't, or and I believe we are the only SO or AC with that level of detail in the, in our description. So I think on the next revision of the bylaws, and going along with the ALS criteria, there will have to be a revision of the bylaws.

I think we're going to recommend that we get less specificity in the bylaws, and more in the external documents, because otherwise, we are locked into almost guaranteeing that bylaws are not being followed. So I'm not expecting a lot of push back, and I don't think… If you look, for instance, in the GNSO, in the last revision of the PDP rules, a lot of the things went out of the bylaws and went into external documents.

So I think we're going to be supported on that, and I'm not sure we need to put our statement in here. At least, that's how I'm feeling right now. And I think we're the only AC and SO with that level of detail. So I think we'll have support in removing that. So that's why I didn't put that in.

Sébastien is that…? Go ahead Sébastien.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yeah. I get your point, and I can understand and accept it. I will take again a look to the bylaw to see if it's not, if it's a [inaudible] or it's already done in one way, it will be done for At-Large the same way. And I just want to be sure that is the case for all of the parts. Everything that, for example, they are part of the [inaudible] that go too much into detail, even in how the Board is working, or subgroup are working, and

maybe put in operation document for the Board, and even if it's public and discuss and whatever.

But it's a general point of view. But I can accept your explanation and the way you want to under that.

ALAN GREENBERG: Certainly if there are any other ACs or SOs that have the level of detail we do, then we should look at it. But I suspect it's unique to us, and you know, I think it's because there was no other place to put stuff at the original time, because nothing else existed, that it was put into bylaws. But for instance, the bylaws refer to things in the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the RALOs, which in some cases aren't even there, but they make reference to them, because those bylaws were written way before.

Now we did make some changes about five, six years ago, but clearly not sufficient. So we do have a problem, but I'm hoping, you know, I'm actually hoping we can get some changes done before this even comes into effect.

Okay. But that is something that we should keep on noting. The next change is, what is it? Yeah, there was a reference to diversity on the IRP panels, and in fact, I had misread the document that it was talking about diversity in the three person panel, whereas in fact it was talking about diversity in the seven person, you know, super panel, and I think that's fine.

Let me just make sure we're not missing anything. Okay. The next one is under community powers. It was a section that was added essentially taking part of Sébastien's statement, and incorporating it, and it effects paragraphs 380 to 381. It's on page three of the document, if you scroll to it. And it essentially says that the, we should be depending more not on the escape hatch of vetoing a budget, but the evolving budget process.

Now the current document says, it does say that we need to enhance and strengthen the process, but says it's a work stream two feature. I think that we need to be a little bit more specific in what work stream one says. Do not simply say, well we discussed in work stream two, but give a little bit more guidance and commitment to exactly what it is we're going to do in work stream two, and to emphasize the fact that there has to be community involvement and sufficient time, and we have to have enough data to be able to do that properly.

So, the first paragraph, 380 to 381 says that. The second one, is I found it somewhat problematic. If you look at the original statement, 380 says we have to strengthen the process, and then the second paragraph starts with, accordingly, this new power gives the community the ability to veto or block a budget, and I don't see an accordingly at all. I see the new power as there if the new processes we're going to develop in work stream two, do not work.

And I think the report needs to be very clear, that these are an escape hatch. They're not part of the process to do it properly. It should really be the fail safe mechanism, and the enhancement should be what covers the real problem. And so I think, this sounds like just a wording

change, but I think it's a real crucial concept. And we have a hand from Tijani, go ahead please.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you Alan. Tijani speaking. I do agree with you 100% about the [inaudible] mentioned in work stream one, that the interaction with the community really [inaudible] budget should be [inaudible] should be [inaudible].   And that the involvement of the community would [inaudible] the possibility of [inaudible] the budget.

I don't think it is something that we can [inaudible] condition the veto or non-veto. So I think that we have to maintain it in work stream one more, and to make it clear that the involvement of the community [inaudible] not dependent on the meaning that [inaudible] or any other one. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Tijani, to be clear, do you accept what I have right now?   It's acceptable? Or do you believe that we really need to work out the details in work stream one? I believe that's going to be a much longer process and something that's going to be much more difficult, and I think we can do it in work stream one, but I think we need to flesh out the commitment, just a little bit better than we have right now.

So, are you saying the wording is sufficient or we need more?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Alan, I like the proposal in work stream one, to mention clearly that the involvement of the community in the development of the budget should be compulsory, and their involvement will not use the possibility of [inaudible]. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Okay. I think it already does say that. You may want to go back and read paragraph 380. Olivier, you have your hand up.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much Alan.   Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking.   My concern on this budget vetoing is that it started, when the discussion started, it was really a case of making sure that ICANN wouldn't do stupid things. So it wouldn't overspend [CROSSTALK]…

I think I'll wait until, okay, thank you. So that was the originally how the discussions, you know, we all ended up coming into these discussions, making sure ICANN doesn't do something things, or the ICANN Board doesn't decide to spend things on, you know, yachts, and brains, and I don't know what champagne and stuff.

And now, the more we're going into here, the more we're putting an emphasis into being able to veto the budget if we don't like it, for whatever reason that it is, and if we can convince another, enough parts of the rest of the community, then the budget will be vetoed. And I'm a little concerned about this. I'm not sure whether we can still say something about that in our statement, but I would hope that the vetoing of the budget would be an exceptional item, rather than every

year the threat of veto being waged against the Board, and against the, well primarily the Board I guess, to say, "Well, we're going to veto if you don't do this or if you don't do that." Thanks.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you Olivier. In the preceding paragraph which we already agreed to, we already expressing our concern that we believe the Board is there to balance the needs, and there is the potential with this power to, for some groups to be blocked, and particularly, we've already seen messages saying ACs aren't as important as SOs, and therefore, it could follow that because they're not as important, they should be denied money.

So we're already saying that. I'm not sure how we can make that a lot stronger, without becoming too defensive in our own right. If you can suggest some words, then we can certainly consider them. If you recall, we had pushed the designator model, which didn't have this power, and that's one of the reasons we ended up with this model because sufficient people in the group believed that this was absolutely essential. We're…

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Alan, it's Olivier speaking.

ALAN GREENBERG: Go ahead.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: I may follow up, thank you Alan. So I would just say that adding to this section 7.1, reconsider, reject, object, the first paragraph, so just before the blue text, I would say we could reinforce this by adding one more sentence and by saying any budget veto that would weaken the ability of the Board to balance various needs and priorities of the constituent parts of ICANN is unacceptable.

That sends a really strong signal that this is a red line for us. We're not going to start letting the community go against the Board for trying to balance the different needs of the community out there.

ALAN GREENBERG: I'm not sure how one differentiates in a bylaw, a change which stops the Board from balancing, versus a change which the community, in general, disagrees with completely. You'll recall, not on a budget issue, but when the Board attempted to follow an ATRT recommendation and changed a threshold regarding GAC advice, and that's to say, it only needed a majority of the Board instead of a super majority of the Board to override, or something like that. I don't remember the details.

There was a community uprising including the ALAC, I personally didn't support it, but the ALAC did make a strong statement saying we don't like it, and the Board backed down. So, you know, how do you differentiate between a change that impacts a single community, and there is widespread support for with a change that impacts a single community and is malicious, as it were?

From the GAC's point of view, the community ganged up against them. But we were one of them. So, I'm just not sure how to word the kind of

statement you want, or how one would word it in the bylaws. May I suggest you send some words to the list and we'll look at them? I didn't capture exactly what you were writing.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah, thanks Alan. I'm equally as [inaudible], I'll draft a couple of sentences now and put them in the chat.

ALAN GREENBERG: I mean, we can make demands, but unless we can come up with sample words that would pass muster in the bylaws, I'm not sure how we can ask for it, and I don't know, you know, we're saying the Board should have discretion. But how do we differentiate the Board having reasonable discretion, and the Board making a ridiculous, you know, decision that we disagree with? I don't know.

Okay. Next, changes are, again, in regard to community powers. This time, removal of individual directors. And I've added a statement, which reflects the fact a number of people in the community, and I really don't know if it's a majority or not, which way the majority is in the community. Says, the At-Large community supports the concept of removing individual SO AC appointed Board members, but is divided over whether this power should be vested in the appointing SO AC, or with the community mechanism as the sole member.

Maybe this is a good time to look for ticks. I've made it clear, I support the SO AC removing individual Board members. Sébastien has expressed concern with it. Tijani had some original concern. I know

Olivier has said he was to be convinced. Where do we sit on this? Are we sort of straddling the wall, or is there really a majority on one side or the other? Sébastien, you have your hand up.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yes, thank you Alan. Sébastien Bachollet. Yeah, it's… The discussion is a little bit more complex than that, from my point of view. It's not too much the fact that we have the possibility, as an At-Large or the other SO to remove a Board member, or that we have the possibility in this proposal to recall the all Board, I think that, at least my point of view, I guess it was also the AFRALO point of view with a different proposal, is to have the possibility for the community, and for the community mechanism as a sole member, to remove Board members up to a certain number or totally.

But not to have the choice between, I remove my Board member, or I participate in the recall of the whole Board. That we have the possibility to do that step by step, or [inaudible]. And because at the end, we, I have no problem that we can recall our Board member, even if I think it's crazy because we elect those members for three years, and it's a short time, but we can do it.

My point, my question is more the granularity possibility that, offered to the community to remove Board members, and to do it collectively, not SO AC, each one, each SO and AC. That could be a better way to go. And once again, it's a question, it's a question you will raise. I disagree, but I can live with it's a question. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you. Tijani?

                             Do we…? Yeah, go ahead.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Okay, thank you. Tijani speaking. As we know, the original position of AFRALO was not [inaudible] the removal of a director by the appointing body, and [inaudible]…

                             The reason put forward at the beginning was that the California jurisdiction doesn't [allow] the removal of directors, but by the appointing body. It says the appointing body should be the removal one, and now, when we decided to go sole member, the sole member would be the appointer and the removing body, officially. But some people in our community, in the community in general, doesn't want that.

                             And they found [inaudible] to make the SO or AC who appointed the director, to be the sole one who has the right to remove. This is only absolutely unacceptable, but what made [inaudible] accountability better, was perhaps the creation of this forum and discussion in the forum, the obligation for the SO or AC who will remove the director to come and explain why they are removing the director. And the ability of the director to be [inaudible] inside these forum.

                             This was something that made us more [inaudible] about this. But now [inaudible] the webinar, someone said the forum is informal. I was reading hoping the forum was not formal, it was official, or official structure. And it becomes an official or optional, everything will be no

good. And we come back to the first case, means that we will reject the [inaudible].

So my point of view, in ALAC and At-Large we have at least, and in AFRALO, we have the conviction that the community must be the one who removes the director, if [inaudible]. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you Tijani. Eduardo?

EDUARDO DIAZ: Yes. I wanted to say in the case that, you know, my point of this is that it should be a sole member, and instead of the individual SO and AC appointed Board member, by the individual SO. It could be a case that, you know, ALAC wants to remove a Board member from another SO. So in order to do to that specific individual, in order to do that, we would have to go to that SO and convince them to take the member out, if we leave the fact that just removing, you know, the SOs have the ability to remove their own from that individual.

So I would say that, you know, we have to start between the two, I will go for sole member, it's simple. And we'll take care of all of these issues. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Yeah. Thank you. I think you have to be careful what you're asking for. I think we said categorically before, that the community must not have the ability to remove a director from an AC SO without the agreement

of that AC SO. If we're suggesting that it is purely the community, according to the normal rules, all the other ACs and SOs can essentially say, we don't like the At-Large director, so [CROSSTALK].

So you know, be careful what you ask for, because we may in fact get it.

EDUARDO DIAZ: Can we leave this both ways of doing this?

ALAN GREENBERG: Well, look. At this point, I think the chances of changing this, the people who believe that an AC or SO should have the ability to remove their own director, you know, I believe that, but I can live with the community doing it. There are many who do not. And we have thrashed this out in the working group many times, and I do not think it's going to change.

What I put here is a statement that there are many, but not all in At-Large, who believe that is the incorrect way to go. I don't think we can make a stronger statement than that. And regarding Tijani's comment on what Thomas said. What Thomas said, I find is rather unimportant. The document is saying that you must go through the community forum process, as one of the steps in this process.

Now, if everyone chooses to not listen, we can't stop that. We can't force people to listen, we can't force people to participate in something, but the process is part of it, and if I recall, Tijani, you agreed that if there is that process there, you can live with it. I'm not sure we can go back,

and there are people within At-Large who believe that the process, as defined in the report right now, is acceptable.

So I don't think we can say something stronger than the words I already have there. I understand AFRALO did not agree with it, and they may still not agree with it, but there are other parts of the community as well. So I'm not sure how we can make a statement very much stronger than that.

And similarly, for Sébastien's suggestion that also may have come from AFRALO, of removing, instead of we haven't gotten to the whole Board yet, but saying we can remove multiple directors, well again, that has been raised multiple times in the CCWG, and simply raising it again, I don't think, is an effective way of us interacting at this point and getting our comment to be listened to.

Tijani you have your hand up again, or is that an old one?

That's an old one. So if someone feels strongly, then please, on the list, give some replacement words that you think represent the community better than the words I've drafted. I'm not sure how we can make it a lot stronger, and still have credibility given what's happened up until now.

Section 7.4, recalling the entire Board. I have a section there saying we believe it would be extremely damaging to ICANN operationally, and might signal to the rest of the Internet community that ICANN is not viable. The ALAC would far prefer relying on surgical removal of problematic individual Board members, rather than this nuclear operation.

Again, I'm not sure how we can make it a lot stronger. And I personally would object to saying that this a go to the wall drop dead issue, because I think that will put us in a very awkward position, as we go forward. Sébastien go ahead.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yeah. I think that you write well what is the feeling. I did agree with the fact that we will be able to have the old Board, but at the same time, the way you write the point of view of At-Large, I guess it's a good one, and it allows us to be part of the decision. It's a decision make one day, in the same time we explain why we have some reservation on the way it's done. I would like very much to have two things. The first one, you didn't get the answer to your previous question, it's who, where is the majority.

Not because I would like to be way not, are losing on who… If we, as a collective group, we think more, we agree with removing other Board member, but then it's not for that objective. My position is more acceptable than the other, but I would like to know what are the feelings really of this community.

And the second point, if we recall the old Board, I want to raise gain one of my issue with that. At the end, if we do not interim Board, but the new Board, will be selected by all the bodies, and one body will have the majority within the Board at once. I know that it's a multistakeholder body that is doing that, but it's something that we need to be careful, because we talk about one Board and we want to prevent that.

Then we don't know how the Nominating Committee will be tomorrow. And we can have a rouge Nominating Committee. If we not, but we're not for the Board either, and they will select a Board member that the majority of the Board, and we have to be… I am concerned by that, as a way to, one way capture the Board for the next one year at least, and maybe the next few years. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you Sébastien. Let me address the two things you raised. I didn't go forward and say, "Let everyone put up an X," because I don't know how the voting in this group would turn out, which side. I suspect we would end up with a majority with an AC SO removing their person. But I'm not sure this group that are on this particular call are necessary representative, number one, and number two, there are a number of people who feel very strongly in the opposite direction.

And therefore I think our statement has to reflect that, even if it's a minority. So from that perspective, you know, I didn't go through with it. It might be an interesting poll, but I'm not sure it's really going to end up changing the statement in any significant way because of that.

On replacing the Board, if the whole thing, if the whole Board is removed, or for that matter, if we simply remove a bunch of the NomCom appointees, the problem is the same. And yes, that does put a lot of trust in the NomCom. I think, I don't know how other groups select their NomCom representatives, and we have more than any single other group has.

You know, the GNSO has six or seven, I don't remember which, but they're selected by individual subgroups, whereas the ALAC has the full responsibility. I don't think we exercise enough control and discretion in that. I don't think we put our NomCom appointees to a test of finding out exactly what they think before appointing them.

I think, to a large extent, rubber stamp that, and I think that's a mistake. I think we should be exercising a lot more thought in how we appoint our NomCom representatives. Once they're there, they're on their own, but I think we should be doing a lot more to interact with them before that, and interact in a general sense afterwards. And we have to be able to trust them, because that is the process we're using.

But I think it does highlight the fact that this is a really important responsibility, and in many cases, we give it to people without the background to exercise it properly. And I think we have to look at that very carefully within At-Large.

So Tijani, go ahead.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you Alan. We are not [inaudible] very good our appointees to the NomCom. I don't think that we have to [control] them. We don't brief them, and we don't have a common understanding and sufficient discussion about the role of the NomCom member yet, which is [right], and we need to do that.

But, and we need to make all our appointees on the same level of knowledge, not of knowledge, but of the [inaudible] needed to be

there. So, controlling, I don't agree with that, but making all of our appointees with the [inaudible] and having the same, at least the same understanding of their role, is something very important, and I agree with you. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you. If I use the word controlling while they're on, while they're acting on the NomCom, that would certainly was an inappropriate word on my part. But we should, you know. It is fair game, for instance, if we feel, for instance, that the next directors should have a certain background, we have an obligation to A, tell them, and B, we can reject the NomCom appointee if they don't agree with what we're saying.

We can't, once they're appointed, they're on their own. But we can select people based on what they believe in, and trust that they will follow through on those stops. So I think it's something that we need to be thinking about more than we are right now, and the concept of the NomCom naming eight people in one year, just reinforces that.

All right. Tijani, is that a new hand or an old one? It's an old one, and I get a tick mark from Sébastien, thank you very much. The next changes is just a very small one, and that changes the comment on Sébastien's statement to say, to remove the square bracketed one and to simply say, the ALAC supports certain aspects of the minority statement, and has incorporated those aspects into the body of the statement.

And I ask Sébastien if you in your own time, but very quickly, can go through and see is there anything that you believe should have been reflected which was not incorporated, and let us know so that we can

consider it at our next and perhaps last meeting. Apparently you've done it already, so your hand is up Sébastien, go ahead.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yes, thank you Alan. Sébastien Bachollet. Yeah I have done it, and I really thank you because you incorporated a lot of our discussion of my proposal, and you [inaudible] in a good way. And I really think that it's good. I have other point of view, but I don't think that it's for ALAC to take them onboard, and I may come with my own comment.

But I really feel this proposal, it's a good one, and it's a good way for At-Large and ALAC to express its opinion on this second draft of work stream one for accountability. Thank you for your work on that Alan, thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you very much Sébastien. I appreciate it. Anything else? We have a little bit work to do, there are a few more statements. The reference to core value four paragraph 216, I'm going to be looking for some input on as to whether we want to keep that or not. That's in reference to the deferring, the Board fully deferring to SOs and other bodies in terms of setting policy.

I don't think there is anything else specific. There are a number of small things, and as noted, I distributed late last night, the set of the mission, the mission commitments and core values, principles and core values, which shows the changes. There were, the highlighting in green, sorry, in red and blue may not be quite accurate. I caught a few places where

Becky had, Becky Burr who had put this document together, had missed wording that was added or subtracted.

So you know, look carefully when you see the size of the paragraph of the left and right, it's different, to make sure that there is no highlighting missing, but I think we need to go through this somewhat carefully, and make sure that nothing else got slipped in, particularly in the second draft that we hadn't noticed before. So there may be other items here that are changes, these are really critical changes, so I think we need to pay a fair amount of attention to them.

And that's all I have. Olivier, I'll turn it back to you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you Alan. [CROSSTALK]

ALAN GREENBERG: Sorry, we have two hands up. I'll presume they're for me, and I'll keep on running it. Tijani, go ahead.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you Alan. Tijani speaking. AFRALO just finished the draft of its statement. It is now under approval of the full AFRALO community, so I will share with you if you want the link, I would think, and the [inaudible] also the main points, and I will also comment on this last draft you did, this version two, with the one which is now made on the screen. I will comment on it for this shortly, perhaps by tomorrow. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you very much. To the rest of the group, to the extent that Tijani identifies anything where AFRALO is very much at odds with what we're saying, or there is something missing, then please comment on it because it's important to understand, is this something, are these positions that are commonly held, or is it indeed a minority position, and you know, we have to live with that.

So I'll certainly do the same, but I ask other people to do also. We have Sébastien and then Olivier.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yes, thank you Alan. Sébastien Bachollet. I wanted to raise that Olivier made a lot of comments on the document we have now on the screen, and I try to comment all of the comments, and I think it's a very good exercise to go through, and I don't know if we can do that during this call or if it's for another one.

But I think it's very important that we go through the bylaw proposed changes. And my second point is that I may not be able to join you tomorrow from my time at the webinar. I will be driving to Germany, and I am not sure I will find an Internet connection where I will be. But I will try. Thank you.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you very much. Olivier.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much Alan. Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking. And I was going to comment in the same way that Sébastien has. Are you planning to go through the core values document today? Or are we moving this to a future call? I'm just a [inaudible] time at the moment, and I do also believe we have to go through that.

ALAN GREENBERG: I would suggest people do it individually and raise issues so that we could do them on our last call, which I believe is Thursday morning, or Thursday morning my time.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay, that's the 24 hour thing, Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: If we had time, yes we could do it, but I wasn't planning to do it, and I personally haven't looked at it carefully enough at this point to identify any hot spots that I found. So I wasn't planning to do it, if time permits, we could, but we only have a half hour left, so let's see how the time goes.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thanks very much Alan. Oliver…

ALAN GREENBERG: We may not have a lot more to do, so we may have time to go back.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Well, wishful thinking. As it always is. Let's bank this. It's Olivier speaking. Let's bank this for tomorrow. That also, I guess, includes the stress 18, and the results in bylaw change on the GAC advice as well, etc. They're quite a few flags that are raising up there, and it would probably would benefit people to have at least 24 hours to read through those bylaw changes.

And as I understand some of the points, there will be further documents that will be coming our way as well, with regards to the affirmation of commitment as well being ported over. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Yeah, thank you. Just one item on stress test 18. I have had some problems with that, and as we know, the GAC has severe heartburn over it. My personal opinion is I believe the intent of stress test 18 is good. I think the wording is bad, and I actually have been talking to Cheryl, who was responsible for all of the stress test work, to see if we could do some rewording, which may make it a little bit clearer.

So you may hear something on that in the next 12 hours or so. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thanks very much Alan. Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking. And now, let's move on to our next statement. And the next statement is about the ICG public consultation. This one has always been drafted in

parallel. I wonder if staff could please turn over to the public comment page with the, well actually, which one would be easier?

Yeah, let's start with the public comment page please, with the proposed statement. I don't see any ICG members on the call. So I was going to ask whether there was any update on ICG matters, but I'm not seeing either Jean-Jacques Subreant nor Mohamed El Bashir. In the meantime, an upload is in progress. Terri, how is that coming along?

TERRI AGNEW: Yes, one moment. And Mohamed has joined on the call.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. So maybe I could ask Mohamed to give us just a quick update of the ICG progress? Has there been any progress or movement since we have last spoken to you? Mohamed El Bashir?

If Mohamed is able to speak.

TERRI AGNEW: And I apologize. He was connected just a few moments ago. It looks like now he has disconnected.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thanks very much Terri. No worries. So we now have on our screen, something which is a little different from what we had a couple of days ago. If you recall, a couple of days ago we had very, very short statement that was essentially a handful of lines that was speaking

about the event of an operational community reaching the decision to replace the IANA functions operator, discussing their decision with other operational communities prior to proceeding forward.

And also a warning of our concern, the ALAC's concern regarding a split, resulting in IANA functions being undertaken by more than one IANA functions operator. And this concern being that it would be likely to introduce instability. Now, this text is actually included somewhere on the template, which is now on your screen. What I have done is to take our input text, which is currently on the Wiki, and perhaps Terri, could you put the link to the Wiki page on the, I can actually put it there myself, there we go.

The link to the Wiki page in the chat. That Wiki page is our policy development page for developing a statement on this page. And on there, you'll have the original text that we had. That text is now embedded somewhere on that template. What the ICG did was to provide a full template asking questions, and for different communities to be able to reply, and I guess this, in a way, would help the ICG being able to collate all of the information, and categorize it, and so on, and being able to make the consultation more useful.

What I have done in the past few hours is to provide some answers that I felt were based on our discussion, the views of the At-Large community. This is a draft, and what I was going to suggest is that we read through those quickly. It's only a handful of questions, so we should be able to take the next 10, 15 minutes on this.

I don't think there is very much else to discuss as far as the CWG IANA is concerned. Alan, correct me if I'm wrong, do we have…? I mean, I don't think that the IANA CWG does have so much going on.

ALAN GREENBERG: I don't think so. We could certainly discuss the issue of the appeal that seems to have died out on the mailing list. This is the concept of, that the CWG said there must be an appeal for the, for IANA decisions. The other thing that was discussed on the CWG, CCWG is, I believe, there has been a misreading of the CWG report that talks about the…

If you remember, the IFR could trigger a special cross community working group to look at separate ability, to look at separation. And there were words that were put into there that said, essentially, the community mechanism decided by the CCWG should be used to make certain decisions. The CWG has read that to say they must design a new process to do that. Avri, who authored that document, and I who have read it with some care, said that was a misreading, that at the time the CWG report was created, we had no idea what the community mechanism would be, so we tried to refer to it using those words.

But now that the community mechanism is known, the wording could be replaced. So I think that's a red herring that we spent too much time talking about, and it's not really an issue. [CROSSTALK] …but nothing really, I think, that concerns us.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: It's Olivier speaking. Let's focus back on the template that we now have on the screen. And the first question that was being asked was for completeness and clarity. Is the combined proposal complete? Each of the operational community proposals contain aspects to be completed in the future, when the proposal implemented. Is the combined proposal specified in sufficient detail such that it can be evaluated against the NTIA criteria?

My proposed response for this is yes, I think we could write either just a yes word, or we could write a 10 page document about how incomplete we think some parts of this document are. But the perfect is the enemy of the good in that case. And in general I would say, and I haven't seen anyone raise any concerns in our discussion, that this proposal, the ICG proposal all together has got some significant parts missing as far as implementation is concerned.

I'm sure we'll build those implementation parts when implementation takes place. Any comments or should we just move on?

Don't see anyone putting their hand up. Number two, compatibility and interoperability.   Do the operational community proposals work together in a single proposal?   Do they suggest any incompatible arrangements, where compatibility appears to be required?   Is the handling of any conflict between the functions resolved in a workable matter? And my proposed text as a response is, pending arrangements to be made about intellectual property issues around IANA and IANA dot org, the ALAC believes that the proposals are compatible with each other.

The ALAC notes that the ICANN Board has pointed toward an amicable transfer of this property to a third party, possibly a trust. And in fact, during this call, I have seen some further emails which point to this issue being resolved as well. Is there anything else that you believe we should be adding in this compatibility and interoperability segment?

Bearing in mind, I am going to include the text, or we will see the text that Tijani mentioned about the separation of the IANA functions later on in this, in this document. Tijani Ben Jemaa, you have the floor.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you Olivier. Regarding the [inaudible], Tijani speaking. I think that [inaudible] shouldn't say that the prefer [inaudible] or anything, because I think that the most important thing for us is that the three operational communities agree on a solution. So it is their function, because we want those [inaudible] to be accessible for all the three communities.

And as you said before, it is not a real problem, and at the end, it is not a problem. So we do not have to sort of expect any point of view regarding this, to whom it must be given. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you Tijani. So what I would take from what you said here… It's Olivier here. What I would take is to just delete that second paragraph, just keep the first paragraph. The second paragraph being this one here, the ALAC notes that the ICANN Board has appointed to an

amicable transfer of this probably to a third party, possibly a trust. Put that aside. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: I would actually leave that in, or maybe replace it with something saying, the ALAC will support any mechanism which the name, which preserves the future rights of the names community.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: And that has the agreement of the three operational communities.

ALAN GREENBERG: Well of course, it's going to have to have the agreement of the three operational communities.

I mean, I can say that supports the needs of all three communities. I can live with that, that's fine as well. I mean, the statement that you have Olivier, the second one, is I think it's fine there. It says there is light at the end of the tunnel. We think it's going to be achievable. The philosophical statement should proceed it perhaps.

But I really don't think this is a really huge issue that we have to comment on. It's clearly something that is going to have to be settled to go forward. So weighing in on it, I don't find the most important thing in the world. [CROSSTALK]

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: …Alan, that perhaps we don't need to [inaudible] because it's not important [inaudible], thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks for this Tijani and thanks for this Alan. Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking. I've put some text on the chat, which effectively captures what Alan has said. The ALAC will support any mechanism which preserves the existing rights of the naming community, and has the agreement of all three operational communities.

Let's move further down. Further down, accountability. Do the operational community proposals together, include appropriate and properly supported independent accountability mechanisms for running the IANA functions? Are there any gaps in overall accountability under the single proposal?

Now in drafting this one line response, my train of thought was that the accountability, ICANN accountability CCWG would do its work, and that other communities have done their work as far their own internal accountability was concerned. And therefore my proposed response here was, the ALAC believes that issues of operation accountability, operational, sorry, accountability have been suitably addressed within the remit of the operational community mandates in developing their proposals. Alan Greenberg, you have the floor.

ALAN GREENBERG: Yeah. You say that later on you are addressing the concern that Tijani has raised on the, making sure that there is cooperation should there

ever be a real problem. Is that correct that you have a reference to that?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: That's correct, yes, regarding stability. It's all based on the stability factor.

ALAN GREENBERG: Then I think this statement should have a forward pointer to it.

You know, but note the ALAC does have some related concerns, and point to it or something like that.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Let me just add this, so that's three…

ALAN GREENBERG: The reason it's not accountability as such, but accountability basically says, accountability says, we will have the mechanisms to do things right in the future. And that possible clash is where that may break down.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you for this Alan. Tijani Ben Jemaa, you're next.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you Olivier. I don't think that, the concern I raised [inaudible] accountability, it is more, how do you say, the harmony of the proposal,

and how it is, if you want, how it is not a compilation, it is more [inaudible], it's more, how do you say, [inaudible] more than compliance in the proposal. Because in the proposal, several parts together, a puzzle.

We perhaps make some dysfunction during the operation of the IANA. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks for this Tijani. Alan Greenberg.

ALAN GREENBERG: Yeah, thank you Tijani. I think that's exactly what I was trying to say. That the, this question asks about independent accountability, and the answer is that it's there, but put together, there may end up being some problems. And I was just referring to the later concerns. So we're answering indeed, they're separate questions, and it's not relevant, but it's a very closely, it's a tied-in related factor, which is why I suggested putting a forward reference to it.

I am not going to die on it not being there, but that was just a preference. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much Alan. Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking. And what I've taken from our discussion here is that, is to add in, or response to question three, note that as in its response to question, and I haven't got the number there but I'll put it there, on stability and integrity of the

DNS, the ALAC has related concerns on the accountability mechanisms as they coordinate with each other in each of the operational communities.

Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Sorry, that hand should be down. I'm fine with that. When I see what's the final statement is later on, I'll tell you whether this was a good forward reference or not. But I'm happy with it now.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Immediately after this call, I will do a red line document and I'll add it to the Wiki, so everyone will be able to comment on it on the Wiki.

ALAN GREENBERG: It's pretty hard if your original document is all red. Joke, joke.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Another thing…

ALAN GREENBERG: It doesn't need a response.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Here's my response. Even harder if you're color blind. Now let's move to number four, and that's the workability. Do the results of any tests

or evaluations of workability that were included in the operational community proposals conflict with each other, or raise possible concerns when considered in combination?

So on this occasion, that to me, translated as, does any of the operational communities mandate something that is direct [inaudible] of the other recommendations from the other communities? I didn't see any raised in our working group. So the answer is, the ALAC does not believe that there are conflicts remaining. I realize it might be a very optimistic note here.

If you think that there are, please put your hand up. Tijani Ben Jemaa, you have the floor.

I'm afraid you might be muted Tijani, on this occasion.

TERRI AGNEW: And this is Terri. Tijani's line has disconnected, but we'll go ahead and try to get him back on.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you Terri. Let's move on then and we'll come back to this when Tijani is back online, if you could please let us know. And I note from Terri that the interpreters are able to stay an additional 10 minutes, and we'll probably need this time.

Question five, do you believe the proposal support enhances the multistakeholder model? If yes, please explain. If not, please explain,

sorry. If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

And the response here, the ALAC believes that the proposed, the proposal supports the multistakeholder model as long as the balance of stakeholders will be kept in the future. The ALAC warns against any particular stakeholder group exercising over influence in future multistakeholder policy development, and asks that all times decisions should be made to enhance the public interest.

Are there any comments or thoughts regarding that?

On this occasion, I guess the recommendation that it enhances the multistakeholder model. And I'm not quite sure whether the proposal actually, I'm sure it supports the multistakeholder model, but does it actually enhance the multistakeholder model? Sébastien Bachollet.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yes. Thank you Olivier. Sébastien Bachollet. It's not really what is written here, but when you write, as long as the balance of stakeholder will be kept in the future, we have to be very careful on how we use the word on this balance of stakeholders, because for example, if we take the Board composition, we I guess still think that we own two Board members.

And then if we write that, we may have this sentence coming back and saying, but you were okay with the current situation of the balance of stakeholder. And we might be careful on how we use this type of word.

And that's the same question you ask, is it [inaudible], is it keeping difficult worthy, but important to keep in mind. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much Sébastien. That's a very valid point. And I'm not quite sure how to redraft this. Maybe as long as, instead of the balance of stakeholders, as long as a balance of stakeholders will be kept in the future. Perhaps, or a balance of stakeholders will… Whatever. I can think of a word right there and then. Tijani Ben Jemaa, you're back. We're on question five now, and if you can comment on Q5, and then we'll go back to question four afterwards.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Okay. So I will wait until come back to question four.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you. Alan Greenberg.

ALAN GREENBERG: I think what you need here is silence. The proposal supports the multistakeholder model, whether it enhances it, questionable. I don't think we need to say anymore. I would be silent on the whole issue of maintaining the balance.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. So it's Olivier speaking. So you say, we would just say, the ALAC believes the proposal supports the multistakeholder model, and that's it.

ALAN GREENBERG: I think so. I mean, the ITF has immense control over the rest of us, in setting the standards. We can all participate in the ITF should we choose to, and should we have the resources that can match those with money who do so, but as has been demonstrated if you've been following the IANA plan list, you know, individuals can have an effect. And you know, but that doesn't alter the fact that the ITF as an entity has immense control, and that's, we've designed it that way.

So I'd be careful about talking about how it evolves over the future, and prescribing or forbidding some particular change. I don't think that the ICG report presents any real break in the current multistakeholder model, and whether it enhances it, I think that's overreaching, but it certainly supports it.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thanks for this Alan. So I take it that we can just have a one-liner here, that the ALAC believes that the proposal supports the multistakeholder model and keep it at that. I don't see anyone saying anything against it. So that's fine. Let's go back then to question four. Tijani Ben Jemaa, on workability.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Okay. Thank you Olivier. I think that it is the workability [inaudible], and this question that our concern of the [inaudible] of the three proposals comes, it is because this [inaudible] may have some dysfunction because it is not done in a way that it is only one proposal taking into account, especially the decision making [inaudible], where we, one decision may affect other things.

And I think that we may have to treat IANA or PTI, as everyone, not as three different PTIs. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much for this Tijani. It's Olivier speaking. I'm trying to get my head around what you're saying, which is very valid indeed, but I wonder, I mean, these are tests or evaluation of workability. I wonder if I can turn to Cheryl Langdon-Orr, if she can suggest text on this, or what her thought is.

ALAN GREENBERG: She's only on Adobe Connect, not on the call.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Oh, she's not on the call.

ALAN GREENBERG: She had to leave for another call.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. So that's a bit of a problem. Olivier speaking. We'll have to work on this. Alan Greenberg?

ALAN GREENBERG: Yeah. Just give me a second.

I don't think any of the tests demonstrated a problem. So to the extent I've read them, and I haven't done a lot, I'm happy with that statement at this point. I'm going to read over your whole statement afterwards, and I may come up with some suggestions, but at this point, one by one, I'm happy with what you have.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks for this Alan. I've put it with a question mark at the moment. We're going to have to have to look at this further. I note on the chat that Cheryl says, "There are no problems identified as such." So by the tests or evaluations of workability, but Tijani has raised this point. So we'll take this afterwards, we'll follow-up with email and on the next call.

Let's go to question number six now. Do you believe the proposal maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary. And I think that this is one of the location where I've added Tijani's points in our original statement.

And I've actually rejigged it, so the second part is in the first part, and the first part is in the second part. Alan Greenberg before I read through this? Or…

ALAN GREENBERG: Yes please, if you could. Just a question. I presume they are using the term DNS in it superset. That's not just the Domain Name System, but the full set of registries operated by IANA. Is that the right context?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: That is correct Alan. It's Olivier speaking. Yes. And just for everyone here, it's Olivier speaking. For everyone here, the DNS as used by the NTIA stewardship transition, by the NTIA itself, is defined as being the full set of protocols, IP addresses, and naming. Not only the dynamic naming system itself.

So the, thanks.

ALAN GREENBERG: Did you just define, redefine the word D, the D in DNS?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Did I just define D in DNS? No.

ALAN GREENBERG: Redefine it. I thought it was Domain not Dynamic.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Did I just say dynamic? Okay. Must be the sun. Okay.

Let's have a look at this. So the ALAC is particularly concerned about maintaining the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS, as every single Internet end user around the world relies on a stable DNS for their Internet use. And the two next paragraphs are a split, resulting in IANA functions being undertaken by more than one IANA functions operator, would be likely to introduce in [inaudible].

The ALAC therefore recommends that although no measures were introduced by the IANA coordination group to increase direct operational coordination between the operational communities, this should be promoted as implementation phase, with the aim to reduce the likelihood of a split in IANA functions operators. This direct operational coordination should take place as enhanced communication and continuous dialogue.

In the event of the operational community reaching the decision to replace the IANA functions operator, they should discuss their decision with other operational communities, prior to proceeding forward, seeking always to keep all of the IANA functions undertaken by a single IANA function operator. Just reach into the text as it was before. Alan Greenberg.

ALAN GREENBERG: One very minor wording change. The end of the first line of the third paragraph, to replace their IANA functions operator.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Replace their IANA functions… Okay.

ALAN GREENBERG: Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you for this Alan. Tijani, are you okay with this, the text as it is? I think that this feel very well under the stability and resiliency of the DNS section.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: I find it wonderful. Thank you Olivier.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay, thank you Tijani. Let's scroll further down. We haven't got that much to go. Number seven, do you believe the proposal meets the needs of expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why, blah, blah, blah, and so on and so forth.

So the answer is, proposed answer is, the ALAC believes that the proposal meets the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services. In the ALAC definition of customer, each and every Internet user is a customer due to their use of the DNS and their Internet related activities. The ALAC reinforces, and I think, its assertion that the Internet would not be the Internet without Internet users, and the notion of a customer of the DNS is user-centric.

That's a statement made that goes further than just answering the question, the floor is open.

And I do apologize for having drafted these so late. You probably do need some time to digest them. So maybe we can, for these last few of them, we can go through them and we will be able to pick up the discussion during our next call. If it's a bit too much to take at this late stage, after already 90 minutes on the call. Tijani Ben Jemaa.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Yes, thank you. Discuss [inaudible] as defined, as defined by the NTIA and by ICANN, I'm not what you are seeing now, so I like it, but I don't know it will be accepted or if it will be understood as we understand it now. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks for this Tijani. It's a valid point that you bring up. I'm not sure I agree with it though. It's Olivier speaking, sorry. The NTIA, in its definition of customer in the affirmation of commitments, actually has the Internet user as being the customer.

Unless there is another definition of customer in the NTIA text. Let's look into this. We'll look into that further. Let's bank this and move to the next question. We'll put this in square brackets.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: No, I like it Olivier.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks Tijani, yeah. Well, should we be as bold as to put this on there? This is the question here. But we'll come back to it. We don't need to make the decision on the spot right now. Now number eight, do you believe the proposal maintains the openness of the Internet? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why, etc.

The ALAC believes that the proposal indeed maintains the openness of the Internet by keeping the processes by which the IANA functions are performed as close as possible to the status quo.

I thought that was quite uncontroversial, I think. Any comments on that?

Alan Greenberg.

ALAN GREENBERG: Only that's it going to inflame some people. There are people that believe the status quo is, ICANN rules supreme, and that is the status quo that they do not want to see preserved. So your call.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Perhaps, it's Olivier speaking. Perhaps not use the word status quo?

ALAN GREENBERG: How about, performed as close as possible to the current operational status which all parties agree is good, or some better word, I don't know.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Satisfactory.

ALAN GREENBERG: It's more than satisfactory. I think you can say more than satisfactory.

                           Everyone has said they're really happy with how things are working. So it maintains a system which were all parties believe that their goals are being met, their needs are being met, something like that. Instead of status quo.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thanks for this Alan. I've taken note of that. Question number nine now. Do you have any concerns that the proposal is replacing NTIA's role with a government led, or an inter-government organization solution? The answer is pretty straightforward. The ALAC believes that the proposal is in no way replacing the NTIA's role with a government led, or inter-governmental organization solution.

                           So we have a first green tick. Great, we have consensus on one of the questions. That's good. Number 10. Do you believe that the implementation of the proposal will continue to uphold the NTIA criteria in the future?

                           Now that of course is another one of these big question marks. And the answer here is, the ALAC believes that the proposal will maintain the operational status quo. I guess we should not be saying this, in light of

what Alan Greenberg has said just a moment ago. Alan, you have the floor.

ALAN GREENBERG: You can make a reverse statement. The ALAC sees no dangers in what is being proposed.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you Alan. The ALAC sees no danger in what is being proposed. Okay, fantastic. And now we have the last question…

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Sorry Olivier.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah, Tijani, please. Sorry, I didn't hear you. Tijani Ben Jemaa.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Yes, the question is about the implementation, so they are asking if you think that it truly, you are speaking about the there is no danger in what is proposed, it's not the answer of the question.

The question was about the implementation, and about what you think about what will happen.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah, that's a good point Tijani. Thank you. Olivier Crépin-Leblond speaking. I'll think of some wording for this. Obviously this looks like more being able to look into a crystal ball and finding out if things will work out well. We might have to ask Cheryl Langdon-Orr to help us out on this one, when she gets back on the call, or during the next call.

Alan Greenberg, and we only have three minutes remaining.

ALAN GREENBERG: Then the ALAC foresees no danger in divergence from the NTIA requirements.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Okay, excellent.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. I miss that Alan.

ALAN GREENBERG: The ALAC foresees, does not foresee any divergence from the NTIA requirements, NTIA criteria in the future.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Thank you. And finally, we have question number 11, concerning the ICG report and executive summary. Do you believe the ICG report and executive summary accurately reflect all necessary aspects of the overall proposal? And the answer was yes. We have some space for

the general questions, and since we have run out of time on today's call, so that we can add these over to the Wiki if you have any additional points, or general comments to make.

In the meantime, I'll make the changes, produce a red line document, send a copy of it on the mailing list, and also upload it to the Wiki page. And please comment until tomorrow's call, when we can then go one step further and effectively have a better document.

And with this, we have run out of time for any IANA stewardship transition issues, but of course, Alan Greenberg went through those quite quickly, just a moment ago, before agenda item number four. So we can just go into the any other business part. And we don't need to do Doodles, we know when we're meeting next.

Terri Agnew, when are we next having the call? When is the agenda?

TERRI AGNEW: Certainly. It actually is looking like it will be tomorrow, Thursday the 27th at the same time, 13:00 UTC.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay, thank you Terri. Is this before the webinar or after the webinar?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: After.

TERRI AGNEW: It will be before Alan's webinar.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Before Alan's webinar, okay. Excellent. Sébastien Bachollet, you have the floor.

SÉBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Yeah, I just, I don't think I received this invitation, and I will not be able to be on the call. I guess, I already said during the call today. Thank you very much. I'm sorry for that.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you Sébastien. We'll record your apologies, and of course, you'll be able to listen to the recording afterwards, if you wish to, or read the transcript a few days later. And with this, we've reached the end of our allocated time, with an extension of 15 minutes, and therefore I thank Veronica and David for remaining on the call to provide interpretation in Spanish.

I thank you all. I thank our staff, and this call is adjourned. We'll speak tomorrow.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]