**ICANN**


**Moderator: Nathalie Peregrine**
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Thomas Rickert: Good morning, everybody. My name is Thomas Rickert and I am one of the co-chairs of the CCWG Accountability. And I'd like to welcome all of you either in the room or remotely to this joint CWG, CCWG town hall meeting.

As Fadi Chehadé mentioned in his speech a few minutes earlier, he requested us all to focus on the first phase of the transition exercise and I think this is the first example during the day where we can evidence that.

I would like to introduce my fellow panelists to you. So on the right of the table is Lise Fuhr, Jonathan Robinson. Lise and Jonathan are the CWG co-chairs that have just submitted their proposal to the chartering organizations. And we expect that the proposal they submitted will be approved by the chartering organizations.

Next to me is Mathieu Weill. To my left it's Leon Sanchez. And we are the co-chairs the of the CCWG and the CCWG is still working on its proposal and we are going to show you where we are in a moment.

So as you have seen on to slides now the burden is on the CCWG to deliver so the pressure is on. But don't cry for us Argentina. So with that I'd like to hand over to Jonathan Robinson who would like to bring you up to speed on the status of the work of the CWG.

Jonathan Robinson:     Thank you very much, Thomas. And good morning everyone. Before we begin with the detail on the work of the CWG I'm going to just make a few general opening remarks. Clearly you've got in front of you here to cross community working groups each of which has their own set of objectives. And their work is rooted in two specific chargers in each case.

Each charter was approved by the chartering organizations, the respective supporting organizations and advisory committees that commissioned this work.

So as the NTIA withdraws from its historic stewardship role accountability is clearly and arguably the overarching theme across the two different groups for both the CWG on the stewardship group and the accountability group.

Since the IANA functions are performed within ICANN these accountability areas are very strongly linked. And the chairs, the co-chairs respectively on this table have had to work together over many months to ensure at this linkage is not only intact but remains coherent and the appropriate interdependence takes place with a lack of duplication.

So we've met together regularly and frequently in order to produce this coordinated approach between the two groups. And we've also benefited from many members and participants in common and liaisons between the two groups.

As you have heard the CWG has now submitted its final proposal to the chartering organizations and we await their approval hopefully later this week. Of course that CCWG, the work on the accountability is still very much a work in progress. And here is the critical point, the work -- of the group that Lise and I chaired on the stewardship is expressly conditioned on the work of the accountability group.

In other words, whilst we can progress with the integration of the names proposal on stewardship together with the other groups, the work cannot be seen as complete in the whole, in the round until it is joined together in the final event with its related work from the accountability group.

So we expect that when the final proposal from the accountability group is delivered to the chartering organizations for their approval a key check that those chartering organizations will want to make for themselves before approving that work is that the conditionality implicit in the work of the stewardship group has been met.

So I think with that background I hope you can -- it's a very -- it's a quick sketch and an understanding of the interlinking between these. By participating in the session, and we hope you will participate rather than simply hear from us, you should end up with a very good understanding of the proposal on the stewardship transition, you should end up with both a good understanding of the proposal on the accountability, and a very current update from their recent work including the sessions that took place at the tail end of last week.

And so the majority of this session will focus on, in the first part, an understanding of the stewardship proposal and then in the second part to focus in on the accountability work and through that we hope you will end up with a

confidence in the proposals and that the community will retain and in fact develop significant influence through the work of the accountability group.

And the conditionality implicit and contained within that will empower the community to vote, we hope, on the stewardship proposal knowing that this linkage is tightly bound in and therefore that you can, with confidence, vote on the stewardship or take your decisions, I think vote is not necessarily appropriate across all the SOs and ACs, but take your decisions on the proposals safe in the knowledge that the conditionality and the linkage is built-in and won't be lost by dealing with the stewardship proposal at this meeting.

Thank you so (unintelligible) So with that I'll hand over then to Lise to deal with the first part of the work from the stewardship.

Lise Fuhr:     Good morning everyone. It's good to see so many of you here interested in the work. We'll do a quick walk-through our slides and the model as such. And the first one is about statistics and diversity. And this is actually a very important slide for us because this slide shows the huge amount of effort that's been put into this proposal but also as important the diversity of the group. And this has been very important for us all along to have representatives from all over the world.

And as you see, we have had, from all of the chartering organizations they've been all along with us in this work. And we also have had people that has no affiliation to ICANN. We have had 53. And that's a very -- that's a very good because that shows the outreach that's beyond the ICANN world.

But you can also see we've been 152 members of the working group, 152 members and participants. And everyone has been participating on equal

terms. So we've had a very good working group with 101 calls, almost 5000 volunteer working hours and a lot of email exchange.

Well, our proposal is not the only one, it's part of a larger process. One of the processes is of course the accountability process where we are dependent on their work. But furthermore we have -- our proposal is an answer to a request for a proposal made from the ICG. So we are the CWG Stewardship Transition Group where we also have the CRISP, the numbering community and the IANA plan, that's a protocol that are giving in their proposals to the ICG that has to compile it all into one final proposal.

And the numbering and protocol community submitted their proposals in January where we, the CWG Stewardship had to work a little more on our proposal so we could submit it for a little while ago.

This is important to understand because this makes time of essence. We have to have another round of public comment with the ICG and also there will be another round with the CWG proposal with public comments. So this is all going to link into a final proposal to the NTIA.

Why is the accountability important to the CWG, the stewardship transition? That's because ICANN (unintelligible) the domain name policy body and the current IANA functions operator. So this makes this linkage very important.

What are the goals and requirements of our proposal? Well first and foremost it's meeting the needs of the direct customers. And to do that we have to produce a consolidated transition proposal for the elements of the IANA functions related to the domain name system.

And what would a proposal require in order to meet those needs? Well, we thought it should have a contract that could replace the current contract with the NTIA. There was also a need for accountability mechanisms on IANA with respect to the -- upon ICANN with respect to the IANA functions. There was also a need for a further -- a separation between the policy and operation for the IANA functions operator.

And we needed a replacement for the NTIA role in the root zone. We needed to find a way to ensure adequate funding of the IANA function. And as you see as the last one, an ability for the multi-stakeholder community to require the selection of a new operator for the IANA function if necessary. That's what's been called separability, separation possibility.

We have actually had two public comment periods. The first one was in December where we sent out a proposal and got a lot of feedback. And we had to change the models from that feedback. But some of the important thoughts of that feedback was the premise that there was great satisfaction with the current IANA functions operator. And ICANN should remain the IANA functions operator furthermore.

And there was also comment stating that we needed independent legal advice. So we have - Sidley Austin has helped us all through this process. And those are also the legal advisers for the Accountability team. This has ensured really good coordination between the groups.

Well, the second public comment period that was in April helped us refine the details of the proposed model we had. After this public comment period we have refined the role and composition of the PTI board, we have refined the approval mechanisms for the root zone environment and also the escalation mechanisms in relation to the separation process.

So those two public comment periods were open to everyone, everyone could submit their comments. And we have a lot of good and constructive feedback. And that's what brought us to where we are today where we have a model that we have actually sent to the chartering organizations. And I will now hand over to my co-chair, Jonathan, who will walk you through the actual model. Thank you.

Jonathan Robinson:    Thank you Lise. So this slide attends to capture a significant amount of that work or at least the outcome of that work in a structural overview of the post-transition to IANA.

Before doing that, before looking at that post-transition structure on the left, it's worth comparing it with the grayed out area of the pre-transition set up. So on the left-hand side of the slide, in the grayed out area, you have the oversight of the NTIA, you have ICANN with the IANA functions operator as a functionally separate unit but managed within the broader ICANN operations under contract with the NTIA. So you've got the current governance set up in a symbolic representation there which encapsulates the current stewardship model.

What changes as we move over towards the right in color in the post-transition world? You see there, there are some similarities but also some critical differences. We have a post-transition entity which is now not only functionally separate, in other words that staff are -- the functional separation describes the operating entity being separately located and independently operated within the overall structure of ICANN.

But here we've put a further wrapper around that in the form of a legal separation, the creation of what many of us would view as a subsidiary.

Technically this subsidiary is more correctly referred to as an affiliate and that is the legal definition of it. But it's useful to view that as a subsidiary, a separate legal entity which has a form of enhanced separation by virtue of this legal separation.

The rationale for the legal separation is that it does exactly that, it enhances the structural separation and assist in the distinction between the policy and operational aspects of the management of the service. Moreover, it provides an entity with which ICANN can contract. Without a legally separate entity or something equivalent it makes it very difficult to encapsulate the relationship in a contract as it currently is.

And so this provides for the capability for ICANN to contract with the separate subsidiary and to encapsulate that relationship including items such as the service-level agreement with the separate legal entity.

Ultimately in the event of the unlikely eventuality, but ultimately we had to consider all sorts of eventualities, in the unlikely eventuality of a bankruptcy there is a -- of the parent company -- there is a greater protection by virtue of the legally separate entity.

And in equally or perhaps even -- well it's certainly in a scenario that many would consider to be at least at the end of a long chain of escalations and remedies, there is the possibility of actual separation of the legally distinct entity.

I can gets probably useful -- the slide highlights the other key components of accountability, oversight and escalation in the form of the CSC and the IFR and then ultimately in the orange lightly shaded area, the accountability

mechanisms provided by the interrelationship worked with the Accountability group.

Will come onto that interdependence much later in the session but over the next few slides I'll take you -- I'll walk you through a little more detail on the post-transition IANA entity, the composition of the board associated with that. Because by virtue of being a separate subsidiary, separate legal entity, there is the opportunity and the necessity to have a board and to deal with the CSC, the customer standing committee, and the IANA function review.

So here we look in a little more detail at the post-transition IANA entity, the separate legal subsidiary. And this is really designed -- this creates the opportunity for the separate entity, as I said, with its own unique board but remains within the overall governance and supervision of ICANN.

So we keep IANA within -- we keep the post-transition IANA within ICANN based on the understanding that there is a current satisfaction with the performance of the current operator. And in order to keep that entity tightly bound into ICANN and for us, the users of that service, to be able to hold post-transition IANA -- hold ICANN fully accountable for the operational performance of the post-transition entity, we have a board that is majority appointed by ICANN.

Now at first sight this is something which might cause some people to be concerned. And it was the subject of quite a lot of discussion within the group, the working group, as we dealt with this. Because the natural instinct is to say -- to seek independent, some form of independent oversight of that post-transition entity.

We took legal advice and in combination with our own careful thinking and analysis of this, and the legal advice we took, we came to the conclusion and understanding that this was not the place to create all of and the significant independent oversight of this entity.

There was a very good reason for that, the post-transition IANA entity is bound into ICANN by virtue of ICANN's membership of the company and by virtue of the appointment of the board. If the board is appointed independently of ICANN, ICANN ceases to control that post-transition entity in a legal sense at the very least. And in so doing cannot be held fully accountable for its performance which is what we need to be able to do.

In the event that the performance is not satisfactory or adequate they are numerous escalation mechanisms to address that. And I'll touch on some of those as we go through this. But in the top right you see the working group's recommendation for the composition of the PTI board, we have suggested that the most senior manager responsible for the operations of that entity is on the board.

Given that it's a technical function that the ICANN CTO is on the board. And given that this is a functionally and legally distinct entity but nevertheless a subsidiary of the parent that the executive within the parent, within ICANN, responsible for the operation of this entity, is also on this board.

So we have three ICANN appointees to the board. And in so doing the majority of the board is controlled by the parent. And in so doing -- and therefore the subsidiary is tightly bound into the parent and we can rely on the accountability mechanisms that will be provided by the work of this group to hold ICANN accountable for the performance of its subsidiary to the extent that the subsidiary remains a subsidiary of ICANN.

We have created the opportunity for the appointment of the two independent directors to create a degree of independent oversight which we think is a valuable additional corporate governance mechanism. And our requirement is that those independent directors are appointed by a mechanism such as the ICANN Nominating Committee or some similarly robust mechanism for producing carefully selected independent directors who have the right skill set to contribute to the independent oversight of that post-transition entity.

The customers of this predominantly technical function will interact with it on a day-to-day basis as you expect any customers to do. These customers are, for the purposes of this presentation that means registries.

However, in order to give those customers some form of organized representation and oversight of the post-transition IANA entity, this working group has recommended the construction of a customer standing committee, a group of registry customers that have the ability to meet on a regular basis and provide oversight of the operation of that entity essentially monitoring day-to-day performance and to replace some of the operational responsibilities or replace the operational responsibilities previously provided by the US government.

The focus of this entity is on the direct customers of the service, hence name, the customer standing committee. There is an opportunity, although not a necessary condition, for liaisons from the SOs and AC's to participate in that customer standing committee.

It may be that those SOs and ACs have little or no interest in this entity providing it is performing its customer operations on a day-to-day basis which

is why we made the liaisons optional. And you see there that that covers both the composition in some detail as well as the reference to the liaisons.

As we move through the PTI, the CSC and then we come onto the IANA functions review. Now here we recognize a number of critical points. In particular that there will be a requirement to periodically review at a distance and with some substantial independence and multi-stakeholder input, the performance of the post-transition structure and set up.

It is planned that these reviews will take place on a five yearly basis, everything being as expected. In addition, we have created a proposal which envisages the first of these -- of such reviews taking place after two years in order that there is not too substantial and eight laps timed post-transition. And we felt there was a balance to be struck here. We didn't want the post-transition entity to be entering into a review immediately but nor waiting too long before there was some substantial oversight.

And you see before you on to slide there the compositions of that IANA review function including familiar components from various elements of the ICANN community -- I'm not sure it's worth reading all of that out to you but you can get a feel for the diverse and multi-stakeholder components of that IANA function review.

You see at the bottom of that highlighted square or lozenge on the screen there, reference to a special IFR. This release has a couple of things do you. One, that although this is a structured and periodic review function, there is the possibility of introducing reviews out of cycle.

And the way in which that will work is in the event that there is a perceived or actual substantial issue with the performance that hasn't been -- of the post-

transition IANA entity -- that hasn't been resolved through direct interaction with customers, that hasn't been resolved via the CSC and the series of escalation procedures, which I'd like to draw your attention to in the report if you have an interest in that.

There's a structured and systematic piece of work that dealt with the range of escalation options that exist. If those essentially fail to remedy sustained performance issues there is the opportunity to institute a special and out of sequence IANA function review.

The reviews in either case, whether periodic and regular or special, are not constrained in what they can look at or what they can recommend so they had a wide ranging potential scope in the oversight of the post-transition entity. And I think that's the crucial point to make. They are not restricted in what they can look at nor what they can recommend.

One potential recommendations that could come out of a review function is to recommend work on separation but that would not mean that such a recommendation or work on separation would result in a separation. What that would do is, if that recommendation was made, it would then kick off the commissioning of a cross community working group analogous to the work that's just been done over the last six months or so which we've called a separation cross community working group.

So what you see and hear is a series of oversight and escalation mechanisms with a series of careful checks and balances along the way that we believe will satisfactorily and comprehensively replace the existing stewardship function with a well thought out and ultimately multi-stakeholder-based solution. We very much hope you agree. There are details to be worked out during the

implementation process but we believe that this proposal as it stands, is a satisfactory and comprehensive response to the RFP from the ICG.

So thank you for paying attention to that. We will come back to this in a little more detail when we come to the final session of this morning's work when we talk about, in some detail, and reemphasize the linkage between the stewardship work and the accountability work.

So thank you again and over to my co-chairs from the Accountability group.

Mathieu Weill:     Thank you very much, Jonathan. And we will now excuse Lise and Jonathan and give them a few minutes rest before you join us back later in the session. As we move to the description of the initial proposal from the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN's Accountability.

And for that purpose we will be joined by the three rapporteurs of the Cross Community Working Group on ICANN's Accountability namely Becky Burr, who is leading the part of our work on reviews and redress; Jordan Carter, who is leading the group on the community mechanisms; and Steve DelBianco.

And as they move on, so the point here now is going to be focusing on this initial proposal starting with an introduction that will be provided by Thomas Rickert and hopefully we'll pass this quite swiftly so we can have a longer question and answer session after that. So Thomas over to you.

Thomas Rickert: Thank you very much Mathieu. Just to refresh everyone's memories, the CCWG accountability has been tasked with improving ICANN's overall accountability, so we're not only looking at aspects of accountability related to the IANA stewardship transition, in fact that part of accountability is

explicitly in the CWG's charter, but we are looking at the overall accountability architecture of ICANN.

And our work is split into two work streams the first of which focuses on those accountability mechanisms that need to be either implemented or committed to prayer to the transition. And this is what Fadi has referred to as phase 1. This is what we're focusing on now. This is what we are trying to complete by Dublin for the chartering organizations to review and approve.

So you might miss a few points that are important to you personally in this very first phase but rest assured there is another phase which we call Work Stream 1 and that includes those accountability measures or such accountability work that we are planning and foreseeing now but that will not be completed prior to the transition. So that will be the more long-term or midterm accountability work that we are conducting.

But we've already included a list of areas of work for Work Stream 1 in our report so that everybody knows that this is not just a vague intention to further work on ICANN's accountability but that there is actually a robust plan in place so that nothing gets forgotten once the stewardship transition is over.

The CCWG has roughly 150 individuals working on it consisting of 26 members from the chartering organizations and 120 participants. On to slide you can see the participants by region and certainly there is room for improvement to be more inclusive at the global level. So those who wish to join this effort you can still do so. There is a lot more work to be done. Please join the group and help us achieve this important task.

There is also some statistical information on the number of calls, volunteer hours and email exchange. And actually I haven't compared that to the CWG figures but I'm confident that we'll beat them in that area.

Now what we've presented in our report, and this is very important, is not something that has our group's consensus. So these proposals that we have published for you to comment on our nothing that is provisionally or finally carved in stone.

Our group is conducting to public comment periods. And we thought it would be very helpful for us to have one of these public comment periods even before we draw our conclusions and do a consensus call because we want to learn from you, from the community, whether we are moving in the right direction and due course correction if need be. And actually there were some and we're going to speak to that as we move on in the session.

So nothing is actually perpetuated in any way, it's all provisional work with us. Actually we made it explicitly clear that our group has debates, that our group is struggling in some areas to find the right solution and that our group has actually put up -- put different options for various questions in front of the community to chime in.

But what seems to be common sense in our group from a very early start is that we think we can build all accountability mechanisms, the whole accountability architecture, infrastructure, from four building blocks. And we tried to be as lightweight as we could by not indenting too much new things but actually to build on what we already found in ICANN.

So we, at the outset of our work we actually established and inventory of the ICANN's existing accountability mechanisms and we looked at those that

were good and we analyze where there's room for improvement. Also, we listened to the community. You will recall that last year I can has conducted a public comment period already where they community has voiced concerns, where the community has made suggestions.

We've analyzed all that so what you find in our findings is actually not only what the individuals in our group came up with but that's already based and rooted in community feedback.

So we think that we can basically replicate something which has proven to be efficient over centuries. So we are building ICANN as a mini-state, if you wish. So we are going to use this analogy just for a moment. But since no analogy is perfect we're going to move away from it very shortly.

But basically we have the legislative, the people which would be an empowered community. We think that in the absence of the historic relationship with the US government where the US government sort of had some power over ICANN, and if that power goes away we would rather give it to the community so that it's truly bottom-up. And I'll explain what this empowered community means in a moment.

We would have an executive which would be the ICANN Board. We would have a constitution, which would be an augmented and amended ICANN bylaws. And we would have a judiciary, which would be the independent review mechanisms that we're working on.

Okay so on to slide you find these four building blocks again. And what we are planning to do with this, we are thinking of having something which we are earlier called that community council where the SOs and ACs have representation and where all of them, except for SSAC and RSAC, would

have five votes and SSAC and RSAC would have two votes. And that group would come together and make some decisions to exercise community powers.

And these community powers would be the possibility to review ICANN's budget, its strategic plan and operating plan and also to chime in on bylaw changes. It would also have the opportunity to remove individual directors or to recall the entire board.

So how would we operationalize that? We would put back into the bylaws. And in order to make the bylaws robust, because there are some in the community who will say okay, now you guys should be cautious because we might change the bylaws now to have all these new accountability features but once the US government has moved away who guarantees that these improvements are not going to be reversed and we're back to square one?

Which is why we thought that certain aspects of the ICANN accountability need to be made more robust than other aspects of ICANN accountability. And that's why we came up with the idea of so-called fundamental bylaws and that would be done mission commitments and core values, you know, that's going to be new language, and amended language in the bylaws, that would be the independent review process so that nobody can jump to the conclusion that we don't need this judiciary in the new system so let's get rid of it.

It would be the power to veto not in fundamental bylaws in order not to be disruptive to ICANN's operations we would say that normal bylaw changes can be done by the board as the board does that now, they would go through a consultation process with the community and then the board would take a decision on the bylaw change.

And only if something goes wrong in that, if the community feels well, this bylaw change is actually not what we authorized the board to do, then they community can veto such bylaw changes of normal bylaws after-the-fact.

For fundamental bylaws that would be different, there, they community would need to explicitly approve the bylaw changes. And then it would be some reviews such as the reviews asked for by the CWG. Those would also be made fundamental bylaws and the community powers that I've just described.

And that's all is to ensure that we maintain flexibility. So these fundamental bylaws are more robust and harder to change, they need a higher voting threshold, yet we are cognizant of the fact that ICANN is working in a rapidly changing environment and even things such as ICANN's remit and mandate might need to be reframed in a couple of years down the line and we can make that happen with this architecture.

And then we would have the independent appeals mechanism. And we've analyzed what the IRP does today. We've analyzed where there are inefficient -- where it is inefficient or where it is even efficient and we try to improve that by adding certain features to it.

So we want to bet the IRP decisions -- or our current thinking is that the IRP decisions should be binding for the board. We think that it's a good idea to have the independent review panel not only look at procedural aspects but also look at the substance of cases to decide on the merits of the case.

We've been discussing one case frequently where the IRP said well, the decision was wrong but procedurally everything was right and therefore they didn't have any further means to go against the decision and helped the aggrieved party. So that's what we're going to change.

We're looking at aspects of accessibility, low cost, relatively low-cost, and we're looking to have a standing panel of independent experts out of which one or three, depending on the case, would be chosen to decide on cases.

Now all these community powers that I've alluded to earlier would follow the same scheme of decision-making. So either one SO or AC or multiple of them, so for example for recalling the whole board it wouldn't be only just one group that could start this process but we would need multiple of them, they would file a petition.

Then it would be checked by this community group whether that petition meets the required threshold. Then if so, if the requirements are met, then votes would be taken. And depending on the subject matter concerned these would either be votes mandated by the SO or AC or the representatives could have flexibility so that depends on the case.

But then if a certain voting threshold is met there would be a decision and I would need to be implemented. And according to our current thinking, and I mentioned that earlier, we would have 29 votes in total but for many cases we would not be prescriptive on how these votes would be managed by the various SOs and ACs.

I think I should pause here. So what we did as a vehicle to make this happen, we thought of the structure, which we called the reference model, although we kept the door open for other models as well, and this reference model was such where the SOs and ACs would create additional legal entities and the recommendation was that we would be using unincorporated associations which is a lightweight legal structure.

It's lightweight to our perception but not everybody agrees that it is lightweight and will get back to that in a moment grade but the SOs and ACs would have these additional legal entities as alter egos or as avatars merely for the purpose of exercising certain community powers.

So that was the idea, that was our proposal, that was the reference model, and we will now take a look at how the community responded to our draft report or to our first report. So, Leon, would you like to or shall I shall I just continue to...

((Crosstalk))

Thomas Rickert: Okay. So we have tried to categorize the various areas of our report in three sections. On our journey to consensus, and we try to slice and dice the feedback that we get so we have tried to identify those areas where they community strongly supported what we were doing. We try to identify areas where further explanation or clarification is needed. And then we have another section or another area where more deliberation of the groups is needed.

And I will briefly confirm to you that the vast majority of commenters has applauded us for the four building block structure. So they said that's a good idea, that's the way you should be going. They also said that what we are suggesting is significantly enhancing ICANN's accountability. Right, so I guess that's very good news, that's very good news.

We have a limited set of powers. You know, it took me only a few minutes to explain them to you. And the community said yes, the requirements that need to be in place for an enhanced accountability are okay, that's what you should be doing.

Also the principle of fundamental bylaws remains more or less undisputed by the commenters. Also, working more on ICANN's purpose and mission was something that the community was very happy with. And the incorporation of AOC reviews into the bylaws or at least part of that were something -- incorporating those was something that the community liked because we said what's going to happen once the AOC is terminated at some future point? Will all these reviews go away? And we said no, they're not going to go away. We perpetuate them in the bylaws.

So I guess that's good news. You know, for our general approach we got a lot of positive feedback so that certainly we need to work on details. And some teams have taken good note of the areas where further work needs to be done. But that's more or less on contentious.

And before I hand over to my colleague, Leon, I just like to note that all the comments we received have been and further will be analyzed very diligently. We're using the so-called public comment review tool where all the incoming reports -- comments have been sliced to the respective areas of the report so that we would have all the community feedback on a specific question in one place.

And then for all comments, for all sections, our group has been working on and will further refine responses that could either be, well that's a good point that we've already taken a look at that so at the moment there is no further action required or this is actually an excellent idea, we will revisit what we've done so far and take that to heart and further elaborate and maybe come up with a different solution.

So I think I should cause here and hand over to Leon.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much, Thomas. This is Leon Sanchez for those who are attending on the remote participation mode and are remote (unintelligible) are connecting to the Adobe Connect room.

As Thomas just said, there was a lot of support for the overall proposal that we have built but of course we have also recommendations that require further explanation and clarification. One of the proposals is the IRP.

On an overall perspective we could say that the IRP, as we are designing it and proposing it, as overall support from the community. But as I said, it requires some clarification in different areas like for example we are talking about a reconsideration request process. That needs to be further clarified.

There have been some concerns and some questions raised with regards to these reckoned Federation request process. There has also been some comments about the ombudsman role like for example we have commenters suggesting that the ombudsman should undertake a preliminary review on our positions as opposed to I can legal staff.

So we think this is of course very valuable feedback that will be taken into account to build our next version of the document, the proposal for the second public comment period.

We also have been asked to do a refinement about the composition of the Board reviewers and conflict of interest check. For example, not having board members reviewing their own decisions. I think that this is a key issue that must be addressed and has of course been raised by the community.

So we also have some changes in review standards like for example material affected versus materially harmed. This new IRP would be open for anyone

that has been materially affected or materially harmed. This is a discussion we are having at this point. And of course they would need to be clarified.

Also we have had comments on standing on deadlines and timelines. Some of the deadlines and timelines have been perceived as being too short or maybe others too long. And there also have been some requests on for example extending the timelines and deadlines under extraordinary conditions. And this of course is important.

And we have also received some comments on transparency and other topics like financial arrangements, community empowerment, and prevention of the use of this IRP for frivolous or vexatious means. So this is of course, as I said, a work in progress. And this time as stated, this is not final, this is not carved in stone. And we will continue to work to incorporate the different comments that we have received so far by the community into the next version of the proposal.

And as well as these clarifications and these explanations on this topic, there have also been new issues arisen and I believe that Mathieu, you have a summary of those, right?

Mathieu Weill:    Thank you, Leon. Indeed this section is actually the most interesting for us as a group because when you get into a public comment period and you were very much pushing for a quick initial public comment even if it was not based on consensus proposal because we knew that the community would bring to retention some aspects that we, even as a very large group as we are, we're not realizing were important. And that's what happens.

Said the key issue that were brought to our attention work, number one, the issue of ICANN's overall culture of accountability. And behind this are

concerns related to how accountability trickles down from the board to all layers of the organization.

And that was an issue that was laid out as a concerned by several of the commenters and we hadn't really taken a lot of time on this so this is an issue we will be considering how to best address it within the scope of our charter obviously.

Number two was a topic which was laid out very nicely by many under the label, who watches the watchers? The model we're providing is a model of mutual accountability. We are separating powers so that there is a balance between the powers of the board, the powers of the independent review process and the powers of the community.

And several commenters said that who is really holding the community accountable? And by the community they say the SOs and ACs because those are the organizations that we are -- our proposal suggests to empower over a certain limited number of decisions made by the board.

And I think this is a very important aspect that we will have to deal with within our group. And once again within the limited boundaries of our charter because it's definitely not our intention nor even in our possibility to go into a major reshuffle of this. But however, we need to make sure there are no unintended consequences in empowering the SOs and ACs with this limited set of powers. So that's item number two.

Item number three is basically about how we ensure that the ICANN community we are empowering represents adequately the overall global Internet community. How do we make sure that the SOs, ACs, when using

their new powers, are actually in line with the expectations from the broader Internet users?

And that was carried through items of diversity, how do we ensure these bodies we're creating, the SOs themselves are sufficiently diverse. And it's important to stress that it's just like Fadi Chehadé was saying in the opening ceremony about excellence. This is about a journey. You're never diverse enough.

There's no perfection but it's about enhancements, enhancing accountability, enhancing diversity. And that's an issue that came back in many comments and we will be considering how best to address it. And on those three new issues we will certainly welcome questions in the question-and-answer session that's coming now and questions and suggestions because we are only at the beginning of our reflections and it's valuable for us to get your input on those issues.

The fourth topic on this list is a main concern we have received in a number of comments regarding the reference model that Thomas was mentioning earlier. The reference model is this model we had designed to empower the community which is community mechanism with the 29 votes, etc.

As Thomas said, we were considering a reference model that would turn ICANN into a membership organization where the members would not be just anyone but would be the ccNSO, ASO, the GAC, At Large, SSAC, RSAC and GNSO. It wouldn't be an open membership it was the proposal.

And the proposal said that these organizations would create unincorporated associations in order to become members. That raised the number of concerns, concerns about complexity, unintended consequences of accountability of

these unincorporated associations and a number of concerns regarding the fact that these organizations might have to be specifically incorporated in certain jurisdictions including the jurisdiction of California.

So basically what our group did on Friday was review all these comments and listen. We listened very intently. And then we said okay, let us try to give another shot at designing a model. So we have this excellent session of elevator pitches where about a dozen of our participants and members sort of introduced in five minutes of their favorite model, their vision of a favorite model, and then we started narrowing down the list based on a number of criteria.

And we are currently designing a fresh approach which we are currently labeling as the empowered SO and AC model, which provides compatible authority, so the same number of powers would still be possible, with a lower number of additional steps to take.

So it is very much under development. And I expect there will be some questions on that and I'm sure Becky Burr here will be able to answer them. But the one thing I want to make clear is, because it's probably the necessary to ask any question about this is the unincorporated associations, they're out, no more. There are no more questions about incorporating into California a specific association in terms of registering, filling the forms to California (unintelligible).

So this model has lived and now we're moving onto another model which has a number of similarities because if you look at the slide here, all of this is still here. We have had feedback from RSAC and SSAC that they wanted to stay as an advisory capacity so that will change, the 29 number will change.

But the powers are so here, the community is still empowered with the power to reject a budget or a strategic plan, to reject bylaw changes common to approve fundamental bylaw changes, to remove individual board members, to recall the whole board as a last resort measure.

And I think I will pause there because probably our group we will need to further flesh out this approach before it's fully ready to be discussed. But I think it was important to signal that the two layer approach where the SO is a member and then it creates another association is off the table.

And I think that with that we will finally come to the point of this meeting where we can have questions and answers. We've talked long enough now. And I'm turning to Leon who will moderate this question and answer part. Leon.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much, Mathieu. Well, we would like to of course open the floor for questions and comments from the audience. There are microphones at the front of the room. And we would kindly ask you to keep your comments and questions short. There will be a two-minute timer for participation. So we now encourage you to come to the front and ask questions and do comment.

So remind - I remind you to state your name of course and affiliation for the transcript purposes and the remove participants. And of course for interpretation. It makes their life easier to know who's speaking rather than just woman or man.

So please, our first on the queue.

Anne Aikman-Scalese:     Thank you. This Anne Aikman-Scalese. I'm a member of the IPC. My questions are actually directed toward the stewardship proposal so I don't

know if Jonathan and Lise are coming back but maybe others can answer these two brief questions.

The first question I had about the stewardship proposal is after the transition and creation of the PTI entity, does the IANA managing director report to the ICANN board or to the PTI board?

Leon Sanchez: Thanks. CWG-related questions we will defer to the session that's (unintelligible) session for CWG that's coming right after. So...

Anne Aikman-Scalese: So no stewardship questions now.

Leon Sanchez: No, we would like to - we would like to refer to them - that was a point that I was supposed to clarify, I'm sorry for that.

Anne Aikman-Scalese: My bad.

(Craig): I've been told to ask a relevant question. (Craig) (unintelligible) from APNIC. It's question that is actually at the intersection of stewardship and accountability. PTI, there's a lot of thought that's gone into the structure and the creation of PTI. In the accountability side, has there been any thought given into the preservation of the PTI in terms of inserting something in the fundamental bylaws that prevents ICANN from, say, disposing of PTI or changing PTI or changing the constitution of PTI in some way?

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much. Anyone want to react to that or provide a reply? Becky?

Becky Burr:          I would expect - I have not been following the CWG closely - that we will get a package of necessary bylaws changes from the CWG and I can't imagine that something like that wouldn't be in it.

Steve DelBianco: And if I could add, they can designate that the establishment of PTI would be considered a fundamental by, not just a regular bylaw. And as the co-chairs explained earlier, regular bylaws are subject to one of the community powers of blocking a change with the 3/4 majority. But a fundamental bylaw is a little different. If the board proposed a change to a fundamental bylaw the community would be required to approve it with a 3/4 majority vote. And I think that's the protection you're asking for.

(Craig):             So just as a follow up, because PTI is going to be a wholly owned subsidiary of ICANN, so ICANN can technically dispose of PTI, change the constitution of PTI without reference to anyone else unless it is prevented from doing so in its bylaws whether it's fundamental or non-fundamental.

Leon Sanchez:      Mathieu.

Mathieu Weill:     Just - the CWG has made clear to us that their requirements were meant to be, by default, fundamental bylaws. In addition, disposing of a subsidiary I would expect would be in a strategic plan plus in a budget. And that would imply that the community will be empowered to veto such a plan in case that happened.

                    And if the board did that outside of the strategic plan or outside of the budget, then the community would be empowered to recall the board if it, I mean, I can expect this kind of situation as very, very sensitive one. So there are a number of powers in our proposal that are actually providing safeguards to that extreme scenario.

(Craig):                    Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:        Thank you very much. Alan, please.

Alan Greenberg:      Thank you. And a new empowered AC SO model is interesting particularly in that it allows each AC and SO to decide whether to participate or not. We've already heard the SSAC and the RSAC will not. It is questionable whether the GAC could, because of various issues related to how governments participate. We haven't heard from the ASO. There have been comments that the ccNSO may have problems with a membership organization.

That says if the ALAC also chooses not to participate, and we also have some significant concerns in that area, we could end up with the GNSO being the only member of ICANN. And from the GNSO that may be a marvelous thing. From the optics of the ICANN being controlled only by the GNSO and when the GNSO has, there is a very very strong not necessarily absolute control that a very strong influence.

And the ability to veto anything by the contracting parties that starts to bring ICANN into question as a multi-stakeholder operation.

Leon Sanchez:        Thank you very much, Alan. Becky, do you want to respond to that?

Becky Burr:           Yes. First of all that is an important concern no matter what model we go with, preventing capture and ensuring that the powers of the community are being exercised by the community and not by a minority of the community imposing their views on others. So I think that's critical under any model and it's completely legitimate to ask that question under the empowered SO AC model.

I want to just say to begin with, we just started talking about the empowered SO AC model, it's not a done deal, you know, people seem interested but it's not a done deal. But that kinds of checks and balances about what kind of support you need in the community to proceed with any of the exercise of those powers don't go away because one SO or AC takes the steps necessary to become an official member.

Those checks and balances are still in there. There are clearly details and refinements that need to be made. But I think that's the fundamental hard work that we have to do no matter where we go and we clearly have to do it if we adopt the empowered SO AC model whatever that turns out to be.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much for that, Becky. Steve, do you want to add to that?

Steve DelBianco: If you don't mind. Alan, I wanted to follow up in one other respect is that the decision to participate in a boat, Alan, the decision to participate in the vote is available to any AC and SO because it would be established in the bylaws. And exercising their voting, on Slide 19 I think Alice or Hillary will put it up, that decision can be made at any point and participate in the vote is something of really great import came to the ALAC you could participate in a vote.

And that doesn't require any indication of membership. So we may have a slight confusion that these powers would be baked into the bylaws and they're available to all AC and SOs to vote and they can vote any time they wish. So the decision of for instance, the SSAC and the RSAC to say that we'd prefer to stay advisory and not vote, that's not an irrevocable decision.

We will try to write the bylaws to be open to all including those who, for the time being, decide they'd rather not vote on a budget proposal or a bylaw change. But that can be changed at any time, they can simply exercise their power to vote by taking a position. And none of that requires a decision to be a member.

Becky Burr: Well just to be clear all of slide 1990 that requires a decision to, I mean, that is -- that's one of the safeguards that gets built-in no matter what. So the voting continues and the powers of the community continue and that has not changed by one SO deciding to become a member.

Alan Greenberg: Okay. I'll reiterate my question was to a large extent the optics and how it will look if the only formal member of ICANN is the GNSO where contracting parties effectively have a detailed (unintelligible).

Becky Burr: Okay that...

((Crosstalk))

Alan Greenberg: ...not so much what (unintelligible) SO (unintelligible) situation should they choose but how it looks to the rest of the world.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you, Alan.

Becky Burr: And that's a fair point.

Leon Sanchez: I think we will continue a course to discuss this point throughout our sessions and this week. And I think, do you want to add something Jordan?

Jordan Carter:    And a sense just from that point, Alan, and everyone, we had a meeting on Friday where we sort of thought about an evolution change to the model based on the feedback. In the process that we're following if you analogize it to where the CCWG was common to stewardship group, we are couple of weeks after the close of the first public comment round.

So I think, you know, it took them from January to June 2 get it right. We need to keep going. But the point I want to rip off your question to make is if anyone is making decisions today about whether they want to participate or not, and I don't think that's what you are saying, I would just urge everyone just to keep an open mind because what the final model is going to look like to propose back to you in September it's really still a bit up in the air.

Alan Greenberg:    In the issue of full disclosure, in the interest of full disclosure, I am a member of the CCWG. I understand how tenuous the current proposal is but I wanted to mention it -- an issue which is of great concern to the At Large Advisory Committee. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:    Thank you very much, Alan. Chuck, we have a remote participant question, could you allow us to...

Chuck Gomes:    Sure.

Leon Sanchez:    Thank you. So, Alice, we have a remote (unintelligible) that's going to join us.

Man:    (Unintelligible).

Leon Sanchez:    Thank you. Thomas, would you want to answer our remote participants?

Thomas Rickert: Yes, thank you very much for your question. And actually inclusiveness is one of the points that we put an awful lot of attention to from the very beginning. It is difficult for us to reach all those that should chime in in our discussion but it's not too late so you can make yourself heard, participate as a participant or observer, do send a public comment in the second public comment period, it will be thoroughly analyzed so there is no door that is closed.

We are fully cognizant that this exercise is an exercise where we need the buy-in of the whole community and not only by different stakeholders but also by participants from all over the world. We have done a few measures, and I'm very clear that there is a lot of room for improvement.

But what we did for example, is to make it easier for everyone to understand, we did something which I think hasn't happened often in ICANN's history. We have added to the written report graphics illustrating what we're doing to make it easier to understand. We have done videos in three languages where we explained the basic principles of what we're doing.

Also the report itself, the long report, has been translated into five UN languages. So I think we are doing what we can do with the toolkit at our fingertips and even beyond. Though we would like to encourage all of you, and I keep repeating this in various fora, if you reach out to your respective peer groups, make them aware of this important task and encourage them to participate. The entry threshold is nil. Please do join and be part of this. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much, Thomas. Next in the queue we have Chuck Gomes. Chuck.

Chuck Gomes:  Chuck Gomes from the Registry Stakeholder Group and VeriSign. First of all, let me compliment the CCWG. You're doing a great job and I know how much time you're spending so thanks for that and not just you guys but the whole group, it's super work. And it's a great example, as others have said, of the multi-stakeholder model working. So my thanks for that.

I just want to clarify something that Alan said with regard to the GNSO. I just want to point out that the contracted parties do not control the GNSO. It's much bigger than that so.

I have a question and, Mathieu, it really comes back to something you said about the unincorporated associations. And that may be a moot point, I don't know now. But with the unincorporated associations if they were involved, would they have to be unincorporated associations in California?

Leon Sanchez:  Becky, do you want to answer?

Becky Burr:  So I'm looking at our lawyers who have given us very good advice. I think the answer to that question is no, and I'm sure they will correct me if wrong. But here's what I think, the statute requires for membership legally cognizable personhood which is established by the declaration of intent to participate as a group to exercise those powers.

In California that might be an unincorporated association, that might be something else. It might be something entirely different in Switzerland. There's no requirement that you actually file papers anywhere and absolutely no requirement that if you want to file papers you have to file them in California. You have to have legally cognizable personhood and, we've wrapped ourselves a little bit around a pole with this term, unincorporated

association, that's really not what's going on here. The legal personhood is the issue.

Chuck Gomes: Thank you very much.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much, Becky. Thank you very much, Chuck. Roelof.

Roelof Meijer: Thank you, Leon. Roelof Meijer. And maybe I should declare I'm also a member of the CCWG so I should probably not take too much time from other people of the community. But I'm just a bit worried maybe, and Becky, you didn't make one particular aspect of the new model that we're looking at clear.

And I want to illustrate it with an example. Steve mentioned that one of the powers that the community will get is a boating on changes to the bylaws with a 70% threshold. Even if, for instance, the ccNSO would not file such a declaration of intent they would be voting. So they would have the power.

It is only that they could not take ICANN to court if they had not declared their intent because they would not have this legal personhood. (Unintelligible) those entities that have declared such. It might not look good, and if it's only the GNSO that files that intention we might wonder if it's a good idea to go into this whole membership (unintelligible).

And maybe the other (unintelligible) but I think it's very important that this is a distinction not for the SOs (unintelligible) have to file this intent to get the power and the power (unintelligible).

Becky Burr: Correct, that's absolutely correct.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much. Seun.

Seun Ojedeji:     Thank you very much. My name is Seun Ojedeji. I'm from Africa. And I'd like to also indicate that participation in Africa is increasing and we hope that to continue to increase. My comment it's in relation to (unintelligible) question to the CCWG.

(Unintelligible) election to exactly what powers would we be losing if we don't go the membership route? Because it still looks like a hand - (unintelligible) would still automatically bounce to a membership solution. So what would we be losing if we don't go the membership route in your report?

Because I know currently without being a member we can actually appoint - SOs and ACs can actually appoint directors at the moment without being a member of an (unintelligible) board of directors actually required (unintelligible) so what powers apart from, for instance, removing board members, is it that we would be losing if we don't go the membership route? Thank you.

Becky Burr:     Could I just ask a clarifying question here? Because I want to make sure when you say, "When we don't go to a membership model." Are you talking about if we live in a purely voluntary cooperative model? Or are you talking about the enhanced...

Seun Ojedeji:     Yes...

((Crosstalk))

Seun Ojedeji:     ...(unintelligible). What is the model we have right now?

Becky Burr:     Okay, right now we don't have a model that has been agreed to by the community...

((Crosstalk))

Becky Burr:     Oh right now? Right now we have a entirely voluntary cooperative model.

Seun Ojedeji:   Yeah, so what would we be losing? Because I know CWG is recommending a lot of improvements on the bylaws and so on and so forth which actually (unintelligible) to obey. So what I'm (unintelligible) what would we be losing if we actually don't go...

Becky Burr:     Okay so we could write all of the bylaw powers that the community has identified into the bylaws right now as a voluntary cooperative model. So long as the ICANN board thought it was consistent with their obligations under law they could honor those and we would be fine.

                The only, as I understand it, power that we lose, and I don't mean to minimize it because I personally think this is a pretty important power, is that we would not have the ultimate enforcement power. Ultimately they would continue to be the board's final call and authority wouldn't be shared in an enforceable way.

                Trying to get away from the word enforceable because I think it's more about authority. But if you are comfortable with a voluntary cooperative model we can put all of those things into the bylaws as they are.

Seun Ojedeji:   Yeah, thank you very much.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much. At this point we'd like to close the queue with the lady that's at the end of the queue. And we would like to of course also open a question for the remote hub that we have in Colombia. Colombia is also a remote hub. And we would like to welcome them. And they will be next.

Man:              (Unintelligible).

Leon Sanchez:     (Unintelligible) Columbia.

((Spanish Spoken))

Leon Sanchez:     So we will go back to English and we will switch to our next person in the queue please.

Andrew Sullivan: Thank you. My name is Andrew Sullivan. And just to be clear I'm speaking for nobody here except for me. I wonder if there might be a tension -- so I wonder if you might reflect on whether there's a tension between the voting approach that is outlined in the proposal and multi-stakeholder traditions broadly construed.

In particular if you look at the proposal, there is a fairly strong bias towards names interests as compared to everything else. Now maybe that is legitimate for the ICANN community. But it does entail that you're going to have a bias in that direction. And of course when you got majority voting mechanisms then as long as you can assemble a majority you can sort of permanently exclude people who are not part of that coalition.

Traditionally in any kind of multi-stakeholder approach the idea is that you've got all these different kinds of views and they all have to be, you know, sort of more or less evenly balanced. And I just wonder whether there is any kind of

tension there and whether that, you know, was something you discussed or looked at. Thanks very much.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much for your question. Thomas, would you like to answer that?

Thomas Rickert:  Yeah sure. Thanks for the question. And it's not the first time we hear this question and we've discussed it extensively in our group as well. There is no intention whatsoever to move away from a consensus-based decision-making. So what you see here, the voting scheme is only for last resort community powers if and when they need to be exercised.

So let's take the example of the budget, before a budget is approved by the ICANN Board, which could then be challenged by the community with one of these powers, there's a consultation process. So nothing or none of these powers should be executed as a surprise.

So there will be consultation with the board and the community on these matters and only in case a future board, a rogue aboard, that say wishes to ignore the express wishes of the community vendor community could come together and take a vote to overturn let's say board decision or force the board to reconsider decisions that it has made neglecting the community's wishes.

Also, let's be very clear that the community empowerment that we are discussing is not related to ICANN's policymaking. So the policymaking in the GNSO or the ccNSO or elsewhere will remain as it is, that remains untouched and that will be continued to be conducted in the way the ccNSO or GNSO, for that matter, would do their policymaking. And that would be primarily consensus-based.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much, Thomas. Steve, do you want to add to that?

Steve DelBianco: Yeah, to further emphasize the notion, if the community power of the independent review, the enhanced independent review, were used, all I can do is ask of these independent experts to look at our bylaws as the standard review and decide whether or not the decision should be upheld or reversed. It cannot change the nature of the policy. It can simply say that the board either did or did not act appropriately.

And in that respect it goes back to the community so that the bottom up consensus process can devise a decision that fits more in keeping with the bylaws. And there's no ability to override the bottom-up process by micromanaging or changing what's in it.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much, Steve. Next in the queue we have (unintelligible).

(Kouwe): (Kouwe) (unintelligible) in my personal capacity, no represent the board view at all. And actually I would like to follow in Andrew's question. Although you are talking about you are going to the consensus stuff, but if you look at the current design, the 29 votes, if you include in the number community and the technical (unintelligible) about nine vote.

If you take a -- in the case you are going to be voting even you take to third, these nine vote on that number community including the technical community, the total vote (unintelligible) is insignificant.

So you ignore this organization, you can ignore the technical group, you can ignore the number community, you still can pass the two third. This is the first question I'd like to, you know, even you say you are going to consensus (unintelligible) critical you are going to vote it would be - their vote is

insignificant, so that mean you can ignore them. This is the one question, the first question.

The second question I'd really like to ask for this design, in this design you are talking about, you know, this 29 vote basically community can override the board decision (unintelligible) . My question is if you override the decision of the board decision (unintelligible) the liability who protect the liability is the board or your 29 voting member? That liability problems.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much for this (unintelligible). I think, Jordan, do you want to answer the first part of the question?

Jordan Carter: On the first question, (unintelligible), I don't think it's -- to assume that the technical community and the rest of the ICANN community would be at total odds on something that was an accountability decision seems unlikely. And given the thresholds that we've built into this first draft of the model, it's almost impossible to exercise some of the -- for example, if there was a fight about resources in the budget, as we've proposed...

((Crosstalk))

Jordan Carter: Could I just finish my point? If there was a fight about the budget and the community sent the budget back to the board to do so a second time would require some of those technical community people to be involved.

((Crosstalk))

(Kouwe): (Unintelligible). So I'd just like to remind (unintelligible) is there any way we can resolve this.

Mathieu Weill:     Following up, the first thing is I think this is an interesting stress test. We need to make sure whether our system, how would we react if at a point in the future there was an a rift between the technical community and the non-technical community although I think the border between them would have to be defined.

I don't know whether, as a ccTLD manager I'm in the technical community. Maybe you don't consider me as a technical community. I would argue that some others at least are very strongly technically rooted. So that's the first question. But that's a valid stress test for us to check. And I mean, the 29 are going to change because it's going to become 25 and then we're going to fine tune this and that's exactly what we're trying to do when we're trying to fine tune it is stress test any risk of capture. So that's very important.

You ask the second question about liability, we have be independent legal counsel here so I am very careful. But my understanding is -- my understanding is the (unintelligible) and the liability rest with the board and only the board.

But you will agree with me that the responsibility of the board is to get community buy-in. Can you imagine a situation where the board would have to adopt the budget that would not be supported by 2/3 of the community? That's a very difficult point.

((Crosstalk))

Mathieu Weill:     And that's exactly what happens in any organization or any membership organization. I mean, sometimes there are projects that my board want to do and the membership is not ready. It's their responsibility and they get rejected,

and never happen, but it could get rejected, it still their responsibility. And that's the sad story of board members.

((Crosstalk))

Mathieu Weill:     You have to deal with the stakeholders or shareholders or whatever you call them.

Man:               Yeah, I know (unintelligible) to understand.

((Crosstalk))

Man:               ...So I must not be too wrong.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much. I remind you too and would kindly ask the questions to remain short. We are running out of time and we need still get through many items and the rest of the session. So please can you go ahead?

(Jahi):           Yes, this is (Jahi). And I'm from China. I'm also a fellow of ICANN fellowship. I just have two questions. First is I'm thinking about (unintelligible) proposal, even if the IRPs that ICANN board make wrong decision how to deal with the decisions. I think we need more (unintelligible) procedures in the ICANN bylaw because we can't fund this specifical processes in the proposals.

                  Maybe - and another question is - and it's not a question, it's a concern, I'm thinking about if - apparently the ICANN board was selected by the communities. And also the ICANN - the communities is possible to recall the whole board and also fire one of the board members. But if I'm - just in my

view, like if we are the ICANN board the smart decision we made - we just keep quiet to accept every policy. So why do we need ICANN board?

((Crosstalk))

Becky Burr:     I'm going to answer the first question and not the second in favor of my continuing ability to interact with the board. Your question about the specific procedures to deal with independent review decisions that the community takes issue with is a very good one. There are not proposals in the report now. That is an issue that we are still working on. It's been flagged but clearly that is an issue of great interest to the community and it is one that we will be talking about.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much Becky. This is Leon Sanchez again. Malcolm, do you want to make a question?

Malcolm Hutty:     For the record, Malcolm Hutty from LINX. This is not so much a question so much as a comment. I'd like to take this opportunity to draw something to the attention of the broader community. It relates to that last issue, the power that is proposed to recall the entire ICANN board.

The proposal from the CCWG would require for that power to be exercised, that it was a motion of no confidence in the board was supported by multiple SOs and ACs. This ensures that it is not too easy to fire the ICANN board. And people don't want it to be easy to fire the ICANN Board.

Nonetheless, the consequence of this is that it is possible that an SO could by a very broad consensus within itself, support a resolution to discharge the entire board and that that resolution would not find support from other SOs and ACs.

It may be, for example, it's entirely foreseeable that an issue that concerned one SO greatly, and for which they had found there was no other option left to them, other than to seek to discharge the board, simply did not relate to the matters of the other SOs.

So for example, if it were, I don't know, something to do with the board's repeated failure to honor the PDP process for example, in the GNSO, simply doesn't concern ccTLDs or the numbers communities because the PDP doesn't relate to them.

Which would create the possibility of a situation where one of the primary communities for which the board was responsible had formally said that it had lost confidence in the board and the board remained in place. This is a choice by the CCWG to prefer the importance of stability and making sure it is not too easy to discharge the board over the importance of ensuring that the board commands the support of the communities which they serve.

I find this surprising and I think that if it ever came to this it would be highly controversial. And that is why I've chosen this town hall as an opportunity to draw the attention of the broader community to the implications of this. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:    Thank you very much, Malcolm. Milton.

Milton Mueller:    (Unintelligible). Milton Mueller. I guess Georgia Tech University. I have some responses to some of the other people that talk to you. I'm coming here from the GNSO. And I was a little bit disturbed to see Alan Greenberg say that the GNSO is basically the contracted party. I just like to remind you that the GNSO is half contracted parties and have not contracted party, there's an

entire house that seems to have been overlooked there. And those non-contracted parties are user constituencies.

But I wanted to address the broader point as to whether these SOs or ACs would accept the empowered membership model. I think that's an interesting element of your current plan and I'm not sure I understand the full implications of it.

So let me just ask you first of all, I can understand when Alan said the RSAC and SSAC and defendants would not possibly accept this. And I actually don't think they should even be in consideration as a member because, A, they're appointed by the board and, B, they are meant to be advisory committees not essentially policymakers as I understood it.

So I think there should be a clear separation between advisory committees in their role as members and the actual supporting organizations that were supposed to represent the entire multi-stakeholder communities that develop policy within ICANN.

So the other comment I have relates to what (Kouwe) said, which is he's picking out a couple of these constituencies and saying very minority. Well taken individually all of them are minorities, are they not? And so you do have a balance of power issue that you need to think about in a stress test fashion. And in some ways the last person mentioned it.

But I don't think it's valid to criticize this model by saying that no single community has complete control of the membership structure. Okay so those are my comments.

And now I have a simple question for you. When people are arguing against this membership model quite are they proposing for enforceability? What is the alternative that they're giving us to create the accountability that we want to have?

Now sure, there are various details about this model that you can debate and discuss. But what really is the alternative that we are being offered if we don't have some kind of membership or some kind of mechanism for enforcing accountability? Because isn't the need for that what created this entire process to begin with?

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much, Milton. Steve, do you want to or Becky?

Becky Burr: So I'm going to answer your question, Milton, on the sort of enforceable, non-enforceable because the designator model also has the enforcement characteristics.

There is a strong group of people in the CCWG that feel that it is okay and effective to continue to rely on the voluntary or cooperative model that we have now. I mean, the quest is sort of we expect and anticipate that the board will do the right thing in these circumstances and we're going to continue to expect and anticipate that. Both sides say that. The question is whether that's enough.

And so the difference is due you need an institutional -- the ability in the absolute worst-case scenario to enforce through an IRP, for example, or not. And that's the discussion that's taking place in the community right now.

Steve DelBianco: And, Milton, if Steve. There is an innovation, and Becky I have to give most of the credit for, the innovation that we discussed on Friday is that you said

would ACs and SOs except the model. There isn't any need to accept a membership concept. Initially all one has to do is decide whether or not you wish to exercise the votes the bylaws would give to each AC and SO. And you can make that decision at any time.

That was the involuntary boat in the sense that the advice or the vote to block the budget would be given to the board. And we would still live in today's world where that's merely advisory to the board.

None of the ACs and SOs have to turn on the membership or activate membership if the board continues to honor the voting that comes out of the bylaws. So it may never turn into a membership organization. But this is our last chance to put that enforceability into the bylaws by creating the potential for membership if it should ever be needed, to get the enforceability.

Leon Sanchez:     Mathieu, do you want to add?

Mathieu Weill:     Well I think it's been already argued quite forcefully. Some of the arguments we are hearing as well and I think are important to state here is that a voluntary model, and I making myself get the kit for a moment, is just representative of how the Internet was built based on cooperative agreements and non-contracted based like the (peering) arrangements which are still very largely non-contracted based.

And so that this model may not be disclosed like this as well as the fact that the threat of basically a process like board recall being put out in the public would be sufficient to hold the board to honor the bylaws. And that's the argument that we are getting. I think and that's the debate we are having in the group. And I think it's important that it shared with a wider group here. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much, Mathieu. Next in the queue we have Mary Uduma.

Mary Uduma:     Yeah, thank you very much. My name is Mary Uduma, I am from Africa. And first I want to put a disclaimer that probably the group would have explored the possibility of looking at other jurisdictions and not just California. I don't know whether that has been done. And whether we have restrictions because each time we come up -- you bring a model we try to analyze how it to appear or how it would work we come back to the fact that there is a jurisdictional restriction. So I don't know whether I'm right or wrong so that's why I'm (unintelligible) of a disclaimer first.

Now, I want to say that if we take this model where now every member of the board become a voting member unlike what is currently done, would all members become voting members? If so can we reverse the process of electing the board or selecting board members to this process, these 29 votes.

So all communities, everybody is involved not only the community where the individual relate to board, the community, the ICANN community would be part of it. People can tell us what they can do for us on the board and we reverse the process and get these votes in the 29 process first before if there's going to be a recall or there's going to be of all or some of the board member.

The liability question is already answered. Can we also look at shortening the tenure of each board member instead of allowing board members (unintelligible) nine years, 10 years, (unintelligible) continue. So can we look at that and make it shorter so that it would be possible for other people to participate. And those that are saying we don't trust the board who now will look at -- they will go to the board and we will see what they can do. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much, Mary. Do you want to (unintelligible) Mathieu.

Mathieu Weill:    Yeah, and sends thank you very much, Mary. And you made a very good point and some of them were actually already discussed although we may want to reconsider including the tenure of the board members.

One of the points you raised was jurisdictions, and I think this gives me an opportunity to address this question which has been part of our deliberation (unintelligible). And what we've realized during this work is that jurisdictions has different aspects. Where are the headquarters, what is the jurisdiction of the contracts and the dispute resolutions?

And of those different aspects we took the approach that, number one, and defendants we were more requirement based, so we looked at the powers we needed and we said, can we do that currently with ICANN being incorporated in California? Answer is yes, mostly, no problem.

And then we said -- and that's going to be important in the next phase -- we will further investigate all aspects of jurisdiction issues in Work Stream 2. But when I say all aspects that means we will look for aspects where the current within ICANN would prevent (unintelligible) some requirements for accountability.

So we won't look at everything but if we find, in the course of our work, that we are blocked to implement a requirement which has not been the case so far, then we would look at whether the jurisdiction is an issue either -- most probably there are some concerns that were voiced in our group about the fact that most of the ICANN contracts would have dispute resolution clauses in California for instance.

And that's something that our group can investigate and further elaborate on. So that's an important aspect and I know it's a topic that's closely looked at by many within ICANN but also outside. So definitely an important aspect of our work. And one of the comments we've received several times is to make our thinking more clear on this issue which was actually not the case in the first initial public comment we send so that work that we know we have in front of us. So I think that's an important aspect that you mentioned.

And the rest of the ideas certainly are part of our deliberations and we need to further elaborate on that in our future work. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much, Mathieu. One last -- there seems to be a misquote by Milton Mueller on Alan Greenberg and Alan wanted to clarify this but the queue was already closed and we didn't let him clarify this. But the misquotation comes from having the contracted parties detail (unintelligible) vote in GNSO so they could actually affect or block a decision by requiring supermajority vote which translates into an effective veto. So clarification made, Alan.

And I'd like now turn to my co-chair, Mathieu.

Mathieu Weill: So we are now going to invite Jonathan and Lise back, they're here. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm giving you the two CWG Stewardship co-chairs, Jonathan Robinson and Lise Fuhr for the next session -- next part of our session which will be regarding their dependencies between our two groups.

((Crosstalk))

Mathieu Weill: Yeah, the queue.

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson:     Okay, thank you everyone. It's Jonathan Robinson speaking. I know it's been a long session and we'll try and bring this to a wrap relatively quickly but we felt it was critical as part of this overall session to come back together now and talk about the linkage between the groups in a little more detail.

Just remind you, there will be an engagement session where you'll be able to talk with myself and Lise and in fact some of our drafting team leads, later today so we very much welcome talking with you in more detail. And I know there were questions earlier that wanted to address the elements of the CWG proposal and we're very happy to engage with you during that session later today.

As a refresher, just to get us back where we were, I've put up a slide here, here we have a slide of the post-transition structure with the critical elements of it. ICANN, the ICANN Board, the contract between ICANN and the subsidiary, the post-transition IANA subsidiary, its own board and the oversight and accountability and escalation (unintelligible) by a combination of the board, the CSC and the review functions and then all wrapped in the accountability mechanisms provided by this group which you've heard so much from over the last hour or so very

So I think it's just absolutely essential to look at this as an integrated package. And before going on to doing a little more detail on those specific linkage and accountability points, I think it's probably worth talking about process because process seems to have bothered quite a number of people during the course of this. And by process I mean how these proposals are taken through the root towards final acceptance.

In Fadi's opening speech this morning he talked about the different phases and he highlighted the process. If you look at the process between our two groups we have a proposal, a final proposal, here before the chartering organizations for approval now.

What are they approving? They are approving a proposal that expressly conditioned -- conditional on the work of the accountability group. They are approving that that proposal is sent to the coordinating group, the ICG, for review and integration with the proposals from the other two communities.

That integrated proposal will then be put out by the ICG for public comment and thereafter brought back to -- as an integrated proposal brought back to be finally reviewed at the Dublin meeting at which point we will be seeing the final proposal from the Accountability group. And in reviewing that Accountability group, as I said in my opening remarks, it's at that point that we would expect the chartering organizations in reviewing the Accountability proposal to seek confirmation from the Stewardship group that their accountability requirements have been met.

What are those accountability requirements? The really break down into five key areas each of which is dealt with, as you've heard, by the Accountability group at a sort of global level. But we have specific requirements into stewardship proposal that these are dealt with.

So clearly we care about the ICANN budget but the components of the ICANN budget we care about into Stewardship group is to ensure that there is sufficient and adequate and ongoing funding for the IANA function. But that sufficient and adequate funding for the operation and future development of

that PTI is a critical component of the ICANN budget and that's why we care about the accountability of ICANN in respect to the budget.

We talked earlier about the fact that PTI is a controlled subsidiary within ICANN. The fact that it is controlled and bound into ICANN means we care about the accountability issues of ICANN relating to the ICANN Board and the community writes that this group, the Accountability group is working on.

Our proposal, under Item 3, has two types of review functions built into it, the regular review function and the possibility of a special review function. We care about that accountability mechanism built into the fundamental bylaws.

Under Item 4, our proposal has the CSC, which I described, the customer standing committee, described to you in some detail earlier. And we care about not being incorporated into the bylaws of ICANN.

Finally, we care about the possibility of independent review and the fact that that should be applicable to the IANA functions. So you take this as a package of requirements that we depend on this group to produce and we need to be satisfied that this group has been -- will produce to the satisfaction of the completion of the overall package and that these mechanisms will be captured in a set of bylaws or fundamental bylaws.

So that's the essence of the linkage in a nutshell and why the proposal can both stand on its own two feet at the moment but ultimately require a third foot, if you like, to make it stand up in full completeness when the work of this group is done.

So we feel comfortable and confident in putting the proposal to the SOs and ACs for approval with those conditions built into it because it is -- it can stand

with all other elements complete subject to the development work on the accountability.

So I think that's probably all I and we needed to say on that. The community will retain significant influence through the accountability work and as the work of this group that you've just heard goes through its further iterations and development. And I think you heard that very clearly from the co-chairs and their presentation from the past hour or so.

Various further development and work to be done to finalize that prior to it coming back together and thinking alongside the work of the Stewardship group which will ultimately then be presented as a package of two proposals to the NTIA later in the year.

So I think that's all I wanted to cover for the moment to make sure Reed would any of my other colleagues like to add anything to that or comment in respect of the linkage and interdependence?

Thomas Rickert: Yeah, maybe just to clarify again that when we started our work both of the groups got charters on the basis of which they worked. So we were tasked with accountability but the CWG's work also contained parts of accountability. And as we progressed and as we closely liaised with Jonathan and Lise in particular we found out that there were sufficient areas where they could just piggyback on what we are doing.

And now we're in the situation where they sort of rely on us delivering on certain aspects. And I think I would like to reiterate that neither in our group nor from commenters during the public comment period did we get any challenges for us to meet CWG expectations. And I think that's something that's encouraging as we move on. So it's very very very very unlikely that we

will experience surprises with respect to the CWG requirements. But this is still a work in progress.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much. And I would like to open the floor now for comments and questions so it's your turn again.

Anne Aikman-Scalese:     Yes thank you. It's Anne Aikman-Scalese with the IPC. And the other question I had (unintelligible)...

Leon Sanchez:     I'm sorry, could you please put the microphone closer?

Anne Aikman-Scalese:     Yeah, Anne Aikman-Scalese with the IPC, and I'll do for the other question to the later session since Jonathan referred to that session. But this session -- this question is about linkage and coordination.

And the question is about the contract itself in other words, I view the ultimate contract between that PTI and ICANN as an accountability mechanism. And so I'm wondering whether there will be a contract that is delivered to NTIA that has been approved by the ICANN Board that will ensure accountability between ICANN and the PTI with respect to those functions which should be carried over and taken out of, for example, you know, in Schedule F there are all these deliverables and it has to be a determination and it's to which of those, you know, come into the new contract.

So that's the linkage question. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much. Does anyone want to react to that?

Jonathan Robinson:     Yeah I think, I mean, we, as you will know from the proposal, we started to work on -- on some ideas around a term sheet for what that contract might

look like. We felt that our job was to produce a post-transition structure that could accommodate and deal with the transition of oversight.

I think it would've been very difficult for us to specify in full and final detail what the shape and scope of that contract would look like. It's my expectation that that is something to be handled as part of the implementation. And I think the confidence that the community should have there is that that contract will need to be ultimately settled between the post-transition IANA and the parent.

And I am almost certain, and forgive me for not being 100% certain, that we -- we certainly discussed, and I would expect that that would be assisted by independent legal advice. And I think that's where the confidence of the community should have backed the reality of trying to develop that contract -- I suppose I'd make one other remark and that contract, as the current draft term sheet is, is likely to at least take some guidance from the existing contract.

The problem with the existing contract is it's not wholly appropriate for the future in that it's a government contract and many elements of that contract relate to it being derived as a government contract. That certainly gives some good guidance to how things might be done in the future and therefore was the basis of the term sheet.

Leon Sanchez:      Thank you, Jonathan. I believe, Steve, do you want to add to that?

Steve DelBianco: And on to slide in front of you look at Number 6 and Number 5 to truly understand the linkage. If the CWG proposal suggests that the bylaws of ICANN establish and create PTI and there in the fundamental bylaws, the linkage is that it would require 3/4 vote of the ICANN community to change a fundamental bylaws, that's the first. So 6 would protect the presence of PTI.

Now go to 5. If in fact the contract between PTI and ICANN were altered the board would have to approve the contract alteration and if they did so above and beyond the community's desires an independent review panel can be invoked to question that decision and measure it against the standard that the bylaws require. So those are the linkage is we're talking about.

((Crosstalk))

Leon Sanchez: Thank you. (Kouwe). And, I'm sorry, we're now closing the queue after Kavouss so please.

(Kouwe): It's (Kouwe) again. Jonathan, can you bring the Number 3, the IANA function review, the (unintelligible). Because if I remember in the very beginning you were making a presentation you look at the IANA function review team - you look at that list. It seems like the number community and the IETF is not in there. How you can do the IANA function review without number community and IETF? Because, you know, the IETF provide the protocol and number community is a provider number addresses. In here it's missing.

Jonathan Robinson: So I think that's a very good question. We had a really delicate line to walk here between trying to -- we had the advantage of having the proposals from the other two communities visible to us through a substantial portion of our work. But we also have to recognize that it was our job and our scope to deal with the requirements of the naming community.

The job of the ICG is to bring these three together and to think about how those might be welded together. As I understand it, there are review functions, review capabilities in both of the other proposals. And it may be that it's

satisfactory for those reviews to operate independently or it may be that there is a coming together of the way in which these work.

My sense is that currently the different groups are satisfied with operating as they are independently. But you know, we have to be very careful about how far the scope of our work in dealing with both the charter we had and our requirement therefore to deal with the naming community needs and requirements.

(Kouwe): Well, I think, as you know, in IETF or the number community IR all the meeting is open for everybody not only for, you know, IR memberships. Anyone can go to the IR to making the comment, making the policies, participations. So I think there is - if that is possible I think you should think about, you know, that is a possibility put the number community and the IETF in the list. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez: Thank you very much. Next in the queue please.

((Crosstalk))

Leon Sanchez: I'm sorry, Lise, do you want to...

Lise Fuhr: Thank you. I just have a response for that because the IANA functions review while supposed to be open and transparent for everyone, so it's not going to be in a closed environment. So there will be possibilities to follow the process. Thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: And engage with the process not just follow it, to actually actively engage with the process. But again, it wasn't necessarily to have to specify additional participants outside of the naming community on there.

(Kouwe):          Yeah, (unintelligible) in this (unintelligible) you didn't include this to constituency. And if you didn't include in this constituency (unintelligible) in the ICG, basically where we (unintelligible) the CWG proposal. So if you don't open a window here you're expecting to modify your final proposal?

Leon Sanchez:      Thank you. Please next in the queue now.

(Doug Lasoango): My name is (Doug Lasoango) and I'm from Uganda. I have a question and probably a suggestion as well and it relates to the accountability mechanisms around please - can I have the slide back? I think it's 9. I believe it's 9.

So my question is especially around the differences between the IFR and the CSC, so - this is particularly because, well, when I read through the remit of the CSC I see that some of it is rather operational in nature. And it got me thinking if a whole committee and a fairly independent committee is necessary to actually carry out this work as opposed to perhaps having the operational aspects of what is being carried out by CSC be something that is inside or administratively handled within the PTI and then any nonoperational aspects perhaps could fall within the IFR.

As you have rightfully pointed out, the IFR's mandatory or remit is rather wide and it could encompass quite a few things. So it got me thinking, instead of two committees wouldn't we cover the work of the CSC somewhere administratively within the PTI and then get some of the nonoperational stuff in IFR? Thanks.

Leon Sanchez:      Thank you very much. You want to write to that?

Jonathan Robinson:     I'll try and respond. I think, I mean, the CSC is by definition responsible for reviewing the operational aspects of the performance. So I'm not sure I fully understand the concern because we have -- it is representatives of users of that service. So to the extent that that service is not being performed adequately or satisfactorily you can expect that to be highlighted and remedied. And if and only if it is not on their escalation mechanisms to deal with that. So, yeah, I'm not sure I get...

(Doug Lasoango): Perhaps I will try again. The CSC and the IFR is there anything the CSC has in its mandate that cannot be fulfilled by the IFR which now requires that we have a completely new committee just for the CSC mandate?

Lise Fuhr:     It's Lise Fuhr for the record. While the CSC is, as Jonathan said, covering the operational staff and the IFR has a wide mandate, as you say, but the CSC is a customer standing committee that's there all the time whereas the IANA functions review is gathered every five years. So it's established to do this specific review.

So you can't actually merge those two. You would have the CSC, that's the customers that's overlooking the operational staff, and the IANA functions review it's a wider review of IANA as a whole. And it has all the organizations included and that's the multi-stakeholder body of this model. Thank you.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much.

((Crosstalk))

(Doug Lasoango): I think it also answers my second question (unintelligible) so thanks.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you very much. We do want to note that in this slide the NCSG is missing but in the report it's of course considered. And we do apologize for the oversight. And this is going to be corrected. So next in the queue we have Malcolm. Malcolm.

Malcolm Hutty:   Thank you. Malcolm Hutty from LINX for the record. I do have a question this time, a simple question, and it was prompted by Jonathan's reference to the resolutions before the chartering committees at the moment. Does the panel believe that it might be useful to keep the CWG and the CCWG formally in existence until the completion of the implementation of the proposals so that the structure -- so that the community has a structure available to engage in dialogue with the board and the staff as they grapple with implementation of your respective proposals?

Leon Sanchez:     Thomas.

Thomas Rickert:   The answer is yes for CCWG.

Leon Sanchez:     Kavouss?

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson:    I think it's a good idea and it's something we should be aware of so, I mean, we've just got to make sure it's consistent with whatever has been resolved already and what's in the charter. But, yes, it's evident that there requires some oversight of implementation and so it's a sensible point to throw into the mix. Thanks Malcolm.

Leon Sanchez:     Thank you. Next in the queue, Kavouss.

Kavouss Arasteh: Thank you. My name is Kavouss Arasteh. I am not raising any question to you, don't worry. The way that you explain (unintelligible) Dublin we have a lot of things to do. You said that few people getting together behind the scene and provide something and that is something to be really discussed.

Now it seems that (unintelligible) in Dublin we have many calls and perhaps few more face to face meeting. And in that sense we will benefitted from the services of the ICANN staff.

As I mentioned yesterday, I want to make it today more publicly. They have been very, very efficient. Very efficient preparing the call, Adobe connections, telephone conversations, difficulty that we have, presentation of the document. Immediately after the meeting providing the note, providing the transcription, replying to the question and so on so forth.

I would request that if distinguish (unintelligible) are coming and naming these people that we formally appreciate the efforts because I don't know all of the names but she may be so kind and kindly announce the name of these staff that provided to us these services that for us time zones is okay. But for them they have to cope with all time zones. So there's a lot of work and they are very, very efficient, very effective, very humble with all courtesy and with all collaboration and we really appreciate their efforts.

But I would like that very name (unintelligible) pronounced and they will be put in this transcription for the record of the people and after that I would request that there's a big round of applause for them. But let's first pronounce the name and introduce them. That is very efficient and very necessary. Thank you.

Jonathan Robinson:    Kavouss, I'll make a quick remark here. I think it's a wonderful suggestion. I think we've had tremendous support. And I think the critical point for me is the support we've had is - you could very easily say well that's their job. But they've gone well beyond over and above beyond their respective jobs.

My challenge is with mentioning names is I'm very worried I might forget someone. So I would...

((Crosstalk))

Leon Sanchez:    Thank you.

Kavouss Arasteh:  (Unintelligible).

((Crosstalk))

~~Woman:~~Theresa Swinehart:    First of all, it is - thank you very much for the recognition of the staff but also for the recognition of the volunteer community around this. There are a wide range of names across the entire organization. We have different touch points across departments. Let me just name a few, Greg, Alice, Adam, Sam, Hillary, Brenda, Kim, Marika, Bart, Bernie, the entire language services team and then obviously everybody else from IT who's helping us...

((Crosstalk))

Man:            Nancy and the meetings team?

Theresa Swinehart: ~~Woman:~~ Yes, and the entire meetings team, Xavier in finance (unintelligible) also provided input into (unintelligible). The IANA team...

((Crosstalk))

Woman: ...the legal team. So we have a wide range of teams across the organization who have really been stepping to the plate and working 200% to help provide (unintelligible) on a daily basis.

Jonathan Robinson: Not to mention Theresa.

Leon Sanchez: And Thomas would you like to do a (unintelligible) remark?

Thomas Rickert: Yes, it's now my privilege to be the only one between you and lunch. This has been a very informative discussion. We will keep working closely together and exchanging thoughts. I would like to encourage all of you to stay tuned, watch out of the next public comment period. And I'm not sure whether we have extended our thanks to the technical team that is doing everything to make this work so that we can understand each other and also to the translator. So I just want to make sure - thanks to Becky Burr, Steve DelBianco, Jordan Carter, Leon Sanchez, Mathieu, Jonathan and Lise. Thanks, everyone. Have a great week. Bye-bye.

Jonathan Robinson: Don't forget the engagement session on the CWG later this afternoon. I'm sure many of you will be aware of it. We look forward to seeing you there. Thank you.

END