**Sidley Draft: May 22, 2015**

**“Punch List”/Open Items on Post-Transition IANA Model  
Items for CWG Discussion and Input**

***Note: Grey shaded/red items below are priority items. Yellow items below are new items added by Sidley based on recent responses to punch list by design teams.***

|  | **Task** | **Responsible Group/ Relevant Design Team** | **Status / Comments / Recommendations** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **New Post-Transition IANA (PTI) entity type** | | | |
| 1. | Determine legal entity: non-profit corporation or limited liability company. (Section III.A.i.a.) | CWG |  |
| 1A. | ICANN Finance/Tax to advise re need for PTI tax exempt status | CWG/ICANN Finance/Tax |  |
| **Transfer of naming functions to PTI** | | | |
| 2. | Determine assets that will need to be transferred to PTI. (Section III.A.i.a.) | CWG |  |
| 3. | Determine whether consents will be required to transfer/assign assets to PTI. (Note: IETF consent is required for the assignment of the IETF MOU.) (Section III.A.i.a.) | CWG |  |
| **PTI Board** | | | |
| 4. | Determine size and composition. Determine who appoints. (Section III.A.i.b.) | CWG |  |
| 5. | Determine scope of PTI Board role. (Section III.A.i.b.) (See Sidley Austin memo of April 28 for statutory duties) | CWG |  |
| **IANA Function Review (IFR)** | | | |
| 6. | Proposal contemplates that a Special Review may also be initiated by TLDs on concerns raised by TLDs directly with the ccNSO or the GNSO. (Section III.A.i.d.) | DT-N | This trigger for the Special Review should be struck and the Special Review should only be triggered after the CSC first undertakes remedial action procedures and then refers the matter to ccNSO/GNSO for approval. Individual TLD operators are empowered to raise these issues with the CSC and that is the correct pipeline through which these problems should come up.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Section III.A.i.d. (page 23)*  While the IFR will normally be scheduled based on a regular 5 year cycle with other ICANN reviews, a Special Review may also be initiated following the CSC raising concerns with the GNSO and/or the ccNSO. In the event of a Special Review being proposed, the ccNSO and GNSO should consult with both members and non-member TLDs, in the light of the consultations, the Councils can decide by a supermajority to call for a special review.  *Annex F (page 49)*  While the IANA Function Review will normally be scheduled based on a regular 5 year rotation with other ICANN reviews, a Special Review may be also be initiated by supermajority approval of each of the GNSO and ccNSO Councils .  *Annex F (page 55)*  [IFR] Can also be triggered by supermajority approval of each of the GNSO and ccNSO Councils |
| 7. | Proposal contemplates that IFR team can recommend amendments to SOW. Annex F contemplates any amendments proposed by IFR would be subject to ratification by ccNSO and GNSO. Determine voting threshold for ccNSO and GNSO (e.g., majority or supermajority? require both organizations?). (Annex F, page 50) | DT-N | Recommendations would require a supermajority of both the ccNSO and the GNSO.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex F (page 50)*  Drafted amendments would be subject to at least the following processes before they came into effect:  ● Public comment period;  ● Ratification by a supermajority of each of the ccNSO and the GNSO Councils; and  ● Approval by the ICANN Board. |
| 8. | Special review is triggered by supermajority vote of ccNSO and GNSO councils. Determine voting threshold (i.e., 66-2/3%; 75%, etc.). (Section III.A.i.d. and Annex F, page 55) | DT-N | “Supermajority” threshold and definition will be defined by internal voting procedures in the ICANN bylaws and special rules and procedures.  For the GNSO, a supermajority is defined as: two-thirds (2/3) of the Council members of each House, or a three-fourths (3/4) of one House and a majority of the other House.  For the ccNSO, [to Come].  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex F (page 55)*  For the GNSO, a supermajority is defined as 2/3 of the Council members of each House, or 3/4 of one House and a majority of the other House. For the ccNSO, a supermajority is defined as [TBD].  We recommend that the requirement to conduct and facilitate these reviews (including the supermajority voting thresholds) be articulated in the ICANN Bylaws and included as a Fundamental Bylaw under consideration by CCWG-Accountability. In addition, the review could be set forth in the contract between ICANN and Post-Transition IANA or PTI. |
| 9. | If persistent problem triggers a special review, will timeline of review be accelerated to address issue? If not, how are issues addressed in the interim? (Annex F, page 55) | DT-N | A special review will follow the same phases identified for the IANA Functions review including:   * Consultations with IFO; * Consultations with CSC; * Consultation with ccTLD and gTLD Operators; * Public Comment Period.   Draft amendments to come out of the Special Review would, likewise, be subject to:   * Public Comment Period; * Ratification by the ccNSO and GNSO; * Approval by the ICANN Board.   DT-N contemplate, however, that the inputs to the Special Review process would be narrower. Instead of reviewing all of the inputs identified for the Periodic Review process, the Special Review would focus primarily on the identified deficiency and its implications for overall IANA Performance, as well as on how that issue is best resolved. Given the narrowed set of inputs, we imagine that the timeline would be accelerated.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex F (page 55)*  A Special Review would follow the same process as that for reviewing or amending IANA SOWs and drafted amendments. Certain recommendations may also require approval of the ICANN membership (for example, the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator for the Naming Functions). In terms of inputs to be considered, a Special Review would focus primarily on the identified deficiency and its implications for overall IANA performance, as well as on resolution of the issue. |
| 10. | Special review can be initiated after “defined escalation procedures are exhausted” and “defined accountability mechanisms are exhausted.” Define with specificity what these procedures and mechanisms will be. (Annex F, page 55) | DT-N |  |
| ***Customer Standing Committee (CSC)*** | | | |
| 11. | Composition: who will select the TLD representative that is not a ccTLD or gTLD registry? (Annex G, page 59) | DT-C | An Expression of Interest must be submitted to be considered eligible for the CSC. For a person seeking to represent a TLD not considered to be either a cc or gTLD registry, the Expression of Interest must have the support of the relevant registry, which will serve as a recommendation for appointment to the CSC. As the ccNSO and GNSO Councils are responsible for approving the full membership of the CSC, the EOI will be considered as part of that approval process.  NB: References to ccNSO and GNSO should be changed to ccNSO Council and GNSO Council.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex G (page 60)*  While the ccTLD and gTLD members and Liaisons will be appointed by the ccNSO and RySG respectively, registry operators that are not participants in these groups will be eligible to participate in the CSC as members or Liaisons. The Expression of Interest submitted by the TLD representatives who are not considered ccTLD or gTLD registry operators must have the support of the relevant registry, which will serve as a recommendation for that person’s appointment to the CSC. |
| 12. | Full membership of CSC is approved by ccNSO and GNSO. By what percentage? (Annex G, page 60) | DT-C | Full membership of the CSC is to be approved by the ccNSO Council and GNSO Council in accordance with their own rules and procedures.  The approval process should include some form of consultation between the two Councils.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex G (page 60)*  The full membership of the CSC must be approved by the Council of each of the ccNSO and the GNSO in accordance with their own rules and procedures and after consultation between the ccNSO and GNSO. |
| 12A. | What form of consultation is envisioned to take place between ccNSO and GNSO Councils in relation to approving the membership of the CSC? (See #12 above) | DT-C |  |
| 13. | If ccTLD or gTLD representative is recalled, can meetings continue before a replacement is named? (Annex G, page 60) | DT-C | In the event that a ccTLD or gTLD representative to the CSC is recalled, the appointing party can provide a temporary replacement while they endeavor to fill the vacancy. As the CSC will be meeting regularly on a monthly basis, best efforts should be made to fill the vacancy within one month of the recall.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex G (page 60)*  In the event that a ccTLD or gTLD registry representative is recalled, the appointing party can provide a temporary replacement while they endeavor to fill the vacancy so that the appointing party can participate in the next meeting of the CSC. |
| 13A. | Are candidates who have been proposed to act as temporary replacements to the CSC required to provide an Expression of Interest? (See #13 above) | DT-C |  |
| 14. | Determine how CSC will decide on who will be liaison to IFR. (Annex F, page 52) | DT-C | The CSC as a whole will decide who will serve as the Liaison to the IFR. Preference should be given to the Liaison being a registry representative given that technical expertise is anticipated to be valuable in the role.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex G (page 58)*  The CSC will determine who will serve as Liaison to the IFR and the SCWG. In making its determination with respect to the Liaison to the IFR, the CSC will give preference to registry representatives because their technical expertise is anticipated to be valuable in the role. |
| 14A. | Determine how CSC will decide on who will be liaison to the SCWG. (See #14 above) | DT-C |  |
| 15. | Proposed Remedial Action Procedures is noted as item to be agreed upon by CSC and PTI. Will this happen prior to transition? (Annex F, page 62) | DT-C | It is expected that the CSC and the PTI will agree to Remedial Action Procedures post transition once the two entities are formed.  It is important to note that the agreement should be between the CSC and PTI, not the CSC and PTI Board. |
| 15A. | Does deferral of the agreement between CSC and PTI until the post-transition period create implementation risk? (See #15 above) | DT-C |  |
| 16. | IANA Problem Resolution Process: contemplates that CSC can escalate to ccNSO and GNSO which may then decide to take further action “using agreed consultation and escalation processes”. What will these processes be and is anything contemplated beyond a Special Review? (Annex J, page 68) | DT-C | The ccNSO and GNSO will be responsible for developing their own procedures, which will be done post-transition. It is envisaged that the Special Review will not be the only possible escalation path available, for example the ccNSO and GNSO could seek a meeting with the ICANN Board as a mechanism to resolve issues. |
| 16A. | Does deferral of the development of the IANA Problem Resolution Process until the post-transition period create implementation risk? (See #16 above) | DT-C |  |
| **ICANN/PTI Contract; Statement of Work and SLEs** | | | |
| 17. | Determine to what extent the ICANN/PTI contract will be enforceability mechanism (vs. CSC, IFR or other ICANN accountability mechanisms). (Section III.A.i. and Section III.A.i.c. See also Annex F) | CWG |  |
| 18. | Determine which rights under the existing NTIA contract will be implemented in the ICANN governance documents and which will be in the new ICANN/PTI contract. (Section III.A.i.c.) | CWG |  |
| 19. | Determine who will have the right to trigger remedies for breaches of, and otherwise enforce, ICANN/PTI Contract (i.e., will PTI Board exercise this right or will this require CSC or IFR). (Sections III.A.i.b, c, and d) | CWG |  |
| 20. | DT-A SLE documentation following receipt of additional IANA documentation. (Section III.A.ii.b. and Annex H) | DT-A |  |
| **Escalation mechanisms** | | | |
| 21. | Who does ccNSO/GNSO escalate unresolved issues to? Will there be an IRP process? (Section III.A.ii.a. and Annex J, footnote 22) | DT-M | Comment from DT-C: This is related to Q. 16 and will be dependent upon the procedures developed by the ccNSO and GNSO, which are expected to happen post-transition. |
| 21A. | Does deferral of the development of escalation procedures until the post-transition period create implementation risk? (See #21 above) | DT-C |  |
| 22. | Additional detail on how a persistent performance issue/systemic problem will be defined (e.g., discretion given to CSC or some principles-based standard)? (Section III.A.ii.c.) | DT-M and DT-C | Comment from DT-C:  This is related to Q15 and should also be considered in the context of the SLAs contained in the contract.  The Remedial Action Procedures should contain a threshold of what is regarded persistent or systemic problems, for example if reports reveal that an SLA has not be met for 6 continuous months this would be considered a persistent performance issue; however, it should be recognized that the CSC will have the discretion to determine whether this is a trivial or serious matter, and agree a course of action appropriate to the circumstances.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex J (page 68)*  The Customer Standing Committee (CSC) is authorized to monitor the performance of the IANA Functions against agreed service level targets on a regular basis. In the event that persistent performance issues are identified by the CSC (in accordance with the Remedial Action Plan), the CSC will seek resolution in accordance with a Remedial Action Plan which includes:… |
| 22A. | What process should the CSC follow in the event it identifies a persistent performance issue or systemic problem that is not serious? Is it still required to follow a Remedial Action Plan? (See #22 above) | DT-M and DT-C |  |
| 23. | Customer complaints, Phase 2: additional detail on customer mediation process and ability to initiate an IRP. (Annex I, page 66) | DT-M and DT-C | Comment from DT-C:  It appears that this question relates to a) and c) and as such is outside the remit of the CSC. |
| 23A. | Who will make determinations with respect to the customer mediation process and/or ability to initiate an IRP? (See #23 above) | DT-M and DT-C |  |
| **Separation Process** | | | |
| 24 | Under what circumstances can the separation process be triggered? Will it only be upon a recommendation of the IFR? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L) | CWG/DT-[SR] | Comment from DT-N: The Separation process would be triggered by the following steps:   * Special IFR Recommendation * Supermajority of GNSO & supermajority of ccNSO * Board approval   Comment from Sidley: Based on Separation Process document, separation would also require ICANN membership approval if a membership organization.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Section III.A.ii.d. (page 26)*  **III.A.ii.d. Separation Process**  The CWG-Stewardship recommends that a fundamental bylaw be created to define a Separation Process that can be triggered by a special IFR if needed. The special IFR would require supermajority approval of each of the ccNSO and GNSO Councils and would only occur if other escalation mechanisms and methods have been exhausted. If the special IFR recommends a separation process, a Separation Cross Community Working Group (SCWG) would be formed to review the issues and make recommendations. The recommendations would need to be approved by a supermajority vote of each of the ccNSO and GNSO Councils, the ICANN Board and the ICANN membership (assuming ICANN becomes a membership organization). There would be no prescribed action by the SCWG for the Separation Process. It would be empowered to make a recommendation ranging from “no action required” to the initiation of an RFP and the recommendation for a new IFO for the Naming Functions [or other separation process]. Any new IFO for the Naming Functions would be subject to the approval the ICANN Board and the ICANN membership (assuming ICANN becomes a membership organization).  *Annex L (page 72)*  [*Replace Annex L with Separation Process Document*] |
| 24A. | Confirm supermajority voting threshold for approvals by the ccNSO and GNSO (Annex L) [*add additional open items if needed from Separation Process Document*] | CWG/DT-[SR] |  |
| 25. | What remedies must be exhausted prior to triggering separation process? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L) | CWG/DT-[SR] |  |
| 26. | Who can initiate a separation process? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L) | CWG/DT-[SR] | Comment from DT-N: Isn’t this the same as the answer to 24? |
| 27. | Is the cross community working group for a separation contemplated by Annex L different from the IFR team? If so, more detail is needed. (Annex L) | CWG/DT-[SR] | Comment from DT-N: The Separation Process Team (SPT) would be a different set of multistakeholder representatives, with the same composition as the IFR team.  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex L (page 72)*  [*Replace Annex L with Separation Process Document*] |
| 28. | Is there an interim approval of an IRF recommendation to separate (i.e., by SOs/ACs) or does recommendation go directly to ICANN/Board? (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L) | CWG/DT-[SR] | Comment from DT-N: Goes to GNSO and ccNSO, and is subject to public comment, then to ICANN Board  **Sidley Proposed Revisions to CWG Proposal:**  *Annex L (page 72)*  [*Replace Annex L with Separation Process Document*] |
| 29. | Implementation of a separation. (Section III.A.ii.d. and Annex L) | CWG/DT-[SR] |  |
| **Root Zone Maintainer (RZM)** | | | |
| 30. | Proposal contemplates that if RZM transition is completed prior to IANA stewardship transition, need mechanism to ensure that change requests for Root Zone are implemented in a timely manner by RZM (proposal references possible agreement between RZM and PTI). (Section III.A.iii.b.) | DT-F | *Note: Cannot yet advance this. Contingent on what happens with the parallel Root Zone Maintainer Cooperative Agreement.* |
| 31. | Discuss potential requirement for an agreement between PTI and RZM or changes to the Cooperative Agreement. (Annex N, page 77) | DT-F | *Note: Cannot yet advance this. Contingent on what happens with the parallel Root Zone Maintainer Cooperative Agreement.* |
| 32. | What is the process mechanism body to approve substantive changes related to RZM? The details for an authorization approval function still needs to be determined. | DT-F |  |
| **Timeline** | | | |
| 33. | Develop timeline for implementation. CCWG dependency (consider with CCWG timeline). (Section IV.D.) | CWG |  |
| **CCWG Dependencies** | | | |
| 34. | ICANN Budget – Ability for the community to approve/veto the ICANN budget. Requirements relating to budget to include transparency of IANA function’s comprehensive costs and itemization of costs at project level. (Section III.A.iv.b.) | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |
| 35. | Community Empowerment Mechanisms – The multistakeholder community would be empowered to have certain rights with respect to ICANN Board and the IANA functions including:   1. ability to appoint/remove board members; 2. ability to exercise oversight with respect to key ICANN board decisions (approve/veto rights); 3. ability to approve amendments to fundamental bylaws | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |
| 36. | IANA Function Review – the IFR should be created and empowered to conduct periodic and special reviews of the IANA functions. (Section III.A.i.d.; Annex F) | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |
| 37. | Customer Standing Committee (CSC)– A CSC should be created and empowered to monitor the performance of the IANA functions and escalate non-remediated issues to the ccNSO and GNSO. The CSC should be contemplated by the ICANN bylaws. If not currently within the mandate, the ccNSO and/or GNSO should be empowered to address matters escalated by the CSC. Section III.A.ii.a.; Annex G and Annex J) | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |
| 38. | Appeal Mechanism –An appeal mechanism, for example in the form of an Independent Review Panel, will be required for issues relating to the IANA functions. (Annex I and Annex J) | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |
| 39. | Separation Process – Mechanism for a separation process to be included once certain remedies are exhausted which would trigger the separation process. (Annex L) | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |
| 40. | Fundamental Bylaws –All of the foregoing mechanisms are to be provided for in the ICANN bylaws as “fundamental bylaws”. | CWG | *Note: Continue to monitor* |