ICANN

Moderator: Brenda Brewer
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Coordinator: The recordings have started already.

Grace Abuhamad: Thank you. Everyone, welcome to the third CWG webinar. It is 13:00 UTC, and Jonathan Robinson will be presenting today. So I will turn it over to him. We'll take questions at the end of the presentation. Thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you, Grace. Welcome, everyone. Thanks for joining us today for this third presentation on the - or the webinar on the work of the Cross-Community Working Group on the IANA stewardship transition. The title of the presentation is towards the final proposal. We've put out our second draft proposal approximately two weeks ago. We're midway through a public comment period.

And myself, Jonathan Robinson, as one of the co-chairs, together with my co-chair, Lise Fuhr, and other colleagues thought it would be useful to create an opportunity for a Q&A session and open up for community question and answers so that you are able to assist yourselves in understanding the proposal

as it currently stands, providing any input but primarily being adequately and well prepared for any public comment you might be glad to make.

It's great to see we've got good attendance and appreciate all of you joining us. We have a set of slides prepared which are available on a link from the public consultation site, and I think I'm going to work through these a little bit faster than we have previously.

On the previous webinars we spent around 40 minutes on the slides and took about 20 minutes Q&A, taking up a total of around an hour. Here we expect that we may take up to a similar amount of time. We've put in up to 90 minutes should there be reason to do that, but my expectation is we'll probably work within the hour. So that's the current plan.

Let me work my way through a couple of these slides and talk you through it, and then we will - that will stimulate I'm sure Q&A. And feel free to put questions either in the chat or prepare to ask question via putting your hand up. And I think it's possibly easier to take them at the end but if you feel that it's imperative to ask a question during the course of the presentation, by all means do put your hand up.

So the first slide highlights that this is part - that the work of the Cross-Community Working Group on stewardship is part of a process. We have the various components of the process. There was clearly the initial NTIA announcement and then through ICANN the setting up of the ICG, the coordinating group, that in turn sought proposals from those different communities benefiting from IANA services.

Here we're clearly focused on not on the numbers or protocol services represented - delivered by the IANA service but those delivered to the naming

community. Those three proposals are being prepared and then will be submitted via the - to the ICG and in turn via the ICANN board to the NTIA.

Was I getting a point? Grace, could you clarify the point on presentation, please?

Grace Abuhamad: Hey, Jonathan, I just wanted to let you know that I can click through - there's an arrow at the bottom of the screen to click through the slides, as opposed to scrolling. That was the - if you'd like me to do that I can help you with that.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay I'll do that. Thank you.

Grace Abuhamad: Thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: All right. So that just - that makes an easier transition through the slides. So the - we've got the three groups each preparing their proposal for submission to the ICG, whose role is to coordinate and integrate these proposals. Now many of you will be aware that prior proposals had been submitted earlier from the numbering and protocol communities ahead of the names community being ready to submit its proposal to the ICG.

So we were aware of that those existing proposals to various extents - various levels of familiarity in the group. And one of the things that chairs were cognizant of was a need to recognize that we were out sync as a naming community relative to the others and to the extent it was possible, our objective was to organize our proposal and make it such that it could be most readily processed by the ICG and coordinated with those of the other groups.

In fact recently the chairs have opened up a dialogue with the chairs of the CRISP and IANA planned groups and we intend to keep and open communication. In general and historically, these have been seen as substantially separate services delivered by the IANA function. But given the structure that's proposed and the need to be coordinated certainly on some aspects of the proposal, there's an awareness of this attempt to manage that.

One of the (unintelligible) in order to manage the scope of the work of this CWG on the IANA stewardship transition, it was necessary to recognize that to the extent that work could be done elsewhere, it made sense to rely elsewhere but - and in particular in this case, we refer to that the transition of stewardship place and the recognition that created a necessary and ideal opportunity to review and enhance ICANN's already developed accountability structures.

So as many of you will be aware, there is a parallel process on which the group has become increasingly and effectively reliant on. And I think one really needs to know and understand that linkage and that reliance and dependence when evaluating this proposal. And we'll come onto that in a little more detail later.

So clearly the objective is the produce a consolidated transition proposal for the various elements of the IANA function, but this group is focused on the domain name system and in meeting the requirements of the naming community in general, and also recognizing and meeting the needs of this group's chartering organization, namely the ccNSO, the SSAC, the GNSO, the ALAC and the GAC, and in particular to also be mindful of direct consumers and their necessary dependence on the IANA functions, including the gTLD and ccTLD operators.

This slide also refers to a scope of the stewardship function based on a range of different areas as set out in the NTIA's statement of work for the IANA contract, and in this case there is clearly a focus on those particular items of work from the statement of work that relate to the naming function. And here it's numbered as 2 to 9 and 11 primarily.

So I'm not going to dwell on the history and scope of the work. Suffice it to say there's been around six months of very intense work, quarter four of 2014, quarter one of 2015, many calls, many hours, many e-mail and varying structures of working, well supported by ICANN's infrastructure, including staff, offices and conference facilities, a number of face-to-face encounters and many, many teleconference or Internet conference hours.

Looking at the next slide, and I think it's worth dwelling on this variation of the timeline in a little more. We're currently in a 28-day public comment. The purpose of this webinar is clearly to offer insight into the work and the outcomes of the group to create an opportunity for Q&A. But this follows an earlier public comment period that took place back in December 2014 with an earlier draft of the proposal that seems a long way off now.

But there was quite some significant input to that, 60 community submissions, which were processed and worked through, including some intensive work time where the group worked together, and various techniques and methods to try and manage in the form of really some model, if you like, some structural models being presented at ICANN 52 in Singapore.

We sought feedback. The group sought feedback from the broader community on those models and I think it was to really test the community's views on the different models and try and get some significant input. We got - we had some very constructive suggestion but we also got concerns that the group wasn't

making sufficient progress and really needed to rethink its methods of operating and start to bring together its thinking and that in some ways having four models was a challenge for the community to absorb.

So in the interim post Singapore and immediately prior to this public comment, we did a couple of key things. We broke up the fundamental underlying work of dealing with the proposal into a series of different themes or components and we addressed those through subgroups called design teams.

We set aside the group's previous intense focus on structure or some of that time while we started to work on the design teams, and we also worked our way through commissioning and ultimately receiving input from some very well qualified legal advisors. Having been through a careful selection process we selected Sidley Austin to help us with the work, and that seems to have gone very well so far.

In terms of the structures, we had, as I said coming into Singapore, had four variants, two of which were - resulted in the post-transition IANA entity being somewhat external to ICANN, and two of which were - remained internal. And then during the course of the ICANN 52 meeting in Singapore, there emerged some work from members of our group that focused on trying to rationalize and produce a form of hybrid, and that could be categorized into three different variants.

So we ended up with seven models that needed to be rationalized. We all got together in Istanbul and worked hard on trying to rationalize and compromise. And I think this is a key point I wanted to make on this slide because there are only two things you're going to want to ask I expect about the model, is one of the benefits of the model you have chosen and how did you get to be there.

I'll talk to the benefits when we talk - and the sort of - the unique characteristics of the model when we get to that a little later in the presentation, but in order to do that, I really felt that this slide visually represented two things really. One, that there had been a substantial amount of work really from December, January, including the four variants presented to Singapore, the mushrooming out to seven, and then coming back down through intense work at both arguing the merits or not of the different models, and frankly using the process to - of discussion and evaluation to rationalize the models down into less and less variants.

We were very conscious that by the time we came into this public comment two, which we're talking about now, we ideally and it wasn't guaranteed that we would have a single model to present to the community, because certainly one feedback from both Singapore and particularly public comment one was an apparently a face value contradictory feedback which said your work is both too complicated and not sufficiently detailed enough.

And I think the complexity resulted from the various models, at least that was one facet of it, and the lack of detail was the lack of detailed explanation on any specific model. So we have attempted to address that in various ways, and you are looking now and we will talk more on sending one model.

I talked earlier and I'll talk a little more on this linkage and coordination with the accountability, the work of the accountability group. This has been handled at a number of different levels but in particular it's been regularly coordinated by weekly meetings between the different chairs of the group. But we have both official and unofficial liaisons between the two groups in the sense that we have members who are on both groups and one or more of our

member has taken an active interest in coordinating between the two different groups.

As I said earlier, they - the necessity here was to ensure that we were able to rely in building the construct for the post-transition IANA entity, we were able to rely on and we will be able to rely on, we need to be able to rely substantially enhanced and further developed accountability mechanisms. And I think the easiest way to deal with that is to talk about those, what specifically we were - we have come to rely on.

And here in Slide 7 you can see that. There were really four key areas that this group, our stewardship group, is preparing this proposal which we're evaluating now through the public comment, need to rely on. First of all was an ability to influence the quality and content of the budget and in particular the transparency of costs associated with the IANA function.

So using this example, the accountability group had their own interests in ensuring that ICANN operated and continued to enhance transparency, visibility and community involvement in the overall ICANN budget. This group, the stewardship group, had a particular interest in making sure we had transparency and influence, relevant influence, on the budget and the portions of the budget specifically allocated and relevant to the IANA function.

And a specific example of a mechanism is that is proposed by the CCWG on accountability that should the budget not meet the requirements of the community for whatever specific reason -- and that work is still being done -- but in this group's case, for the purposes of satisfactorily operating the IANA function, there is the opportunity for a community to veto or no confidence mechanism on the budget and for referring the budget back for improvement and development. Such a mechanism does not exist at present. And so on.

So there are further examples that you see to the right of that first point on that ICANN budget. There are the community empowerment mechanisms whereby there is the ability through the proposed ability to review the ICANN board decisions relating to various issues, but it's this group's specific case, in the case of the IANA stewardship function we would want to review potentially we would want there to be able to be the ability to review the board's decision around a review of the IANA function.

We'll talk a little bit more about how those review functions might work, but in the event that the IANA function is reviewed, some recommendations are made out of that review function and the board does not satisfactorily respond to those recommendations, the community will be empowered to challenge that outcome.

So again you can start to see a theme here where there are general accountability mechanism that needed to be and have been and are being worked on by the group on accountability and very specific examples of utilizing those mechanisms or tools directly in relation to the IANA function.

So I feel we've done a good job of not absorbing all of that work into this group and yet making sure that those working on these mechanisms and capabilities were aware of this group's specific needs. Let me move onto the next slide.

The next slide simply summarizes the work of the different design teams, and I'm not going to dwell on that but I highlighted a broke and componentized down the work of the group. And I suppose there is one important point to make here. Not all of the work of the design teams is complete or fully complete in the draft proposal you see in front of you.

We had a balance to strike here between meeting a certain timeline which required this 28-day public comment, synthesis of the public comment, the integration into a final proposal, and refining and developing the work of the design teams. So the judgment that's been exercised is that in many cases it was complete, in some cases it was materially complete, and in some cases there is more work to be done, and that work is being continued as the public comment period proceeds.

Now clearly there's an element of risk here, and that risk is that those commenting on the draft say in some way the draft is insufficiently complete given that work is going on. We do not believe that to be the case. We believe there's the form and structure of the proposal is sufficiently complete for it to be evident how it's envisioned it will work, and whilst there is a necessary amount of work to be done on detail and implications, that's not sufficient to say conceptually in many areas of detail, a proposal is not sufficiently complete to have detailed public comment on it.

Now here is arguably the most critical slide but we would - we as co-chairs felt it was important not to present this upfront for two reasons. One, because we've done a lot of work other than simply contemplating the structure. And two, we were initially criticized to some extent for overly focusing on structure and less or insufficiently on all of the detail such as the detailed operation of the service level expectations or the way in which customers would interact with the entity.

But let me talk you through this visual map of where we were and where we are and what this means. So on the left-hand side of the slide you have the current situation, which is clearly the stewardship and oversight performed by the NTIA institutionalized by a contract with ICANN, and IANA sitting in a

corner of ICANN as a functionally separate entity providing services to those customers of the IANA function.

In the future, the way we envisage that working is we make some further separation of the IANA function so it is not only functionally separate but legally separate. And now I refer you back to my earlier thought, which is the point about the fact that this structure and all of the associated components of it were reached via deliberation, compromise and thought, but let me tell you a couple of things why this end - this point that we've got to seems to work.

You'll notice that in the middle of that blue rectangle in the post-transition world, we have a contract. So this model by simply separating out the IANA function as opposed to simply retaining the functional separation, we are able to put in place a contract which will institutionalize and encapsulate the relationship between ICANN and the post-transition IANA entity, or the PTI.

By making that entity legally separate, we produce not only the ability to have a contract, which is a very valuable formalization of the relationship between the two entities but we also get to produce at least a few other advantages, some of which I'll mention now.

We effectively capture and enhance the functional separation which exists today and make that absolutely clear via the use of - via the support of a legal entity. We create the prospect of significant new accountability via the use of the additional accountability mechanisms, which I've talked about, and ultimately although this should - this needs to be very carefully weighted how one considers this, we pre-prepare or prepackage, if you like, the possibility of separating that entity, that IANA service entity, from ICANN more formally in the future.

Now there is no intention within this group to advocate for such a separation. One of the starting premises of the group's work was that in general whilst no service provider is perfect, it was broadly recognized that IANA performed a good and more than satisfactory service to the different customers of that service to date. And there is no reason to think that that won't continue indefinitely.

But nevertheless, there was significant concerns expressed at various points along the way that a mechanism needed to be in place such that in the event of repeated performance failures and an inability to remedy such performance failures and ability to separate should be built into the construct.

So that deals with the legally separated post transition IANA entity. It remains a service under the supervision and provision and housed within the ICANN entity but with those additional changes that I've mentioned.

You will see and it's worth highlighting that there is the prospect of putting in place and in fact the necessary condition of having a board by virtue of the fact that it's a legally separate entity a board is required.

This is an area of quite some discussion in the CWG as to what that board's role might be.

There is - there are certain legally necessarily functions that such a board will be required to perform. Those functions are typically performed in a subsidiary of an organization that can be performed by a small and what you might view as an internal board, a board supplied - a board populated by management or parent company directors or staff.

The point of discussion is whether that board should have a degree of independence and if so to what extent it should have that independence and why. And that question has not been satisfactorily answered nor dealt with by the group at this stage.

So it's possible it could be an internal board that is simply a what you might call a classic subsidiary board or it's possible that it might have a more complex or independent function.

To the extent that it has more independence we immediately create additional accountability for potential for additional accountability issues and associated complexity. So that is something to bear in mind in considering that.

Additional structures that are very important to recognize are those two in green to the right of the blue post-transition structure. And that is the customer standing committee and the IANA function review.

The customer standing committee is a group specifically focused on the needs of the direct customers of the IANA function. I mentioned that at the outset that the direct customers were clearly - the group that is receiving a service and needs to monitor and ensure that that service is adequate for the customer's requirements.

And so that's a critical and necessary function which has - which we'll expect to review and monitor primary function of which is to review and monitor performance of the post-transition IANA entity.

The CSC will have the opportunity escalate to a - an IFR, an Independent an IANA review function. But this IANA review function is something which we expect to be institutionalized in any event.

What do we mean by that? We mean there will be a review of the functions and performance of the post-transition IANA at regular intervals and encapsulated within I'll refer to as a fundamental bylaw which will be constitutionally mandated that there will need to be a review, a periodic review every five years.

And in addition to that periodic review there will be an initial review to your post transition. And in addition should there be a necessity that there will be the possibility for review at - on an ad hoc or what we refer to as a special basis, so a special review required by specific conditions most obviously if there was sustained or ongoing performance concerns or whatever other rational reason.

There is an orange dotted line which refers to the accountability mechanisms. And whilst this isn't' the work of this group I've referred to on a couple of occasions already and it's worth highlighting that this dependence on those accountability mechanisms and the fact that they are necessary conditions for the validity and standalone basis for this proposal we rely on those mechanisms. And so it's vital that they are in place or at least sufficiently guaranteed to be in place for this proposal to stand on its own two feet.

I'll say a couple of words on Slide 10 about where we go from here. And I think I'd really like to turn it over to Q&A from the group.

You will see we are clearly in the April May timeframe on the 28th day of the comment period. I described that there was ongoing work.

There are a couple of the design teams that we've agreed to continue running with specific open items from their work.

We are continuing to have regular interaction and legal input. And we will continue to refine the draft proposal based both on the work of the group and the public comments as they come in.

We have an intense period from the 20th of May through to the 29th of May where we seek to integrate and absorb the public comments and then write those up from 29th of May to 8th of June with an intention to deliver those to the chartering organizations sufficiently in advance of the Buenos Ares meeting so that in principle this final proposal could be approved and/or ratified by the chartering organizations in Buenos Aires such that post Buenos Aires we could submit that to the IGC for comparison integration and preparation alongside the proposals from the other responding communities.

So I think ICANN staff Grace and Marika and Brenda and participants in the Webinar that's probably a sufficient overview. I hope it's not too fast and skipped over too much detail.

There's a balance to be struck between reintroducing the key concepts and yet not spending the whole time talking but creating the opportunity for Q&A.

So let me turn over now for any hands to go up, any comments or thoughts or questions. And if I could ask (unintelligible) anything that's come up via the chat in the meantime as well that would be helpful.

All right let's - I think it may be - I'm just wondering how to work through these questions in the chat. It would be I - and it's probably easier for me although it's not totally helpful to you but if I work backwards through them.

And maybe Grace, perhaps Grace and/or Marika if you could keep an eye out for me if I miss anyone and just draw me to that.

(RenalioRinalia Abdul Rahim) asks about the PTI board being empowered to appoint the PTI CEO and the IRI and IETF representative with CSC. Those are two very good questions. Let me take them separately.

Currently IANA performs the function as I understand it in a functionally separate way but ultimately under the supervision of ICANN senior management.

In the post transition and there is the functional separation maintained, there's a legal separation maintained and there is the board.

And I think Rinalia (Renalio) this goes to the heart of the question. What is the role and function of that board over and above the statutory minimum? And is there a necessary function of that?

I wouldn't say my personal view is the answer is no. But my personal view is that we need to articulate any function over and above any requirement for that function over and above the statutory minimum and be sure that that function is carried out elsewhere in order to adjust it by why that board would need to have additional functions.

So what you describe their appointing a PTI CEO is an additional function that it may be the fact that is a function the board could perform. But that is one additional function that has not yet been rationalized.

In terms of the RIRs and IETF representation of the CSC or frankly elsewhere in this proposal that was very challenging because as I said we were mindful

of the existing submissions, the existing responses to the requests for proposals. We were very cautious not to presume anything.

And it's interesting; I re-read ahead of this presentation the memo that's been provided for us on the - by the lawyers on the summary of the ICANN structure of the PTI structure.

And essentially what it says is that in reference to the role general or how the RIRs and the IETF might react with this new post transition entity there are some minor changes that would be needed to be made to reflect the new legal structure.

But it doesn't presume any specific change other than if you like technical legal changes that would be required to reflect the new structure.

However there are some options. And one option might be representation on one or more of the post transition IANA entities.

So for example, should we decide to increase the board a little bit more than the it may be appropriate that there was - and this is one suggestion that's been made on within our group, it may be that it's logical to have a representative from the names numbering and protocol communities on the post transition IANA call.

But I think some of that might percolate out as there's some informal discussions and absorption of this proposal and what this might mean so I think that's really the point. And we've been careful not to presume anything but aware that there are some options in there.

I have another question then from Peter Van Roste on elaborating on where or how the CSC IFR will be structured.

Peter the detail is belabored in the proposal. But if you like for me the critical division between the two is that the CSC is primarily a customer oriented function. In other words, those entities that are receiving a direct representative of those entities that are receiving a direct service.

The IFR has much more of a multi-stakeholder - there seems to be much more multi-stakeholder and diverse as you might expect for a broader periodic review function.

And so for me that's the critical difference between composition in both cases.

Are there any other comments you might want to make a point of fact if you think I've expressed something not as clearly as you'd like or you'd like come additional clarification please fire away. If there's any other questions we're happy to hear them.

There's a question from (Steva) relating to structural separation of IANA board and doing an expansion of the ICANN board.

I think - well, to include better RIR representation. I certainly think that's beyond the scope of this group and very much encourage you to look at the accountability changes that have taken place because I think that's a key component.

But this group as it currently stands and assuming at least a legally minimum or a - I'm trying to think of what the right word to describe this is, a

minimalist board if you like, a board that performs the statutory minimum requirements.

Under those circumstances there is no additional accountability built into the post transition IANA. And the accountability that that group would rely on, that we would all rely on for IANA would ultimately revert to the ICANN board and all of the accountability and community empowerment mechanisms that have been put in place.

Personally I feel there's some far-reaching changes being proposed. And they are very likely to be satisfactory and meet the requirements of this group.

I think the obvious question or point that one could make is well how can you be sure those will be in place and that you can rely on them? And that's an issue of perhaps the lack of synchronicity of the timing of the two groups but also just a confidence that those will be implemented.

And there I think this group envisages that our proposal will be - will have a conditionality built into it that says we make this proposal on the understanding that A, B, C, D, E accountability or A, B, C, D accountability mechanism are in place and that we can rely on them to fulfill W, X, Y Zed functions required by - with in the post transition IANA.

Just noting the movement in the chat, I don't think I'm seeing a specific question that I haven't at least attempted to deal with.

Actually Mark I'll come to you in a moment. I see your hand is up thank you. Just one point I will note at this point is that what we decided to do was start to collate the questions we had received from Webinars 1 and 2 and now today.

And I think we will plan - we start to prepare those up into a form of a queue document. So hopefully that will be something of benefit to all those who've participated in the Webinar and who are interested in submitting public comments.

And so that will either answer your questions if you might otherwise have asked it in public comments or help you refine your comment and input.

Oh I see a hand up from Mark Cavell so go ahead Mark.

Mark Cavell: Yes thank you Jonathan. And thank you very much for the presentation.

Yes, I did have a question. It was and this cropped up in the GAC discussion yesterday about this proposal and the accountability one.

There's a lot of focus on the PTI board and its constitution and where is the accountability for the board's decision and exactly what its role is.

There was concern about lack of clarity of that. And maybe this is - this reflects the current discussions that you mentioned as taking place in the group.

So my question is how soon do you see this being resolved in terms of a consensus view of the group as to the accountability of the PTI board and how it's appointed and how members can be taken off it and so on?

Do you see as the public comment period is already underway do you see this happening during the current period or is this going to be something that's not going to be sorted until the meeting in Buenos Aires? Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks Mark. That's a good question and a tough question but a relevant question.

In the first instance I would give the answer that I gave earlier and say that the post transition IANA entity could at least in my view function with a minimum board, a board that complied with statutory minimum.

Now what that means is that such a board would typically be populated from either within the IANA management and/or within from the ICANN staff or board.

So in my personal experience a typical example would be that you would put the finer director of the parent entity on the board to make sure that the finances were in shape.

And you might put a manager or - and/or one other director of the parent entity on this.

So you might have a manager and two directors of the parent. And you'll have a three person board. That gives you a degree of control, a degree of resilience should one or more - one member of the board not be available to sign any statutory requirements.

But that's only the minimum and that's what required for it to function.

Now as yet again this is my opinion I don't think there has been a compelling case. There's been some interesting points put forward but there's as yet not a compelling case. And there are some risks associated with increasing or enhancing the size and potentially the independence of that board.

So in the first instance I would be talking to - I would suggest talking to the GAC colleagues that there is not yet a requirement or at least a well-articulated requirement for a board that - to be other than the minimum.

But none of that gives you the answer you asked for which is when are you going to sort this out?

And frankly I - it would be a (unintelligible) misfortune to say we will do it by a certain time. We clearly have a clock ticking and a requirement to sort this out really by the time we write the final proposal.

But so if you really pushed me for a time I say it's got to be sorted out in the final proposal.

And you can hear I have some opinions based on personal experience and the work of the group. But, I'm very mindful of being receptive to proposals, thoughts and ideas letting the group chew this over properly as we deal with the other items.

So that doesn't give you quite the answer you wanted but I hope it gives you some of it.

Now (Stephan) came back and - or was it Peter before sort of saying well actually what he really wanted to know is that the diagrams suggests that CSC and IFR are outside of ICANN. Can you clarify?

I don't think that that's - I think that's where the weakness of the graphical representation breaks down.

I think that representing - and I think the intention was that the blues were directly comparable. There is no CSC or IFR in the current structure so they are add-ons. But they are broadly formed under the overarching what you might call the ICANN umbrella rather than the ICANN corporate entity which is probably what that (unintelligible) structure is better representing it's ICANN corporate versus ICANN community.

Boy I hope that helps Peter.

(Mary Uduma) asked if ICANN is satisfied with PTI. Would ICANN satisfy itself?

Well ICANN is providing the service through IANA. IANA's providing a service, ICANN is - IANA sits within the ICANN structure.

ICANN is empowered to make changes to ensure the performance of the post transition IANA is satisfactory.

To the extent that no matter what ICANN does the performance of the post transition IANA it remains unsatisfactory to the (cust) of their function that is the point at which that will be picked up by the by a regular periodic review or by escalation through one or more mechanisms including instituting a special review which in and of itself will - one would - it's not limited in scope what a review might recommend.

And to the extent that it's not limited in scope it could recommend one or more remedial changes. For example it could say in performing this review of the IANA function and the sustained performance issues that have taken place over the past period we strongly recommend that one or more changes are made to senior staff or we find that it is no longer credible for whatever

reasons for post transition IANA to be operated under within the - as a wholly-owned subsidiary. And we recommended the form of separation of divestiture.

So there are many different remedies that could be produced. And the issue there is that you might way well hang on. So the review tells ICANN that really you've got to get rid of IANA.

You're no longer competent to house and run that service within under your - under the auspices of your sort of corporate structure.

ICANN says no way. We really like that. It's very, very important to us as it is currently and as it always has been. And we refuse to comply.

Well at that point then the community as a whole says well they've got very good reasons for doing that and we accept that. Or they really haven't got good reason for doing that and we challenge it via one of the new accountability mechanisms that are in place.

So these are the kind of processes and remedies that are envisaged.

All right, well we're coming to the top of the hour. I'll give it a minute or two to see if any other hands or questions come up in the chat.

It's very helpful and much appreciate if members of the group are active in dialogue and sharing thoughts and responses to questions.

I supposed I should take advantage of this moment to say how give how strongly held certain views were and people have held from the beginning and during the course of this work some pretty strongly held views over

fundamental points the spirit of the work in which this group has worked has frankly got better and better.

And there's a highly collaborative and willing sprit to produce a high quality output in a reasonable timeframe that everyone can be satisfied with.

So I think that's important message to go out to the community at large that when you're commenting on this by all means give any critical feedback you like.

But do be aware that this is being conducted in a good spirit and with a genuine good-faith attempt to produce a viable, valid and holistic proposal that works.

So I think that that's important. And Chuck acknowledging your point which I did mention earlier and I don't know who else we communicated but that the CWG is continuing to work on certain key items in more detail during the course of the public comment period.

Okay, well with that as a closing remark and with - I'll acknowledge that we spent an hour on this. It's great to have some more feedback and comments.

We will integrate these into an FAQ and we will have another Webinar tomorrow. And on the back of that Webinar tomorrow we'll integrate all of this into a series of FAQs that you should be able to share with your respective communities in the relatively near future.

And thank you very much for your participation and active participation in responding to the proposal and asking questions of us.

So with that I think I'll draw the Webinar to a close.

END