

	Reconsider/Reject Budget or Strategy Operating Plans	Reconsider/Reject Changes to ICANN Bylaws	Approve Changes to Fundamental Bylaws	Recalling Individual Board Directors	Recalling the Entire ICANN Board
IN SHORT	Ability to consider/reject budget, strategic/operating plans after they are approved by Board	Ability to reject proposed Bylaws changes after they are approved by the Board but before they come into effect	Ability to give positive assent to any change to Fundamental Bylaws before it was finalized	End the term of a director, and trigger a reappointment process	
GROUND TO INITIATE	No	No	No	No; NomCom appointed Directors: case of removal TBD	No
STANDING	SO/AC	SO/AC	SO/AC	Same as the group that elects them	SO/AC
THRESHOLD TIMELINE TO INITIATE	Any participant in the community powers mechanism would be able to raise the question  Timeframes would be included in the planning and budgeting process to ensure that a single rejection would not unduly disrupt the planning and approvals process	Two-week window following Board approval	Very high degree of community assent  To be developed as part of WP2 deliberations or joint discussion between WP1/WP2 rapporteurs	For directors appointed by SO/ACs, or subdivisions within them, a process led by that organization or subdivision could lead to the director's removal  An SO, AC, or SG could escalate issues with the director to the point where there was consideration of the director's removal by the community mechanism e.g. a petition by 2 AC/SO, including 1 AC (TBD) or SO/AC appointed Recall Committee (SO/AC)	Petition of two-thirds of the SOs or ACs in ICANN, with at least one SO and one AC petitioning  After a petition is raised, there would be a set period of time for SO/ACs to individually and collectively deliberate and discuss whether the removal of the Board is warranted under the circumstances
WHO GETS VOTING POWERS	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism	Would be done within appointing SO/AC with a minimum threshold; separate process for removing NomCom appointed directors
RELATIVE VOTING POWER	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism  ccNSO, GNSO, ASO, At-Large, GAC: 5 SSAC, RSSAC: 2 or ASO, ccNSO, GNSO: 4 ALAC, GAC, RSSAC, SSAC: 2	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism  ccNSO, GNSO, ASO, At-Large, GAC: 5 SSAC, RSSAC: 2 or ASO, ccNSO, GNSO: 4 ALAC, GAC, RSSAC, SSAC: 2	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism  ccNSO, GNSO, ASO, At-Large, GAC: 5 SSAC, RSSAC: 2 or ASO, ccNSO, GNSO: 4 ALAC, GAC, RSSAC, SSAC: 2	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism	To be determined in developing the community powers mechanism  ccNSO, GNSO, ASO, At-Large, GAC: 5 SSAC, RSSAC: 2 or ASO, ccNSO, GNSO: 4 ALAC, GAC, RSSAC, SSAC: 2

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DIVERSITY REQUIREMENTS	(as per mechanism/independent Advisors?)	(as per mechanism/independent Advisors?)	(as per mechanism/independent Advisors?)		(as per mechanism/independent Advisors?)
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST	(as per mechanism/independent Advisors?)	(as per mechanism/independent Advisors?)	No Directors, Staff, SO/AC Officers, dependent contractors		No Directors, Staff, SO/AC Officers, dependent contractors
DIRECTED VOTE	No	No	To be discussed		Yes (Agreed 23 March?)
QUORUM	2/3 of votes	2/3 of votes	TBD		Roll call; Votes cast through SO/AC
DECISION THRESHOLD	A 2/3 level of support in the mechanism would be required in the mechanism to reject a first time: a 3/4 level of support for subsequent rejections	3/4 level of support in the community mechanism to reject a proposed bylaw change	24 in favor (of 29) 10 in favor (of 12)	(66%)(75%) level of support (or equivalent) to decide in favor of removal	24 in favor (of 29) 10 in favor (of 12)  Suitably high threshold: (75%) (85%) of all the support available within the community mechanism would have to be cast in favor to implement
LIMITS	Yes. Plan or budget cannot be sent back again with new issues raised but subsequent version can be rejected	No. There is no limit to the number of times a proposed change can be rejected, but the threshold for sending back is a supermajority in the community mechanism set out in 6.5.1 above, to limit any potential for abuse of this power	No. Any proposal to change these bylaws can fail to be approved. With failure the proposal dies, and if submitted again is a new proposal (TBC with WP2)	Not discussed; A limit on time between attempts? Time after election?	Not discussed, but worth discussing
OTHER MATTERS		Binding: Board would have to absorb the feedback, make adjustments, and propose a new set of amendments to the bylaws  Note that for the Board to propose a bylaws change requires a 2/3 vote in favor		Common requirements for process thresholds TBD	Mandated discussion phase