THOMAS RICKERT: Can staff please confirm that the recording has started? Okay, excellent. So with that, we can start this webinar. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, everyone. My name is Thomas Rickert and I’m one of the three co-chairs of CCWG, and I’m the co-chair that has been appointed by the GNSO, but it’s not only the co-chairs that have been working.

We have excellent rapporteurs also present on this call. That is Becky Burr and Jordan Carter. And we have other sub-team leaders. Steve DelBianco and Cheryl Langdon-Orr, who are also with us. And we of course, have a fantastic group with more than 150 individuals that have been working very hard over the last couple of months to prepare this report, and let me not forget excellent staff support that we continuously receive, so that’s also much appreciated.

The way that we’re going to conduct this webinar is as follows. I will show you through the roughly 15 slides that enshrine the main ideas of what we have presented in the report. And during that phase, I would really appreciate if you could hold back your questions, because after that, we’re going to run through all the chapters, all the main topics, of this short presentation again, and open it up for discussion with you.

This webinar is translated into all UN languages, but today unfortunately due to storms in Buenos Aires where parts of the translating teams are sitting, Russian translation is unavailable. Please do note is that if you want to ask questions, you need to be on the telephone bridge. So if you want to be heard when asking your questions, please dial in to the telephone bridge so that we can all hear
you, but you don't have to be on the telephone bridge in order to ask questions.

Please do put your questions into the chat window, and if you do so, please do mark them with a Q or with “Question” at the beginning of your chat so that we can clearly identify the question that you want to ask.

Also, it would be very valuable for us if you would only put questions into the chat that relate to the section that we we’re just discussing because it’s very hard not only for the leadership team, but also for staff and for the whole group of attendees to follow a discussion or multiple discussions that are taking place at the same time.

Finally, let me note that I highly recommend that you all go download the report and take a look at the report. The report has much more detail on how the discussion inside our group evolved. As you will know, we haven't started from scratch, so we based our work on community input that was received during the public comment period that ICANN conducted after the announcement of the US government, so we already got a very good idea of what the community requests for improving ICANN's accountability would be, so we took that on board.

We also created an inventory of what ICANN had in place in terms of accountability so that we would not duplicate any effort that might already have been done inside ICANN. Then we published the first report earlier this year, and we thoroughly analyzed all the input that we received, and that input lead to some substantial changes on parts of the aspects that we are dealing with.
But the good news is that for many of the main ideas for improving ICANN’s accountability, we already got broad support during the first public comment period, so what you see in this report is actually the result of a continued discussion and improvement since we started our work roughly at the beginning of this year. The report has a lot of detail in the body of the report, but also I would like to highlight that there are multiple appendices on the [background]. You find the charter in there. You’ll find information on how we interacted with the outside independent legal counsel, more information about the different work areas of our sub-team, and you find legal analysis documents, and also minority statements.

And I would like you to know that our group is trying to work on a consensus basis as much as we can, yet we do want to be transparent about the dissenting opinions that are held within our group. What I can say is that reference proposals that we have in our report got most traction inside out group. Nonetheless, the discussion on some of the aspects still continues, and I think it’s worth [inaudible] to look at the minority statement to see how the discussion and the variance of opinions are within our quite diverse group.

Not diverse in opinion – sometimes diverse in opinion, that’s true – but our group is very diverse in terms of stakeholder representation. I think that is a remarkable evidence of a good-functioning multi-stakeholder model.

So without any further ado, I would like to walk you through the slides. Can we move to the next slide, please? Now, this slide shows you what
we already know. It is a graphical depiction on the whole IANA stewardship process.

You know that there are three proposals that have been worked on by the technical communities, and I would like to highlight that our group has strong inter-linkage with the CWG, which dealt primarily with the naming functions of IANA, and which also had some accountability questions related to that. And in order to ensure that there is no friction between the accountability needs of the CWG and what we can offer in terms of accountability enhancement, we very closely collaborated with the CWG.

There have almost been weekly leadership team conference calls, but also face-to-face meetings and virtual meetings in order to ensure that what we do to the best possible extent supports what the CWG needs for its purposes. And the CWG has provided us with a list of requirements that we’re going to discuss a little bit later in this webinar, and we will evidence to you that we did what we could in order to address the needs of the CWG and embed that into our work results because please do remember, although the CWG proposal has been adopted by the chartering organizations during the last ICANN meeting, there are some dependencies, some conditionalities, in the CWG paper that requires the CCWG to deliver on certain aspects so that actually the CWG proposal holds.

Now, as we move forward and as we refine and finalize our recommendations, we will pass them onto the ICANN board, and that is an important distinction between what we did and what the three technical communities did because the technical communities delivered
their proposals to the ICG, which has now published the ICG proposal, which is a combined proposal, and then they moved their or passed on their proposal to the ICANN board.

So the ICANN board will then look at the two proposals and then pass them on to NTIA after they have affirmatively decided upon those via a board decision, so that's where we stand in terms of process.

I will show you through a work plan slide again, but I think I should [slow] at this point we do think we're in good shape to finalize our report and recommendations so that they can be decided upon by the charter and organizations during the upcoming meeting in Dublin. And therefore, it is very important that you take a look at what we did and that you let us know whether you think what we are doing substantially enhances ICANN's accountability, which is our core mandate, and also let us know if you have concerns. So we need statements both in terms of support, but also we need to know whether there are concerns so that we can address those as we did as a result of the first public comment period. Next slide, please.

Our goal – and this is sort of opposite to what the technical communities did. We are not only looking at what IANA did, but we are looking at proposals to enhance ICANN's accountability towards all its stakeholders, and not only toward IANA customers, if you wish. Since this is a very huge task to have taken on, we have divided our work into two Work Streams based on guidance that was provided by NTIA (i.e. Larry Strickling) because he said that you don't have to do everything or that we don't have to do everything at once. He recommended we divide our work between Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2.
Work Stream 1 focuses on those mechanisms that must be in place or committed to within the timeframe of the IANA stewardship transition. Work Stream 2, a little bit more long-term because it addresses accountability topics for which a timeline or development solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA stewardship transition.

So both of these Work Streams encompass important accountability work that needs to be done. But what we are focusing on in Work Stream number one is what is inevitably needed in order for the transition to take place.

As you will remember, the US government has said that the proposal coming from the global community needs to include measures to replace the historic relationship with the US government, and this historic relationship has been characterized as a backstop. So if ICANN goes rogue, then the US government can so choose to go somewhere else for the operation of the IANA functions. And if this relationship is gone, then there is a fear that, say, the board may go rogue, or that individual stakeholders get too much influence and can capture ICANN, and that needs to be avoided.

There are more contingencies that we will speak to later, but what's important is to appreciate that in Work Stream 1, we're only doing what is inevitably required to make that first step to give comfort to the US government as well as other stakeholders that ICANN is protected from getting out of control once the US relationship has ended, but that doesn't mean that our work will have ended by then. We will continue
our work and make sure that important work in Work Stream 2 is going to be conducted.

Now, this box at the bottom of this slide briefly depicts the role of the ICANN community and the ICANN board, but I recommend that we leave that for everybody's individual reading. And I'm sure that you have read it already while I was showing you through the rest of the slides, this slide. Can we now move to the next slide, please?

This is what we think is not only ICANN's current accountability framework, but also what we believe is an excellent basis for ICANN's future accountability framework. When we did our work, we really tried to think hard about governance models that are already induced that have proven to be efficient and that provide for good checks and balances and sharing of powers.

So instead of coming up with new entities, new bodies, or new components in the ICANN world, we thought that we could use what's already there and just improve it a little bit. And what you see here is basically resembling how a state functions, and that was the governing model that was the role model for our work. So in brief, but we already have is the ICANN community with the SOs and ACs representing stakeholders, and these sort of build the people, the legislatures in the state.

Then we have the ICANN board, which is the executive, something you also know from states. We have principles, and those resemble what could be a constitution, where all the important ideas on what makes a state or what makes ICANN go into.
And then we have the independent appeals mechanisms, which are the equivalent to an independent judiciary, which you also find in states. So these are the four building blocks out of which we thought and continue to think, and we’ve received broad community support for that, that these are the foundations for ICANN’s future accountability framework. Next slide, please.

It's also important to note that what we are doing provides escalation paths in case, and in case which hopefully will not happen, that there is friction between the board and the ICANN community. So if everything works fine, if there is consultation which we have made mandatory for a lot of aspects of our work, if there is efficient collaboration and exchange of thoughts between the community and the board, and if the board chooses not to ignore the wishes of the community, then the community will likely not even notice that we have empowered the community to do certain things.

So ideally, the community paths that [inaudible]. So we do hope that ICANN can continue to work on a consensus basis, and only in exceptional cases where this fails, where a board goes rogue, or where there is another contingency, then these mechanisms that I will speak to in a moment will be invoked. Next slide, please.

And can we please unfold it a little bit, because this is an animated slide? And what you see here is exactly the same setup of building blocks, but now I’m going to show to you – and this is obviously very high-level – how these will interact.
So the ICANN board creates a budget. It creates a strategic plan, an operating plan, and it might have ideas on how bylaws need to be changed. And next slide, please. What the communicant can do is in case the budget does not meet the community's expectations, it can ask the ICANN board after the budget has been adopted to review it and the community can reject it, as it can with a strategic plan or operating plan. Next slide, please.

If the directors go rogue, if individual directors or the whole board go rogue, then community can remove individual directors or recall the entire board. We will speak to all these community powers as we move on, but this is just to give you an overview of what we did. Same for we will have two examples on the strategic plan, I think, and the board recall. Next part of the animation, please.

In turn, there will be structural reviews taking place periodically in order to make sure that the community that will then be empowered is also accountable and remains to be accountable. That was one of the aspects that have been highlighted during our first public comment period.

This is the concept of “watch the watchers.” We can’t only impose accountability burdens, if you wish, on the ICANN board, but leave the community not being accountable to anyone, and therefore we have strengthened components in our proposal to ensure that the community itself is accountable. Next part of the animation, please.

Then we have worked on the bylaws. We will have a separate slide on that, but the components of the bylaws are to a huge extent existing
bylaws, then new mechanisms that are embedded in the bylaws. We are putting AOC reviews in the bylaws, and we are adding the new idea which are fundamental bylaws, and I will speak to those in a moment. Next part of the animation, please.

Then the judiciary that I alluded to earlier, we will have an IRP or an enhanced IRP, independent review process, where we are going to have independent decisions made by a panel that is going to check whether ICANN’s actions have or have not been in violation of ICANN’s bylaws, i.e. the constitution. That would resemble a constitutional court, if you wish. Next slide, please.

ICANN’s revisited bylaws will have a revised section on the mission statement, so that's primarily to address the concerns by many in the community that ICANN could mission creep into other areas that it shouldn't be active in. So we have phrased that more completely to ensure that ICANN is acting within its mission.

We then have refined core values, which we have now divided in two subsections, i.e. the commitment and the core values, and we have included some ideas of the Affirmation of Commitments into the bylaws in order to ensure that some of the reviews in particular are perpetuated in order to continuously improve ICANN as an organization and its governance.

So I will leave it there quite superficially because we have Becky Burr with us, who’s been leading the sub-team on that work. And when we go to the Q&A phase, when we go to the discussion phase, Becky will
give you a brief overview of exactly what has been recommended to change ICANN's bylaws in these regards. Next slide, please.

The idea of fundamental bylaws—now just imagine that we come up with all these fantastic proposals to enhance ICANN's accountability. Let's then imagine that the board, the NTIA, approves that the transition takes place, and let's also imagine that that rogue board might be in place that is reversing all the accountability enhancements on day one after ICANN has been released into its independence.

That must not happen, so we must ensure that the most important pillars of ICANN's accountability are made sufficiently robust so that they can't easily be changed. That doesn't mean that they have to be cast in concrete forever, because we do know that ICANN is working in a rapidly changing environment, and therefore the organization as well as its community must have the possibility to change even the most important part of its bylaws, but those should be protected more than standard bylaws.

So the idea was that standard bylaws can be changed by board decisions after community consultation, and only if that is to the disliking of the community. If the board hasn't fully understood what the community wished, then that can be vetoed, if you wish, after the fact. While for fundamental bylaws, explicit approval and high voting threshold by the SOs and ACs is required to make it harder for those fundamental parts of the bylaws to be changed.

And in the left-hand side of this slide, you find those ideas that we think must be made fundamental. And they are the mission, commitment,
and the core values; the IRP; the independent review process (i.e. the judiciary), the manner in which fundamental bylaws itself can be changed to avoid that the bylaws are changed in the fashion whereby individual groups’ wishes are sufficient to change or remove fundamental bylaws.

Then the communities mechanism, which I am going to speak to in a moment, which is the legal vehicle for the community to exercise its powers. Then the most important powers themselves, and you will remember these as I read them out to you because I mentioned on one of the initial slides, and these are five powers: the power to reconsider/reject the budget or its strategy or operating plan, the power to reconsider or reject changes to the ICANN bylaws, the power to remove individual ICANN directors, and the power to recall the entire ICANN board.

Then we have ideas that have been conveyed to us by the CWG, and then these are the IANA functions reviews and the separation process as required by the CWG. And the IANA post-transition governance and Customer Standing Committee structure which also have been requested by the CCWG.

What we have, again, is huge parts of the bylaws remaining untouched, some parts being added as new mechanisms, some ideas we already know from the AOC being incorporated into the bylaws, and some of these aspects made specifically robust and be the fundamental bylaws part of the bylaws. Next slide, please.
Let's talk little bit about the appeals mechanisms, and the independent review process in particular. Many in the community felt that the current IRP is not sufficient, particularly because it takes long, it’s costly, and also it only looks at the procedural aspects of ICANN’s doing, and that can lead to decisions being made that basically state, “Okay, what ICANN did was wrong, but they followed due process. And because of that, there's nothing we can do.”

So we thought that should change, so there must be a possibility to have checks whether ICANN acted or has failed to act in violation of its bylaws. Then we want to make sure this was a lesson learned by the new gTLD, introduction to the new gTLD program, that something can be done if there are conflicting expert panel decisions. And also [inaudible] involving rights of the sole member that we’re going to think about as we move on.

So how are these decisions made? A lot of detail is yet to be specified for the implementation of this, but the idea is that we are going to have a standing panel of at least seven independent experts that they should have the expertise required to make these decisions and that they follow diversity requirements in order to make sure that the panelists don't only come from one region or one gender or one area of expertise.

Out of this standing panel, three decision-makers will be picked to make individual decisions, and the idea there is that each of the parties chooses one panelist, and the third panelist is picked by the two panelists that have previously been chosen by the both parties.
So the decision shall be binding, and again, this is to determine whether ICANN has been acting in violation of the bylaws. So that is, again, what we think [inaudible] strongly constitutional court, so that is also an important factor of our work. Some call the IRP the crown jewel of what we’re doing, and I'm curious or we are curious to hear what the community feedback on that is. Next slide, please.

We also discussed and recommend changes to the process of requesting a reconsideration, so that is expanding the scope of permissible risk requests to include board or staff actions or inactions that contradict, and this is what you already know, ICANN's mission, commitment, or core values. So again, the constitution is the measure for ICANN's doings.

Then we recommend to expand the filing period from 15 to 30 days. We recommend to narrow the grounds for dismissal. This is to ensure that cases are not easily dismissed or that deserve being discussed on its merits. Then the ICANN Board of Directors is asked to make determinations of all requests after receiving a recommendation from the BGC.

Then we want to strengthen the role of the ombudsman in order to make sure that independent or even inside legal experts, a legal department or an outside counsel, don’t make these determinations, but we felt that the ombudsman is better placed to do an initial substantive evaluation of the case.

I will briefly speak to the two remaining points, which is first the opportunity for requesters to chime in after the initial determination
has been made so that they can make themselves heard before a decision is made, and we also provide of course some transparency enhancement.

Ideally, decisions would be made within 60 days, but they by no means should take longer than 120 days. That's also to ensure that [aggrieved] parties get decisions in a shorter period of time. Next slide, please.

The community mechanism. Those who have followed this discussion for longer will remember that we had suggested a reference model based on membership. So the SOs and ACs would, according to the old model, use legal entities, and we recommended these would be unincorporated associations under California law to exercise voting rights because legal personality, legal personhood, is required for exercising those powers and enforcing those powers. And so the SOs and ACs would not themselves transform into another legal entity, or they wouldn't change, but the recommendation was that they would use separate legal entities as their vehicle for having these enforceable community powers, and that was perceived as being too complex.

It was perceived as the SOs and ACs having [avatars] and other words have been used for that, so it was perceived as being too complex. And more importantly, it was perceived as potentially destabilizing ICANN and being disruptive to ICANN because the members would all have statutory powers granted under California law, which they could potentially use without consulting with the other SOs and ACs, and therefore bypass community processes.
Also, there was the criticism that this model would allow for derivative lawsuits, so we took these concerns very seriously, and we’ve been working hard looking at a variety of options that we could think up, analyze the pros and cons of all these models, and the new model that we now came up with applies only a minor tweak to what we currently have. And what we currently have you'll see on the left-hand side of the screen. So we have the board; you know that. We have the community with the SOs and ACs, and we have that board making decisions, but what was missing previously, that there was no recourse for the community in case decisions have been made by the board that the community doesn't support.

So we’re now going to tweak the bylaws in a fashion that the community as such, the SOs and ACs in combination, make for one single member of the organization. And since they make this one member, this member would have the legal personality to have enforceable rights vis-à-vis ICANN, and therefore these five community powers that you find visualized here can be used by the CMSM as we call, a new acronym that you should be familiarize yourself with, but that's the idea.

We worked with designers that presented the slides to find a visual way of showing to the community that what we are doing is not establishing another body that has to follow strict formalities or that imposes additional burdens, that creates additional risks, but that this is a very lightweight thingy, if you wish, that only exists virtually.

So the decisions or the discussions are still made in the community as you know – the community today – but only in the hopefully rare
instances where there needs to be a vote on community powers, the CMSM would be the vehicle to be used to exercise that voting power, and how they exactly functions we will see in the next couple of slides. Next slide, please.

This is a chart giving an overview of the community powers that you already know. I'm not going to dwell on them for long because we will surely get back to them as we discuss, but again, it's the power for the community to have a say on the strategic plan, operating plan budget.

You can ask questions about details through the Q&A, but we thought it was important that the community has the opportunity to chime in if there's an inadequate plan or budget proposed to the communities. Then there is the possibility to ask for reconsideration or reject changes to ICANN standard bylaws. You will remember the ICANN board can take decisions on bylaws [as such], and if it does wrongly after the community has discussed with the board, then after the fact on standard bylaws the community can say, “Okay, please redo this. That wasn't perfectly what we asked you to do.”

Then the approval to fundamental bylaws. So again, there's a strong distinction to be made between standard bylaws and fundamental bylaws, and the difference being that standard bylaws the communities can chime in after the fact, but for fundamental bylaws, that needs to be explicit approval by the communities before a decision by the board is made, then removing individual ICANN directors and recalling the entire ICANN board. Next slide, please.
Now let's look at how the powers are exercised, and I hope that you will agree with us that this is or should not be disruptive to what ICANN is doing. First of all, there needs to be a cause, so something must have gone wrong so that the community [inaudible] the need for petitioning that process on deciding [on if] a community power is invoked. So first thing there needs to be a cause, then there is a petition phase, then there is a discussion phase.

So it's important, and this is where I would hope most of the cases would stop if there are any [inaudible] the discussion shows what the community wishes, and that maybe even the board by itself determines, “Okay, we should better fix it before the decision is made.”

But if that's not the case, then after the discussion in the whole community, we go to the decision phase, where the SOs and ACs do make up their mind on how they want to build on a community power, let's say recalling the ICANN board. So they were following their own processes, come to a decision, and this decision would be communicated via the SO and AC chair. And that is what makes the communities mechanism, and that would be then conveyed to the ICANN board. Next slide, please.

Let's look at two examples. So we have a cause: ICANN standard bylaws have been amended by the ICANN Board after or despite an extensive community discussion, and the ICANN board chose to change the bylaws in a way that's not consistent with the community's wishes. Then one SO or AC is sufficient to petition for invoking the community power.
After that, there's going to be a discussion by the whole community. [Inaudible] we’re suggesting that there be an [ICANN] community forum where exchange of thoughts is taking place, to have a wide consultation on those cases, and there's also going to be advice from those groups that do not participate in the voting, and we’ll speak about that later.

After that, there's a decision, and the decision, again, will be communicated through the SO/AC chairs, and in this particular case, two-thirds the majority would be sufficient to exercise the community power, i.e. ask the board to redo the decision that it's made on the amendment of the bylaws. So that would be the outcome. Next slide, please.

Recalling the ICANN board, the entire board. Let's assume that there is a board in the future that is going rogue where the community says, “Okay, we've placed these folks on the board, but they're just not acting in the best interest of the community, i.e. they violate severely what's in the bylaws. They violate its mission. They are doing things that are outside ICANN's mission,” or whatever other cause there might be. Then there is, again, the petition, which in this case is conditional to stronger requirements because removing the board or recalling the entire board is quite a thing, so at least two of the SOs and ACs must jointly do the petition. And there must be one of each group at least – or one must be an SO, I apologize.

Then we have the discussion phase, which you already know, and we have a higher voting threshold of 75% for such a petition to be carried or a vote to be carried. And the outcome of that would be that the board is dismissed and that an interim board is placed, so we have
foreseen that there shall be no vacuum after the board is let go, so for continued operations, there is a process in place that immediately places an interim board until such time when a new board is seated. Next slide, please.

[Inaudible] community mechanism. We propose for all SOs and ACs except for SSAC and RSSAC to have five votes. SSAC and RSSAC would both have two votes, should they wish to exercise these votes, and today they have that they would prefer to remain in an advisory capacity.

The decisions from the GAC whether they want to exercise voting rights is still pending, so that’s yet to be seen, but for the others we would have five votes. And the number five was picked because that would allow for giving one vote should the SO or accomplish wish to do so to each of the geographic regions, so we thought that the number five would mirror the structure of some of the groups nicely and help them to address mainly diversity concerns there might be.

This is important to remember, that yes, we do have this cloud, this CMSM, but it doesn't mean that it would meet as a member, so there will be no additional group established, and also there shouldn't be any individuals, any representatives. So these five votes would not be the equivalent of five individuals meeting, but it’s just five votes per group. And how the group determines to cast these votes, whether it can be split votes or whether it can be a block vote, but how that’s going to be allocated is entirely up to the own processes by the SOs and ACs. Next slide, please.
[inaudible] we want to make sure – this is also required by the US government. We want to make sure that the enhancements to ICANN’s accountability actually help sufficiently address concerns. We don’t want to be disruptive to ICANN. We don’t want to create additional risks for ICANN, and therefore we have defined based on community input but also based on our own thinking numerous scenarios that we think would be scenarios where something could go wrong.

And if you look at the contingencies that we want to safeguard ICANN against, we found these five groups. So all the stress tests that we did, [directly assessing] stress tests, are within these groups to ensure that our accountability mechanism safeguards ICANN even if there is a financial crisis.

Let’s say revenue streams are going down because nobody registers domain names. Still, we must ensure that the DNS is upgrading in a secure, stable, and resilient fashion. Failure to meet operation obligations, legal legislative actions. How does ICANN react if there is court action against the delegation of one TLD website? Failure of accountability and failure of accountability to external stakeholders.

I think I should leave it there. Look at the scenarios. What we basically did is defined the contingencies, the stress test scenario. Look at ICANN's current accountability response, determine whether that's sufficient or not, and where it not sufficient, check whether the enhancements to ICANN's accountability that we came up with help address those contingencies. And we do think that for all the stress tests that we’ve come up with and that we've analyzed, that we’re good to
go, that we are adequately addressing all the contingencies that we could come up with. Next slide, please.

Working the implementations. We are now [inaudible] for the ICANN meeting number 54 in Dublin, so we plan to have our work ready for the chartering organization to adopt. We will then if the board approves our recommendation, go into the implementation phase for the Work Stream 1 recommendations, and we will continue the development phase for the Work Stream 2 items.

And developing our Work Stream – or the implementation of Work Stream 2 items is going to go beyond the transition, but that was foreseen in our plan. I think it's important for you to know what we're doing in Work Stream number two. It's operational details. It's further [inaudible] enhancement to government participation, considering the issue of jurisdiction – and please do note that jurisdiction does not mean only where ICANN is located. It's the law that governed ICANN contract. It's the law that governs ICANN's dispute resolution mechanism. It also looks at where ICANN is sitting, but that's just one aspect of the whole jurisdiction discussion, but please do bear in mind that the question is much broader.

Then we’re going to talk more about SO and AC accountability, the concept of watch the watchers, make sure that the community is also accountable. We will further work on transparency, improving the DIDP, the document disclosure policy.

We will work more on diversity and we will continue to work on human rights, which was flagged as a very important aspect of ICANN’s work.
And so we have therefore established in response to the feedback we have received, we’ve already set up a team that will as of now look more to the human rights question. Next slide, please.

Finally, on this slide you see the linkage with the stewardship group, the CWG. The CWG has requested we work on safeguarding particularly the IANA budget, make sure that the ICANN board can be recalled in its entirety or that individual directors are removed. They’ve asked us to look at some bylaw revisions on the IANA functions review, the CSE and [separation process] to make certain things fundamental, and they’ve asked us to put in place an IRP that in future can be used as a basis for the IRPs relating to ccTLDs if and when the ccNSO has crafted a respective policy on that.

So basically we would do the groundwork in that aspect for them, and we think we’ve met all the requirements. You’ll find more details in the report. I think I should end now, so that was the overview.

We're now going to go into the discussion phase of our call, and we will follow the same sequence as we now did with the presentation. So first of all, I would like you to ask questions with respect to the mission, commitments, and core values. And in order to enable you to really ask to the substance, I would like to welcome Becky Burr and ask Becky to give us a two-minute overview of what changes are recommended by our group.

Becky, you might be on mute. I suspect there is an audio issue with Becky's line, so I would suggest that we then take questions now on the idea of fundamental bylaws and get back to the mission, commitment,
and core values, so once I get a signal from staff that Becky can be heard. Does anyone have questions on the idea of—

BECKY BURR: Hi.

THOMAS RICKERT: Becky, is that you?

BECKY BURR: Yes. I'm sorry, I don't know why I wasn't being heard. I wasn't on mute, but let me know if you want me to go ahead.

THOMAS RICKERT: Please do.

BECKY BURR: Okay. What we did with mission and core values was take ICANN's existing mission and core values statement, which is in the bylaws, and really tightened it up to ensure that ICANN's mission was very clearly stated and that we had the tools we needed to hold ICANN to that mission, and also to reflect in the mission and core values statement — and particularly in the core values statement — reflect the affirmation of commitment obligations and commitments that were not already in there.
The mission statement remains largely as it is in the current bylaws. However, we do articulate that ICANN has no power to act other than in accordance with its mission, and ICANN will not use its powers to regulate services that use the unique identifiers of the Internet or the content that they carry or provide.

We’ve then divided core values into two sections – one group of commitments that are so fundamental to ICANN that they’re expected to be followed in all the cases, which involves obligating ICANN to perform its mission consistent with its bylaws, to preserve and enhance the stability, reliability, security, interoperability, etc. of the DNS and the Internet, to act in a nondiscriminatory way, and to employ open and transparent multi-stakeholder processes to develop policies.

Then core values are pretty much as they are in the existing bylaws. So the bottom line here is it’s a clearer, cleaner, stronger statement of ICANN’s limited mission and affirmative obligation for ICANN to stay within its mission, and then just enhancing the commitments and core values that are in the ICANN bylaws today.

The reason why the mission and core values statement is so important is because that is one of the fundamental underpinnings for the independent review process, and so we really spent a lot of time making sure that we got this right. Thanks, Thomas.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks so much, Becky. Thank you very much, Becky. Are there any questions from the group on this? So I see that [Inaudible] hand is raised. Do you have a question relating to this? If so, please do speak.
Okay, so there don't seem to be any questions on this. Thank you very much, again, Becky, not only for this brief intervention, but also for all the excellent work that you and your sub-team did on this. Let me get back to the question of fundamental bylaws.

Do you have any questions on the process or the idea of fundamental bylaws? And please note if we are moving too quickly, we can always go back to a point that we went on from, so that's no problem. Please do make sure that you ask all the questions you might have.

Good, can we then moved to the IRP? Do you have any questions on the independent review process? There is a hand raised by Tijani, so Tijani, please.

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Thank you very much, Thomas. I noticed that in the final report, there is no mention of the duration of the consideration of the IRP, and this is a very substantive point I raised during the development of this report. And I hope it will be well-articulated in the future when we will submit our final report to the charting organizations and also on the during the implementation. This is a very important thing because if you like it like this and you have the experience, we may have [inaudible]. Thank you.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Tijani. And since this is also work that has been conducted by Becky's sub-team, I would like to hand over to Becky to give an answer.
BECKY BURR: Yeah, I'm sorry, I didn't understand exactly what you were referring to, Tijani. There's no mention of what? Could you repeat that?

TIJANI BEN JEMAA: Time for consideration, time for examination of the complaint.

BECKY BURR: Oh, there is a reference in the document that says that they should strive to be done as efficiently as possible to render a decision within six months, and if they are unable to issue that decision within six months, to issue an interim report articulating why there is a delay and providing an estimated timeline for completion.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks for that, Becky, and I see a comment made by [Aron] in the chat that I think is worthwhile noting on the audio bridge before we move to the reconsideration process, and that is a comment that finding [a summary of] public comment to be offered formally to the CCWG and made generally available. The summary of our review of the public comments will be published. We have to prioritize the delivery of this report for the public comment period, but there is a very thorough analysis of all individual comments that we have that [we received] during our first public comment period, and we will do the same for the second public comment period where we respond to the reporters or to the commenters stating whether their ideas have been taken on board
already, whether they have led to changes of our report, and what other consequences were drawn.

So we take that very seriously, so rest assured that all effort that you put in writing public comments will be reviewed by the group as we thoroughly digest everything. So unless there are more questions for the independent review process, let me now ask whether there are any questions on the request for reconsideration.

There don't seem to be any, so I would now like to open it up for questions under community mechanism as a full member. Any questions on that? Any questions on the community mechanism? Okay then, let's move to the community powers and hear whether there are any questions on those.

We have Jordan Carter with us on the call, who is already answering questions in the chat and will certainly be more than happy to answer all questions that you might have with respect to the community powers. And actually Jordan, if you don't mind, maybe for individuals to better understand how we go about with this, if you did have any further comments that you would like to make in addition to what I presented during the initial run-through, by all means, please do chime in and make yourself heard.

JORDAN CARTER: Thank you, Thomas. Can you hear me?

THOMAS RICKERT: Yes, we can hear you all right.
JORDAN CARTER: Great. Hi, everyone, it’s Jordan Carter from .NZ here, the rapporteur for Work Party 1, which is about community empowerment. And the other thing I wanted to add to Thomas's introduction was that we didn't just sit in a dark room or on an Adobe chat and invent the six powers or the five powers that are in front of you. I just wanted to remind people that they came from the many feedbacks in the ICANN community [inaudible] accountability tools and consultations over seven years, including last year.

So they're quite well-grounded and things the community has asked for and got quite a wide array of support in the first [PC] period, so we do add to ICANN's accountability. I don't have anything more to add than that at this point, Thomas, but I’m happy to help with the questions if people have them now or by e-mail or in the chat channel.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Jordan. I think that was very helpful. Are there questions from the group? So there's a question in the chat from Peter Koch, DENIC, on point four: “Is the appointing buddy the only authority to remove its appointed director, item five notwithstanding?”

Can we please move to the fourth point? I'm not sure whether we need the other slide which shows the director removal, maybe not. But Jordan, would you be okay with responding to that?
JORDAN CARTER: Yeah, sure, and thank you, Peter, for your question. And the appointing party is only authority to remove the individual director, where it’s one of the SOs of the at-large community. So the GNSO is the only party that can remove one of the two directors appointed by the GNSO.

We’re not introducing a power for the NomCom to remove the NomCom-appointed directors, any one of those, and the only alternative to an individual director removal is the recall of the entire ICANN board. So the community working together can recall the whole board or the appointing group can remove the director it appointed, but the community can’t, so they pick off a particular SO’s director and remove them, and the NomCom can’t remove anyone.

THOMAS RICKERT: And, Jordan, if I’m not mistaken, the board itself can also take action against the other fellow board members in case something [goes wrong]. Correct?

JORDAN CARTER: That’s correct that the moment, Thomas. When this moved to the community mechanism of a single member, there were some restrictions [there in] the Board’s ability to remove directors, but I’m not exactly [across] the legal detail of that one.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much. There’s another question: does the community empower to take checks, the flow of revenues? Is there financial
accountability to the community? Jordan, would you also like to take that?

JORDAN CARTER: I can try, thank you, Padmini, for the question. The only financial power that we’ve proposed [inaudible] is the ability for the community to send back a budget. So if in the judgment the community after the consultation process to the board approving a budget, the view is that there’s an unrealistic take on revenue, for example, if people think the board is being too optimistic with the revenue [inaudible]. Or the alternative is they think that there’s too many reserves being built up in that should be spent but or not, they can veto the budget and send it back. But that’s the only power that we’re proposing here. We’re not proposing any powers related to budget or financial [inaudible].

THOMAS RICKERT: But beyond this power to influence the ICANN budget, certainly if the ICANN board chooses to make unreasonable expenditures, buy helicopters for everyone or what have you, then certainly there is still the opportunity to use the ultimate power (i.e. remove individual directors or recall the entire board). So there is [inaudible]. There will be accountability with respect to how money is spent. And then we have the community power that Jordan spoke to, as a last resort that the possibility to let the board go.

There is another question from Philip Sheppard: “What was the problem in removing a NomCom director?” I’m sure, Jordan, that you will also be able to answer that one.
JORDAN CARTER: Actually, I just want to quickly refer back to our report if I could before I answer that one. I just want to make something before I answer, so let me type an answer to that question back in the chat if that's all right.

Thomas, if you're still waiting for me, I'm be happy to respond to that question now. I just wanted to check the answer to the question in the report, which I've now done.

THOMAS RICKERT: Please go ahead, Jordan.

JORDAN CARTER: Thanks, sorry. Sorry, about the delay, I thought that we would carry on while I read the report. I just wanted to make sure I give you the right answer. The answer for a NomCom director is spelled out in the same part of our report, which is on page 58 and 59, and SOs and ACs can petition for the removal of the director who was appointed by the NomCom, and that's in paragraphs 408 and 409.

And to trigger that, any of the participating SOs or ACs could pass a petition to do so, and then there’d be the same dialogue process that there would be in the community forum idea, and it would be the participating SOs and ACs who could make the decision as to whether to remove that individual director or not. So it isn’t the NomCom that makes the decision. It's the whole community working through the community mechanism that would make the decision about the removal or otherwise the NomCom director.
And just for completeness and to be clear, the 16th voting director on the ICANN board is the president and CEO, and none of these powers would apply to them. That person is appointed and removed by the Board of Directors as a whole.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Jordan. I hope that answers the question. But actually, there is a follow-up question from Philip: “So removal possible, but process different. Right?” Can you confirm, Jordan? Cheryl has already answered that this is correct, and Jordan has done so, too. Thank you very much for those answers.

More questions? And let me point out again that all these community powers will only be exercised after thorough discussion in the communities. That's very important, particularly when it comes to the budget. There have been concerns by several individuals that exercising the community power and reject the budget could lead to paralyzing the organization.

And while we are recommending measures to prevent that from happening, still we in addition do think that if there is a good enough exchange of thought between the community and the ICANN board before the budget has been adopted, the chances for something going wrong with the budget approval are significantly lower than they otherwise would be.

Rinalia, you had asked the question on why the possibility by the board to let individual directors go is restricted. I attempted to give an answer to that by saying that we need to get back to our legal counsel to give
you a good explanation. And unless somebody's on the call who could help with this, I would suggest that we get back to you in writing, Rinalia, since the answer to the question will be of interest for many.

There is a Q&A in the making where all the questions that we received from the community on occasions such as this will be gathered together with answers to them so that everybody can be informed by that. I hope this is okay for the moment. Jordan has clarified that we have it in one of the [inaudible] memoranda, but unfortunately I can't dive into that and dig it up for you at the moment. Jordan will provide more information as we move on, or in the Q&A.

More questions on the community powers? Since there don't seem to be any, let's now move to the voting rights. You will remember that we suggest to allocate five votes to all groups except for SSAC and RSSAC. Please remember SSAC and RSSAC will not vote. They indicated they don't wish to vote at this point in time.

The GAC’s decision is still outstanding, so that we would at the moment have the ASO, GNSO ccNSO, and ALAC with concern that they would participate in the voting scheme.

There’s a question from Peter Green: “According to the 5/5/5/5/5/2/2 power exercise distribution, does the CCWG consider the number of members in each SO and AC determining to exercise and determining to exercise the community power?”

So Jordan, I think that's one for you.
JORDAN CARTER: Thank you, Thomas. I don't entirely understand what you mean by the word “consider,” Peter, but let me try and explain. These numbers are about notional voting rights, so the five votes that the ccNSO can cast, for example, in this muddle could be passed by a resolution of the ccNSO council, or if the ccNSO council wants to adopt this process, it could ask its members to vote and so on. All it means is that the decision that it makes can be to exercise its votes all in one direction or another, or to share them out.

So say if 60% of the people in the ccNSO wanted to support the [inaudible] powers, then three of the five votes could be cast in that direction. But the community mechanism [inaudible] isn't a group of people, so the ccNSO doesn't have to nominate five people with one vote each or ten people with half a vote each, and it isn't imposing any quorums on what the SOs or ACs do internally in making their decisions other than to specify that it’s the normal governing body that does it because we’re trying to propose as few institutional innovations or changes as possible to decision-making in the ICANN framework. I hope that answers your question.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Jordan. We have one more question in the chat before we move to Sébastien Bachollet, who has raised his hand. Phillip Sheppard is asking another question: “Is the voting pool always 27 or 25 without RSSAC and 20 without the GAC?”

Jordan?
JORDAN CARTER: I can answer that if you like, Thomas. I think the answer to this is, yes, if all the SOs and ACs were participating, there would be 29 votes [inaudible] out on the table, and SOs would be able to opt in to joining the mechanism. And if they do, there’s a three-month period of adjustment and then they have votes [inaudible], and they also are able to decide to remove themselves from the mechanism.

Our proposal says that if they join or if they leave, then there’s a year [inaudible] where they can change their mind and go the other way. So at any one time, you’ll know how many votes there are available in the mechanism and you’ll know with some degree of certainty whether it’s likely to change anytime soon, but we don’t adjust the numbers of votes per SO and AC to keep a static total of votes in the whole mechanism. It is just as many as there are [inaudible] people or not.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much Jordan, and let me add that the question as well as the response, covered the scenario of the existing community as we know it, and I would like to emphasize that the model is open even for welcoming new entries. So let’s just assume that the worst supporting organization on the Internet of Things or some other groups, the system is so open that it can actually have new additions or removals, and in that case, likely the distribution of [those] would be reconsidered, but at the moment that does not proceed. Sébastien?

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET: Hello, I’m in the French line and I wanted to bring something additional to Peter Green’s answer. There are three billion users, but that that
does not mean that there are more votes for At-Large or for the other SOs.

But one of the reasons why there are less votes for the SSAC and for the RSSAC is that one of the ways that we fill these committees is based on a decision by the board, so it is a little bit of a vicious circle, so to speak. And so this is one of the elements that was included in this choice that we made as far as the number of votes, five and two. Thank you very much.

THOMAS RICKERT: So I understand that's more a comment than a question. Jordan, did you wish to speak that? Please do.

JORDAN CARTER: No, no, I have nothing to add to Sébastien’s comment.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thank you, and I'm glad that the audio worked for Sébastien. We had some technical difficulties during the last webinar, so it's great that this worked. More questions on the voting [weight]?

So there don't seem to be any, but there are people typing and actually I do see a question from [inaudible]: “Who can take the vote position for each AC/SO? The same as both member for each AC/SO to vote for ICANN board member?”

Jordan?
JORDAN CARTER: Thank you, Thomas, and thank you, [inaudible], for that question. Once again, I'm not 100% clear on exactly what you're getting at, but I think just try and sort of help, the decision about the votes is made [governing council].

So in the ccNSO, we have a governing council with 15 or so members from the regions and so on [inaudible] liaison. They can make a decision about how the votes will be exercised, and then the ccNSO chair will communicate that decision to the vote counting system, so there aren't any sets of representatives appointed by the ccNSO and the CCWG.

This proposal doesn't create any rules around how the ccNSO or the GNSO or ALAC has to organize itself internally to exercise the powers. We've tried to be [inaudible] in diversity and for the the customs that have emerged within each of the SOs and ACs to guide how they will make their decisions, so I hope that helps to answer your question.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Jordan. More questions on the voting [weights]?
Then I will suggest we discuss the stress test, and this is a heads-up to Steve DelBianco and Cheryl Langdon-Orr because we already did have a question in the chat earlier on, I'm just trying to—

CHERYL LANGDON-ORR: We dealt with that. We dealt with that. I believe everybody's happy with the answer to that question.
Okay, so it's been dealt with in the chat. That's excellent to hear. Do we have more questions on the stress test? Good, then let's move to the last item, which are the CWG requirements.

Do you have any questions or concerns with respect to how we met or seem to have met the CWG requirements? And this is critical because as I mentioned earlier, the CWG proposal and its approval is conditional to us meeting the requirements.

Question from [Padmini]: “What are the proposed reviews for DIDP? Not specifically connected to the slides, but just wanted to flag it.”

[Padmini], that is that an item that we have reserved for Work Stream number 2? I'm not sure whether – I think it's under Becky's purview, possibly. Becky, would you have an answer to that, more detail on that?

I'm sorry, could you repeat the question? I'm not in the room.

Are there any concrete suggestions in terms of how to review the DIDP?

No. At this point what we heard in the public comments is that there is a lot of concern about it, that there are no checks and balances, and that essentially staff has more discretion and there's sort of no respective way to challenge that. So that is something that we will be
looking at specifically as part of Work Stream 2, but we don't have concrete suggestions right now.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thank you, Becky, and let me add that there were some concerns about the time that it takes and the percentage of DIDP requests that have been turned down in the past, so there is a need for more transparency and making it easier to get access to information or documents.

So thank you for that question on an important topic for Work Stream 1-related work. There are two more questions in the chat, both of which I'm going to read out to you from Philip Sheppard: “Have the CWG told you that you have met the requirements?”

So the answer to that, Phil, is there have been no signals yet that we would not meet the requirements. In fact, the CWG has set up a team analyzing our reports to determine exactly that, but to my knowledge this determination and a proper response is still outstanding.

There is another question from [Asha]: “Thomas, may I ask a question on the IRP now or should I leave it for the end?” In fact, you're more than welcome to ask it now, [Asha].

So while [Asha] is typing, let me read out another question from Jyoti Panday: “Given the recent findings about the IRP in the .Africa domain, is there work being done around strengthening and improving on the process?”
I would suggest I hand over to Becky Burr now, who is leading on those improvements. And Becky, please do respond to this question as well as to [Asha’s] question [inaudible] being published in the chat.

BECKY BURR: Okay, thanks. We are absolutely – I don’t want to comment on any particular IRP, but we are absolutely focused on process and substance improvements in the IRP. The first thing is that we think it’s critical that we have a standing panel of jurists who are familiar with ICANN and ICANN’s mission and the rules and procedures, and that’s why we have proposed the standing panel, so that at any time you won’t end up with three potentially random judges who don’t know, aren’t familiar with ICANN and its mission and operations, so that’s a critical feature of it.

The second is that the IRP is narrowly focused on violations of the bylaws and articulations that ICANN has acted – claims that ICANN has acted in a manner inconsistent with the bylaws. And in addition, we call for the court to have or the panel to have decisions to have some precedential value so that there’s learning over time with respect to how those decisions work.

And then finally, as part of Work Stream 2, there will be a subgroup working with expert assistance to develop clear rules for operating procedures and clear rules for appeals, for example, from three panelists’ decision to the full panel to make sure that the decisions are correct and consistent over the course of time. So without commenting on any particular IRP, both substance and process enhancements are the goal of this. And if Asha has typed something into the Adobe room,
I'm not in there so, Thomas, if you could read me her question, I'd be happy to answer that.

THOMAS RICKERT: Certainly. Question from [Asha]: “On the IRP slide, it says reasonable efforts will be used to populate the panel. How do we ensure that those efforts will be strong enough?”

BECKY BURR: So we’ve spent a lot of time talking about the need for diversity, both geographic diversity and gender diversity and language diversity, but also diversity in legal traditions, so we don't have all common law or all civil law panel, that there are panelists out there so that anybody who brings a complaint will be able to choose among a panelist to get somebody familiar with the legal tradition from which they come.

We did talk at great length about putting a mandatory, no more than two panelists, from each ICANN region. What we ended up saying is that we would have a goal of no more than a certain number of jurists per region, but we concluded that we’re going to have a minimum of seven panelists so that the cap, the aspirational cap, would have to be determined based on actual total number of panelists.

The other proposal that we have made is that there would be a tender for a provider to help the community go out and affirmatively identify and seek applications from qualified prospective panelists from around the globe. We are quite confident that there are many qualified potential panelists from every region in ICANN, and the task is really to
affirmatively reach out to people to ensure that we can get qualified jurors from everywhere, from all ICANN regions.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Becky. There’s been another comment from [Asha] confirming that cost containment is a positive outcome of diversity of panelists.

[inaudible] is asking a follow-up question, which is more of a comment: “Request. Given the long-term responsibility accountability work in place, it would be beneficial to perhaps have a report that tracks the various IRP failures over the years, the learnings from those failures including what has been done by ICANN over the years to address [the gaps].” Becky, would you like to respond to that?

BECKY BURR: Yes. That's a very, very important point. One of the changes that we made in the second report is that we call for ongoing review of the IRP along the lines of one of the ATRT reviews not in terms of the selection process, but basically that there would be, in fact, an institutionalized periodic review of what the IRP, how the IRP is working, what the decisions have been, how they’ve been handled by ICANN, and what if any improvements or suggestions by that review.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks, Becky. There is the question that I’ve missed from Rinalia in the chat. “Is [inaudible] containment for all parties concerned one of the goals of improvement?” Becky?
BECKY BURR: Yes. Making this an acceptable process was a very important priority for the CCWG, so what the rules will be looking at as part of Work Stream 2 will be the sort of specific rules that govern [cost-containment]. In general, the proposal is that ICANN would be responsible for the panelists, the cost associated with the panelists themselves, but that the procedures would be set up so that there might be filing fees as necessary to deter frivolous suits.

We have also talked about, and the report talks about, securing pro bono legal representation for community IRPs or the like, but cost-containment is a serious part of this. The biggest part of that is making sure that there's not a lot frivolous use of or abuse of use of the process.

The second is to make sure that the process is efficient and moves quickly enough so that the costs do not rack up extensively, so the kinds of rules that exist now regarding page lengths on memorandums and pleadings and the like would be put in place also to try to maintain the efficiency and speediness of the panel.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Becky, and there's another question for you from Philip Sheppard: “One IRP issue is interpretation of poorly drafted rules versus the spirit of the policy behind the rules. This is [discretion]. Are we allowing this in the new IRP?”
BECKY BURR: Is the question is interpretation of poorly drafted policy documents, or are we talking about poorly drafted rules of the IRP? I mean, clearly the goal here would be to have very, very clear and easily understood rules for the IRP, and clearly we will be looking to clarify what is and is not subject to independent review.

But we do specifically say that the IRP would be available to reconcile inconsistent or conflicting decisions of expert panels, for example. So it would be a place to resolve some of the difficulties that we've had in the new gTLD process where the expert panels have different interpretations and there are decisions from one panel that simply can't be reconciled with the decision of another. So the hope is that to the extent ICANN continues to rely on expert panels, the IRP will provide a mechanism for resolving and ensuring that there’s consistent application of the rules.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thanks very much, Becky. Do we have more questions? So I guess at this point since we've walked through all the different chapters, please feel free to ask all questions that you might have on substance, on process, on whatever aspect you are concerned about or that you would like to get some more clarity on.

I will pause for a few more seconds to give everyone the opportunity to ask their questions. Some individuals are typing in the chat, and I would suggest that should there be no more questions, we will wrap up. Olivier Muron from the ISP asks a question: “Are there many sole member non-for-profit corporations in California?”
And since this is a question that's related to the community mechanism, Jordan, would you try to give an answer to that? And Jordan just writes in the chat that he has no idea.

JORDAN CARTER: I was just going to say, and it is a question we can ask our lawyers and quickly get an answer to, but there's no difference in the rights and powers of membership whether there be one or a million members of a nonprofit, so I'm not sure what their question might be getting it.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thank you, Jordan. What we can say is that this is not an uncommon concept, but we can't quantify. But we are more than happy to mark this as an action item for us and have that question answered by [someone who can answer].

So Tijani's hand is up, but I think that [Asha] was a little bit earlier with the intervention in the chat. Yes, I was going to ask a similar question. Do we have any role models for CMSM structure since this is a model that was suggested by external counsel? So we will also take that offline, [Asha], and have that responded to. Tijani?

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Thank you, Thomas. As we are about to wrap up, I would like to add something about the power of the budget reconsideration or rejection. Thomas, you just said that to make the rejection not happen, we have to have a good cooperation between the staff, the board, and the community before that rejection of the budget.
In fact, this is something which is happening now, and the process has evolved and now we have a very good cooperation between the community and the staff. What I asked during the development of this report is that we make it compulsory because now it is because [inaudible] want it to be like this, but the good thing is to make it compulsory and to make this cooperation and this interaction compulsory before [the rejection] of the budget so that we never be in the situation where we have a budget rejected, so the organization paralyzed. Thank you.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thank you very much, Tijani. Jordan, would you care to give an answer to that?

JORDAN CARTER: I can say that I personally support the suggestion. I think putting the current really engaged process into the bylaws would be helpful, and I think that’s one of the first things that the Work Stream 2 investigation has had on [inaudible] processes should suggest because it’s an easy win and it would help give people a [inaudible] things aren’t going to go back up again later.

THOMAS RICKERT: Thank you very much, Jordan, and thanks very much, Tijani, for your question. And let me say that Tijani as well as Sébastien and many others are very active members of the CCWG and I would just like to applaud them. I would like to applaud the rapporteurs for being on
these calls and help us communicating our work [results] to the wider audience, to the community, to be as inclusive as we can be and have as many brains working on this as possible to respond to all the questions there might be and to spread the word.

So with that, I think we can end the call. I think this has been very interesting in terms of the questions that you asked. Again, please do let me emphasize that it's important for you to spread the word. Talk to your respective community. Tweet about it, write about it, speak about it. Convey the message that we are working on this and what our work results are. And please do chime in with a public comment.

If you think that what we did is good, please do say so. Statement of support, help us evidencing that what we did has broad community support. If we have missed something, if there are concerns, please raise them so that we can clarify in case we've already thought about it, just if you have an idea that we have missed so far.

So thanks again to all of you. I know that this time is not convenient for everyone. Luckily it is for me, but it’s not always the case, so thank you all for your time. Thank you all for your interest. Thanks to the interpreters. Thanks to the scribes.

Thanks to ICANN staff. Thanks to a fantastic CCWG, and stay tuned for more work results that are coming out of this group, and in 40 minutes’ time another webinar is going to start, which I think is going to be at least as much fun as this was. Thanks everyone, and have an excellent day. Bye-bye.