## 6.6.1    Mechanism to empower the community: >>>Name of Mechanism<<<

a)  Initial legal advice has indicated that the set of powers in this report can be made available to the ICANN community. More specifically: there are approaches we can take within ICANN to make these powers legally available and durable. The CCWG continues to take legal advice and to debate the pros and cons of the specific options for this, which will feature in our Second Public Comment Report.

b)  In the meantime, the CCWG is largely agreed on the following:
    • To be as restrained as possible in the degree of structural or organising changes required in ICANN to create the mechanism for these powers
    • The mechanism should be organised along the same lines as the community – that is, in line and compatible with existing SO / AC / SG structures

c)  The CCWG considered the decision weights of the various parts of the community within the mechanism. It seeks community feedback on two options as set out here:

| Community segment | Option 1 "votes" | Option 2 "votes" |
|---|---|---|
| ASO | 5 | 4 |
| ccNSO | 5 | 4 |
| gNSO | 5 | 4 |
| At Large | 5 | 2 |
| GAC | 5 | 2 |
| SSAC | 2 | 2 |
| RSSAC | 2 | 2 |

d)  The rationale for Option 1 is that it gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs and the two ACs that are structurally designed to represent stakeholders (Governments and Internet users, respectively) within ICANN, while still guaranteeing a say for the other ACs.

e)  The reasons discussed to allocate a lower number of "votes" to SSAC in Option 1 is that it is a specific construct within ICANN designed to provide expertise on security and stability, rather than a group representing a community of stakeholders

f)  For RSSAC, the reason is slightly different but relies on the limited size of the community of root server operators as well as the strong focus of their mission on operations.

g)  The rationale for Option 2 is that it gives the bulk of influence to the SOs, while guaranteeing a say for the ACs on an equal basis between them. It is therefore more aligned with the existing structure of ICANN.

h)  The logic for 5 "votes" in Option 1 for the higher number was to allow for greater diversity of views, including the ability to represent all the ICANN regions in each SO. The logic for 4 "votes" in Option 2 was to allow for appropriate coverage across SGs in the GNSO.

i)   Option 1 emerged as part of Work Party 1's deliberations following up on the CCWG's discussions in Singapore. Option 2 emerged recently in deliberations of WP1 and of the whole CCWG.

j)   The subsidiary option discussed in Istanbul of 2 votes for the first five SOs and ACs, and one vote for the remaining two, has not been pursued.

k)   The CCWG is interested in community views on the relative influence particular SOs and ACs, or classes of these, should have.

l)   In our Second Public Comment report, ***we will set out the proposed mechanism or two alternatives, and if alternatives are proposed will explain the decision factors the community could consider before deciding which it prefers.***