This document is a summary interpretation of key points found in the proposal described above. The summaries and graphics here present the main recommendations found in the full proposal. This document may be updated based on revisions made to that proposal.
The Two-Track Parallel Process

Since the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced their intent to transition stewardship of the IANA functions, the ICANN community has been working in a two-track parallel process. The ICG has finalized its proposal for stewardship transition, and the the CCWG-Accountability has finalized its proposal for Work Steam 1.
Overview

Goal

The CCWG-Accountability is expected to deliver proposals that would enhance ICANN’s accountability towards all its stakeholders.

Scope

Work Stream 1 - Focuses on mechanisms enhancing ICANN’s accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition.

Work Stream 2 - Focuses on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.

The ICANN Community & Board of Directors

The ICANN Community is organized in three Supporting Organizations (SOs) and four Advisory Committees (ACs), each represents key stakeholders. While the ICANN Board has the ultimate authority to approve or reject policy recommendations, Supporting Organizations are responsible for developing and making policy recommendations to the Board. Advisory Committees formally advise the ICANN Board on particular issues or policy areas. Much of the CCWG-Accountability’s efforts are focused on ensuring accountability of the Board of Directors (and ICANN staff) toward these stakeholders.
Accountability Mechanisms: Current

There are four building blocks involved in ICANN's current accountability mechanisms.

The ICANN Community
is organized in three Supporting Organizations (SOs) and four Advisory Committees (ACs).

The Principles
 guarantee the mission, commitments and core values of ICANN through its bylaws.

ICANN Board
has the ultimate authority to approve or reject policy recommendations, developed by the SOs. ACs formally advise the ICANN Board on particular issues or policy areas.

Independent Appeals Mechanisms
confers the power to review and provide redress, as needed.
Escalation Paths

Possible slide to include details around status quo and community powers as escalation paths...

The CCWG-Accountability recommends giving the multistakeholder community more governance powers, as detailed in the following slides.

These powers are intended to provide recourse as part of an escalation path in case of substantial disagreement between the ICANN Board and the community. They do not interfere with the day to day operations of ICANN. Additionally, these powers would not impact how the community operates today, or introduce new risks to them.
The CCWG-Accountability has identified enhancements required to *those building blocks that would form the accountability mechanisms* required to improve ICANN’s accountability.

**The Empowered Community**
refers to the powers that allow the community SOs & ACs to take action should ICANN breach the principles (i.e. the People).

**The Principles**
guarantee the core mission, commitments and values of ICANN through its bylaws (i.e. the Constitution).

**Independent Appeals Mechanisms**
confers the power to review and provide redress, as needed (i.e. the Judiciary).

**ICANN Board**
represents the primary decision-making body that the community holds accountable (i.e. the Executive).
ICANN’s Bylaws are at the heart of its accountability. They require ICANN to act only within the scope of its limited mission, and to conduct its activities in accordance with certain fundamental principles. The CCWG-Accountability proposes the following changes be made to the Bylaws.

ICANN’s Mission Statement describes the scope of the organization's activities. The CCWG-Accountability recommends clarifying the language to better describe what is in and out of scope, and that ICANN’s powers are “enumerated.”

ICANN’s Affirmations of Commitments (AoC) requires a periodic review process conducted by the community that results in recommendations for improvement. The CCWG-Accountability proposes to bring aspects of the AoC and the AoC reviews into the ICANN bylaws.

ICANN’s Core Values guide the decisions and actions of ICANN. The CCWG-Accountability recommends dividing the existing Core Values provisions into “Commitments” and “Core Values.”
The Principles: Fundamental Bylaws

ICANN’s Bylaws can generally be changed by resolution of the Board with a two-thirds majority. CCWG-Accountability proposes revising ICANN’s Bylaws to establish a set of Fundamental Bylaws, which would hold special protections and can only be changed based on prior approval by the Community with a higher vote threshold.

The CCWG-Accountability recommends that the following items be given the status of Fundamental Bylaws:

1. The Mission / Commitments / Core Values;
2. The framework for the Independent Review Process;
3. The manner in which Fundamental Bylaws can be amended
4. The Community Mechanism as Sole Member Model
5. The community powers to Reconsider/reject Budget or Strategy/Operating plans, Reconsider/reject Changes to ICANN Bylaws, Remove Individual ICANN Directors and Recall the Entire ICANN Board
6. The IANA Function Review and the Separation Process required by the CWG-Stewardship’s proposal;
7. The Post-Transition IANA governance and Customer Standing Committee structures, also required by the CWG-Stewardship’s proposal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
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<td>Proposed</td>
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BYLAWS

Existing + New mechanisms + AoC Reviews

Fundamental Bylaws

Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal for Public Comment
Appeals Mechanisms: Independent Review Process

The CCWG-Accountability recommends significantly enhancing ICANN’s existing Independent Review Process (IRP), whereby any person or entity materially affected by an action (or inaction) in breach of ICANN’s Bylaws by ICANN’s Board may request an independent third-party review of that action.

The core of the recommendation is to create a new standing panel to serve as a fully independent dispute resolution function for the ICANN Community, in conjunction with specially organized review panels who preside over specific disputes.

**Standing Panel**

**Composition**: 7 members (minimum).

**Selection**: ICANN to organize a community effort to identify and propose candidate members, Board to confirm.

**Expertise**: Significant legal expertise; expertise in the workings of ICANN and the DNS; access to other experts upon request.

**Diversity**: Reasonable efforts to achieve diversity, including no more than 2 panelists from an ICANN region.

**Review Panels**

**Composition**: 3 decision makers.

**Selection**: Selected from Standing Panel. 1 panel member chosen by each party, those 2 chose the 3rd member.

**Expertise**: Relevant to the dispute in question; access to other experts upon request.

**Decisions**: Are to be binding on ICANN (subject to appeal to full panel) to the extent permitted by law. Possible decisions are:

1) Action/inaction is/is not consistent with Bylaws
2) Substantive decision on Sole Member rights

**The Role & Scope of the IRP**

- Determine whether ICANN has acted (or has failed to act) in violation of its Bylaws
- Reconcile conflicting holdings in process specific “expert panels”
- Hear claims involving rights of the Sole Member
Appeals Mechanisms: Request for Reconsideration

The CCWG-Accountability proposes a number of key reforms to ICANN's Request for Reconsideration (RFR) process, whereby any person or entity materially affected by an action (or inaction) of ICANN may request review or reconsideration of that action by the Board.

Key Reforms Proposed include:

- **Expanding the scope of permissible requests** to include Board or staff actions or inactions that contradict ICANN's Mission, Commitments or Core Values.
- **Extending the time for filing** a Request for Reconsideration from 15 to 30 days.
- **Narrowing the grounds** for summary dismissal.
- **Requiring the ICANN Board of Directors** to make determinations on all requests after receiving a recommendation from the Board Governance Committee (rather than the BCG deciding).
- **Tasking ICANN's Ombudsman with** initial substantive evaluation of the requests to aid the Board Governance Committee in its recommendation.
- **Providing requesters an opportunity** to rebut the Board Governance Committee’s recommendation before a final decision by the entire Board.
- **Providing enhanced transparency requirements** and firm deadlines in issuing determinations.
Community Mechanism as Sole Member Model

Numerous legal structures, or mechanisms, have been explored for organizing the community to have enforceable powers, which generally requires “legal personhood” in California (and other jurisdictions). The CCWG-Accountability is recommending the Community Mechanism as Sole Member Model.

The Community Mechanism in which SOs/ACs participate jointly to exercise their community powers would be built into ICANN’s Bylaws and be the Sole Member of ICANN. Decisions of the SOs/ACs per the Community Mechanism would directly determine exercise of the rights of the Community Mechanism as Sole Member (CMSM).

Community Power – Current
If the community disagrees with a Board decision or action, they have no recourse to challenge it.

Community Power – Future
If the community disagrees with a Board decision or action, they can challenge it exercising their powers through the CMSM.
The CCWG-Accountability recommends the ICANN community be empowered with six distinct powers.

1. Reconsider/reject budget or strategy/operating plan
   This power would give the community the ability to consider strategic/operating plans and budgets after they are approved by the Board (but before they come into effect) and reject them.

2. Reconsider/reject changes to ICANN “standard” bylaws
   This power would give the community the ability to reject proposed Bylaws changes after they are approved by the Board but before they come into effect.

3. Approve changes to “fundamental” bylaws
   This power would form part of the process set out for agreeing any changes of the “fundamental” bylaws. It requires that the community would have to give positive assent to any change, a co-decision process between the Board and the community and that such changes would require a higher vote.

4. Appoint & remove individual ICANN directors
   The community organization that appointed a given director could end their term and trigger a replacement process. The general approach, consistent with the law, is that the appointing body is the removing body.

5. Recall entire ICANN board
   This power would allow the community to cause the removal of the entire ICANN Board. (expected to be used only in exceptional circumstances).
How does the community exercise its powers? The exercising of different community powers may include unique steps relevant to a given power, but the general process is as follows.

**CAUSE**
ICANN Board or Board Member action causing significant concern to members of the community.

**PETITION**
To trigger the use of a community power, an SO or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power should be used.

**DISCUSSION**
Where a petition succeeds, the whole community through its SOs and ACs discusses the proposed use of the power, through the ICANN Community Forum (ICF).

**DECISION**
SOs/ACs that have voting rights cast their votes to decide whether the power is used or not. The CMSM collects the votes and communicates the decision to the board.

**OUTCOME**
Depends on community power.
**Example: Reconsider/reject changes to ICANN “standard” bylaws**

**How does the community exercise its powers?** The exercising of different community powers may include unique steps relevant to a given power, but the general process is as follows.

1. **PETITION**
   - To trigger the use of a community power, an SO or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power should be used.

2. **DISCUSSION**
   - Where a petition succeeds, the whole community through its SOs and ACs discusses the proposed use of the power, through the ICANN Community Forum (ICF).

3. **DECISION**
   - SOs/ACs that have voting rights cast their votes to decide whether the power is used or not. The CMSM collects the votes and communicates the decision to the board.

   **OUTCOME**
   - ICANN Board acts in accordance with the community’s decision.

**CAUSE**
- ICANN Board or Board Member action causing significant concern to members of the community.

Details...

Details...

Threshold:
Details...
Example: Recalling the Entire ICANN Board

How does the community exercise its powers? The exercising of different community powers may include unique steps relevant to a given power, but the general process is as follows.

1. **PETITION**
   - To trigger the use of a community power, an SO or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power should be used.

2. **DISCUSSION**
   - Where a petition succeeds, the whole community through its SOs and ACs discusses the proposed use of the power, through the ICANN Community Forum (ICF).

3. **DECISION**
   - SOs/ACs that have voting rights cast their votes to decide whether the power is used or not. The CMSM collects the votes and communicates the decision to the board.

Details...

- Each SO and AC has 7 days to follow its own internal processes to decide how to vote on the matter.

- **Threshold:** 75% of the eligible votes

4. **OUTCOME**
   - The interim board replaces the ICANN board (except for the president)

**CAUSE**
- Significant concerns with the entire ICANN board.
Possible slide to include details around voting…
Stress Tests

An essential part of the CCWG-Accountability Charter calls for stress testing of the recommended accountability enhancements. The purpose of these stress tests is to determine the stability of ICANN in the event of consequences and/or vulnerabilities, and to assess the adequacy of existing and proposed accountability mechanisms available to the ICANN community.

I
Financial Crisis or Insolvency

II
Failure to Meet Operational Obligations

III
Legal/Legislative Action

IV
Failure of Accountability

V
Failure of Accountability to External Stakeholders

The exercise of applying stress tests identified changes to ICANN Bylaws that might be necessary to allow the CCWG-Accountability to evaluate proposed accountability mechanisms as adequate to meet the challenges identified.
The CCWG-Accountability’s work is organized in two Work Streams. Work Stream 1 changes must be implemented or committed to before any transition of IANA Stewardship from NTIA can occur.

Possible tracks for implementation of Work Stream 1:

- Revising Mission, Commitments and Core Values
- Establishing Fundamental Bylaws
- Completing the IRP enhancements
- Establishing Community empowerment mechanism and incorporation of the community Powers into the Bylaws
- Implementing the AoC reviews into the Bylaws
- Completing the Reconsideration process enhancements

Elements considered for Work Stream 2:

- Refining the operational details of WS1 proposals
- Further assessing enhancements to government participation in ICANN
- Considering the issue of jurisdiction
- Enhancing SO/AC accountability
- Instituting a culture of transparency within the ICANN org.
- Defining security audits and certification requirements for ICANN’s IT systems
- Considering improvements to diversity in all its aspects at all levels of the organization

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**2015**

- **Work Stream 1 Development** (and identifying topics for Work Stream 2)
- Frankfurt
- Istanbul
- Paris
- ICANN 52
- ICANN 53
- ICANN 54

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**2016**

- **Work Stream 1 Implementation**
- **Work Stream 2 Development**
- **Work Stream 2 Implementation**

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Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Accountability 2nd Draft Proposal for Public Comment
### Linkage with the CWG-Stewardship

The CCWG-Accountability recognizes that continued and close engagement with the CWG-Stewardship is essential. **Key aspects of the CWG-Stewardship proposal are considered to be conditional on the output of the CCWG-Accountability.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CWG-Stewardship Requirement</th>
<th>CCWG-Accountability Proposal</th>
<th>Requirement met?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICANN Budget</strong> Community rights regarding the development and consideration.</td>
<td>Reconsider/reject budget or strategy/operating plan</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICANN Board</strong> Community rights regarding the ability to appoint / remove members, and to recall the entire Board.</td>
<td>Appoint &amp; remove individual ICANN directors &amp; Recall entire ICANN board</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICANN Bylaws</strong> Incorporation of the following into ICANN’s Bylaws: IANA Function Review, Customer Standing Committee.</td>
<td>Reconsider/reject changes to ICANN “standard” bylaws</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fundamental Bylaws</strong> All of the foregoing mechanisms are to be provided for in the ICANN bylaws as Fundamental Bylaws.</td>
<td>Approve changes to “fundamental” bylaws</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Review Panel</strong> Will be applicable, except for ccTLD delegations / revocations and numbering decisions.</td>
<td>Met?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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